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This study examines the City of Edinburgh Police and establishes that organisational 
and operational aspects during the Second Word War were characterised by both 
continuity and change.  These aspects were influenced by both the centralised 
direction of the war effort on the home front and by a specific combination of 
strategic police decisions and broader political, social, economic, and religious 
factors.  These included the failure to implement a system for warning juvenile 
offenders; the desire to control vagrancy; the desire to control public disorder 
attendant to anti-Catholic sentiment; the extension of the spatial extent of the city; 
and financial constraints imposed by the town council.  In this latter regard, the 
concept of ‘reactive underestimation’ is created and explored.  That is the policy of 
imposing harsh conditions on the workforce until its stability was threatened.  
Utilising extensive and previously unseen primary sources, including reports by 
Special Branch, minutes of the Scottish Police Federation, and police officers’ 
Service Records together with Rhodes’ theory of ‘power-dependence’ the study 
examines the interplay between aspects of the police organisation as well as local 
policing within a macro-structural context.  In doing so the study contributes to the 
‘relational’ historiography of the ‘new’ police, the social history of police officers, 
and revisionist accounts of the home front.  
 
The study establishes that, despite the introduction of the Defence Regulations giving 
the central state more control over local policing, the police authority was not 
marginalised in the governance of the police.  Furthermore, as a consequence of the 
legacy of its creation, the Police Federation remained an ineffective mechanism of 
representation for rank-and-file officers.  Given the context of the war there was even 
less of an imperative for central government to create an effective means of 
collective bargaining.  The study also demonstrates that, whilst operational policing 
and consequently the profile of personnel had evolved since the late nineteenth 
century, both aspects changed dramatically in response to the war.  The additional 
demands associated with policing the home front and the consequent recruitment of 
auxiliaries together with the release of younger regular officers to the armed services 
and industry and the retention of those who would otherwise have been 
superannuated, however, created a problem of capacity.  As a consequence, the use 
of discretion at a strategic and tactical level was a significant feature, whilst aspects 
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‘History with its flickering lamp stumbles along the trail of the past,  
trying to reconstruct its scenes, to revive its echoes,  








                                                
1 Speech on the death of Neville Chamberlain, 12 November 1940.  
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/233-1940-the-finest-hour/104-neville-






In a radio broadcast in 1941 Prime Minister Winston Churchill whilst honouring the 
work of the Civil Defence Services in the ‘formidable ordeal’ of the Second World 
War singled out the police: ‘… if I mention only one of these services here, namely 
the Police, it is because many tributes have been paid already to the others.  But the 
Police have been in it everywhere all the time …’1   
 
On the home front the police in Edinburgh, as elsewhere in Britain, were required by 
the Police War Instructions issued by central government to undertake additional 
duties to the core functions of preventing crime and preserving the peace.2  Many of 
the Defence Regulations made under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939 that 
were introduced throughout the emergency also required enforcement by the police.3  
As Chris Williams observed, central government in the context of total war ‘quickly 
found that police institutions were remarkably useful all purpose executive agencies 
for imposing the many controls that wartime mobilisation involved’.4  At the same 
time, the existing system of police governance was supplanted.  On the one hand, the 
Defence Regulations gave central government unprecedented power over local 
policing.  The Secretary of State could, for example, direct chief constables in 
operational matters as well as order the amalgamation of forces.  On the other, a 
regional form of government headed by a Regional Commissioner who would 
assume authority in the event of a breakdown of communications with central 
government was introduced.5  
                                                
1 ‘Give us the Tools’ speech, 9 February 1941.  www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-
of-winston-churchill/97-give-us-the-tools.  Accessed 25 March 2015.  
2 Historians have been unable to trace a copy of the Police War Instructions.  Dixon’s unpublished 
work, which contains the most complete and detailed institutional overview of the police in the war, 
outlines the headings under which they were made to give an indication of their scope.  Arthur L 
Dixon, "The Emergency Work of the Police Forces in the Second World War "(Unpublished 1963), 
227-230.  See Appendix ‘1’.  For the primary role of the police in Scotland in the early twentieth 
century see Police Manual for Scotland (Glasgow: McCorquodale & Co. Ltd, 1931), 19.   
3 2 & 3 Geo. 6, cap. 62 (1939).  For a digest see E.R. Baker, Emergency Law Summary (London: The 
Police Review, 1943). 
4 Chris A Williams, "Introduction," in Police and Policing in the Twentieth Century ed. Chris A 
Williams (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011 ), xii. 
5 For terms of the Warrant see The National Records of Scotland (hereafter NRS) HH50/128, Letter 
from Regional Commissioner to Secretary of State for Scotland, 24 February 1941.  Scheme ‘Y’, as it 
was known, had been used in response to the General Strike of 1926.  See. Terence H O'Brien, Civil 
Defence (London: HMSO, 1955), 117. 
 2 
The extent to which the war created a paradigm shift in policing from the pre-war era 
is, however, the subject of competing interpretation by those writing in largely broad 
terms in relation to the experience in England and Wales.6  As Assistant-Under 
Secretary at the Police Division of the Home Office in the early part of the war 
Arthur Dixon appears well placed to make an observation.  He wrote that police 
duties during the war were ‘merely extensions’ of those at other times.7  T. A. 
Critchley, secretary to the 1960 Royal Commission on the police and subsequent 
member of the Police Division of the Home Office, agreed: ‘ … the effect of the war 
was to shift the balance of police duties and diversify them rather than to change 
their essence’.8  Yet Chief Constable of Oxfordshire during the war, Eric St. 
Johnston, recalled that many peacetime police duties ‘disappeared’, whilst the former 
police officer Roy Ingleton argued: ‘virtually overnight, the functions and 
responsibilities … were widened and completely changed’.9  In his oral history study 
of Leeds and Hull, Roger Donaldson, another former police officer, finds that 
policing during the war was a paradox: ‘the pressures were towards normality, whilst 
the conditions were abnormal, and whilst the nature of the job was changing 
considerably’.10  
 
This thesis will examine the extent to which organisational and operational aspects of 
policing changed in Edinburgh as a consequence of the war.  The impact of the war 
on operational policing varied throughout the UK.  In broad terms, notwithstanding 
that they were less populous, smaller towns and county areas were less affected than 
major conurbations, especially those with key war-related industries or, as in 
Edinburgh in relation to the Firth of Forth, having a Protected Area.  The police in 
Edinburgh during the war also had to deal with the aftermath of 15 air raids that 
                                                
6 ‘Policing’ here refers to the ‘range of functions’ undertaken by officers ‘within the bureaucratic 
institution of the police service’.  See Michael Brogden, Tony Jefferson, and Sandra Walklate, 
Introducing Policework (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 2., Angela Bartie and Louise A. Jackson, 
"Youth Crime and Preventive Policing in Post-War Scotland (c. 1945-71)," Twentieth Century British 
History 22 no. 1 (2011 ): 81. 
7 Dixon, "The Emergency Work of the Police Forces," 76.   
8 T. A. Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales 900-1966 (London: Constable, 1967), 
232. 
9  Eric St. Johnston, One Policeman's Story (London: Rose, 1978), 56., Roy D. Ingleton, The 
Gentlemen at War: Policing Britain 1939-45 (Maidstone: Cranborne, 1994), 1. 
10 Roger Donaldson, "Policing the War" (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Huddersfield, 1998), 
16. 
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killed and injured 237 people and destroyed or damaged 2575 properties.11  In terms 
of response this was, however, insignificant by comparison with the consequences of 
the air raids in Clydebank in March 1941, and more especially the Blitz and 
Baedecker raids in London and other English cities.12 
 
In Scotland, the Scottish Home Department (hereafter SHD) instructed in 1940 that 
even under invasion conditions the police ‘must remain available for the 
performance of normal … duties’.13  The extent to which the Second World War 
affected operational policing in areas such as the regulation of road traffic in 
Scotland has, however, escaped detailed study by historians.  The degree of change 
to aspects of the police organisation, such as the police authority and the Police 
Federation, has also been neglected.  In a similar vein, there are no social history 
profiles of the police officers that served in Scotland during the Second World War.   
 
Literature survey  
The history of the police is a comparatively recent area of study. 14   The 
overwhelming majority of the published and unpublished sources on the police relate 
to England and Wales in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the 
Metropolitan Police in particular on the basis that it is perceived as creating the 
model for the ‘new’ civilian municipal police throughout Britain.15  ‘One of the 
greatest gaps’, as Clive Emsley found in 2005, remains ‘the general lack of work on 
the history of crime and criminal justice in Scotland and Ireland’.16  Most of the 
focus by historians in Scotland has been on Glasgow in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.17  Despite being the capital and having a specific legacy of political, social, 
                                                
11 Edinburgh City Archives (hereafter ECA) ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police 
Establishment, 1945, 18-19. 
12 See, for example, Juliet Gardiner, Wartime: Britain 1939-1945 (London: Review, 2005), 416.  
13 NRS HH55/864, Circular 3964, 25 May 1940.  HH52/27/1, Circular 3732, 13 October 1939 advised 
that central government in Scotland should be referred to as the SHD.  
14 Chris A. Williams, Police Control Systems in Britain, 1775-1975: From Parish Constable to 
National Computer (Manchester Scholarship Online 2014), 2. 
15 For the different types of police see Clive Emsley, "A Typology of Nineteenth-Century Police," 
Crime, History & Societies 3 (1999). 
16 "Crime and Punishment: 10 Years of Research (1)," Crime, History & Societies 9, no. 1 (2005): 12. 
17 See, for example, Alistair Dinsmor, "Glasgow Police Pioneers," Police History Society 15 (2000)., 
Alastair L Goldsmith, "The Development of the City of Glasgow Police c.1800 - c.1939" 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Strathclyde, 2002)., David G. Barrie, Police in the Age of 
Improvement: Police Development and the Civic Tradition in Scotland, 1775-1865 (Cullompton, UK; 
Portland, Or.: Willan, 2008)., "Patrick Colquhoun, the Scottish Enlightenment and Police Reform in 
Glasgow in the Late Eighteenth Century," Crime, History & Societies 12, no. 2 (2008). 
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economic, and religious factors that affected policing, detailed academic studies of 
Edinburgh are limited by comparison and none relates to the twentieth century.18   
 
Notwithstanding an element of oversimplification and ‘arbitrariness in lumping 
together historians in different categories’, a variety of political, social, and 
economic theories underpin the historiography of the creation and development of 
‘new’ police forces, and hence the objective of operational policing.19  Put briefly, 
the ‘traditional’ or Whiggish canon, which originated largely in the early twentieth 
century, sees it in teleological terms.  Reform was the consequence of the failure of 
pre-existing systems of police to cope with a rise in crime and disorder and a 
consensus as to the professional, rational, and impartial adoption of preventive 
policing to achieve the communal benefit of preventing crime and maintaining order.  
Charles Reith, for example, argued that the application of these principles during the 
Second World War would solve the ‘problem of recurring wars among the nations’ 
and secure the ‘observance of international laws’.20    
 
By contrast, revisionist ‘Structural’ accounts, including Marxism, see developments 
in instrumental terms.  The ‘new’ police were created to maintain surveillance and 
discipline labour in work and leisure to meet the demands of industrial capitalism.  
Mark Neocleous, for example, sees the police as one of the ‘supreme … concepts … 
                                                
18 See John McGowan, Policing the Metropolis of Scotland: A History of the Police and Systems of 
Police in Edinburgh & Edinburghshire, 1770-1833 (Musselburgh: Turlough, 2011)., A New Civic 
Order: The Contribution of the City of Edinburgh Police 1805-1812 with Reflections on Social and 
Public Order (Musselburgh: Turlough, 2013).  For a non-academic history relating to the police in 
Edinburgh see T. W. Archibald and Edinburgh and East of Scotland Military Collectors' Society, A 
History of the Lothian and Borders Police (Edinburgh: The Author in association with Edinburgh and 
East of Scotland Military Collectors' Society, 1990). 
19 David Taylor, The New Police in Nineteenth-Century England: Crime, Conflict and Control, New 
frontiers in History (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 8n.  For a synopsis of theories 
see Robert Reiner, The Politics of the Police (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1985), 9-46. 
20 Charles Reith, Police Principles and the Problem of War (London, 1940), vii-viii, 141-147., See 
also, for example, The Police Idea: Its History and Evolution in England in the Eighteenth Century 
and After (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1938)., British Police and the Democratic 
Ideal (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1943)., A Short History of the British Police 
(London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1948)., The Blind Eye of History: A Study of the 
Origins of the Present Police Era (London: Faber and Faber, 1952)., A New Study of Police History 
(Edinburgh, 1956)., W. L. Melville Lee, A History of Police in England (London: Methuen, 1901)., J. 
M. Hart, The British Police (London: Allen & Unwin, 1951)., Leon Radzinowicz, A History of 
English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750, Vol.3: Cross-currents in the Movement for 
the Reform of the Police (London: Stevens, 1956)., A History of English Criminal Law and its 
Administration from 1750, Vol.4: Grappling for Control (London: Stevens, 1968)., David Ascoli, The 
Queen's Peace the Origins and Development of the Metropolitan Police, 1829-1979 (London: H. 
Hamilton, 1979).  
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in the fabrications of a central component of bourgeois order, namely wage labour’.21  
In effect, the policeman was a ‘domestic missionary’ and ‘represented the 
penetration and continual presence of central political authority throughout daily 
life’.22  Although denying any ruling-class conspiracy, V. A. C. Gatrell argued that 
its effect was to create the ‘Policeman State’.23  Rather than consensus, writers see 
perennial hostility arising out of consequent intervention by the police in civil 
society.24   
 
More recently, David Barrie has argued that both traditionalist and revisionist 
‘problem response’ models fail to account for, among other things, local variation.25  
He adopts Kit Carson and Hilary Idzikowska’s framework to examine the ‘interplay 
between macro-structural forces and localised factors’ in the pattern of development 
of the ‘new’ police in urban Scotland in the nineteenth century.26   As will be seen, 
one of the defining features in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was 
increasing intervention by central government in municipal policing, through the 
acquisition of power through legislation.  During the Second World War the 
additional powers granted by the Defence Regulations gave central government 
power to potentially determine local policing priorities.  At the same time, however, 
Edinburgh had a specific legacy of political, social, economic and religious factors 
that affected policing during the war.  The ‘relational’ approach therefore more 
readily fits the pattern of policing in Edinburgh in the Second World War.  Thus, by 
                                                
21 Mark Neocleous, The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power (London: 
Pluto Press, 2000), xii-xiii. 
22 Robert D Storch, "The Policeman as Domestic Missionary: Urban Discipline and Popular Culture in 
Northern England, 1850-80," Journal of Social History 9, no. 4 (1976): 481., Allen Silver, "The 
Demand for Order in Civil Society: A Review of Some Themes in the History of Urban Crime, 
Police, and Riot," in The Police: Six Sociological Essays ed. D. J.  Bordua (New York; London: 
Wiley, 1967), 12-13. 
23 V. A. C Gatrell, "Crime, Authority and the Policeman-State," in The Cambridge Social History of 
Britain, 1750-1950, ed. F. M. L. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 257. 
24 See also, for example, Robert D Storch, "The Plague of Blue Locusts: Police Reform and Popular 
Resistance in Northern England 1840-57," International Review of Social History (1975)., P. Cohen, 
"Policing the Working Class City," in Capitalism and the Rule of Law: From Deviancy Theory to 
Marxism, ed. Bob Fine, et al. (London: Hutchinson, 1979); David Philips, "'A Just Measure of Crime, 
Authority, Hunters and Blue Locusts': The 'Revisionist' Social History of Crime and the Law in 
Britain 1780-1850," in Social Control and the State: Historical and Comparative Essays, ed. Stanley 
Cohen and Andrew T.  Scull (Oxford: Robertson, 1983).   
25 David G. Barrie, "Britain's Oldest Police? A Political and Social History of Policing in Glasgow, 
1779-1846" (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Strathclyde, 2000), 37-44. 
26 Kit Carson and Hilary Idzikowska, "The Social Production of Scottish Policing, 1795-1900," in 
Policing and Prosecution in Britain 1750-1850, ed. Douglas Hay and Francis G. Snyder (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1989), 268. 
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considering the specifically local factors that determined operational and 
organisational aspects of policing within the macro context of the centralised 
direction of the war effort on the home front this thesis builds on Barrie’s example.   
 
Writers have largely neglected historical case studies of police governance.  Robert 
Morris’ study of the Metropolitan Police 1860-1920 examines administrative and 
political structures and concludes that the Home Secretary, as the police authority, 
settled for the appearance rather than the substance of effective control of the force.27  
In a similar vein, Shane Ewen analyses the interplay between police authorities in 
two English forces and central government 1870-1938 and concludes that neither 
dominated the decision making process.  Ewen pointed out that few historians have 
attempted to combine empirical approaches with theory in the analyses of the 
relationship between local and central governments and utilise R. A. W. Rhodes’ 
concept of ‘power-dependence’.28  For that reason this thesis will follow his example 
and utilise the concept in the analysis, particularly in relation to the police authority 
and Police Federation.  As Arthur Marwick pointed out, however, this has to be 
balanced with the requirement to account for ‘the actual messiness of history as it 
happens, and the need to write a reasonably readable and interesting narrative’.29   
 
Rhodes draws on inter-organisational and corporatist theory to counter the 
mainstream assumption that the ‘Westminster’ model, based on parliamentary 
sovereignty, strong cabinet, and majority party control of the executive, should be 
the starting point for any examination of British government.  Given that British 
central government is non-executant, and dependent on others to provide services 
there is, he argued, a need for a theory that acknowledges the differentiated nature of 
the polity.  Furthermore, sub-central governments can either be compliant or exercise 
a high degree of local discretion.  Rather than being linear, there is therefore a need 
to recognise diffuse and complex bases of power and, consequently, 
intergovernmental relations should be characterised by the notion of ‘power-
dependence’.  
                                                
27 Robert M Morris, "The Metropolitan Police and Government 1860-1920" (Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, Open University, 2004), 1.  
28 Shane Ewen, "Power and Administration in Two Midland Cities, c.1870-1938" (Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of Leicester, 2003), 9-10.   
29 Arthur Marwick, War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century: A Comparative Study of 
Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States (London: Macmillan, 1974), ix. 
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The model asserts the relative power of participants and the intricate pattern of 
interdependence where both the centre and periphery are dependent on each other for 
the constitutional-legal, hierarchical, financial, political, or informational resources 
required to achieve goals.  The relative power potential is, moreover, evident through 
the process of interaction between the institutions involved, which is viewed as a 
‘game’, where each side manoeuvres for advantage.  As a consequence, there is no 
zero-sum game as assumed in the ‘Westminster’ model; rather, there is a positive-
sum outcome.  For Rhodes, the starting point of analysis is, therefore, policy 
networks or the ‘cluster or complex of organisations connected to each other by 
resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks 
in the structure of resource dependencies’.30  The principal form of policy network is 
the ‘policy community’, such as a police authority, which is characterised by the 
existence of high quality interaction between a limited number of participants where 
membership values and outcomes persist over time together with a high degree of 
vertical interdependence with the local authority and central government, for 
example.  Rhodes’ emphasis on the macro-meso level of analysis in particular, 
focuses, therefore, on the extent to which policy networks shape policy processes and 
outcomes.31   
 
Despite being the representative organisation for rank-and-file officers since 1919, 
studies of the Police Federation are also limited.  As with the majority of the 
published history of the police, that which does exist is largely based on the 
experience in England.32  Given the locus of the strike in 1918 that led to the creation 
of the Federation and the subsequent strikes in 1919, this is not unreasonable.  
Indeed, the historiography of the immediate context has attracted greater attention 
from historians and sociologists.  Gerald Reynolds, Ron Bean, and Owen Jones, for 
                                                
30 R. A. W. Rhodes and David Marsh, "Policy Networks in British Politics: A Critique of Existing 
Approaches," in Policy Networks in British Government, ed. David Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 10-12. 
31 R. A. W. Rhodes, "Some Myths in Central-Local Relations," Town Planning Review 51 (1980): 
277., The National World of Local Government (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 16-30., Beyond 
Westminster and Whitehall the Sub-Central Governments of Britain (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 
7., Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability 
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), 5-9., Control and Power in Central-Local Government 
Relations (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 77-80, 143. 
32 See, for example, Anthony Judge and Police Federation of England and Wales, The First Fifty 
Years: The Story of the Police Federation (London: Police Federation, 1968)., The Force of 
Persuasion (London: Police Federation, 1994). 
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example, variously focus on the strikes in London and Liverpool, whilst V. Allen and 
Robert Reiner examine police unionism.33  More recently, Keith Laybourn and 
David Taylor have questioned the extent to which the creation of the Police 
Federation was a   response to the threat of revolution.34  With the exception of a 
commemorative brochure, there is, however, no in-depth historical study of the 
Federation in Scotland in any era.35   
 
Social historians have done much in recent years to redress the institutional focus of 
much of the writing on the police.36  By concentrating on social processes and 
questions of ‘culture and consciousness … social structure … [and] … the material 
conditions of life … of a social group or of a whole society’ they have reconstructed 
the meaning of historical experience for individuals.37  Among other areas, they have 
compiled detailed occupational studies of officers from the point of recruitment 
through to leaving the force.  Most of these profiles, however, relate to England in 
the period before the Second World War.38  In the comparatively small number of 
studies relating to Scotland only Charles Withers and Alastair Goldsmith consider 
                                                
33 See, for example, Gerald William Reynolds and Anthony Judge, The Night the Police Went on 
Strike (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968)., Ron Bean, "Police Unrest, Unionisation and the 1919 
Strike in Liverpool," Journal of Contemporary History 15, no. 4 (1980)., Owen Jones, "The 'Spirit of 
Petrograd' ? The 1918 and 1919 Police Strikes," What Next? , no. 31 (2007)., V. Allen, "The National 
Union of Police and Prison Officers," The Economic History Review XI, no. 1 (1958)., Robert Reiner, 
The Blue-Coated Worker: A Sociological Study of Police Unionism, Cambridge studies in sociology 
10 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978)., Joanne Klein, "Blue-Collar Job, Blue-Collar 
Career: Policemen's Perplexing Struggle for a Voice in Birmingham, Liverpool, and Manchester, 
1900-1919," Crime, History & Societies 6, no. 1 (2002). 
34 Keith Laybourn and David Taylor, Policing in England and Wales, 1918-39: The Fed, Flying 
Squads and Forensics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
35 cf Seventy-fifth Anniversary Brochure, 1919 - 1994 (Glasgow: The Scottish Police Federation 
1994). 
36 See, for example, Michael Brogden, On the Mersey Beat: Policing Liverpool Between the Wars 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)., Shane Ewen, "Civic Identity, Pride and Police Leisure in 
Birmingham during the Inter-War Years," International Journal of Regional and Local Studies Series 
2, no. 1 (2005)., Joanne Klein, Invisible Men: The Daily Lives of Police Constables in Manchester, 
Birmingham and Liverpool, 1900-1939 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2010)., "Moving On, 
Men and the Changing Character of Interwar Working-Class Neighbourhoods: From the Files of the 
Manchester and Liverpool City Police," Journal of Social History 38, no. 2 (2004)., Haia Shpayer-
Makov, The Making of a Policeman: A Social History of a Labour Force in Metropolitan London, 
1829-1914 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).  
37 "Editorial," Social History 1, no. 1 (1976).  
38 See also Clive Emsley and Mark Clapson, "Recruiting the English Policeman C. 1840-1940," 
Policing and Society 3 (1994)., Mark Clapson and Clive Emsley, "Street, Beat and Respectability: The 
Culture and Self-Image of the late Victorian and Edwardian Urban Policeman," Criminal Justice 
History 16 (2002). 
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the aspect of personnel in detail.39  David Smale’s examination of the background, 
careers, and lifestyles of the officers in the Scottish Borders in the nineteenth century 
remains the most developed.40  As Emsley concluded: ‘much more work needs to be 
done on the origins of the different kinds of policemen’.41 
 
Whilst these writers have also reconstructed some operational activity, detailed 
studies relating to the regulation of road traffic are limited, despite it being the 
exponential policing requirement throughout Britain from the creation of the ‘new’ 
police.  As before, these largely relate to the experience in England in the period 
before or after the Second World War.42  Laybourn’s recent study of road traffic 
policing in Britain from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth centuries, for 
example, dedicated a mere handful of pages to the war period.43  At the beginning of 
the twenty-first century historians from a sociological perspective began to consider 
the interconnections that created the system of ‘automobility’.  Policing was 
examined solely in relation to its contribution to create the ‘lock in’ to that system.44  
In this regard, Laybourn has argued that the ‘police were not committed to the almost 
inevitable dominance of the motorist’; rather, they ‘negotiated the use of the 
highways’ and thus adopted a ‘nuanced, independent and neutral stance’ in an 
attempt to create a safer environment for all road users.45  Yet, as with many other 
aspects of policing there is no extant detailed study of Scotland in general, and 
Edinburgh in particular in the 1930s and 1940s in this regard.  
                                                
39 Charles W.J. Withers, "'The Long Arm of the Law': Migration of Highland-Born Policemen to 
Glasgow, 1826-1891," The Local Historian 18, no. 3 (1988)., Goldsmith, "The Development of the 
City of Glasgow Police," 115-123. 
40 David Martin Smale, "The Development of the New Police in the Scottish Borders c. 1840-1890" 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, Open University, 2007), 218-290. 
41 Clive Emsley, "The Policeman as Worker: A Comparative Survey c. 1800-1940," International 
Review of Social History 45 (2000): 93, note 20. 
42 See, for example, "'Mother, What Did Policemen Do When There Weren't Any Motors?' The Law, 
The Police and the Regulation of Motor Traffic in England, 1900-1939," The Historical Journal 36, 
no. 2 (1993)., Joanne Klein, "Traffic, Telephones and Police Boxes: The Deterioration of Beat 
Policing in Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester Between the World Wars," in Policing Interwar 
Europe: Continuity, Change and Crisis, 1918-40 ed. Gerald Blaney and Cañada Blanch Centre for 
Contemporary Spanish Studies (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)., Shane Ewen, 
"Policing, Planning and the Regulation of Traffic in Post-War Leicester," Midland History 28 (2003). 
43 Keith Laybourn, The Battle for the Roads of Britain: Police, Motorists and the Law, c.1890s to 
1970s (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
44 See, for example, John Urry, "The 'System' of Automobility," Theory, Culture & Society 21, no. 4 
(2004)., Jennifer Bonham, "Transport: Disciplining the Body that Travels," in Against Automobility, 
ed. Steffen Böhm, et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006)., Simon Gunn, "People and the Car:  The 
Expansion of Automobility in Urban Britain, C. 1955-70," Social History 38, no. 2 (2013). 
45 Laybourn, The Battle for the Roads, 36. 
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A word is also needed here about changing historical perspectives on the wartime 
home front. During the Second World War the mobilisation of the people across the 
UK created a pervasive perception that, as J. B. Priestley told his listeners in a radio 
broadcast in September 1940, they were ‘all in it’ on the home front: ‘we’re not 
really civilians any longer but a mixed lot of soldiers – machine-minding soldiers, 
milkmen and postmen soldiers, housewife and mother soldiers – and what a gallant 
corps that is – and even broadcasting soldiers’.46  The Spitfire pilot Richard Hilary 
contemporarily observed that ‘it was as much the war of the unemployed labourer as 
of the Duke of Westminster’.47  The notion that these people played their part in a 
‘people’s war’ which was the ‘greatest spectacle of mass heroism in history’, 
especially during the Blitz, which began in September 1940, has become a dominant 
part of the national memory.48  Since the 1960s, however, revisionist historians have 
questioned the extent to which this view is sustainable.  To varying degrees these 
writers have identified, for example, an increase in crime, juvenile delinquency, and 
blackmarketeering, as well as the continuity of pre-war divisions and conflicts over 
class, gender, and race.49  At the same time, as Robert Mackay has pointed out, a 
body of work exists which has ‘served to buttress the traditional standpoint’.  In his 
study of civilian morale he concluded that, although the discreditable features 
identified by revisionist historians in the ‘people’s war’ were ‘indisputably present’, 
they were not ‘on such a scale as to invalidate the orthodox picture’.  In effect, the 
question to which revisionist aspects are an ‘over-correction’ is one of degree.50  We 
will return to some of these issues in the conclusion.   
 
                                                
46 J. B. Priestley, Postscripts (London,1940), 68-69. 
47 Richard Hilary, The Last Enemy (London: Macmillan, 1943), 208. 
48 Ritchie Calder, The Lesson of London (London: Secker & Warburg, 1941), 62. 
49 See, for example, Angus Calder, The People's War: Britain, 1939-45 (London: Cape, 1969)., Mark 
Roodhouse, "Popular Morality and the Black Market in Britian, 1939-55," in Food and Conflict in 
Europe in the Age of the Two World Wars, ed. Frank Trentmann and Flemming Just (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)., Stuart Hylton, Their Darkest Hour: The Hidden History of 
the Home Front, 1939-1945 (Stroud: Sutton, 2003)., Harold L. Smith, Britain in the Second World 
War: A Social History (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996)., David Smith, "Official 
Responses to Juvenile Delinquency in Scotland During the Second World War," Twentieth Century 
British History 18, no. 1 (2007)., Jose Harris, "War and Social History: Britain and the Home Front 
during the Second World War," in The World War Two Reader, ed. Gordon Martel (New York; 
London: Routledge, 2004)., Edward Smithies, Crime in Wartime: A Social History of Crime in World 
War II (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982)., Donald Serrell Thomas, An Underworld at War: Spivs, 
Deserters, Racketeers and Civilians in the Second World War (London: J. Murray, 2003). 
50  Robert Mackay, Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britain during the Second World War 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 8-9, 248. 
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Aims, structure, and themes  
The principal aim of this study is to address the empirical gap in relation to the 
history of the police in Scotland, specifically Edinburgh in the Second World War.  
In particular, analysing the extent to which organisational and operational aspects of 
policing changed in response to the war.  However, whilst it is easy to identify 
historical change it is harder to describe and explain.51  The thesis will, therefore, 
examine the extent to which change was determined by local exigencies within the 
context of the centralised direction of the war effort on the home front.  Put simply, 
the thesis demonstrates the nuances in the hypothesis that writers who argue that 
there was little or no change in policing and those find that there was a paradigm 
shift are both correct with regard to organisational aspects and operational demands 
in Edinburgh.  A profile of the regular officers who served during the war will also 
be constructed.  By combining Rhodes’ theory with empirical historical research the 
thesis thus contributes to ‘relational’ historiography, social history, and revisionist 
accounts of the home front.   
 
The main body of the thesis is therefore divided between a consideration of 
organisational aspects and operational demands.  Chapter two provides a profile of 
the 820 regular officers who served in the police in Edinburgh during the war.  As 
much of the thesis relates to an analysis of operational policing, this ascertains 
something of the nature of those who performed these duties.  Thus, the profile 
considers the place of origin, previous occupation, and age of recruits as well as 
sickness levels, discipline, and the reasons for leaving the police to identify any 
change that occurred as a consequence of the war.  It also establishes the wartime 
phenomenon of the release of officers to the armed services and industry, which had 
a detrimental effect on operational capacity.   
 
The police authority is analysed in chapter three, in particular the interdependence of 
power between central government, local government, and the chief constable in the 
governance of the force.  Given the centralised direction of the war and the potential 
for the Secretary of State for Scotland to direct operational police matters, the 
chapter considers whether there was a shift in the balance of power.  Finally, so far 
                                                
51 Williams, Police Control Systems, 2. 
 12 
as organisational matters are concerned, chapter four examines the Police Federation.  
In particular, it considers the interdependence of power between the various 
representative boards and the degree to which its form and function established in 
1919 circumscribed its effectiveness in the 1930s and 1940s.   
 
In 1941 Hermann Mannheim predicted that, on the basis of the experience in the 
Great War, there would be ‘an enormous outbreak of lawlessness’ during the current 
war.52  Chapter five examines some of the duties undertaken by the police as part of 
the war on the home front, many of which were included in the Police War 
Instructions, and considers whether they represented a new requirement or were an 
intensification of pre-existing functions.  Chapter six analyses activity in relation to 
the core police functions of the protection of life and property, the maintenance of 
order, and civic regulation, whilst chapter seven considers policing in relation to the 
regulation of road traffic.  Both these chapters examine the extent to which the 
pattern of policing during the war was different from the immediate pre- and post-
war eras as a consequence of the requirement to undertake war-related functions as 
well as factors associated with personnel.  The final chapter will draw together the 
findings of the study. 
 
A number of interlinked themes recur in the analysis of the ‘new’ police in 
Edinburgh.  Some that determined aspects of policing during the war were the 
consequence of a specific political, social, economic, and religious legacy.  Thus, 
whilst much of the prosecution of the war on the home front was subject to 
centralised direction and control, the resultant pattern of police enforcement was 
‘local and particular’.53   
 
It is necessary at this point to provide a brief profile of the City of Edinburgh at this 
time.  On the eve of the Second World War, Edinburgh occupied an area of fifty 
square miles.  The extent of the city had trebled in size in 1920 as a consequence of 
the boundary extension that included the Burgh of Leith and the districts of Colinton, 
                                                
52 Hermann Mannheim, War and Crime (London: Watts, 1941), 129. 
53 Mark Roodhouse, Black Market Britain, 1939-1955 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 145. 
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Corstorphine, Cramond, and Liberton in the County of Midlothian.54  The population 
had also been increasing since the 1920s as a trend of migration was replaced by 
immigration from outside.  By 1939 the number of people in the city had grown by 
over 10 per cent from 1922 to reach a figure of 471,987.   
 
A 1946 civic survey concluded that Edinburgh, by comparison with Glasgow and 
Manchester, was not an ‘industrial city’.55  Indeed, the concentration in Edinburgh in 
the early twentieth century of the professions was ‘unparalleled elsewhere in urban 
Britain’.  Yet manufacturing and industry were significant aspects of the local 
economy.  Between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries about half of the 
male workforce was employed in the industrial sector.  Nonetheless, in the half 
century before the Great War, Edinburgh was ‘not a heavy industrial city dominated 
by a single industry’ and there were ‘very few large plants’.  Industrial employment 
was spread over a number of businesses, in particular printing.  One consequence, 
according to Richard Rodger, was that this created ‘diversity in the socio-spatial 
structure’.56  In effect, there was less social segregation than occurred elsewhere.   
 
In the early 1920s, however, parts of the old town were deliberately but partially 
depopulated because the housing was overcrowded and lacked basic sanitary 
provision.  Some were decanted to new lower-income, lower-density housing 
schemes that were built between 1924 and 1939 in rural and agricultural areas.57  
Charles McKean has argued that the scheme in Niddrie, in particular, created, in 
practice, an ‘enormous single-class ghetto’.58  At the same time, increasing numbers 
of bungalows and villa-type houses were being constructed in the peripheries for the 
more affluent.  In any event, given that there was less probability of noise being 
heard in these areas compared to older parts of the city, there was less deterrent to 
                                                
54 See 10 & 11 Geo. 5, cap. 97 (1920).  In consequence, 173 officers from Leith Burgh Police and 20 
from Midlothian Constabulary were transferred and together with the officers of Edinburgh City 
Police became part of the force renamed the City of Edinburgh Police.  cf. ECA SL1/1/369, Minutes 
of the Town Council, 25 October 1920, 776; SL1/1/370, 17 November 1920, 31-32.  Seventy of these 
193 officers subsequently served in Edinburgh during the Second World War.  
55 Patrick Abercrombie and Derek Plumstead, A Civic Survey and Plan for the City and Royal Burgh 
of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1949), 18, 22, 85, 87.  
56 Richard Rodger, "Landscapes of Capital: Industry and the Built Environment in Edinburgh, 1750-
1920," in Edinburgh: The Making of a Capital City ed. Brian Edwards and Paul Jenkins (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 86-89.  
57 Abercrombie and Plumstead, A Civic Survey, 15, 18. 
58 Charles McKean, Edinburgh: Portrait of a City (London Century 1991), 211, 217.  
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those seeking to break into either class of housing.  The ability of the police to 
discharge their core role of prevention was further hampered by the fact that many of 
the new developments had little in the way of street lighting.  As will be seen, the 
legacy of suburbanisation affected policing during the war.   
 
Two of the defining features of the police authority in the interwar period, most 
notably in relation to the policing of road traffic, as Paul Laxton and Rodger 
identified especially in relation to Edinburgh in the nineteenth century, was ‘short-
term financial expediency’ and ‘administrative paralysis’. 59   In effect, in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the police authority frustrated some of the 
strategic planning by the chief constable and others involved in municipal affairs, 
notwithstanding that they were increasingly regarded as the experts.   
 
Closely related is what might reasonably be conceptualised as the ‘reactive 
underestimation’ that chief officers and those concerned with the governance of the 
‘new’ police adopted in relation to rank-and-file officers.  That is the deliberate 
policy of paying the lowest possible wage and imposing harsh conditions up until the 
point where disaffection threatened the stability and hence capacity of the workforce 
to a sufficient degree that concessions became imperative.  As Critchley noted in 
relation to the 1940s and 1950s, the level of police pay was the ‘biggest single factor 
in limiting the availability of sufficient manpower to conduct a successful fight 
against crime’.60  The history of the police in the twentieth century was characterised 
by a cycle of committees of inquiry established in response to crises.  The attitude of 
‘reactive underestimation’ was a reflection of the deliberate employment policies 
adopted by police authorities immediately after the creation of the ‘new’ police 
forces in the early nineteenth century where police management sought to recruit the 
unskilled and semi-skilled in the belief that they would be more amenable to 
discipline and thereby create a stable workforce.61  
 
                                                
59 Paul Laxton, Richard Rodger, and Henry Duncan Littlejohn, Insanitary City: Henry Littlejohn and 
the Condition of Edinburgh (Lancaster: Carnegie Publishing Ltd, 2013), 68, 91. 
60 Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales, 248-249. 
61 See, for example, Goldsmith, "The Development of the City of Glasgow Police," 119-121., Emsley 
and Clapson, "Recruiting the English Policeman," 269-271. 
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Another prominent factor more specific to Edinburgh was a fierce anti-Catholic 
sentiment, which was driven, in large measure, by Protestant/Presbyterian 
sectarianism.62  Riots broke out in the city as well as Glasgow in 1779, for example, 
at the repeal of the penal laws.  In the 1930s anti-Catholic disturbances in Edinburgh 
reached, according to one writer, a ‘high point’.63  In a similar vein, the legacy of the 
desire to control vagrancy determined aspects of operational policing during the war.  
Many of the local police initiatives in Scotland in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries were based on a fear of the impact of the indigent, given the lack of 
adequate poor-relief in Scotland compared to England.  Indeed, part of the impetus 
behind the 1805 Act in Edinburgh was a desire to supress vagrancy.64  The issue was 
still considered significant in the 1930s with the police conducting a bi-annual census 
of migratory poor, which was reported to the town council and the Secretary of State 
for Scotland.   
 
In addition to those factors associated with the political, social, economic, and 
religious milieu, some themes, such as the problem of capacity, related more 
specifically to the police organisation.  In the early decades of the twentieth century 
the responsibility of the police throughout Britain for a range of social services and 
in particular the regulation of traffic increased exponentially.  Forces were required 
to absorb the additional demand largely without a commensurate increase in strength.  
By 1928 the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure in England and 
Wales warned that the police might become overburdened.65  In Edinburgh, police 
boxes were introduced between 1931 and 1933 to extend beats.  This was also a 
response to suburbanisation.  As Williams argued, the development of lower density 
housing in the early twentieth century created spaces that were hard to patrol on foot 
and police boxes were ‘taken up systematically to fill that gap’.66  The police 
authority in Edinburgh, however, saw this as an opportunity to reduce the strength of 
the force to save money, which exacerbated the problem of capacity.  
                                                
62 Panikos Panayi, Racial Violence in Britain, 1840-1950 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 
1993), 137. 
63 Joseph M Bradley, "Catholic Distinctivness: A Need to be Different?," in Scotland's Shame?: 
Bigotry and Sectarianism in Modern Scotland ed. T. M. Devine (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2000), 160-
161. 
64 Carson and Idzikowska, "The Social Production of Scottish Policing," 281., McGowan, Policing the 
Metropolis of Scotland, 97-98. 
65 Report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure. Cmd 3297, 1929, 82. 
66 Williams, Police Control Systems, 131. 
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Closely related is the theme of discretion.  As Laurence Lustgarten identified, 
discretion is one of the concepts ‘central to nearly all literature concerning the 
police’.67  Faced with competing demands officers were selective in the enforcement 
of crimes and offences.  Although inherently difficult to gauge the extent to which it 
was used, the doctrine of constabulary independence was well established by the 
1930s.68  As Lustgarten put it: ‘Substantive vagueness of the law and limited 
resources … [created] … enormous discretion at the lowest and highest levels for the 
police.’69  At the strategic level discretion in operational matters was part of the 
increasing professionalism and autonomy of chief constables in the governance 
structure.  During the period under consideration there were two chief constables in 
Edinburgh: Roderick Ross, who retired in 1935, held the office for 35 years; William 
Morren became chief constable on the retirement of Ross and remained in post until 
1955.70  As will be noted, especially in relation to the regulation of traffic, the 
character of policing was determined by the chief constable’s perception of the 
police role.   
 
At the tactical level, Scottish officers were instructed to have ‘regard to the nature of 
the crime, the surrounding circumstances, and the condition of the character of the 
accuser and the accused’.71  Michael Chatteron has pointed to the paradox of the 
extent of autonomous power exercised by constables compared to their position in 
the hierarchy of the police.72  Robert Colquhoun, the wartime police detective in 
Glasgow, recalled that this amounted in practice to working by a ‘rule of thumb’.73  
Donaldson found that during the Second World War officers adopted a ‘blind-eye’ 
attitude.  As one recalled: ‘You only dealt with matters you were forced to.  You 
                                                
67 Laurence Lustgarten, The Governance of Police(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1986), 10. 
68 See, for example, Chris A. Williams, "Britain's Police Forces: Forever Removed from Democratic 
Control?," (2003), www-histpol.hist.cam.ac.uk/papers/policy-paper-16.html.  Accessed 1 November 
2011. 
69 Lustgarten, The Governance of Police, 22. 
70  Martin Stallion and David  Wall, The British Police: Police Forces and Chief Officers, 1829-2012, 
2nd ed.(Bramshill: Police History Society, 2011), 101. 
71 Police Manual for Scotland, 11. 
72 Michael R Chatterton, "The Supervision of Patrol Work under the Fixed Points System," in The 
British Police ed. Simon Holdaway (London: Edward Arnold, 1979), 83. 
73 Robert Vernon Colquhoun, Life Begins at Midnight (London 1962), 156. 
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didn’t go looking for things.’74  In effect, there was and remains a dichotomy in 
policing between the ‘law in books and the law on the streets’.75 
 
A number of interlinked themes also recur in relation to the tactics used by the 
police.  From the outset, the ‘new’ police was premised on overt and proactive 
preventative policing.  The 1931 Manual for Scottish officers exhorted them to 
‘exercise such vigilance and activity as to make it almost impossible for any one to 
commit crimes or offences without observation and detection’.76  The bedrock of this 
system in Edinburgh, until at least the 1980s, was beat patrol by an officer in 
uniform.  At the same time, since at least the early twentieth century, plain-clothes 
officers in Scotland maintained covert surveillance on, for example, political and 
protest groups.77  In addition, police activity was and remains reactive.  As the 
wartime City Prosecutor in Edinburgh, James Mill, advised in 1944, it was also a 
duty of the police to detect and investigate crimes and offences after they had 
occurred.78  Furthermore, as noted, the police in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries were increasingly required to respond to the demand created by the 
regulation of traffic.  The distinction between national and local policing objectives 
is additionally worthy of note here.  For example, although central government 
subvention covered half of total police costs, the Royal Commission on Transport 
found in 1929 that some local authorities considered the requirement to fund half the 
cost of the regulation of traffic unjust on the grounds that local ratepayers derived 
little or no benefit.79  In a similar vein, much of the police activity outlined in the 
Police War Instructions was intended to support the prosecution of the war on the 
home front.  Thus, whilst much of core policing was intended to have an effect 
locally, some police activity by municipal forces was directed towards national 
objectives.  
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A number of themes also arise specifically out of war conditions, in particular the 
paradox of the blackout.  On the one hand, enforcing the ‘Lighting Restrictions’ was 
a major preoccupation for the police.  On the other, it made preventative policing 
more difficult.  In this respect it was closely interlinked with the legacy of 
suburbanisation.  In the first weeks after its imposition The Scotsman reported that 
the police in Edinburgh had ‘been severely handicapped by the darkness’.  A few 
weeks later it noted that the city had been ‘hit by a black-out crime “wave” … shops 
were looted [of] bicycles, tinned foods, jewellery, clothing and, other sundry 
articles’.80   In a similar manner, the Police Review advised that police work, 
especially ‘in relation to traffic control’, had become more arduous.81  This and the 
other themes and questions will be examined in the thesis.   
 
Method and primary sources 
Drawing on Rhodes’ theory of ‘power-dependence’, empirical analysis has been 
used to develop the hypothesis from a ‘relational’ perspective that organisational and 
operational aspects of policing in Edinburgh during the Second World War 
represented both continuity and change.  The thesis draws on a wide range of sources 
from a variety of archives covering the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth 
centuries, but especially between 1930 and 1949 to provide detailed parenthesis for 
the period between 3 September 1939 (when Britain declared war on Germany) and 
2 September 1945 (when Japan surrendered).  Some have never or rarely been used 
in historical studies.   
 
Privileged access was, for example, given to the Minute Books of the Scottish Police 
Federation which contain a record of the meetings and membership of the local and 
national representative boards between 1919 and 1945.82  The extent to which these 
can be considered a comprehensive record of activity needs to be treated with 
caution however.  In places, the minutes are brief to the extent that it is difficult to 
discern what the issue relates to.  In the early record this might be the consequence of 
an uncertainty as to what to record, given that rank-and-file police officers had never 
                                                
80 The Scotsman, 18 September 1939, 5; 2 October 1939, 5.  
81 Police Review, 3 May 1940, 337. 
82 Scottish Police Federation (hereafter SPF), Edinburgh (hereafter E): Minutes of Constable’s, 
Sergeants, Inspectors and, Joint Branch Boards; Glasgow (hereafter G): Minutes of Joint Central 
Committee.   
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had an official representative forum from the creation of the ‘new’ police until 1919.  
Later, part of the explanation might be related to a degree of stability in membership, 
particularly office bearers, who could provide a level of expertise and continuity, 
which are characteristic of policy networks and can negate the need for a more 
detailed record.  Furthermore, the correspondence that informed meetings has not 
survived in the Federation’s archive and is only rarely and briefly excerpted into the 
minutes.  Thus, it is impossible to determine fully how successful the Federation was 
in representing its members.  Nonetheless, the archive provides the opportunity to 
construct for the first time something of a detailed picture of the working of the 
Scottish Police Federation at both local and national level. 
 
The thesis also draws on the Police Review.  At its first meeting in 1919 the Joint 
Branch Board of the Police Federation in Edinburgh recognised the journal as its 
official organ.83  Similarly, at the first Scottish Central Conference of the Federation 
a few days later, the press were excluded with the exception of representatives of the 
Police Review.  In this, the Federation in Scotland was clearly following the thoughts 
of representatives in England and Wales.  The Police Review and Parade Gossip, 
which appeared in 1893, was one of a number of publications that sought to 
challenge the portrayal of the ‘new’ policeman as a ‘bumbling Dogberry’.  However, 
its reports must be viewed with some caution.  As well as fostering the idea of a 
brotherhood of policing, it had an explicit political purpose in seeking to improve the 
conditions of the police service by propaganda and ‘securing avenues through which 
the attention of Parliament could be called’ to grievances.84   
 
Access was also gained to reports by force Special Branches and their summary 
compiled by the SHD made between 1940 and 1945 under a number of headings (see 
Appendix ‘2’) relating to aspects of policing classified as secret.85  These therefore 
remain closed or exempt from release to the public.  Following a request to the 
Scottish Government, however, they were redacted to a small degree and supervised 
access was permitted for academic purposes.  The degree to which they are a 
                                                
83 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 15 December 1919, 3. 
84 Police Review, 5 December 1919, 532; 12 December 1919, 541; 2 January 1920, 2-5.  Clive 
Emsley, The English Police: A Political and Social History, 2nd ed.(London: Longman, 1996), 101., 
The Great British Bobby: A History of British Policing from the 18th Century to the Present (London: 
Quercus, 2009), 172. 
85 NRS HH55/50/1-61/1.   
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comprehensive account of police activity likewise needs to be treated with caution 
however.  Some Scottish chief constables were clearly unhappy about the 
requirement and consistently did not submit a report. 86   The explanation is 
undoubtedly related to the fact that, although in existence in Britain since the 
nineteenth century, some Scottish police forces did not have a Special Branch in 
mid-1940.  Fear of secret police and agents provocateur had been a feature of the 
creation and development of the ‘new’ police in Britain. 87   The 1928 Royal 
Commission on Police Powers and Procedure in England and Wales regarded such 
methods as ‘alien to our habits’.88  In July 1940 the SHD asked Scottish police forces 
that had not already done so to assign experienced detectives to undertake enquiries 
of a ‘particularly secret nature’.89  Thus, notwithstanding that a Special Branch had 
been created in Edinburgh in February 1939 in response to the prospect of war, and 
Morren consistently submitted returns, a question remains as to whether the reports 
by Special Branches were selective if there was a pervasive uneasiness about their 
existence. 
 
Furthermore, in addition to the redaction in 2012, cases that the Security Service, 
MI5, considered matters of special secrecy were specifically omitted from reports by 
police forces during the Second World War.  The MI5 Regional Security Officer in 
Scotland also exercised a measure of editorial control over the précis compiled by 
the SHD.  In a memorandum from the SHD in September 1942 the Regional Security 
Officer was requested to ‘vet’ the draft summary ‘as usual’.90  For all that, the 
content was clearly negotiated during the interaction between the SHD and Regional 
Security Officer.  In May 1944, for example, the Regional Security Officer took 
issue with the conclusions reached in two items and although one was subsequently 
redacted, the SHD declined to alter the other.91  Notwithstanding, the reports do 
                                                
86 Scottish chief constables proposed to discuss the matter sometime in late 1940.  In a response, the 
SHD pointed out that the scheme had been operating in England and Wales for some time, which was 
clearly intended to pressurise Scottish chief constables to remain in-step.  See NRS HH48/66/1, 
Circular 4270, 6 December 1940.  
87 Bernard Porter, The Origins of Britain's Political Police, Warwick Working Papers in Social 
History no.3 (University of Warwick, 1985), 8. 
88 Cmd 3297, 40. 
89 NRS HH52/28, Circular 4053, 1 July 1940.  
90 NRS HH55/54/1, Memo from McDonnel to Perfect, 8 September 1942.   
91 NRS HH55/58/1, Letter from Perfect to Christie, 5 May 1944.   
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provide detail on an aspect of policing during the war that has largely been otherwise 
unavailable.  
 
Use is also made of circulars issued by the SHD.  Within the model of governance as 
it had evolved by the early twentieth century, circulars issued by central government 
were, as Reiner found principally in relation to the English experience, viewed by 
chief constables as ‘virtually mandatory’. 92   During the war the SHD issued 
something in the region of 2,500 circulars.93  Whilst some were directed at other 
parts of the war on the home front, a great many were addressed to all or some 
Scottish police forces and many, if not most, had organisational or operational 
implications.  
 
Reports submitted by chief constables relating to ‘Home Intelligence’, 1940-45, and 
their summary compiled by SHD have also been utilised.94  Although the reports 
were intended to include the public perspective of war conditions some entries 
clearly reflect the personal opinion of the chief constable which raises a questions 
over the degree to which they can be considered accurate.  Indeed, T. H. O’Brien 
noted that agencies compiling such reports during the war were ‘influenced to a 
peculiar degree by individual judgements … and frequently took different views 
about the elements to be included in their compound and reached different results’.95  
In this sense, reports might reflect what Taylor calls ‘supply-side policies’ rather 
than incidence.96  Notwithstanding this, and whilst many of the headings under 
which the reports were made had little to do with policing as it had evolved by the 
                                                
92 Robert Reiner, Chief Constables: Bobbies, Bosses, or Bureaucrats? (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 274. 
93 See principally NRS HH48/66/1-3, 52/27-33, 55/864.  
94 NRS HH55/13, 17-42.  The content and frequency of the requirement for reports was amended 
throughout the war by the SHD.  See Appendix ‘3’.  Edinburgh daily and incidental reports were 
made 1940-46; Fortnightly 1939-42; Four-weekly 1942-45; Quarterly 1945-52.  For detail on the 
creation of the Home Intelligence department and the collation of reports see Paul Addison and 
Jeremy A. Crang, Listening to Britain: Home Intelligence Reports on Britain's Finest Hour, May to 
September 1940 (London: Bodley Head, 2010), xi-xvii.  Donnelly has identified a long continuity in 
the collection of information by the police in Scotland on behalf of the central state.  Daniel Donnelly, 
Municipal Policing in Scotland (Dundee: Dundee University Press, 2008), 116-144. 
95 O'Brien, Civil Defence 295. 
96 Howard Taylor, "Rationing Crime: The Political Economy of Criminal Statistics since the 1850s," 
The Economic History Review, New Series 51, no. 3 (1998): 571.  For a critique see Robert. M Morris, 
"Lies, Damned Lies and Criminal Statistics: Reinterpreting the Criminal Statistics in England and 
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first half of the twentieth century, they provide evidence of police activity during the 
war that is otherwise unavailable.   
 
The thesis also draws on the annual reports by the chief constable to the town council 
on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment in Edinburgh between 1930 and 
1949.97  Whilst subordinates undoubtedly compiled the reports, the chief constable at 
the very least approved the content.  In that sense the views and opinions expressed 
were endorsed and can be reasonably be said to be those of the two chief constables 
in the period under consideration, Ross and Morren.  Although the reports for the 
war period are brief by comparison with those of the pre- and post-war eras they 
continued to provide statistics relating to crimes and offences made known to the 
police and those where one or more persons were arrested or cited (see Appendix ‘4’ 
for an example of the classification of crimes and offences).  An in-depth analysis of 
patterns of crime is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis and the statistics will 
be assessed only insofar as what they might reveal in broad terms about operational 
policing.  
 
In cases where the offence only becomes ‘known’ at the point of detection, the 
number made known to the police and cases where one or more persons were 
arrested or cited are generally identical or very approximate.  Crimes and offences 
against Betting, Gaming, and Lotteries, for example, largely arose as a consequence 
of proactive activity by police officers.  In effect, all crimes and offences made 
known to the police resulted in a case where one or more persons were arrested or 
cited.  For consistency in such cases, tables and figures in the thesis will be based on 
the number of crimes and offences made known to the police.  In addition to the 
crude numbers many of the tables include a percentage or index to give a better sense 
of temporal change and to permit a comparison to be made between series.98  Year-
on-year comparison about the implied nature of policing needs to be treated with 
caution however.  In places figures in the reports by the chief constable to the town 
council have been aggregated incorrectly.  Furthermore, the way that crimes were 
categorised and aggregated changed over time.  In addition, prior to 1936, only those 
                                                
97 ECA ED006/1/9-12.  
98 Percentages and indices given in tables have, where necessary, been rounded to the nearest decimal 
point.  
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deemed ‘serious’ were included in the reports.  Cases where the police had arrested 
or cited someone who was not brought before a court might also have been excluded.  
Nonetheless, the statistics are essential for an understanding of police activity, 
particularly in relation to the core roles and the regulation of road traffic.   
 
The thesis also utilises the Service Record for regular officers who served in 
Edinburgh in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.99  As specified in the 
1920 Regulations these contain: the officer’s name and collar number; date and place 
of birth; date of appointment and retirement; age at appointment and previous 
occupation; advancements in pay or promotion; and details of discipline and 
sickness.100  Williams has argued that as well as being part of a bureaucracy in a 
Weberian sense, police forces kept such records for the purposes of ‘legitimising and 
enabling the exercise of surveillance and control’ of officers.101  By comparing the 
date of appointment and date of retirement given in the Service Record, 820 officers 
have been identified as having served during the Second World War.  It is unknown, 
however, whether the collection is complete.  The reports by Morren to the town 
council identify a mean of some 703 regular officers between 1939 and 1945, which 
suggests that the profile constructed from the 820 records will be representative of 
most, if not all, those who served during the war.  Conclusions drawn solely from the 
Service Records need to be treated with some caution however.  Some entries have 
been recorded inconsistently.  In other aspects information given in the chief 
constable’s annual reports point to omissions in relation to the entries in officers’ 
Service Records.  Given the likelihood of some administrative chaos during the war 
this is understandable.  Statistics derived from the Service Records should therefore 
be considered as indicative rather than precise. 
 
As a picture of operational police officers this is, however, partial.  During the war a 
number of auxiliaries were recruited to the City of Edinburgh Police to supplement 
regular officers in light of the additional wartime demands and to replace those 
regular officers who had been released to the armed services and industry.  There 
                                                
99 ECA ED006/13/1-22.   
100 S.R.&O. (No. 2113), regulation 43 (1920).  The Private Record(s) containing the officer’s address 
and details of wife and children, which were considered ‘confidential’, were also in use in Edinburgh 
in early 1939 but have not been traced.  See NRS HH55/399, Minutes of 13th Scottish Police Council, 
24 March 1939, 8-9.  
101 Williams, Police Control Systems, 93. 
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were, for example, a mean of 212 First Police Reserve officers, consisting of retired 
regular officers, as well as Police War Reserve officers serving in each year of the 
war.  Furthermore, as will be seen in chapter three, eight members of the Women’s 
Auxiliary Police Service were sworn-in and given the powers of regular officers in 
late 1943.  There were also an unknown number of whole-time and part-time Special 
Constables.  No Service Records relating to these auxiliaries have been found 
however.  Thus, a picture of at least one-third of the actual operational strength of the 
force in Edinburgh during the war remains obscured.  
 
Among the other principal primary sources the thesis draws on the minutes of the 
town council and the Lord Provost’s Committee between 1938 and 1945.102  To 
provide historical context, these are supplemented by the minutes of the General 
Commissioners, 1805-1856, the Watching and Lodging Houses Committee, 1852-
1856, and the town council, 1856. 103   Together these provide details of the 
membership of committees and a record of issues surrounding the administration of 
the police establishment and are the official, and in most cases certified, record of 
proceedings.  Yet they are only a partial record of what actually occurred.  The detail 
of the interaction that clearly occurred between councillors is largely absent.  Given 
the drive for national unity during the Second World War, this might have been the 
consequence of an attempt to disguise the existence of divisions that, as will be seen, 
clearly existed over some issues.   
 
Some of the social dynamic is evident in contemporary newspapers.  The thesis 
draws on The Scotsman, the Edinburgh Evening News, and the Edinburgh Evening 
Dispatch, principally between 1939 and 1945.  Among other things, they report on 
the activities of the town council.   Although the public gallery in the council 
chambers was closed for security reasons from the beginning of the war until mid-
1943, it appears that reporters witnessed meetings of the town council and some 
committees.  A question remains over the extent to which newspaper reports during 
the war were accurate however.  Stephen Vella observed that the ‘socio-political, 
economic and ideological structures from which news stories arise remain crucially 
                                                
102 ECA SL1/389-395., SL25/2/24-30. 
103 ECA ED9/1-13., ED9/2/5., SL1/1/269.  
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important background to a full understanding of newspaper texts’.104  In this respect, 
those during the war need to be treated with especial caution.  Whilst compulsory 
censorship was never introduced, the Defence Regulations gave central government 
wide powers to control the media.  Together with ‘D’ notices and the voluntary 
restriction exercised by editors there was a concerted effort to prevent the disclosure 
of information that might aid the enemy or impede the war effort by weakening the 
resolve of the public.105  Whilst it is difficult to assess how far this influenced 
reporting, there were contemporary concerns that information that was of no military 
significance whatsoever was, nonetheless, being arbitrarily supressed.106  
 
Following Donaldson’s example, an attempt was made to utilise oral sources.  Until 
comparatively recently, much of the focus of police history was political and 
organisational.  As Paul Thompson has argued, oral history offers the possibility of 
juxtaposing primary sources with the voice of rank-and-file officers to, among 
others, ‘open new areas of inquiry’ and bring recognition to a specific group of 
people ignored by historians.107  Writing in 1998 Donaldson recognised that the 
majority of human sources in this regard were, however, already likely to have been 
lost.108  This was even more likely with the passage of further time.  Indeed, by 2010, 
the current writer was unsuccessful in establishing contact with anyone who had 
served in the police in Edinburgh during the war.  
 
This thesis further draws on memoirs by police officers.  As with most of the 
literature, the overwhelming majority of these relate to the Metropolitan Police.  
Again, in Scotland, the focus generally relates to Glasgow in the era before the first 
half of the twentieth century.109  As Haia Shpayer-Makov identified, the majority 
were written by senior officers and therefore do not reflect the experience of the 
                                                
104 Stephen Vella, "Newspapers," in Reading Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Texts from 
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rank-and-file.110  Furthermore, as Paul Lawrence has argued, police memoirs need to 
be treated with some caution: ‘there are problems in judging where fact and fiction 
collide’.111  For example, the sole source in this regard in relation to Edinburgh is the 
autobiography by William Merrilees who, from August 1940, was the detective 
superintendent in charge of the Criminal Investigation Department (hereafter CID) of 
the City of Edinburgh Police.  Much of his memoir is of the ‘cases I have solved’ 
variety.  As Merrilees stated, it was explicitly intended: 
 
to inspire young lads and attract them to the police service and to show that 
despite a humble background, lack of educational qualifications, and other 
handicaps – through perseverance, single mindedness of purpose and sheer 
hard work – it is possible to reach the top of any career upon which one 
embarks.112   
 
As with many police memoirs, the commonplace that is of interest to the historian is 
often ignored.  Nonetheless, together with the other primary sources referred to, they 
provide some insight into the largely neglected aspects of police history that this 
thesis will address.  
 
                                                
110 Haia Shpayer-Makov, "Explaining the Rise and Success of Detective Memoirs in Britain," in 
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2 
The Regular Officers 
The Report of the Committee on the Police Service of England, Wales and Scotland 
(hereafter the Desborough Committee), which was established in response to the 
crisis of the police strike in London in 1918, defined the desirable attributes of 
candidates to the police.  They must, it noted:  
 
not only reach certain standards of height and physical development but must 
have a constitution which is sound in every way … a man cannot make a 
good policeman unless his general character should be unblemished; he 
should be humane and courteous and, generally, he should possess a 
combination of moral, mental and physical qualities not ordinarily required in 
other employments.1 
 
The delivery of policing was carried out by police officers.  The expenditure on 
personnel has always been the most expensive aspect of the police organisation.  Yet 
comparatively little is known of police officers as individuals.  As Joanne Klein 
argued, police officers have largely remained ‘anonymous’, leaving a gap in the 
analysis of the police.2  Although she and others, comparatively recently in terms of 
the academic sub-discipline of police history, have began to consider the social 
characteristics of police officers and address the empirical gap, the studies have 
ignored Edinburgh.  The purpose of this chapter is therefore firstly to construct a 
detailed profile of the 820 regular officers who served in Edinburgh during the 
Second World War; and secondly to consider the extent to which this changed as a 
consequence of the war.  Given the question of whether operational activity 
represented a paradigm shift from the pre-war era, the chapter also identifies a 
combination of factors relating to personnel that undoubtedly affected capacity.  In 
places, this research both confirms and contradicts the findings of existing studies.  
The chapter principally draws on officers’ Service Records.  In the absence of 
comparable information relating to auxiliaries, however, it remains a partial picture 
of those who carried out operational policing in Edinburgh during the war. 
                                                
1 Report of the Committee on the Police Service of England, Wales and Scotland, Part 1. Cmd 253, 
1919, 8. 
2 Klein, Invisible Men, 1. 
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The chapter examines some of the antecedents of recruits to the force, in particular 
their place of birth, previous occupation, and age.  Put briefly, it is argued that, as a 
consequence of the changing nature of policing, the profile of recruits changed over 
the period of the first four decades of the twentieth century.  The proportion from 
predominantly rural areas of Scotland and those formerly employed as agricultural 
labourers and farm servants declined, whilst there was a corresponding increase in 
those from Edinburgh and those formerly employed as clerks.  Furthermore, it finds 
that joining the police was aspirational for younger recruits.  Yet those who had been 
in other occupations for a comparatively longer period were less inclined to view it 
as advantageous.  Lastly, whilst a comparatively small number joined during the war, 
they were older than those recruited in the pre-war era. 
 
The chapter also focuses on various aspects of their service as police officers, 
including the circumstances under which they left.  What is advanced here is the 
argument that discipline became stricter during the war.  Whilst it might have been 
envisaged that the pressure of war would make senior officers more lenient in the 
enforcement of discipline, the reverse was the case.  As Klein found in her detailed 
study of three English forces in the early twentieth century the ‘tolerance for some 
offences changed over time’. 3   By comparison with the pre-war period, 
unprecedented use was made of dismissal and requiring officers to resign in the 
disposal of disciplinary cases during the war.  The chapter also examines the wartime 
phenomenon of the release of younger regular officers to the armed services and 
industry.  It is argued that, whilst there was no apparent change in the pattern of 
sickness during the war, the rate of attrition of officers leaving because of ill-health 
was greater than the immediate post-war era.  In contrast, the rate of attrition by 
resignation increased dramatically after the war as a consequence of the cycle of 
‘reactive underestimation’. 
  
                                                
3 Invisible Men, 72. 
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Place of birth, previous occupation, and age of recruits 
The significance of the place of origin of recruits to the police lies in the extent to 
which they were local to the area they policed.  The Scottish based studies point to 
the migration to Glasgow and the Scottish Borders of men born in the highlands 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.4  In a similar manner, English based 
studies found that recruits to urban forces in the nineteenth century came from 
largely rural areas.  On the one hand, there was a belief that those from outside the 
force area would more readily be able to undertake control and surveillance functions 
over a population with whom they had no ties.5  At the same time, there was a 
perception that the urban environment had a debilitating effect on moral and physical 
health and rendered recruits less able to withstand the rigours of the job than those 
from rural areas.  As the second report of the Desborough Committee noted in 1920, 
the majority of recruits had been drawn from agricultural labourers ‘who have the 
advantage over industrial workers in physique and stamina and, with proper training, 
make an excellent type of policeman’.6  For all that, as Shpayer-Makov found in 
relation to the Metropolitan Police, recruits in the early twentieth century 
increasingly came from London.7  
 
Although the Service Records of the officers who served in Edinburgh during the 
war contains details of their place of birth this has been recorded inconsistently.  
Some places are referred to by local names such as Linlithgowshire and 
Haddingtonshire rather than their actual names of West Lothian and East Lothian 
respectively.  Likewise, in some instances officers born after 1920 have their place of 
birth recorded as ‘Colinton’, for example, even though this and other areas of 
Midlothian had been incorporated into Edinburgh when the city boundary was 
extended.  In addition, in places, county names are noted in the anglicised form: 
Argyllshire instead of Argyll; Morayshire instead of Moray (also known as 
Elginshire until 1918); and Sutherlandshire instead of Sutherland.  Finally, the 
Service Records do not always reflect the changes brought about by the Local 
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Government (Scotland) Act 1889 where Ross-Shire, for example, was renamed Ross 
and Cromarty.8  The place of birth has therefore been rationalised according to the 
officer’s date of birth.  Table 2.1 shows the number and percentage of recruits who 
served in Edinburgh during the Second World War by birthplace and decade of 
appointment.  Clearly, this does not necessarily reflect where they spent the majority 
of their life or lived immediately prior to joining the police: their place of birth 
therefore remains suggestive of whether or not they were local to Edinburgh. 
 
Of the 800 officers whose place of birth is known, 93.3 per cent came from Scotland.  
As Table 2.2 summarises, the majority of those were not from Edinburgh: some 65.3 
per cent came from rural areas.  Thus, in common with other studies, this research 
suggests that the majority of recruits were not local to the area they policed.  Whilst 
the highlands were significant, however, on the basis of a rough line drawn across 
Scotland west to east north of Stirlingshire, more came from southern counties.  Yet 
the single largest source was Edinburgh.  As in London there was, therefore, either 
no real discrimination against the urban environment or there was a change in the 
pattern over the period when those who served during the Second World War were 
recruited.   
 
  
                                                
8 52 & 53 Vict, cap. 45 (1889).  See Hay Shennan, Boundaries of Counties and Parishes in Scotland, 

















Edinburgh 0 2 32 96 96 9 235 28.7 
Midlothian 0 0 35 28 34 2 99 12.1 
Sutherland 0 2 16 13 7 0 38 4.6 
England 0 0 8 17 12 0 37 4.5 
East Lothian 0 2 18 7 5 1 33 4.0 
Fife 0 1 16 3 7 1 28 3.4 
Perthshire 0 2 8 9 4 1 24 2.9 
West Lothian 0 1 4 8 8 0 21 2.6 
Berwickshire 0 0 7 4 10 0 21 2.6 
Inverness-shire 1 0 4 10 6 0 21 2.6 
Ross and 
Cromarty 0 0 3 8 9 1 21 2.6 
Aberdeenshire 0 1 11 6 1 0 19 2.3 
Argyll 0 2 4 9 4 0 19 2.3 
Caithness 0 1 6 7 4 0 18 2.2 
Lanarkshire 0 0 7 5 3 1 16 2.0 
Stirlingshire 0 1 3 4 4 0 12 1.5 
Angus 0 0 6 6 0 0 12 1.5 
Overseas 0 0 1 4 6 0 11 1.3 
Orkney 0 0 6 2 2 0 10 1.2 
Glasgow 0 0 1 5 3 0 9 1.1 
Roxburghshire 0 0 1 4 3 1 9 1.1 
Kincardineshire 0 0 5 1 2 0 8 1.0 
Peeblesshire 0 1 5 1 1 0 8 1.0 
Ayrshire 0 0 1 4 2 0 7 0.9 
Renfrewshire 0 0 1 3 3 0 7 0.9 
Aberdeen 0 0 2 1 4 0 7 0.9 
Selkirkshire 0 0 2 2 2 0 6 0.7 
Dumfriesshire 0 0 2 2 2 0 6 0.7 
Moray 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 0.6 
Dundee 0 0 2 0 2 1 5 0.6 
Banffshire 0 0 3 1 1 0 5 0.6 
Ireland 0 0 3 1 1 0 5 0.6 
Shetland 0 0 1 2 1 0 4 0.5 
Clackmannanshire 0 0 2 1 1 0 4 0.5 
Inverness 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0.2 
Nairnshire 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0.2 
Kirkcudbrightshire 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.1 
Stirling 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.1 
Kinross-shire 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.1 
Buteshire 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.1 
Dunbartonshire 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.1 
Wales 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.1 
Not recorded or 
Unknown 0 0 5 2 12 1 20 2.4 
Total 1 16 235 279 270 19 820 100.0 
Table 2.1  Recruits by birthplace and decade of appointment 
[Source: ECA ED006/13/1-22] 
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Birthplace	 Recruits Number	 %	
Southern Counties:  
Ayrshire, Berwickshire, Buteshire, Clackmannanshire, 
Dumfriesshire, Dunbartonshire, East Lothian, Fife, Kinross-shire, 
Kirkcudbrightshire,  
Lanarkshire, Midlothian, Peeblesshire, 
Renfrewshire, Roxburghshire, Selkirkshire, 
Stirlingshire, West Lothian	
281	 37.7 
Edinburgh	 235 31.5 
Northern Counties:  
Aberdeenshire, Angus, Argyll, Banffshire, Caithness, Inverness-
shire, Kincardineshire, Moray, Nairnshire, Orkney, Perthshire, 
Ross and Cromarty, Shetland, Sutherland 
206 27.6 
Aberdeen, Dundee, Glasgow, Inverness, Stirling	 24 3.2 
Total	 746 100.0 
Table 2.2  Recruits by birthplace in Scotland 
[Source: ECA ED006/13/1-22]  
 
Existing studies have identified a change in the profile of recruits from the late 
nineteenth century as the number of agricultural labourers declined and the number 
of clerks in particular increased.  This was a consequence of the decline of the 
agricultural sector in the nineteenth century.  As T. C. Smout noted, by 1901 the 
proportion of male workers employed in farming had fallen by more than half from 
30 per cent in 1851.  At the same time, it was a consequence of rural depopulation 
and urban growth.9  Part of the explanation also relates to the growing complexity of 
policing caused by new technologies and the motor-car.10   In this sense, in Scotland, 
it was a reflection of the change in the concept of ‘police’ from a mechanism of 
municipal improvement to, as it was elsewhere in Britain, its specialist association 
with law and order.11  
 
Between 1910 and 1939, when the majority of those who served in Edinburgh during 
the Second World War were appointed, the ratio of recruits from predominantly rural 
areas of Scotland declined from 78.7 per cent to 50.8 per cent, whilst those from 
Edinburgh increased from 13.9 per cent to 37.2 per cent, which raises the question as 
to whether this was a consequence of a shift in the pattern of previous employment.  
                                                
9 T. C. Smout, A Century of the Scottish People 1830-1950 (London: Fontana Press, 1987), 58. 
10 David G. Barrie, "Police in Civil Society: Police, Enlightenment and Civic Virtue in Scotland, c. 
1780-1833," Urban History 37, no. 1 (2010): 52. 
11 Haia Shpayer-Makov, "The Appeal of Country Workers: The Case of the Metropolitan Police," 
Historical Research 64, no. 154 (1991): 186.  For the ‘technologisation’ of policing in the early 
twentieth century see, for example, Williams, Police Control Systems, 119-166. 
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English-based studies suggest that the majority of recruits in the nineteenth century 
were drawn from the ‘vast existing reservoir of manual labour’.12   Whether or not 
this was the case for those who served in the City of Edinburgh Police during the 
Second World War is difficult to determine accurately given the ambiguity in 
occupation titles and without an accurate description of the role requirement for each 
job.  In many places, the description of the previous occupation of a recruit given in 
the Service Record is ambiguous.  It is unknown whether a ‘clerk’ or ‘boy clerk’ 
was, for example, in commerce, the civil service, or the police.  Similarly, it is 
unclear whether ‘engineer’ was professional or artisan.   
 
So far as seems reasonable, the descriptions of the previous occupations have been 
rationalised in line with those in the 1911 census of Scotland.  Table 2.3 shows the 
number of recruits by occupational group and decade of appointment.  Within these 
groups, the regular officers had some 244 different specific previous occupations, 
including butcher and bricklayer, dairyman and draper, golf-club maker and gun-
maker, skinner and stationer.  The majority of recruits had previous specific 
occupations that were most likely manual in nature.  Although ‘Agriculture’ was the 
largest single group, only 7.7 per cent of recruits with a determinable occupation had 
been agricultural labourers/farm servants, which is approximate with Goldsmith’s 
finding in relation to Glasgow in the century from 1840.13  At the same time, this was 
the second most numerical single occupation.  This research thus confirms that the 
majority of recruits came from manual sectors of the economy, whilst agricultural 
labourers/farm servants were a significant minority.  
 
Some 12.9 per cent of recruits, the largest single number with a determinable 
occupation, were clerks of some kind.  Between 1910 and 1939, the ratio of clerks 
increased from 3.9 per cent to 19.3 per cent, whilst that of agricultural labourers 
declined from 16.1 per cent to 0.4 per cent, which undoubtedly helps explain the 
decrease in the number of Scottish recruits with a rural birthplace and an increase in 
those born in Edinburgh.  
  
                                                
12 Shpayer-Makov, The Making of a Policeman, 60. 


















General or Local 
Government of the 
Country 
0 1 9 13 13 6 42 5.1 
II Defence of the Country 0 0 19 20 13 0 52 6.3 
III 
Professional, Occupations 
& their Subordinate 
Services 
0 1 1 11 19 2 34 4.1 
IV Domestic Offices or Services 0 1 11 4 9 0 25 3.0 
V Commercial Occupations 0 2 10 34 70 6 122 14.9 
VI Conveyance of Persons, Goods, & Messages 0 1 44 42 22 2 111 13.5 
VII Agriculture 0 6 68 35 14 1 124 15.1 
VIII Fishing 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 0.5 





0 1 4 38 17 1 61 7.4 
XI 
Precious Metals, Jewels, 
Watches, Instruments, & 
Games 
0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0.2 
XII Building & Works of Construction 0 0 6 5 9 0 20 2.4 
XIII Wood, Furniture, Fittings, & Decorations 0 0 3 6 1 0 10 1.2 
XIV 
Brick, Cement, Pottery, & 
Glass 
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.1 
XV Chemicals, Explosive, Oil, Soap, Resin, &c. 0 0 1 9 3 0 13 1.6 
XVI Skins, Leather, Hair, & Feathers 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.1 
XVII Paper, Stationery Books & Prints 0 0 3 5 7 0 15 1.9 
XVIII Textile Fabrics 0 1 4 3 4 0 12 1.5 
XIX Dress 0 0 2 1 1 0 4 0.5 
XX Food, Tobacco, Drink, & Lodging 0 2 11 12 11 0 36 4.4 
XXI Gas, Water, Electricity, & Sanitary Service 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.1 
XXII 
Other, General & 
Undefined Workers & 
Dealers 
0 0 22 21 9 1 53 6.5 
XXIII Without Occupation or Occupation Unspecified * 1 0 3 10 40 0 54 6.6 
Total 1 16 235 279 270 19 820 100.0 
*Includes occupation undetermined.  
Table 2.3 Recruits by previous occupation and decade of appointment 
[Source: ECA ED006/13/1-22] 
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Notwithstanding the extension of Edinburgh’s boundaries and the consolidation of 
those officers from Leith Burgh Police and Midlothian Constabulary, 34 recruits 
were police constables, whilst two were railway policemen.  A further 19 from a 
variety of recorded occupations had previous police service.  They served in a large 
number of Scottish, English, and Irish city and county forces: in some cases in more 
than one force.  For those not immediately transferring from other forces, they came 
from the forces in Edinburgh, the Metropolitan Police, and West Lothian.  Smale 
noted a similar trend in the Scottish Borders in the nineteenth century.14  Whilst this 
movement into and out of the police points to the cross-fertilisation of policing 
throughout the UK, it was a reflection of the attempts by individuals to establish 
whether they could tolerate the physical demands of the job and the attendant harsh 
discipline.15 
 
Given that the majority of recruits had a previous occupation it suggests that joining 
the police was aspirational.  Critchley has argued that the higher wages enjoyed by 
the police in the aftermath of the Desborough Committee, together with secure 
employment, paid holidays and, unusually for working-class occupations, a pension 
acted as ‘pull’ factors which created a ‘golden age’ for the police in Britain.16  As a 
consequence, as Barbara Weinberger found in England, applications outstripped 
vacancies between 1930 and 1960.  At the same time she identified that downturns in 
other sectors of the economy ‘pushed’ men ‘towards an occupation they might never 
otherwise have considered’.17  The extent to which a pension acted as an incentive to 
join is also unclear.18  On the other hand, again in relation to the English experience, 
David Taylor has argued that, in addition to economic considerations, the changing 
nature of the job, the change in the public perception of the police, and especially the 
growth of the sense of professionalism from the late nineteenth century, made it an 
attractive career prospect.19  This research suggests that the extent to which potential 
recruits perceived these aspects as positive depended on their age.  
  
                                                
14 Smale, "The Development of the New Police in the Scottish Borders," 234. 
15 Klein, Invisible Men, 288, 290. 
16 Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales, 249. 
17 Barbara Weinberger, The Best Police in the World: An Oral History of English Policing from the 
1930s to the 1960s (Aldershot: Scolar, 1995), 7-9. 
18 Emsley, "The Policeman as Worker," 99. 


















18 0 0 8 2 5 0 15 1.9 
19 0 2 14 23 47 6 92 11.2 
20 0 3 34 38 57 1 133 16.2 
21 0 2 38 41 40 0 121 14.8 
22 1 1 40 39 28 0 109 13.3 
23 0 6 27 39 25 0 97 11.8 
24 0 2 27 41 21 1 92 11.2 
25 0 0 9 17 15 0 41 5.0 
26 0 0 11 10 14 0 35 4.3 
27 0 0 4 9 4 1 18 2.2 
28 0 0 6 6 5 0 17 2.1 
29 0 0 5 7 5 0 17 2.1 
30 0 0 3 2 1 4 10 1.2 
31 0 0 2 2 0 1 5 0.6 
32 0 0 2 0 1 2 5 0.6 
33 0 0 2 0 0 2 4 0.5 
36 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0.2 
37 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 0.4 
39 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.1 
40 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.1 
Not 
recorded 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0.2 
Total 1 16 235 279 270 19 820 100.0 
Table 2.4 Recruits by age and decade of appointment 
[Source: ECA ED006/13/1-22] 
 
The Regulations made in Scotland under the 1919 Police Act in response to the 
Desborough Committee specified that candidates for appointment to the police must 
be less than 25 years of age.  Older applicants were, however, accepted if they were 
transferring from another force or had been a member of the armed services in the 
preceding three months.20  Table 2.4 shows the number and percentage of recruits by 
age in years and decade of appointment.  Whilst the oldest was 40 the youngest was 
18, the mean was 22.5, and the mode 20.  Thus, the majority of recruits could not 
have been employed for very many years, which suggests that those in occupations 
for longer periods were less likely to see the police as an attractive option.  Although 
the comparatively small number recruited between 1940 and 1945 does not suggest 
                                                
20 9 & 10 Geo. 5, cap. 46 (1919).,  S.R.&O. (No. 2113), regulation 7 (1920).  
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any meaningful pattern in terms of place of birth and previous occupation, the mean 
age increased to 26.4.   
 
During the war men aged between 18-50 could be conscripted into the armed 
services or directed into essential war service and the increased age of those joining 
the police suggests that the younger men who had previously formed the bulk of 
recruits were the first to be absorbed.21  Throughout the war younger regular officers 
were also released to the armed services and industry.  Furthermore, under the Police 
and Firemen (War Service) Act 1939, the automatic entitlement of regular officers to 
retire on pension was suspended for the duration.22  Thus, notwithstanding the 
recruitment of auxiliaries, the profile of regular police officers during the war was 
different to that which had prevailed in the pre-war period.  Operational officers were 
likely to have been older than might have been the case in peacetime, which raises 
the question as to whether this had an effect on the level of sickness and hence 
capacity.  In the Metropolitan Police the number of officers suffering from mental 
and physical exhaustion nearly tripled during the war.23  In his memoir the wartime 
constable in Devon, Edward Trist, recalled that senior officers in particular ‘were 
haggard and toil-worn, due to the ever-increasing requirement to turn out on every 




The date, number of days lost, and medical condition for each period of sickness are 
noted on officers’ Service Records.  In a small number of cases there is no reason 
noted for the absence: most likely the consequence of administrative error, especially 
during the war given the added burden with which the police had to contend.  There 
is, however, no sickness record whatsoever for those officers from Midlothian or 
Leith prior to their consolidation in 1920 or for any transferee before they joined the 
force in Edinburgh.  As with discipline, relevant details relating to sickness of 
transferees do not appear to have been transcribed to the Service Record maintained 
                                                
21 Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 51. 
22 2 & 3 Geo. 6, cap. 103, section 10 (1939).  
23 Emsley, The Great British Bobby, 240-241. 
24 Edward Trist and Simon  Dell, Take Cover: The Wartime Memories of a Devon Policeman, 1938-
1946 (Newton Abbot: Forest, 2001), 97. 
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by the City of Edinburgh Police from records held by the originating force.  There is 
also no record of instances that occurred during an officer’s release during the war – 
in some instances for a major part of the war – since this was probably only recorded 
by the relevant armed services or industry. 
 
In a comparatively small number of cases the reason given for the sickness relates to 
psychological conditions such as neurasthenia, nervous debility, nervous exhaustion, 
and nervous breakdown.  The overwhelming majority, however, relate to physical 
conditions such as influenza, bronchitis, fever, chill, and infective catarrh.  Given 
that most officers were, as the Desborough Committee noted, ‘liable to suffer from 
exposure’ for the majority of their working life this is unsurprising.25  Morren noted 
in the mid-1930s that the lack of ventilation in police boxes used by officers 
patrolling the beat in Edinburgh was also detrimental to health.26  Part of the impetus 
behind recruiting agricultural workers was the belief that they would be more 
physically able to withstand these rigours.  
 
Put crudely, with a mean service of 14.1 years for the 801 officers serving at the 
outbreak of war, the mean annual rate of sickness for all officers in the pre-war 
period was 0.6 periods and 10.0 days.  Given the susceptibility to exposure it would 
be anticipated that the level of sickness would be commensurate with length of 
service.  However, no clear pattern emerges to suggest that this was the predisposing 
factor.  Indeed, whilst the overwhelming majority of individuals who lost five times 
the mean number of days joined before 1920, there were others with over 20 years 
service that were never or rarely off work through sickness.  At the same time, some 
who joined in the 1930s had periods of sickness in double figures and lost twice the 
mean number of days.  In general terms, however, the level of sickness increased 
with age, which was not necessarily related to length of service.  Whilst the largest 
single number of days lost was by someone under 40, some 81.5 per cent of those 
with over three times the mean number of days lost were over 40 by the time war 
was declared.  Likewise, the majority of those with twice the mean periods of 
sickness were over 40.   
 
                                                
25 Cmd 574, 12. 
26 ECA ED006/1/10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1935, 8; 1936, 9. 
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In all, over the six years of war the mean annual rate of sickness for all officers was 
0.5 periods and 10.6 days, which was consistent with the interwar period.  Thus, on 
the basis of the Service Records there was no increase in the incidence of sickness 
during the war.  As in the pre-war era, there was a relationship between age and 
sickness levels.  Two-thirds of those who had lost more than four times the mean 
number of days, and over half who had been off sick for 10 periods or more, were 
over 40 by the end of the war.  In contrast to Emsley’s finding in relation to the 
Metropolitan Police there was, however, no increase in the level of psychological 
disorders and thus no change in the typology of sickness.  Part of the explanation was 
undoubtedly related to the fact that officers in Edinburgh did not have to contend 
with the consequences of anything comparable to the Blitz.  Furthermore, despite the 
restriction, some 110 regulars, whom it can be assumed were the oldest or, as will be 
seen, the most infirm, either retired or left the force through ill-health during the war.  
 
Release of officers during the war 
During the Great War officers from Scottish police forces were released to the armed 
services, even where they had no obligation as a reservist.  As His Majesty’s 
Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland (hereafter HMICS) reported in 1918, some 37 
per cent of the actual strength had been released in Glasgow and 27 per cent in 
Aberdeen.27  Edinburgh released some 43 per cent.28  Morren, who joined the force 
in November 1911, for example, had been released for four years.  In total, 114 
officers who had been released by Edinburgh during the Great War were still serving 
in the police when war was declared in 1939.  The release of officers to the armed 
forces in an emergency was therefore not unprecedented by the time war was 
declared again.  
 
Notwithstanding the recognition by the War Cabinet in 1940 that the emergency had 
placed ‘heavy additional responsibilities’ on the police and its commitment to 
maintain strengths at a ‘level sufficient’ to enable them to fulfil their responsibilities, 
the increasing requirement for manpower in the armed services and war-related 
                                                
27 NRS HH4/78 & 284 His Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland Annual Inspection 
Report for City of Glasgow Police, 23 October 1919, 1; Aberdeen City Police, 29 May 1918, 1.  
28 NRS HH4/33, His Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland Annual Inspection Report for 
Edinburgh City Police, 6 June 1918, 1. 
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industry created pressure to release officers.29  As Churchill recalled in relation to the 
competing demands: ‘I was like a keeper in the Zoo distributing half-rations among 
magnificent animals’.30  Morren’s annual report to the town council for 1945 records 
that 162 men had been released for service with the armed forces alone.  The Service 
Records, however, only contain the specifics of some of these releases.  Some 
officers were released two and three times during the war.  In general terms, the 
pattern of release followed the progress of the conflict and the consequent changes in 
reservation status.31  The majority of releases in Edinburgh occurred after late-1941.  
The explanation is undoubtedly related to the fact that in October of that year central 
government identified that two million men and women were required for the armed 
forces and war-related industry and scrapped all ‘block reservations’ of occupations, 
including the police.32  
 
In April 1942 the Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom Johnston, approved a request 
by the Ministry of Labour and National Service for the immediate return to active 
coalface work of ex-miners in the police unless there were exceptional reasons to the 
contrary.33  Although the City of Edinburgh Police had a number of officers within 
its ranks who had formerly been employed in the mining industry, none were 
released at this time.  A letter from Johnston to the Ministry of Labour and National 
Service suggests the contribution from police forces across Scotland to the mines 
was minimal because of the impending draft to the armed services: ‘we are very 
sorry not to be more helpful, but you will appreciate that the request for the release 
of these men has come at a very difficult time.  The Scottish Police will lose some 
800 regular officers in the forthcoming releases to the armed forces’.34  A week later 
Johnston advised police authorities that central government had decided to release 
younger officers to the ‘most active forms of combatant service’, which were being 
expanded: 
 
The high standard of physique and intelligence of the police make them 
particularly valuable for this type of service, and the Government have come 
                                                
29 NRS HH55/193, Note by Joint Secretaries to the War Cabinet, 7 June 1940.  
30 W. S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, Vol 3, The Second World War, 6 Vols. (Suffolk: The Reprint 
Society, 1952), 403.   
31 For a digest of the changes see Donaldson, "Policing the War," 71-81. 
32 Calder, The People's War, 267. 
33 NRS HH55/196, Circular 4888, 21 April 1942.    
34 NRS HH55/196, Letter from SHD to Ministry of Labour and National Service, 1 July 1942.  
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to the conclusion that it would be in the interests of the successful 
prosecution of the war …. and that in the present circumstances the gain to 
the country’s offensive power will outweigh the loss to the police forces.35 
 
The majority of those released from the police in Edinburgh are recorded as having 
gone to the armed forces, whilst in 1944 one went to industry and another to coal 
mining.   Towards the end of the war some were also released to the Allied Military 
Government in Occupied Territories – later called the Allied Control Commission.36  
The mean age and service in years of all releases in Edinburgh was 26.1 and 5.2 
respectively, whilst the mode was 25 and four.  Thus, those released were younger 
officers with a commensurate length of service.  The mean length of release in years 
was 2.7, the mode three, and the maximum seven.  All but four were constables and 
therefore more than likely to have been deployed on preventative policing.  Whilst 
this was less a proportion of the actual strength of the force than in the Great War the 
loss of 162 regular officers for lengthy periods of the war represented a considerable 
abstraction in real terms.  Despite the recruitment of auxiliaries, they did not 
necessarily have the same degree of local knowledge or experience, especially the 
members of the Police War Reserve and the Women’s Auxiliary Police Service, 
particularly in dealing with the more technical aspects of policing such as the 
regulation of road traffic.  By comparison with the pre-war period there was 
therefore a reduction in the capacity of the force during the Second World War.  In 
particular the ability to undertake preventative policing was diminished.  Indeed, the 
continued abstraction of at least 40 regulars into 1946 prolonged the loss of 
experience.37  
 
Some of those released never returned to the force however.  At least nineteen 
officers were killed or posted as missing in action, whilst at least two died from 
unknown causes during their release to the armed forces.  At least five resigned 
whilst released to the armed services.  Ingleton argued that some officers in Britain 
were disillusioned by the log-jam in promotion in the police caused by the 
suspension of the automatic right to retire and were inspired by the opportunities in 
the armed services.  Some constables who had been commissioned or achieved rank 
                                                
35 NRS HH55/215, Circular 4897, 28 April 1942.   
36 cf ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1945, 3. 
37 cf ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1945, 3; 1946, 6. 
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were therefore resentful about returning to the police to find themselves back at the 
bottom of the hierarchy. 38   Morren recorded that 76 released officers were 
commissioned.  Whatever the motivation of those who resigned whilst released, the 
combined losses compounded the crisis of capacity in the immediate post-war era.  
The direction of the war effort by central government thus influenced the 
effectiveness of local policing during the war and in the immediate aftermath. 
 
At the end of the war there was an exodus from police forces throughout Britain as 
the regular officers whose superannuation had been deferred were allowed to leave.  
In 1945 Morren cautioned that the revocation on 1 January 1946 of the power to 
retain police officers compulsorily would lead to a reduction in the actual strength.39  
Between the end of hostilities and the end of 1946, for example, 110 regular officers 
left the City of Edinburgh Police, or some 15.7 per cent of the mean actual strength 
over the period.  At the same time, the auxiliary officers recruited for the duration of 
the war were stood down.40  In this sense, the repercussions of the war created a 
shortage of officers in the immediate aftermath.   
 
In addition, as will be seen, many officers resigned due to the cycle of ‘reactive 
underestimation’.  The improvements brought about as a consequence of the 
Desborough Committee had not been sustained in the following two decades.  By the 
immediate post-Second World War era the police were again underpaid in relation to 
comparable occupations and many left the police for better pay and conditions in 
industry for example.  As a consequence, recruitment in forces throughout Britain 
barely kept pace with wastage. 41  Morren reported with ‘grave concern’ in 1947 that 
recruitment in Edinburgh had become ‘increasingly difficult’.42  The stability of the 
police workforce and hence capacity had become sufficient a problem that, in an 
echo of 1919, central government established a committee of inquiry (the Oaksey 
Committee), which led to a pay rise in July 1949 and the cycle of ‘reactive 
underestimation’ was re-set to start again.43   
 
                                                
38 Ingleton, The Gentlemen at War, 29. 
39 NRS HH55/187, Circular 6192, 8 November 1945. 
40 ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1945, 3; 1946, 5; 1947, 5. 
41 Philip Rawlings, Policing: A Short History (Cullompton: Willan, 2002), 196-197. 
42 ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1947, 30.  
43 See Report of the Committee on Police Conditions of Service, Part 1.  Cmd 7674, 1949, 90-91. 
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Discipline 
The Service Records contain details of disciplinary offences and punishment.  
However, in some instances where officers were required to resign as an alternative 
to dismissal, which was undoubtedly the consequence of a disciplinary offence, the 
details are not recorded.  Furthermore, as previously noted, there is no disciplinary 
record for those officers from Midlothian or Leith prior to their consolidation in 1920 
or for any transferee before they joined the force in Edinburgh.  Thus, whilst the 
Service Records remain the most detailed source in respect of discipline, statistics 
should be considered as indicative rather than precise.  
 
Up until 1920 disciplinary ‘incidences’, which could comprise a number of separate 
offences, were recorded in officers’ Service Records in general terms such as 
‘bringing the force into disrepute’.  However, as part of the 1920 Regulations issued 
by the Secretary for Scotland, a Discipline Code was issued and remained in force 
largely unaltered throughout the period under consideration (see Appendix ‘5’).  C. 
H. Rolph recalled that the Code was:  
 
A farrago of Thou Shalt Nots based on King’s Regulations as they governed 
the regular army at the time of the Peninsular War, though they exuded also a 
faint flavour of Cromwell’s Model Army.  They forbade you to do almost 
anything, and in case they might have forgotten something they added that 
you must not do anything “likely to bring discredit on the reputation of the 
force or of the Police Service.”  The effect was that almost any kind of 
conduct, on or off duty, which was not compulsory was prohibited.44 
 
Notwithstanding, disciplinary incidences continued to be recorded in the Service 
Records in similarly vague and general terms.  An amendment issued by the 
Secretary of State for Scotland in 1934 regarding the procedure to be adopted in 
disciplinary cases, however, stipulated that offences ‘must specify the section or 
sections of the Code under which the charge is made’. 45   For consistency, 
disciplinary incidences recorded in general terms on the Service Records have, so far 
as seems reasonable, been rationalised with those of the Discipline Code.  
                                                
44 C. H. Rolph, Living Twice: An Autobiography (London: Gollancz, 1974), 77. 
45 S.R.&O. (No. 658) (1934).  The Secretary for Scotland was created in 1885 and made a Secretary of 
State in 1926.  See 48 & 49 Vict, cap. 61 (1885)., 16 & 17 Geo. 5, cap. 18 (1926). 
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Existing studies have identified the repressive and arbitrary nature of discipline in the 
‘new’ police.  Given the recruitment from largely manual sections of the economy, it 
was believed that this would create a stable workforce.  In this sense, it was another 
aspect of ‘reactive underestimation’.  Harsh conditions prevailed until the stability of 
the workforce was threatened.  Every aspect of an officer’s working and private life 
was controlled.  The requirement to live in police accommodation, for example, was 
intended to allow officers to be recalled to duty at any time without pay and to 
facilitate surveillance of their private life.  Officers could not drink off-duty and were 
obliged to wear their uniform at all times, whilst church attendance was 
compulsory.46  The officer in charge of one Scottish force in the mid-nineteenth 
century wrote in a memorandum that he hoped those off duty on the Sabbath: 
 
will not fail to attend a Place of Worship and that all members of the Force, 
whether on duty or not will observe the Sabbath and all other moral duties 
according to the Divine Commands … [He further hoped] that the men in the 
Section House as well as the men on duty in the office will peruse the Bibles 
supplied for their use and he trusts that all men will read the Bibles in their 
families and single men in their lodgings...47 
 
The harsh regime led to many dismissals, especially for drink-related offences.  
Together with the low rate of pay in the era before the Desborough Committee, this 
created a rapid turnover of personnel.48  The paradox for police authorities and chief 
constables was, therefore, that the application of discipline contributed to instability 
in the workforce.  Nonetheless, and despite the introduction of the Code, discipline in 
the police remained, as one writer has argued, ‘extraordinarily harsh and pervasive’, 
even by the standards of the early twentieth century.49  In a letter to the Secretary of 
State for Scotland the Scottish Police Federation complained that chief constables 
continued to act in an ‘arbitrary’ and ‘high-handed’ way whilst ‘exercising their 
prerogative in disciplinary cases’.  The Police Federation concluded that ‘justice was 
                                                
46 Haia Shpayer-Makov, "Relinking Work and Leisure in Late Victorian and Edwardian England: The 
Emergence of a Police Subculture," International Review of Social History 47, no. 2 (2002): 217-218.  
47 Cited in 75th Anniversary Brochure, 50-51. 
48 cf. Goldsmith, "The Development of the City of Glasgow Police," 150-151., Critchley, A History of 
Police in England and Wales, 153. 
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administered in a partial and biased manner’, which continued to engender 
discontent.50   
 
The 1931 Manual reminded Scottish police officers of the necessity of:  
 
absolute obedience to all who are placed in authority over you, and rigid 
observation of every regulation made for your general conduct … Obey every 
order given to you by your superior officer without for a moment questioning 
the propriety of it.  You are not responsible for the order but for obedience.51   
 
At the same time a paradox existed whereby constables who were at the bottom of 
the hierarchy exercised discretion over operational policing.  Regardless of what they 
might be instructed to do constables could largely choose which offences to enforce 
or ignore whilst patrolling their beat.  Indeed, the 1928 Royal Commission on Police 
Powers and Procedure in England and Wales consistently recognised that it was 
‘impossible to issue hard and fast instructions’ given the ‘variety and complexity’ of 
the police role and that a constable’s power was vested in the individual.52  Williams 
has correctly identified that the tension between the need to control officers and 
complexity in the delivery of policing was managed by inculcating the development 
of self-discipline and the incentive of promotion.53   
 
Scottish constables were further urged in the 1931 Manual to discipline themselves 
to be:  ‘truthful in word and deed … [and] … temperate in his habits … maintain an 
equable temper … good order in his family …[and] … not contract debt …’.54  As 
Shpayer-Makov found, even the provision of leisure pursuits and competitions for 
police officers was, in addition to team spirit and collaboration, a means to ‘promote 
bourgeois ideals of self-reliance, self-restraint, industriousness, obedience to rules, 
and maximum effort’.55  There are, therefore, stark continuities across urban police 
forces in Britain between the Victorian era and the 1930s in the application of 
discipline in the police and the inculcation of self-discipline among officers.  
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Whereas constables chose which offences to enforce, senior officers also exercised 
discretion in dealing with disciplinary incidences.  As Klein found, having come 
through the ranks, many senior officers remained sympathetic to their subordinates 
and therefore ‘most minor problems were handled informally unless constables made 
a habit of breaking the rules after being advised to mend their ways’.56  The Service 
Records relating to officers in Edinburgh can, therefore, only ever be a partial 
measure of the actual extent of disciplinary incidences.   
 
Of all 820 officers who served in Edinburgh during the Second World War nearly 20 
per cent of are recorded as being the subject of discipline at some point in their 
service: between the earliest date an officer was recruited in 1899 and the date the 
last one left the force in 1969.  Some 80 per cent therefore had no disciplinary 
record.  Those who did were involved in 258 incidences.  Although the mean number 
of incidences was 1.6 the largest number committed by one officer during his service 
was seven.  As stated, each incidence could comprise a number of offences.  Thus, 
notwithstanding that these might be trivial, there was clearly some latitude that 
allowed officers to accumulate comparatively substantial disciplinary records whilst 
still remaining in the job.  Smale found that the chief constable in Edinburgh in the 
late nineteenth century was ‘remarkably lenient’ by comparison with those in the 
Scottish Borders in the matter of discipline relating to officers drinking on duty for 
example.  Some 42 officers who had been disciplined for being drunk on three 
occasions and four who had been disciplined seven times were not dismissed.57  By 
the twentieth century there was, therefore, a legacy of leniency in Edinburgh in 
relation to the disposal of disciplinary incidences.  Chief constables clearly had 
different views on the delivery of policing.  
 
It could be assumed that those most likely to offend would be officers who were 
early in their service and therefore had not become fully conversant with the rigid 
requirements.  Disciplinary incidences were, however, committed by officers at 
every level of service in years.  On the other hand, the general trend points to an 
inverse relationship between offending and increasing length of service.  Officers 
clearly became increasingly ordered or fully established the boundaries of acceptable 
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conduct.  It is also probable that officers were less likely to transgress towards the 
end of their police service as the prospect of securing their pension became more 
apparent.58 
 
In the pre-war era 131 officers are recorded as having committed 186 disciplinary 
incidences comprising 230 offences.  Put loosely, each officer disciplined was 
responsible for a mean of 1.4 incidences comprising 1.2 offences.  The rate of 
offending for the 802 officers who joined the police before the emergency was 
therefore 16.3 per cent.  As Table 2.5 demonstrates, the largest single category 
relates to neglect of duty, which could be anything from wilful or careless omission 
to idling and gossiping or failing to work the beat in accordance with orders.  This 
research thus confirms Klein’s finding in the period before 1939 that it constituted 
the majority of offences committed by officers.59  Given that the mean service of 
those committing disciplinary offences in the pre-war era was 10.9 years it seems 
unlikely that the offences were related to naiveté.   By the interwar period the 
demand on the police had increased exponentially in respect of a variety of activities 
that had little to do with their core role.  In exercising discretion or merely 
complacency there was therefore greater potential for an officer to neglect some 
requirement.  Whilst some were undoubtedly dealt with informally, it provided an 
opportunity for more zealous supervisors to pursue the formal process.   
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Discipline Code Offence Pre-war era 
During the  
Second World War  
Number % Number % 
1. Discreditable Conduct 29 12.6 15 15.8 
2. Insubordination or Oppressive 
Conduct  8 3.5 6 6.3 
3. Disobedience to Orders 6 2.6 2 2.1 
4. Neglect of Duty  84 36.5 24 25.3 
5. Falsehood or Prevarication 13 5.7 2 2.1 
6. Breach of Confidence 1 0.4 0 0.0. 
7. Corrupt Practice 2 0.9 1 1.0 
8. Unlawful or Unnecessary Exercise 
of 
Authority  
7 3.0 1 1.0 
9. Malingering 2 0.9 2 2.1 
10. Absence Without Leave or Late for 
Duty  9 3.9 3 3.2 
11. Uncleanliness 0 0.0 0 0.0 
12. Damage to Clothing or Other 
Articles Supplied 0 0.0 0 0.0 
13. Drunkenness 43 18.7 29 30.5 
14. Drinking on Duty or Soliciting 
Drink 12 5.2 3 3.2 
15. Entering Licensed Premises &c. 
While on duty 12 5.2 4 4.2 
16. Lending or Borrowing Money 0 0.0 0 0.0. 
17. Being found Guilty of Offence in 
Court 2 0.9 3 3.2 
Total  230 100.0 95 100.0 
Table 2.5 Disciplinary offences in the pre-war era and during  
the Second World War 
[Source: ECA ED006/13/1-22] 
 
The next largest and proximate category of offences related to alcohol.  For obvious 
reasons, the offences of being drunk on duty invariably went hand-in-hand with 
those of drinking on duty or soliciting drink, and entering licensed premises.  
Together these account for 29.1 per cent of all offences.  At times, an officer could 
also be charged with the associated offences of leaving the beat and bringing 
discredit on the police.  The incidence could clearly, therefore, give rise to a number 
of separate disciplinary offences depending on the interpretation of the circumstances 
by the chief constable.  In four instances between 1922 and 1924 officers were 
disciplined for being unfit for duty through drink whilst off duty and, at least in two 
of these, when they were in plain clothes.  Whilst it remained a disciplinary offence 
to be unfit for duty through drink when off duty until at least 1947, the absence of 
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any cases after 1924 suggests that either officers were not drinking off duty, which 
seems unlikely, or that supervisory officers had began to exercise discretion in this 
respect.  
 
Existing studies have identified that drink-related offences were the largest category 
of disciplinary action in the nineteenth century.60   The issue of officers drinking on 
duty in Edinburgh and elsewhere was of such concern that it was made a specific 
part of the annual inspection of police forces by HMICS.  Part of the explanation as 
to why policemen drank on duty relates to opportunity.  It was easy for an officer to 
succumb to the offer of a free drink from a publican who was keen to ensure that 
there was no adverse comment from the police with regard to the public house 
licence in addition to a prompt response to any trouble on the premises.  As a 
nineteenth century ballad from a policeman’s perspective mocked:  
 
The publicans have such a dread 
Whene’er the hour gets late 
My very strut does make them quake, 
When I am on my beat, 
I’ll levy fines whene’r I can, 
In fact I’ll never cease, 
I will torment them night and day … 61 
 
Klein found that drinking also alleviated the boredom of walking a beat for hours 
alone.62  It was also likely to have been considered a justifiable perk at times in the 
cycle of ‘reactive underestimation’ when police wages were comparatively low.  
Hard drinking also aligned with the emphasis on masculinity and toughness that was, 
as Emsley argued, part of policing.63  Whilst, as this study finds, it continued to be an 
issue in the 1930s and 1940s, its decline as the pre-eminent disciplinary problem was 
a reflection of the wider trend in society towards sobriety.  As one writer has argued, 
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there was a ‘gradual and temporarily interrupted long-term decline’ in alcohol 
consumption in Britain from the beginning of the twentieth century.64 
 
Notwithstanding the discretionary application of the Discipline Code, the 
introduction of the Regulations in 1920 regularised the punishments that could be 
imposed either singly or in combination for disciplinary offences.  Officers could, for 
example, be dismissed, required to resign, demoted, fined, reduced a number of 
classes (annual increment of pay), reprimanded, or cautioned.65  Whilst not specified 
in the Regulations, transferring an officer to another division was commonly used in 
combination with other forms of punishment as a disposal of disciplinary incidences 
in the period before the Second World War.  Part of the intention might have been to 
move the officer to somewhere where there was more supervision.  At the same time 
it could remove the officer from the proximity of anything associated with the 
offence, such as a public house or brewery.  On the other hand, it might have been 
intended to be an encumbrance by giving the officer further to travel to and from his 
place of work.   
 
Disposal Pre-war era During the Second World War 
Fine 41.0 33.3 
Transferred 18.0 13.0 
Reduction in class 13.0 17.9 
Reduction in money 7.9 4.8 
Severe reprimand 6.3 16.7 
Reprimand 4.6 1.2 
Other 5.0 0.0 
Suspended 2.9 1.2 
Demoted 1.3 0.0 
Dismissed 0.0 7.1 
Required to resign 0.0 4.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Table 2.6 Disposal of disciplinary incidences in the pre-war era and during 
the Second World War (%) 
[Source: ECA ED006/13/1-22] 
 
As Table 2.6 demonstrates, the most frequently used disposal in disciplinary 
incidences in the pre-war era was a fine.  Whilst the mean was 22s, individual 
amounts varied between 2s 6d and 90s.  Table 2.7 shows the scale of pay for 
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constables who joined after 1931, for example.  Thus, at its maximum, the fine could 
amount to over one week’s wages.  In other places the level of fine is recorded as 
anything from one day’s to one week’s pay.  Some officers were reduced an amount 
of money for six or 12 months.  Whilst the mean reduction was 4.3s per week, the 
maximum was 10s per week for six months, which was nearly three times the 
amount of the maximum fine.  On the basis of the rate of pay in 1931 it represented 
anything between five and eight per cent of a constable’s annual pay.  Even more 
potentially harsh was the reduction in ‘class’.  Although the mean was a reduction of 
5.3 classes, five officers found themselves reduced 10 classes for 12 months.  On the 
basis of the 1931 scales this represented a reduction of some 22 per cent of pay for a 
constable on the highest rate.  Thus, whilst no officers were dismissed for 
drunkenness or any other disciplinary offences in the pre-war era, some monetary 
punishments were anything but lenient.   
 
Length of police service Weekly rate in shillings 
On appointment 62s 
After 1 Year 65s 
After 2 years 67s 6d. 
After 3 years 70s 
After 4 years 72s 6d. 
After 5 years 75s. 
After 6 years 77s 6d. 
After 7 years 80s 
After 8 years 82s 
After 9 years 84s 
After 10 years 86s 
After 11 years 88s 
After 12 years 90s 
Table 2.7 Scale of pay for constables appointed after 30 September 1931 
[Source: Report of the Committee on Police Pay (New Entrants). Cmd 4274, 1931] 
 
Weinberger identifies a change in police discipline in England as a consequence of 
the Second World War.  On the one hand, the presence of auxiliaries brought a ‘new 
civilian attitude’.  One regular recalled that supervisory officers ‘had to treat them 
with kid gloves because they were just as likely to say “well you can go and …’’’.  
At the same time, supervisory officers were ‘overburdened’ with additional 
responsibilities and had ‘less time to look for minor transgressions’.66  Something of 
that change is evident in police memoirs.  St. Johnston, for example, recalled that a 
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senior officer in Chelsea, who had been refused permission to retire at the outbreak 
of war, became ‘slack and only did the bare minimum of work taking no interest in 
seeing that the job was done well or that the men were properly supervised’.67  Trist 
recounted the story of an officer drunk on duty falling through a window in Newton 
Abbot.  Whilst this would otherwise have led to dismissal he was, because of the 
demands of the emergency, fined, admonished, and transferred to a station to receive 
greater supervision from officers who were lay-preachers and strict teetotallers.68  In 
Edinburgh, Merrilees recalled that ‘the multiplicity of war-time duties kept me, like 
other police officers, constantly busy’.69  There was, therefore, a clear potential for 
the pattern of discipline in Edinburgh to be less strict than in the pre-war era.   
 
During the Second World War 57 officers in Edinburgh were disciplined in respect 
of 72 incidences comprising 95 offences.  Again put crudely, each officer disciplined 
was responsible for a mean of 1.2 incidences comprising 1.3 offences, which is 
remarkably similar to the pre-war period.  As a percentage of the 820 officers who 
served during the war the rate of offending was therefore 6.9 per cent.  Although this 
is much less than the pre-war ratio the timescales are clearly different.  Whilst the 
war lasted six years, disciplinary incidences in the pre-war era have been calculated 
from the earliest in 1910 until 1939.  On the basis of a per-year calculation of the 
number of officers disciplined, the number of incidences, and the number of 
offences, there was approximately twice as many in each category during the war 
than before.  Officers were therefore either committing more serious transgressions 
or senior officers had become stricter in following the formal process for 
circumstances that had previously been resolved informally.   
 
Table 2.5 demonstrates that drunk on duty and its associated disciplinary offences 
became the largest category during the war.  Together they comprised 37.9 per cent 
of all offences.  Neglect of duty, meanwhile, was the second largest at 25.3 per cent, 
which represents a reversal of the pre-war trend.  At the same time, the possibility 
that more officers were drinking on duty during the war contradicts the trend in 
society: as will be seen in relation to operational policing, public drunkenness 
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decreased during the war due to the shortage of alcohol and conscription of those 
who produced and consumed it.  Part of the explanation for the increase in police 
officers drinking on duty might be related to the pressure of policing the home front.  
There was in relation to sickness, however, no increase in the incidence of 
psychological disorders during the war.  On the other hand, it might have been the 
case that officers were more predisposed to take a drink on duty in the belief that 
senior officers were preoccupied with war-related duties and therefore less concerned 
with the application of the Discipline Code.   
 
The relative increase in the number of officers disciplined, incidences, and offences 
during the war suggests that Morren was more concerned to enforce discipline than 
in the pre-war period.  Indeed, Table 2.6 shows that, whilst a fine remained the most 
frequently used form of disposal, there was a notable and hitherto unprecedented use 
of dismissal and requiring officers to resign.  Given the added pressures on capacity 
during the war it might be assumed that Morren would do everything to retain 
officers, especially in circumstances where their loss was otherwise avoidable.  
Probably for this reason suspension from duty was used more sparingly than in the 
pre-war era.  Yet the disposal in nearly 12 per cent of incidences involved dismissal 
or the requirement to resign.  Although one officer was dismissed on the grounds of 
being unlikely to become an efficient officer, the others related to disciplinary 
offences including drunkenness, discreditable conduct, neglect of duty, malingering, 
being absent without leave, being found guilty of an offence in court, failing to 
account for property, and assaulting a member of the force.  Whilst the specific 
circumstances of the incidences are unknown, there is nothing on the face of it that 
was not part of the pattern of incidences in the pre-war era.  Whilst the mean length 
of service of these officers was 12 years, two had over 20 years’ service.   
 
The apparently more strident attitude to punishment might therefore be the 
consequence of an expectation by Morren that, given the wartime pressure on 
capacity and lack of supervision, officers with comparatively lengthy police service 
should have demonstrated more self-discipline, especially where discharge could 
render some liable to conscription to the armed services.  In that sense, the 
incidences would be perceived as being aggravated by a breach of trust worthy of 
more condign punishment than would have been the case in peacetime.  This 
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research thus suggests a contradiction during the war with Klein’s finding in the pre-
war era that ‘probationers were treated more strictly than veterans’ in the application 
of discipline.70 
 
Leaving the force 
One of the consequences of ‘reactive underestimation’ was recurring instability in 
the police workforce.  Existing studies have identified a high rate of turnover from 
the creation of the ‘new’ police.  Some forces consistently had to re-stock entirely.71  
With improvements in conditions and increasing status, however, the number leaving 
voluntarily in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries decreased.72  At the 
same time, the continued harsh conditions and certainty of exposure led many 
otherwise healthy officers to leave because of ill-health.73   
 
The 1921 Police Pensions Act gave effect to the recommendations of the 
Desborough Committee with regard to the age of retirement and entitlement to 
superannuation for members of a police force.74  In general terms, it was compulsory 
for constables and sergeants to retire on attaining the age of 55, superintendents and 
inspectors at 60, and chief constables and assistant chief constables at 65.  The age 
differentials for ranks in the legislation was likely a reflection of the recognition that 
those lowest in the hierarchy had to endure the harshest conditions on the beat, whilst 
increasingly senior officers had more of an administrative role.   
 
All regular officers were entitled to retire on pension after 25 years’ service, after 10 
years’ on medical certificate, or if incapacitated by injury on duty.  Those who had 
not completed 10 years’ service could retire on medical certificate and receive a 
gratuity.75  For officers retiring under normal circumstances, for example, a pension 
of one-half of wages was payable after 25 years’ service and two-thirds after 30 
years’ (see Appendix ‘6’).  Of the 801 officers who served in Edinburgh during the 
war whose date of leaving is known, 432 had completed between 25 and 30 years’ 
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service, whilst a further 179 had completed between 31 and 43 years’ service.  Over 
three-quarters therefore had sufficient service for a pension and all but 88 were 
constables.  Thus, this research appears to confirm Klein’s finding that most 
constables ‘managed to qualify for their pensions’.76  
 
The 1920 Regulations specified that the cause of an officer leaving the force should 
be recorded as: pensioned on completion of service; pensioned in consequence of an 
injury received on duty; pensioned on account of ill-health; discharged on gratuity on 
account of ill-health; resigned; required to resign; dismissed; or discharged as 
unlikely to become an efficient constable.77  A large number of variations have, 
however, been recorded on the Service Records.  Although some categories are 
unambiguous, it is clear that those making the entries used others erroneously in 
places.  Whilst an officer had clearly completed the required amount of service for a 
pension, for example, the entry might, nonetheless, show that they ‘resigned’.  
Furthermore, although not a specified category, some are recorded as having 
transferred to another force, whilst others who ‘resigned’ were, in reality, also 
transferring.   The Regulations also do not specify a category for those who died 
whilst in service or were killed or reported as missing in action whilst on release to 
the armed services.  An attempt has therefore been made to rationalise the entries in 
the Service Records on the basis of what seems reasonable to construct an indicative 
picture.  
 
As Table 2.8 shows, of the 801 officers whose reason for leaving the force is 
recorded, a total of 64.4 per cent were pensioned on completion of service.  A further 
30 of those recorded as having resigned without health-related issues had completed 
between 25 and 33 years’ service, which suggests that in some, if not all instances, 
their Service Record should have shown that they had been pensioned on completion 
of service.  Thus, by any measure, the majority of officers who served in the police 
in Edinburgh during the Second World War retired from the force.  In that respect 
the police workforce was stable by comparison with the general pattern in police 
forces in the early and mid-nineteenth century.  
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Cause  




Number  % Number  % 
Pensioned on completion of service 54 29.8 462 74.5 
Pensioned on account of ill-health  49 27.1 13 2.1 
Discharged on gratuity on account of ill-
health 0 0.0 1 0.2 
Resigned 29 16.0 94 15.2 
Required to resign 4 2.2 3 0.5 
Dismissed 6 3.3 2 0.3 
Died  10 5.5 31 5.0 
Killed/Missing in Action  
(armed Forces) 19 10.5 0 0.0 
Resigned on account of ill-health 7 3.9 3 0.5 
Transferred 3 1.7 11 1.8 
Total  181 100.0 620 100.0 
* The last officer who had served during the Second World War left the force in May 1969. 
Table 2.8  Cause of leaving the force during the Second World War and in 
the post-war era 
[Source: ECA ED006/13/1-22] 
 
At same time, resignations and ill-health continued to cause instability which had 
managerial implications for operational capacity.  In both cases the general pattern 
during the Second World War was different from that which prevailed over the 
period of service for the remainder of officers who served in the police in Edinburgh 
during the war.  The 93 officers recorded as having resigned with less than 25 years’ 
service had a mean service of 11.7 years.  For many, resigning was, therefore, not the 
immediate reaction to joining the force and deciding that the conditions were not 
tolerable.  Indeed, with the mode being 10 years service, they were clearly 
accustomed to the requirements, which suggests that other ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors 
were significant.   
 
Over 71 months during the Second World War 27 officers with less than 25 years’ 
service resigned.  Put roughly, the monthly rate of attrition to resignation in relation 
to these officers was therefore 0.38.  Of these, 22 resigned after the introduction of 
the Police and Firemen (Scotland) (Employment) Order 1940, made under Defence 
Regulation 29B, which prevented constables serving in a whole-time capacity from 
leaving except with the consent of the chief constable and was, therefore, intended 
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by central government to maintain the capacity of the police.78  Given that they came 
from a wide range of previous occupations there is no obvious pattern to suggest that 
resignations during the war were, for example, related to other aspects of the war 
effort on the home front.  One officer with three years’ service had formerly been a 
musician, for example, another with eight years’ service had been a theatre attendant 
whilst a third with 21 years’ service had been a clerk.  Given the pressure on capacity 
it would be reasonable for Morren to have used the power under the Order to reject 
the resignations.  On the other hand, given the potential expectation that officers 
would exercise a greater degree of self-discipline during the war than previously, he 
might have been of the view that it was better not to retain those who were 
disenchanted.  Thus, Morren used discretion in the application of the restrictions on 
leaving the police during the war.   
 
The monthly rate of attrition to resignations at least tripled in the immediate 
aftermath of the war however.  In his 1947 Report, Morren advised that, 
notwithstanding the appointment of 125 officers that year, 71 others had resigned 
including 33 recruited since the end of the war.79  The Service Records, meanwhile, 
indicate that over 39 months in the period between the end of hostilities and the 
implementation in July 1949 of the pay rise recommended by the Oaksey 
Committee, 48 officers with less than 25 years’ service resigned.  As before, there is 
no commonality in relation to their previous occupations to suggest they left to go to 
specific industries.  One officer with seven years’ service had been a baker, whilst 
another with 17 years’ service had been a reporter, and a third with 22 years’ service 
had been a farm servant.   
 
Part of the explanation for the resignations might have been a reaction to the 
apparently stricter application of discipline during the war.  At the same time, it was 
undoubtedly a consequence of the cycle of ‘reactive underestimation’.  Many of 
those who resigned did so because police pay had again failed to keep pace with the 
cost of living.  As the Oaksey Committee noted, ‘general comparisons with other 
occupations in which conditions of work are in any way comparable indicate that the 
police are at present underpaid’.  Given the context of full employment in the 
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immediate post-war period, the committee noted there was ‘ample opportunity of 
transferring to work that makes fewer demands, seems more congenial or offers 
more immediate financial reward’.80  The police was therefore a less attractive 
employment option in the immediate post-war period for those men with other 
opportunities than it had been in the period after the Desborough Committee.  In 
effect, for those concerned with the governance of the police, attracting recruits 
became more difficult in the immediate aftermath of the war.   
 
Some of those who resigned, however, did so because of ill-health.  Together with 
those who otherwise left on the grounds of ill-health they comprise 9.1 per cent of 
those whose reasons for leaving the force are known.  Although 31 of these officers 
had over 30 years’ service and were therefore eligible to retire on the maximum 
pension of two-thirds, it cannot be assumed that they had simply been categorised 
wrongly on their Service Record as retiring with ill-health rather than because of it.  
One officer who served during the war had 43 years’ service by the time he left the 
force.  Put simply, even though they had completed enough service to gain a pension 
it was possible for regular officers, provided they were under the compulsory age of 
retirement, to leave the force on the grounds of ill-health.  Given that preventative 
policing in Edinburgh was premised on beat patrol until at least the 1980s and 
officers thus continued to be subject to exposure to the elements, it would be 
unsurprising if some did not succumb to associated ailments, especially those who 
had endured it for a lengthy period.  The mean service of those who left on the 
grounds of ill-health was 25.1 years.  In general terms, they were, therefore, older 
officers.  Those who left the force on ill-health were, however, clearly in the 
minority.  This research therefore again confirms the finding of Klein’s pre-war 
study.81   
 
The majority of the officers who served in the police in Edinburgh during the Second 
World War who left on the grounds of ill-health did so during the war and the pattern 
was therefore the reverse of that relating to ordinary resignations.  Put crudely, the 
monthly rate of attrition to ill-health was over 1200 per cent greater during the war 
than in the post-war period.  Part of the explanation relates to the compulsory 
                                                
80 Cmd 7674, 10, 90. 
81 Klein, Invisible Men, 297. 
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retention of officers suffering from ill-health beyond the point where they otherwise 
would have been released and until their health broke down completely.  The 
incidence of sickness would, therefore, clearly have been greater than that indicated 
by the Service Records.  Indeed, at the end of the war Morrren compared the level of 
sickness with that of 1938 and found that the average number of days lost for regular 
officers had increased from 10.0 to 15.3 as a consequence of ‘wartime conditions and 
the fact that the Force is generally composed of older men’, which undoubtedly 
impacted on operational capacity and effectiveness.82  
 
Conclusion  
The evidence suggests that the application of discipline became stricter during the 
war.  Whilst the extent to which this was a ‘push’ factor is unknown, it is clear that 
the cycle of ‘reactive underestimation’ precipitated a dramatic increase in 
resignations in the immediate post-war era.  The improvements made by the 1919 
Act had, by then, been eroded and once the power to retain officers compulsorily had 
been revoked many took the opportunity to leave for employment that was both 
better paid and had less harsh attendant conditions.  In effect, attracting recruits to 
the police became harder in the immediate aftermath of the war.   
 
The chapter also demonstrates that some of the antecedent characteristics of recruits 
to the force in Edinburgh changed over the period under consideration.  For example, 
the decline in those from rural areas of Scotland and those employed as agricultural 
labourers and farm servants was most likely a consequence of the increasing 
complexity of policing.  Recruits were increasingly drawn from clerical occupations 
that were more likely to be located in an urban environment, especially Edinburgh.   
 
The significant conclusion to be drawn from this chapter, however, is that whilst the 
profile of police officers had evolved since the nineteenth century in consequence of 
the demands of policing, it changed dramatically in response to the Second World 
War.  On the one hand, the restriction on retirement meant that those who would 
otherwise have been superannuated were retained.  At the same time younger regular 
officers were released to the armed services and industry.  Those recruited during the 
                                                
82 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1945, 4. 
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war were also older due to the conscription of younger men to the armed forces and 
essential civilian services.  In general, police officers serving during the war were 
older than otherwise would have been the case.  Furthermore, given both the 
restriction on leaving and that the Service Records do not point to an increase in the 
incidence of sickness, the high rate of those who left on ill-health suggests that some 
officers, for whatever reason, continued to work whilst they were unfit and up until 
the point where there was no alternative but to release them.  In addition, although 
auxiliaries were recruited to assist the majority were not trained to the same extent as 
regular officers nor were they as experienced.  Thus, even without the additional 
demands of policing the home front, the operational capacity of the police in 
Edinburgh to carry out preventative and the more technical aspects of policing in 
particular was diminished by comparison with the pre-war period.  As a 
consequence, as will be seen, officers at both the strategic and tactical level utilised 
discretion whilst aspects of core policing and the regulation of road traffic were 
either not carried out to the same extent that they had been in the interwar period or 





The Police Authority 
By the Defence Regulations the Secretary of State for Scotland was empowered to 
give chief constables and police authorities ‘such general or special instruction as 
appears to him necessary or expedient in the interests of public safety, the Defence of 
the Realm, the maintenance of public order or the efficient prosecution of the war’.  
Critchley has argued that this put chief constables ‘for the first time in the history of 
the police … under the formal authority (as opposed to the informal) authority’ of 
central government.1  Indeed, the City Prosecutor, James Mill, contemporarily viewed 
the provisions as giving the Secretary of State for Scotland ‘drastic powers over the 
police’.  The Secretary of State, Mill pointed out, ‘is to be regarded as the official head 
and central coordinating authority of the Scottish Police’.2  In effect, the Defence 
Regulations supplanted the ‘tripartite’ form of police governance as it had evolved by 
the second decade of the twentieth century.3   
 
In general terms, until then central government made regulations concerning pay and 
conditions and provided a subvention of 50 per cent whereas chief constables 
exercised operational control.  The police authority, meanwhile, was responsible for 
‘maintaining’ the force in terms of personnel and infrastructure and provided the 
remaining 50 per cent of finance through local taxation.4  Notwithstanding, there were 
significant areas of overlapping power and authority, which was a consequence of the 
compromise between the conflicting principles that underpinned the creation of the 
                                                
1 Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales, 228. 
2 Mill, The Scottish Police, 18. 
3 ‘Governance’ is simply conceived here as the mechanism that exercises control and coordination 
over policy and the allocation of resources to provide for the delivery of services.  See R. J Morris, 
"Governance: Two Centuries of Urban Growth," in Urban Governance: Britain and Beyond Since 
1750, ed. R. J. Morris and Richard H. Trainor (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 1-14., Mark Bevir and R. 
A. W. Rhodes, "Searching for Civil Society: Changing Patterns of Governance in Britain," Public 
Administration 81, no. 1 (2003): 41-62., Interpreting British Governance (London: Routledge, 2003), 
6. 
4 The ‘police authority’ refers to the local government aspect of police governance in Scotland.  
During the nineteenth century it was variously known as the ‘police board’ and ‘police committee’.  
By 1939 it was usually referred to by the Secretary of State for Scotland as the ‘police authority’.  
Contemporary newspaper reports, however, continued to utilise all the terms interchangeably.  In 
England, with the exception of the Metropolitan Police where the Home Secretary was the ‘police 
authority’, it was known in borough forces as the ‘watch committee’.  In English county forces it was 
known as the ‘police committee’, then, after 1889 as the ‘standing joint committee’.  See Emsley, The 
English Police, 250.  
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‘new’ police forces.  On the one hand, there was the perception of the need for an 
effective system of police to protect property in particular whilst, on the other, there 
was a fear of creating an instrument that would infringe personal liberty.  The resulting 
relatively fragmented way in which local forces evolved and developed with 
increasingly national underpinnings created problems of a lack of definition around 
specific responsibilities and accountability that persists in 2016.5 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider police governance in Edinburgh and whether 
this altered as a consequence of the Defence Regulations.  Specifically, the chapter 
analyses power dynamics in relation to the police authority.  Whilst the general 
overview of the roles of central government and the chief constable in the model of 
police governance is drawn from the existing historiography, the specific analysis of 
the police authority in Edinburgh is based on empirical research: principally, the 
minutes of the town council and the Lord Provost’s Committee.  Given the way in 
which the relationship between aspects of police governance developed, a longitudinal 
approach has been adopted to show transformation across time.   
 
The chapter establishes that a complex and overlapping pattern of power, authority, 
and interdependence existed at all levels of police governance, especially between the 
police authority, the town council, and its network of committees.  Furthermore, 
notwithstanding specific wartime factors that undermined stability in the committees, 
continuity in outcomes was maintained.  In this regard the Lord Provost occupied the 
pivotal role.  Thus, whilst central government exercised its power under the Defence 
Regulations elsewhere in Scotland and England and Wales and in other contexts to, in 
effect, supplant the existing system of governance during the war, the police authority 
in Edinburgh remained a significant actor in the structure of local policing.  As it was 
elsewhere in Britain and at other times, power in relation to the governance of the 
police in Edinburgh during the Second World War was negotiated in the interaction 
between local and central government.   
                                                
5 Whilst the 1960 Royal Commission was established, in part, to consider the constitutional position 
of the police throughout Britain and the arrangements for their control and administration, HMICS 
argued in 2011 that the resulting 1967 Act exacerbated the weaknesses in governance and 
accountability.  See Andrew Laing and Emma Fossey, "Governance and Accountability of Policing in 
Scotland: A Discussion Paper by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (Abridged),"(Edinburgh: The 
Scottish Government, 2011), 3. The problem remains unresolved in the second decade of the twenty-
first century in the relationship between Police Scotland and its unitary authority. 
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Overview of central government in the governance structure  
By comparison with the other actors, it is easy to determine the official position of 
central government in the structure of police governance since this was largely based 
on legislation and maintained through government circulars.  It is, however, more 
difficult to determine the extent to which these were adhered to in practice at the local 
level.  Much of the historical record in this regard is implicit at best, obscuring the 
subtle shifts in dynamics between the social actors at any specific point in time.   
 
The dominant trend relating to central government in the governance structure of the 
policing is one of increasing intervention.  In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries central government was largely content to allow Scottish civic elites to 
determine whether a system of police was required and its format.  Local initiatives, 
which mirrored much of the improvement legislation in England, were, however, 
dependent on Parliament for the acts that conferred the necessary power.6  At the same 
time, in the pre-reform era when many municipal authorities were run by self-
perpetuating oligarchies, the creation of police commissions conferred a measure of 
local political power.7  One consequence of the dual system of administration was that 
it precipitated power struggles for control of the police throughout Scotland.  In 
Edinburgh, one struggle raged between 1820-22 over who had power over the 
superintendent in charge of the police.8   
 
                                                
6 David G. Barrie, "Anglicization and Autonomy: Scottish Policing, Governance and the State, 1833 
to 1855," Law and History Review 30, no. 2 (2012): 465. 
7 For the example of the self-elected corporation in Glasgow see T. M. Devine, "Urbanisation and the 
Civic Response: Glasgow 1800-30," in Industry, Business and Society in Scotland Since 1700: Essays 
Presented to Professor John Butt, ed. John Butt, T. M. Devine, and A. J. G. Cummings (Edinburgh: J. 
Donald, 1994), 183-196., Irene Maver, "Politics and Power in the Scottish City: Glasgow Town 
Council in the Nineteenth Century," in Scottish Elites: Proceedings of the Scottish Historical Studies 
Seminar, University of Strathclyde, 1991-1992, ed. T. M. Devine (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1994)., 
"The Guardianship of the Community: Civic Authority Before 1833," in Glasgow. Vol. 1, Beginnings 
to 1830, ed. T. M. Devine and Gordon Jackson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 
239-277.  
8 McGowan, Policing the Metropolis of Scotland, 220-223, 235., In Aberdeen, see Rosemary Tyzack, 
"'No Mean City'? The Growth of Civic Consciousness in Aberdeen with Particular Reference to the 
Work of the Police Commissioners," in The City and its Worlds: Aspects of Aberdeen's History Since 
1794, ed. Terence Brotherstone and Donald J. Withrington (Glasgow: Cruithne, 1996), 351-371. In 
Dundee, see Louise Miskell, "From Conflict to Co-operation: Urban Improvement and the Case of 
Dundee, 1790-1850," Urban History 29, no. 3 (2002). In Glasgow, see David G. Barrie, "'Epoch 
Making' Beginning to Lingering Death: The struggle for Control of the Glasgow Police Commission, 
1833-46," The Scottish Historical Review LXXXVI, 2, no. 222 (2007). 
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As part of the general shift in thinking on social policy in the late nineteenth century 
central government increasingly sought power from Parliament to intervene in 
municipal affairs.9  By comparison with earlier permissive legislation, Scottish police 
acts echoed provisions in England in becoming increasingly authoritarian.10  The 1857 
Act, for example, obliged county areas to set up and maintain forces and, in a 
precursor to the early twentieth century, gave the Secretary for Scotland the power to 
make regulations for the new forces.11  The Act also established central government 
strategy, expressed in successive acts, to reduce the number of forces through 
amalgamation.12  Most significantly, the Act empowered the Secretary for Scotland to 
inspect all forces for efficiency in return for a grant of 25 per cent towards the cost of 
pay and clothing.  Whilst this might have been intended to compensate local 
authorities for the loss of autonomy, it established the precedent of the periphery’s 
fiscal dependency on the centre in relation to local policing.  The power of central 
government was, however, confined to withholding the grant.13  In any event, some 
forces refused to accept the grant and therefore remained outwith the system of 
inspection until the Second World War.  Similarly, despite immediate attempts to 
coerce smaller forces to amalgamate by certifying them as inefficient, some resisted 
amalgamation until well into the twentieth century.  The power of central government 
over municipal policing in the late nineteenth century therefore remained limited in 
practice.   
 
                                                
9 Graeme Morton, "Civil Society, Municipal Government and the State: Enshrinement, Empowerment 
and Legitimacy. Scotland, 1800-1929," Urban History 25, no. 3 (1998): 363.  For a critique of the 
existence of laissez-faire see J. B. Brebner, "Laissez Faire and State Intervention in Nineteenth 
Century Britain," Economic History 8 (1948). 
10 For a summary of some of the legislation see R. M. Urquhart, The Burghs of Scotland and The 
Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1833, The Police of Towns (Scotland) Act 1850, The General Police and 
Improvement (Scotland) Act 1862: An Introductory Note (Motherwell: Scottish Library Association, 
1992)., The Burghs of Scotland and The Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1833 (3 & 4 Will. IV c.46) 
(Motherwell: Scottish Library Association, 1989)., The Burghs of Scotland and The Police of Towns 
(Scotland) Act 1850 (13 & 14 Vict. c.33) (Motherwell: Scottish Library Association, 1989)., The 
Burghs of Scotland and The General Police and Improvement (Scotland) Act 1862 ("The Lindsay 
Act") (25 & 26 Vict. c.101) (Motherwell: Scottish Library Association, 1991). 
11 20 & 21 Vict, cap. 72 (1857). 
12 See especially 55 & 56 Vict, cap. 55 (1892).  
13 James Moore and Richard Rodger, "Who Really Ran the Cities? Municipal Knowledge and Policy 
Networks in British Local Government, 1832-1914," in Who Ran the Cities?: City Elites and Urban 
Power Structures in Europe and North America, 1750-1940, ed. Robert Beachy and Ralf Roth 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 55. 
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The 1919 Act represented a much stronger element in the movement towards 
standardisation and central direction however.14  Dixon recalled that it was the 
‘integrating influence par-excellence’.15  It gave the Secretary for Scotland wide-
ranging powers to make regulations.  It thus marked the clear transition from local 
agency in determining the conditions of police forces to one where these were set 
nationally.  The government grant was also increased to 50 per cent to fully meet the 
cost of maintaining police forces thereby increasing further the fiscal dependency of 
local authorities on the centre.16  Indeed, until 1946 police authorities in Scotland 
required prior approval for even the most minor expenditure.17  At the same time, as 
the 1928 Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure in England and Wales 
noted, circulars issued by central government had come to be regarded by chief 
constables as virtually mandatory.18   
 
In the decades before the introduction of the Defence Regulations central government, 
therefore, had established a pattern of increasing its powers to acquire de facto control 
of local police forces.  Yet, as will be seen in the discussion of Edinburgh in relation to 
the introduction of women police, the Secretary of State for Scotland clearly remained 
dependent on the police authority for the implementation of policy.  What is 
immediately noticeable in the historical record of the interaction between the two 
political actors is that there is little general evidence of change in the operating 
procedure or language after the introduction of the Defence Regulations compared to 
that in the immediate pre-war period.  Central government and the police authority 
continued to defer to each other for matters within their respective purviews in relation 
                                                
14 Reiner, The Politics of the Police, 52. 
15 Arthur L Dixon, "The Home Office and the Police between the World Wars,"(Unpublished 1966), 
257.  Subsequent to the Desborough Committee, Dixon was placed in charge of the newly formed 
Police Division of the Home Office to work out the practicalities of implementation.  The ‘Home 
Office and the Police’ relates to this period and has much the feel of a memoir and is therefore 
considered a primary source.  During the Second World War he was charged with the task of creating 
a National Fire Service.  ‘The Emergency Work of the Police Forces’ thus contains references to 
issues with which he had no direct involvement and is therefore considered a secondary source.  See 
T. A. Critchley, "Dixon, Sir Arthur Lewis (1881-1969)," in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
ed. H.C.G Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
16 The Desborough Committee Report noted that the grant had been increased to 50 per cent at some 
time prior to March 1919.  See Cmd 7674, 17-18.  Dixon outlines how the increase occurred in 
relation to England and Wales.  See Dixon, "The Home Office and the Police between the World 
Wars," 59-61.  The Police Supplementary Government Contribution Rules, 17 November 1919, state 
that the grant is intended to meet the one-half of the net total expenditure of police forces.  See NRS 
HH55/498.  
17 See NRS HH55/498, Circular 6425, 5 October 1946.   
18 Cmd 3297, 16. 
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to even the most commonplace administrative issues.  Administrative power in 
relation to the governance of the police therefore continued to be negotiated in the 
interaction between central and local government.   
 
Part of the explanation was undoubtedly related to the ethos of the two Secretaries of 
State that were in office for all but 12 months of the Second World War.  David John 
Colville, in office from May 1938 to May 1940 and therefore over the first eight 
months of the war, was, according to George Pottinger, ‘determined to be fair to all 
points of view’ and to ‘direct business with acceptance’.19  In a similar vein, despite 
being associated with Red Clydeside, the Labour MP and ex-regional Commissioner 
for Scotland, Tom Johnston, in office from February 1941 to May 1945 and therefore 
for the majority of the war, was, according to David Torrance, a ‘zealous advocate of 
government by consent’.20  Indeed, as Johnston himself recalled, the Advisory Council 
he established, consisting of all previous Secretaries of State, was an ‘experiment in 
political cooperation’. 21  Thus, notwithstanding the Defence Regulations, it was 
unlikely that either Colville or Johnston would be anything other than politically 
pluralist. 
 
Overview of chief constables in the governance structure  
The dominant theme in the largely English-based historiography of chief constables in 
the governance structure is one of growing professionalism and increasing autonomy 
in operational matters.  Notwithstanding the difficulty of periodising systems of 
police, one of the significant characteristics of the ‘new’ forces was that they were 
under hierarchical command.  By 1812 in Edinburgh the ‘Superintendant’ in charge of 
the police in Edinburgh was in direct operational control without 'direction from 
political or judicial authority’.22  One scholar has argued that by the mid-nineteenth 
century the image of a professional, disciplined police hierarchy was more or less 
                                                
19 George Pottinger, The Secretaries of State for Scotland, 1926-76: Fifty Years of the Scottish Office 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979), 78.  The remaining Secretaries of State for Scotland 
during the Second World War were: Ernest Brown, May 1940-February 1941; Harry Primrose, May-
August 1945; Joseph Westwood, August 1945-October 1947. 
20 David Torrance, The Scottish Secretaries (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2006), 52. 
21 Thomas Johnston, Memories (London: Collins, 1952), 169. 
22 McGowan, Policing the Metropolis of Scotland, i, 1, 107, 340. 
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consolidated throughout Britain.23  Others have pointed out that by the late Victorian 
period the police ‘increasingly insisted on their status as professionals’.24 
 
Part of the explanation in Scotland is related to the previously noted change in the 
definition of ‘police’ and profile of personnel.  At the same time, the increase in 
operational autonomy was a consequence of the activities of central government.  Its 
deployment of concepts of ‘efficiency’ and ‘national security’ in the early twentieth 
century, whilst simultaneously assuming increased responsibility for the training and 
appointment of chief officers, reinforced the culture of professionalism.25  Together 
with judicial pronouncements in the first decades of the twentieth century that 
reinforced the doctrine of constabulary independence, police authorities increasingly 
withdrew from the governance of the more technical aspects of policing leaving chief 
constables in executive control.26  
 
Probably for this reason, following his appointment as chief constable in 1935, 
Morren’s annual reports to the town council were much shorter and contain far less 
detail than his predecessor.  By the time he retired Ross had been in office for 35 years 
and the pattern of his interaction with the town council had therefore been established 
before some of the developments that increased further the autonomy of chief 
constables.  Yet, as will be seen, given the hierarchy of fiscal dependency, Morren 
remained dependent on the police authority for the provision of the most minor piece 
of equipment or infrastructure.  At the same time, the police authority acquiesced to 
almost everything he requested, which was undoubtedly a reflection of his perceived 
expertise.   
 
  
                                                
23 Reiner, The Politics of the Police, 53. 
24 Clapson and Emsley, "Street, Beat and Respectability," 126. 
25 Williams argued that the process was fully consolidated by the corruption scandals of the 1950s.  
See Williams, "Britain's Police Forces: Forever Removed from Democratic Control?".  
26 Lustgarten, The Governance of Police, 49.  By 1960 the Royal Commission on the Police saw the 
question of controlling the police as one of ‘controlling chief constables’.  Notwithstanding, the police 
in Scotland were bound to obey the lawful instructions of the sheriff and magistrates with regard to 
the maintenance of public order and the prosecutor in relation to criminal investigations.  The Royal 
Commission concluded that assertions of Constabulary Independence in Scotland had therefore been 
more cautious than England.  See Report of the Royal Commission on the Police. Cmd 1728, 1962, 
23-24, 34.   
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Given that the majority of urban chief constables had risen through the ranks, one of 
the distinguishing features of their relationship with their police authorities in the early 
twentieth century was that it was perceived to be one of ‘professional expert and local 
paymaster’.27  In this sense, in the context of the response to the demands of 
increasingly complex urban societies, the ascent of chief constables paralleled that of 
professionals in other areas of municipal government.28  Having risen through the 
ranks Morren clearly fits the profile of urban chief constables and there is no evidence 
in the period under consideration that the police authority in Edinburgh treated him as 
anything other than the professional police officer.29  By contrast, county chief 
constables were less likely to have police experience; rather, they were drawn from the 
landed gentry, former army officers, or ex-colonials and were, like the local authority, 
therefore, part of the feudal structure.30  As St. Johnston in Oxfordshire during the war 
recalled: ‘One of the real pleasures of being a County Chief Constable has always 
been the invitations to most, if not all of the big houses’ such as Blenheim or 
Tusmore.31 
 
Thus although chief constables had, by the early twentieth century, acquired power 
outwith emergencies to make autonomous operational decisions, they remained 
dependent on the police authority as ‘gatekeeper’ for applications to central 
government for approval of grant expenditure.  In the majority of cases the police 
authority, however, approved the recommendations made by the chief constable.  As 
with its relationship with central government, therefore, the police authority negotiated 
power in relation to the police force through the interaction with the chief constable. 
  
                                                
27 Michael Brogden, The Police: Autonomy and Consent (London: Academic Press, 1982), 155. 
28 Moore and Rodger, "Who Really Ran the Cities? ," 39.   
29 For Morren’s Service Record see ECA ED6/13/14(2). 
30 In 1920 Desborough recommended that no person without previous police experience should be 
appointed as chief constable unless he had some exceptional qualification or there was no other 
candidate.  See Cmd 574, 11.  Notwithstanding, by 1939 90.4 per cent of English county chief 
constables had not come through the ranks compared with 5.1 per cent of borough chief constables.  
See Reiner, Chief Constables, 14-15.  In Scotland, although the percentage of those who did not have 
police experience in the 42 chief constables of the 48 forces examined under the 1857 Act is 
unknown, only 12.5 per cent of those in counties and 5.5 per cent of those in burghs in 1939 had a 
military title.  cf Stallion and Wall, The British Police.   
31 St. Johnston, One Policeman's Story, 68. 
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Edinburgh Town Council, the police authority, and power-
interdependence 
By an Act of 1856 the powers and responsibilities of commissioners in Edinburgh 
with respect to the ‘Watching Force’ were transferred to the town council.32  Although 
this rectified the problem of dual administration that had characterised the creation and 
development of ‘new’ police forces, it has to be viewed in the context of the enormous 
expansion of municipal power in response to the growing complexity of urban society.  
As Barry Doyle has pointed out: ‘local government took on a bewildering array of 
powers’ in Britain between 1830 and 1940, much of it as a consequence of local 
initiative.33  The assertion that the centre acquired power unilaterally in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries therefore requires modification.  In addition to the other social 
actors in the model of police governance there was, however, a complex pattern of 
power-interdependence within Edinburgh Town Council in relation to the police 
authority.  
 
As a consequence of the expansion of municipal functions, the number of single-issue 
council committees and sub-committees increased dramatically.  Appendix ‘7’ shows 
that there were 11 main business areas of Edinburgh Town Council prior to the 1856 
Act.  By the Second World War, however, the structure had expanded considerably.  
As Appendix ‘8’ shows, whilst there remained 11 main business areas, there were 23 
sub-committees.  Members of the police authority were therefore members of a 
number of other committees.  Analysis of the minutes of the town council provides 
that, of the 93 members who were in office during the war, a mean of 2.5 served on 
only one committee in any one year whilst the remainder were members of between 
two and six, with the mode being three in all years except 1941-1942 when it was 
two. 34   In short, the police authority was part of an intricate web of power-
interdependence between the various committees and vertically with the town council 
as councillors negotiated political deals.  As Ewen found in his study, civic functions 
                                                
32 19 & 20 Vict, cap. 32 (1856). 
33 Barry M. Doyle, "The Changing Functions of Urban Government: Councillors, Officials and 
Pressure Groups," in The Cambridge Urban History of Britain Vol III, ed. D. M. Palliser, Peter Clark, 
and M. J. Daunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 287-289. 
34 ECA SL1/1/389-395 Minutes of the Town Council, 1938-45.  The figure includes Lords Dean of 
Guild and Convenors of Trades who by 63 & 64 Vict, cap. 49 (1900) were constituent members of the 
Town Council.  For the history of the offices see David Keir, ed. The Third Satistical Account of 
Scotland. Vol.15, The City of Edinburgh (Glasgow: Collins, 1966), 280. 
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and private discussions helped control rivalries and encourage intra-dependency.35  Of 
course, none of this interaction is part of the historical record.  There was, however, a 
widespread belief that town councils during the Second World War operated on a 
system of ‘you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours’.36  Put simply, the extent to 
which members of the various committees were able to advance their respective policy 
priorities depended on an established quid pro quo.  As will be seen, the Lord Provost 
occupied the pivotal role across this network of committees.   
 
The continuity of outcomes was therefore, in part, dependent on the stability of 
membership.  Historians have argued that this led to members becoming ‘repositories 
of collective memory and precedent’ where radical policy options were 
circumscribed.37  Councillors in the policy communities thus acquired institutional 
memory of interaction and outcomes.  On the one hand, there was greater potential for 
stability during the Second World War due to the suspension of the normal rules for 
the election of councillors.  In an attempt to prevent the development of the 
oligarchies, which were a feature of the pre-reform era, the 1900 Act specified that 
one-third of the councillors for each ward had to face re-election annually.38  The 
suspension of this requirement by an Act of 1939, however, allowed existing 
councillors to remain in office.39  Some 54 per cent of Edinburgh councillors served 
for the duration of the war, whilst 35 per cent of the remainder served for four years of 
the war or more.  They generally tended to remain in the same committees or business 
areas during the Second World War.  Councillor Adam Millar, for example, was a 
member of the Education Standing Committee, and the Treasurer’s Standing 
Committee for the duration of the war.  In a similar manner, councillor Hardie 
remained a member of both the Public Health Standing Committee and the Streets and 
Buildings Committee throughout the war, whilst also being a member of the 
Emergency Committee for all but the first year.  
 
                                                
35 Ewen, "Power and Administration," 76-77. 
36 Edinburgh Evening News, 19 July 1940, 4.  
37 Moore and Rodger, "Who Really Ran the Cities? ," 53. 
38 63 & 64 Vict, cap. 49 (1900). 
39 2 & 3 Geo. 6, cap. 115 (1939).  Although operative for one year, the Act was renewed with minor 
amendments in 1940, 1941, 1942, and 1943.  See ECA SL1/1/394, Fourteenth Annual Progress 
Report by Lord Provost’s Committee for the year 1943-44, 2.  The 1900 Act already made similar 
provision for the filling of causal vacancies.  An Order by 24 Geo. 5, cap. 5 (1933), however, 
specified that casual vacancies in Edinburgh should be filled by election.  
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On the other hand, the system of co-option to fill casual vacancies caused by the 
resignation or death of a councillor created instability in the network of committees 
and threatened the continuity of outcomes.  Twenty members were appointed in 
Edinburgh during the war under the arrangement.40  Although there was a tacit 
understanding that a member of the same political party as the departing councillor 
would fill the vacancy, and the process had been used in the Great War, it created 
resentment from the outset.41  At a council meeting in mid-1942, for example, socialist 
members protested strongly and motioned unsuccessfully for the reinstatement of 
elections on the basis that, given ten members had by then been co-opted, the council 
could not claim to be democratic.42  Likewise, the City Treasurer commented at a 
Unionist Party meeting in 1943 that some of those co-opted would be reluctant to face 
an election and implicitly questioned the extent to which the town council was 
politically representative.43  Whilst there is no evidence of any such appointment being 
rescinded in Edinburgh, the example of the Fife County Council shows that it did 
happen elsewhere and demonstrates the extent to which co-option was a divisive issue 
amongst councillors.44 
 
James Moore and Rodger have argued that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries the unwritten law of municipal business was that loyalty to the committee 
was as important as loyalty to the political party.45  During the Second World War a 
parliamentary electoral truce similar to that in the Great War was also in operation.  
Party whips agreed that no candidate would be set up to contest a seat in opposition to 
the representative of the political party to which the former member belonged.46  
Notwithstanding, and despite the existence of a ‘National’ followed by a Coalition 
central government for most of the war, political partisanship created instability across 
the network of committees of Edinburgh Town Council, most notably in the period 
until November 1943.47  
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It is difficult to discern precisely the political composition of the town council during 
the war.  Surprisingly, the political party to which councillors belonged is not recorded 
in the council record.  Furthermore, contemporary newspaper reports of appointments 
to the council or council offices, retirements, and obituaries rarely give a clue to 
political affiliation.48  On the basis of MPs elected to Scottish constituencies in the 
general election of 1935 and subsequent by-elections before the war, the majority of 
councillors would likely be a mix of Unionist, Labour, Independent Labour, Liberal, 
‘National’ Liberal, and Scottish Nationalists.49  In general terms, local government in 
Scotland was characterised by a Conservative-dominated alliance of Liberals and 
Independents based on an anti-Socialist agenda.  In some places they were known as 
Moderates, whilst in others they were referred to as Progressives and contemporary 
newspapers used the terms interchangeably even in the same report.50  For the sake of 
continuity, ‘Moderates’ will be adopted in this chapter.  The Edinburgh Evening News 
reported in late 1941 that this grouping commanded a clear majority in Edinburgh 
Town Council.51  Given the system of co-option this is unlikely to have altered for the 
remainder of the duration of the war.  An unpublished typescript shows that of the 88 
councillors in office during the war, 25, whom contemporary newspaper reports 
referred to as Socialists, were, at some point during the war, members of the Labour 
Party.52 
 
A further councillor, John Cormack, represented the Protestant Action Society, which 
arose in Edinburgh in 1933 as a backlash to the state funding provided to Roman 
Catholic schools by the 1918 Education (Scotland) Act.  The object of the society was 
to spread the principles of ‘true Protestantism throughout the country and oppose the 
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erroneous teaching of Romanism at every opportunity’.53  Cormack was the instigator 
of much of the sectarian disturbances that erupted in Edinburgh in 1935.  Although the 
Society had a larger share of the vote than Labour in the 1936 municipal elections its 
credibility as a political force declined as the decade wore on.  Furthermore, some, like 
councillor Horne, had defected to become ‘Independents’.  As a result, the Society had 
virtually receded to a one-man operation.  With the outbreak of war, the impetus 
behind the protestant cause was further diminished.54  Nevertheless, as will be seen, 
Cormack elicited a considerable operational policing response during the Second 
World War.  By 1942 the three councillors left advocating the cause were referred to 
in contemporary newspaper reports as the Protestant Action Group.55   
 
It would be assumed that a persistent political majority throughout the war would 
predispose a degree of stability.  It was this disposition, however, that underpinned 
strife across the network of committees.  Specifically, Labour members were 
aggrieved that they were not offered the proportion of offices to which they felt their 
number in the council entitled them to.  The Scotsman reported in 1942 that there had 
been ‘openly declared war’ over the issue.56  As a consequence, for some years in the 
immediate pre-war period they refused to become chair or convenor of any of the 
committees.   
 
At the first election of offices in the early months of the war, however, the Labour 
Whip claimed ‘full representation’ on the committees, probably in response to the 
drive for national unity.  In the event Labour was offered the chair of only one 
committee, which one Labour member described as an ‘insult’.57  Given Labour’s 
established position, it is likely that it was, in consequence, declined as no members of 
the party held office that year other than bailie.  Nonetheless, by late 1940 an 
accommodation had clearly been reached whereby the Moderates and Labour had 
agreed that it would make for the better handling of affairs if the offices were shared.  
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As the Edinburgh Evening Dispatch reported: ‘those who follow Town Council affairs 
will be genuinely pleased to know that a movement is on foot whereby the Labour 
Party may take a larger share of the offices’.58  As a consequence, Labour councillors 
did take a number of offices that year.   
 
Yet the extent to which the Moderates were prepared to share power was clearly 
limited.  At the election of the Lord Provost in 1941 the Moderates, in private session, 
nominated a single candidate thus demonstrating the extent to which power was 
exercised in the margins to official meetings.  Labour members argued that, given the 
need for national unity and the tacit political truce, the selection should have been 
made in full council.59  Criticising the ‘Tory majority’ for ‘reducing the government of 
Edinburgh to a farce’ Labour members consequently absented themselves from 
council meetings and again refused to accept office.60  For whatever reason, at the 
election of office bearers in late 1942 a ‘more congenial atmosphere’ prevailed and 
Labour members took a number of offices.61  The inequality of political power thus 
threatened the continuity in outcomes as members of committees withdrew from 
pluralist politics.  
 
Whilst, in general terms, Labour members served on committees to the same extent as 
the mode throughout the war, and 11 became chair or convenor, the profile of two who 
changed allegiance to the Communist Party in 1940 is markedly different.  In 1856 the 
practice was established that all members of the council should, as near as possible, be 
members of the same number of committees.62  Although the two Communist Party 
councillors were members of the council for virtually the duration of the war neither 
served on more than two committees nor became an office-holder or bailie.  By way of 
contrast, councillor Hogg, who changed allegiance in 1940 from Labour to the 
Moderates served on a mean of 4.5 committees in each of the war years and became 
chair of the Public Health Standing Committee for three years.  
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The explanation was undoubtedly related to the pervasive, but largely unfounded, fear 
during the war of subversion by fifth columnists, especially in the aftermath of the fall 
of the Low Countries and France in May-June 1940.63  In particular, there was a fear 
that Fascists and, until Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the 
Communist Party were Trojan Horses, fomenting a ‘revolutionary defeatist’ ethos.64  
As will be seen in relation to operational policing, the threat was taken seriously by 
the SHD.  In Edinburgh, preparations were made for the inauguration of a ‘sixth 
column’ to counteract the activities of the Fifth.65  In addition to the related closure of 
the city chambers for much of the war, armed police were posted at all police stations 
and key administrative points to guard against sabotage.66  Furthermore, over months 
in 1940, for example, the Town Clerk sought guidance on the policy for dealing with 
Conscientious Objectors and other employees whose loyalty was in question. 67  
Elsewhere in Scotland, two Socialist councillors in Greenock complained that they 
had been rejected as Special Constables without any explanation.68  In this context, the 
change of allegiance to the Communist Party by two councillors in Edinburgh 
undoubtedly caused alarm.  Their service profile across the committee network was, 
therefore, undoubtedly a reflection of the attempt to withhold or restrict the extent to 
which they could exercise municipal power.  
 
A similar process was clearly at work in respect of Cormack.  Whilst two members of 
the Protestant Action Group had, by 1942, been convenor of a committee, Cormack 
had never been appointed to any office despite having been a councillor since 1933.  
At the election of office bearers in 1942 there was some rapprochement between the 
Moderates and Labour members.  As a consequence, the Protestant Action Group 
complained that there had been some ‘queer going on behind the scenes’, that the 
council ‘still ran on party lines’, and that the Moderates were ‘on their knees to the 
Labour Party’.  In protest, Cormack took the unorthodox but ultimately unsuccessful 
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step of seconding his own nomination as a bailie.  Similarly, although the Protestant 
Action Group nominated candidates for the convenor of every committee, it was 
heavily defeated.69  A subsequent letter to the Edinburgh Evening News complained 
that the Moderates and Labour had done ‘all in their power to keep the Protestant 
Councillors from getting into a position to which, through length of service, they are 
entitled’.70  Despite similar appeals, Cormack was consistently denied the opportunity 
to become chair of any committee or a bailie during the war.71  The repeated fractures 
over politics and appointment to offices across the network of committees in 
Edinburgh Town Council raises serious questions as to the existence of a ‘widespread 
and unprecedented ethic of self-sacrifice, social levelling and community spirit’ which 
underpin the concept of a ‘people’s war’.72 
 
The police authority, the Lord Provost, and power-interdependence 
Of all the areas of municipal administration the Watching Department was considered 
the most important.  From the creation of the ‘new’ police it was, in consequence, 
strongly linked to the principal council officer, the Lord Provost.73  In the early to mid-
nineteenth century, for example, although Residential Commissioners were elected to 
provide local policing, the Lord Provost along with other councillors exercised power 
in the ‘new’ system of police through their appointment as General Commissioners 
responsible for policy formulation.  The Lord Provost was, moreover, convenor of the 
commissioners’ Watching and Lodging Houses Committee, known as the Police 
Board, and along with the sheriff had the power to appoint and dismiss the officer in 
charge of the Watching Force.  Furthermore, in 1855-1856 the Lord Provost occupied 
the pivotal position among both the commissioners and town council during the 
consideration to end dual administration, which undoubtedly explains why there was 
not in Edinburgh, as there was elsewhere in Scotland, a bitter struggle over 
incorporation.  Indeed, as the Bill was passing through Parliament, the commissioners 
recorded that they unanimously consented to ending dual administration ‘after hearing 
the explanation of the Lord Provost’.74   
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By the Second World War the Watching Department was the purview of the Lord 
Provost’s Committee.  As will be seen, however, both the Lord Provost’s Committee 
and its Watching Standing Sub-Committee acted as the police authority in practice.  
Given its overarching responsibilities the Lord Provost’s Committee was, with the 
possible exception of the Finance Committee, the pre-eminent council committee.  It 
was often referred to as the Cabinet of the town council.75  During the war it was for 
example, empowered to coordinate the work of the standing committees; deal with any 
questions of policy affecting any outside local body on which the council was 
represented; and, with any general questions affecting the conduct of the 
administration of the council or with any matter affecting the interests of the council 
not referred to any other committee.  The members of the committee and especially 
the Lord Provost were therefore in a position to exercise power and influence across 
council policy communities and elsewhere.  Indeed, in addition to being the convenor 
of his own committee and its Watching Sub-Committee, the Lord Provost was also an 
ex-officio member of all standing committees to which he was not otherwise 
appointed.  Furthermore, whilst the Treasurer was similarly an ex-officio member of 
all committees and any councillor could attend any committee meeting, they were not 
entitled to a vote, whereas the Lord Provost was.  
 
At the same time, the fragmentation of the committee structure in the town council 
prevented the principal officer from exercising despotic authority.76  Furthermore, a 
complex pattern of power-interdependence existed between the town council and the 
Lord Provost’s Committee.  For example, councillors were directly or indirectly 
dependent on the town council for their appointment to the Lord Provost’s Committee.  
Members of the Lord Provost’s Committee were specified in Standing Orders as: the 
Lord Provost, the Convenor of Trades, the chairs of the other standing committees 
(except Trinity Hospital), together with five other members appointed by the town 
council.77  Over the council sessions 1938-1944 the committee had a mean annual 
membership of 24.4.  In turn, the Lord Provost’s Committee was empowered to 
recommend councillors to the town council for appointment to the other committees. 
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Given the significance of the Lord Provost’s Committee, and in order to ensure 
continuity of outcomes, it would be assumed that stability of membership would be a 
matter of policy.  Yet despite the suspension of elections, the committee was not as 
stable as the town council.  The minutes of the committee show that of the 58 
councillors who were members for some portion of the Second World War, nearly 
two-thirds were members for between one and three years, with the mode being one 
year.  The overwhelming majority of the members of the committee served for half the 
duration of the war or less.78  Nonetheless, whilst four members served on the 
committee for the duration, another 10 members served for four years or more.  In 
addition, members of minority political groups, such as Cormack and those in the 
Communist Party, whose agendas might threaten stability, were excluded.  Most 
importantly, the Lord Provost chaired almost 89 per cent of the meetings of the 
committee that took place during the war.  Although there were three individuals who 
occupied the office, their unique position in the nexus of committees, enabled them to 
exercise formal and informal influence to create stability.  Furthermore, despite the 
additional pressures of commitment to other committees, such as the Civil Defence 
Committee and Emergency Committee that were introduced as consequence of war, 
not once throughout the duration did the Lord Provost’s Committee fail to achieve the 
required quorum of six members.  The telling point is that there was significant 
potential to maintain continuity of outcomes in the Lord Provost’s Committee. 
 
Although the Watching Department was remitted to the Watching Sub-Committee 
along with other responsibilities such as police pensions, the fire brigade, coal 
weighing, and cruelty to children, both it and the Lord-Provost’s Committee acted as 
the police authority in practice during the Second World War.  This represented a 
continuity of business practice.  The commissioners of 1855 and their Watching and 
Lodging Houses Committee, for example, dealt with the same issues in relation to the 
‘new’ police.  During the Second World War, whilst the minutes of the Watching Sub-
committee were read and approved by the Lord Provost’s Committee which, in turn, 
reported to the town council, the exercise of power in relation to the maintenance of 
the police force was, however, more diffuse than this suggested hierarchy of 
accountability.  There was no clear pattern to suggest which committee had the power 
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to deal with specific matters.  In some cases the Watching Sub-Committee made 
decisions without reference to the Lord Provost’s Committee.  In others the Lord 
Provost’s Committee took decisions over exactly the same range of issues without 
reference to its sub-committee.  In still other instances, the committees would remit to 
each other.  In this regard, Laxton and Rodger have identified that it was established 
practice in Edinburgh Town Council in the nineteenth century to ‘anaesthetise issues’ 
by remitting them to committees.79   
 
Part of the explanation for the ambiguity over responsibility relates to the lack of 
specificity in the remits of the Lord Provost’s Committee and the Watching Sub-
Committee.  In any event, during the Second World War, the members of the 
Watching Sub-Committee were also obviously members of the Lord Provost’s 
Committee and town council and could, therefore, provide formal and informal 
continuity through the levels of the corporation.  Specifically, the Lord Provost as 
chair of the town council, the Lord Provost’s Committee, and the Watching Sub-
Committee was in a pivotal position to explain police authority policies at official 
meetings or in their margins to secure continuity in outcomes.  Thus the areas of 
overlapping power and authority that existed between the other social agents in police 
governance were also present in Edinburgh at the level of the local authority.  
References to the police authority in this thesis could, therefore, signify either the Lord 
Provost’s Committee or its Watching Sub-Committee.   
 
Apart from casual vacancies the members of the Watching Sub-Committee were 
appointed at the first meeting of the council session by the Lord Provost’s Committee.  
Over the council sessions 1938-1944 the mean annual membership was 11.4.  
Virtually half the number of the Lord Provost’s Committee were appointed to the 
Watching Sub-Committee.  The comparative instability in membership of the Lord 
Provost’s Committee was therefore transmitted to its sub-committee.  Only one of the 
27 members who served on the Watching Sub-Committee during the war did so for 
the duration.  However, nine members served on the sub-committee for four years of 
the war or more.  The Lord Provost who chaired 72 per cent of the meetings during the 
war provided further continuity.  The salient point in all of this all is that across the 
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two committees that could be considered the police authority there was, 
notwithstanding the introduction of the Defence Regulations, significant potential for 
stability in policy outcomes.   
 
The police authority, the chief constable, and power-interdependence  
Although contemporary newspapers reported on the meetings of the Lord Provost’s 
Committee these rarely, if ever, refer to police-related matters.  Furthermore, the 
Watching Sub-Committee appears to have been ignored entirely.  In short, there is 
little in the way of media reporting on the meetings of the police authority and the 
picture of its activities is therefore drawn from the committee minutes.   
 
By the Second World War the pattern of governance that consigned the police 
authority to the rump of maintaining the force was well established and meetings 
considered comparatively minor administrative issues.  Much was concerned with the 
infrastructure of the police estate as well as issues associated with pensions.  In early 
1944, for example, Morren submitted a letter to the Watching Sub-Committee from a 
retired senior officer requesting his pension be paid in full to him on the basis that, 
since 1936 when the police authority granted a payment of one-half to his wife, he had 
become divorced and given she no longer had responsibility for their children.80  The 
sub-committee also dealt frequently with matters relating to rent allowance.  In May 
1941, for instance, Morren submitted applications for an increase in rent allowance for 
Constables Orr and Lindsay on the grounds that they were single men who had 
dependent relatives living with them.81  In November 1943 Morren made a request 
relating to rent allowance to the Lord Provost’s Committee on behalf of Constable 
Stevens.82  Although this was remitted to Watching Sub-Committee, it demonstrates 
Morren’s contemporary understanding that either committee could fulfil the functions 
of the police authority.  
 
The committees also spent a considerable amount of time dealing with extensions of 
leave for officers who had been sick for more than 90 days.  In mid-1941, for example, 
Morren passed to the Watching Sub-Committee a suggestion from the medical referee 
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that Constable Thomson be granted a further one-month leave of absence.83  A few 
months later a similar representation by Morren on behalf of Constable Fraser was, 
however, handled by a special sub-committee of the Lord Provost’s Committee that 
had been established to deal with urgent matters during the council’s summer 
vacation.84   
 
The police authority also took much time during the war over the perpetual changes in 
personnel that were the consequence of the additional duties the police were required 
to undertake and the release of regular officers.  Towards the end of the war, however, 
as well as concentrating on reconstruction, the focus related to the release of officers 
to the Allied Control Commission.  In April 1945 the Lord Provost’s Committee, for 
instance, agreed to a request to release Constables Mackay and Canning for service as 
staff sergeants.85  By contrast, in December 1944 the Town Clerk received notification 
that Constable Ross had been appointed to the Commission as a staff sergeant.  In 
view of the urgency, the Town Clerk obtained the authority to the secondment from 
some members of the Watching Sub-Committee.86  Although the sub-committee 
retrospectively approved of the action taken, the example demonstrates the extent to 
which power was exercised by the police authority in the margins to official business.   
 
By the Second World War the process whereby the chief constable was considered the 
professional expert in the pattern of police governance was, whilst not complete, also 
well established.  As a consequence, with, as will be seen, the notable exception of the 
regulation of road traffic, the police authority acquiesced to most of Morren’s 
representations.  Councillors, who were accountable to the electorate, were dependent 
on the chief constable for the local delivery of policing and were, therefore, usually 
unwilling to contradict his recommendations.  At the same time, the chief constable 
clearly remained dependent on the police authority for the matters that fell within the 
purview of maintaining the force.  In late 1944, for example, the Lord Provost’s 
Committee approved Morren’s request to sell the manure from the police stables for 
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the sum of £3 per annum.87  Similarly, in May 1940, the Watching Sub-Committee 
approved his recommendation to rent premises at a cost of £12 per year to provide a 
rallying point for Special Constables in the event of an air raid.88  Shortly thereafter 
the Lord Provost’s Committee approved his representation to modify the premises at a 
cost of £20.89  Given the Watching Sub-Committee dealt with the original application 
for the premises, it would be reasonable to assume that it would have considered the 
subsequent request for the modification.  Since the costs in both representations were 
not significantly different, the amount of money was therefore not the factor that 
determined which committee dealt with an issue.  Indeed, there is no identifiable 
pattern to indicate that there was any demarcation on the basis of cost.  It is therefore 
likely that representations were made to whichever committee had a meeting 
proximate to the date the issue arose.  
 
Indeed, there is, similarly, no clear pattern to the occasions when Morren’s requests 
were refused by the police authority.  In the early weeks of war, for example, he made 
representation to the Lord Provost’s Committee that, given they were in exposed 
conditions during air raids, members of the force should be provided with identity 
discs at a total cost of some £8.90  Whilst this was ultimately refused it prompted a rare 
case of recorded division in the committee over police matters.  Clearly, some 
members of the committee were uncomfortable with rejecting a recommendation by 
the chief constable.  In contrast, the Watching Sub-Committee apparently 
unanimously rejected Morren’s representation in mid-1944 to provide electric kettles 
for each police box at a total cost of some £500.91  It is unlikely that the refusal to 
accede to the representation for kettles was related to cost since Morren was successful 
in pursuing more costly facilities throughout the war.  Perhaps, therefore, the reason 
why some requests were rejected was that some members of the police authority 
viewed them as an irrelevance given competing demands.  Councillors were clearly 
required to exercise discretion to prioritise the allocation of limited fiscal resources.  
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The police authority, central government, and power-interdependence  
The pattern of power-interdependence between the chief constable and the police 
authority during the war was replicated in the relationship between the police authority 
and central government.  Whilst the police authority generally approved Morren’s 
representations, the minutes emphasise that this was almost always with the caveat of 
permission from central government.  Even in requests involving minimal cost, the 
police authority sought approval from the SHD for grant expenditure.  At the same 
time, notwithstanding the Defence Regulations, central government clearly remained 
dependent on the police authority for the delivery of policy at the local level.  Judging 
by the historical record, the language used by SHD in its interaction with the police 
authority in Edinburgh shows a contemporary awareness of the reality of 
interdependence.  As the examples relating to establishing police reserves and women 
police demonstrate, rarely did the SHD adopt a tone that was anything other than 
conciliatory.  Furthermore, the SHD hardly, if at all, refused a representation by the 
police authority.  Part of the explanation was related to the pluralist character of at 
least two of the Secretaries of State for Scotland: Colville and Johnston.  It is clear that 
the interaction between central government and the police authority in Edinburgh 
during the Second World War was something of a highly ritualised dance, which 
contemporarily underscored the reality of interdependence.  
 
Apart from issues relating to equipment and infrastructure, much of the interaction 
between the police authority and central government related to the perpetually 
changing personnel profile.  In the preparations for war in January 1939, for example, 
the Watching Sub-Committee minuted a communication from Colville to the effect 
that he had under consideration the question of improving the existing arrangements 
for the strengthening of police forces in emergencies by establishing a First Police 
Reserve of mainly retired officers, a Police War Reserve, and recruiting additional 
Special Constables.  Forces in England and Wales could, since 1911, call on such 
reserves in an emergency.  In contrast to the Home Office in England and Wales, the 
SHD was of the view that there was no statutory authority to establish such reserves.92  
Chief constables in Scotland had therefore obtained reinforcements by inviting retired 
officers to become temporary constables.  The minutes record that Colville wished to 
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know ‘whether local authorities considered it desirable’ to form a reserve and was thus 
a reflection of the recognition by central government that it was, in this respect, 
dependent on police authorities.93  In this case, the Watching Sub-Committee remitted 
the matter to the Town Clerk and chief constable to discuss with the SHD.  Thus, 
although they were required to report, aspects of police administration were negotiated 
by others in the margins to police authority meetings.  Morren’s subsequent 
recommendation to recruit a reserve was referred to the town council, which 
approved.94   
 
Part of the explanation as to why the issue was considered by the town council was 
undoubtedly related to the fact that the issue was more significant in comparison to 
those normally dealt with by the Lord Provost’s Committee or the Watching Sub-
Committee.  In this case the town council acted as the police authority, complicating 
further the picture of power relations in respect of the governance of the police.  
Furthermore, although the Act of Council to establish a reserve was a response to an 
initiative by the SHD, the council remained dependent on central government for 
approval of the specifics.  By the same token, whilst the SHD approved the council’s 
representation, it deferred over the question of augmenting the Special Constabulary.  
Power over resources was thus negotiated in the interaction between local and central 
governments.   
 
Indeed, a comparison with Glasgow illustrates the limitations of central government 
power in this regard.  Whilst all other police forces in Scotland agreed to the proposal 
to recruit a reserve, Glasgow Town Council procrastinated by continually employing 
the familiar municipal delaying tactic of adjournment.  Part of the explanation was 
related to the fact that the corporation had a socialist majority drawing on the memory 
of police reserves being used in the General Strike.  Although the council agreed after 
some four months to establish a reserve the process was clearly characterised by 
compromise.95   Put simply, Colville remained unable to force the town council to 
comply.  
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The Defence Regulations in practice 
Elsewhere in Scotland, the Secretary of State for Scotland used the Defence 
Regulations to supplant the existing system of police governance.  In mid-1940, for 
example, notwithstanding the threat by Lerwick Town Council to resign en-masse, 
Colville used this power to amalgamate the burgh force with the Zetland county force 
and make the new force subject to the provisions of the 1857 Act.96  Similarly, in late 
1940, against the wishes of police authorities and notwithstanding that the regulations 
had not been approved, Ernest Brown granted police officers a supplementary bonus 
of 5s and a war duty bonus of 3s per week.  Whilst the council in Fife, for example, 
railed against the fact that it had not been consulted and undertook to protest over 
Brown’s ‘high-handed attitude’, it acknowledged that it had ‘no option but to accept 
it’.97  There was certainly a contemporary perception by local authorities that the pre-
war system of police governance had been supplanted.  The Police Review reported in 
1942 that there had been a number of ‘outbursts’ at police authority meetings against 
‘interference’ by central government in matters of police administration.98  At the 
Watching Sub-Committee in Edinburgh in late 1944 the Town Clerk reported on the 
proceedings of the Scottish Local Authority Associations where it had been agreed 
that the Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom Johnston, should be urged to give 
‘utmost weight’ to their views.  The Association of County Councils, meanwhile, 
suggested that in view of the ‘unsatisfactory’ position, it should refuse to attend 
related meetings.99 
 
Elsewhere in Britain and in other respects, there was a feeling that local authorities 
had lost power to direct municipal affairs.  In particular, the introduction of a regional 
form of government through regional commissioners gave rise to a perception that 
powers conferred for civil defence were being utilised to encroach on other areas that 
had hitherto been the purview of local government.  One contemporary critic saw it as 
an ‘insidious attack on the entire system of local democratic government’ and likened 
it to the imposition of the Gauleiters in Germany.100  Harold Scott, the wartime Chief 
Administrative Officer in the regional government in London and subsequently 
                                                
96 Edinburgh Evening Dispatch, 20 April 1940, 6; 1 June 1940, 5. 
97 Edinburgh Evening Dispatch, 7 September 1940, 6.  
98 Police Review, 8 May 1942, 230.  
99 ECA SL25/2/30, Minutes of Watching Sub-Committee, 13 December 1944.  
100 Edinburgh Evening Dispatch, 16 March, 1942, 5.  
 86 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, remembered that other critics of the 
development recalled Oliver Cromwell’s system of Major Generals and ‘suggested 
that the Government was creating a machine which might in time supplant democratic 
rule under the sanction of wartime emergency’.101   
 
Despite these fears, police authorities in larger burgh forces, such as Inverness and 
Dunfermline, successfully rebuffed proposals by the Secretary of State for Scotland 
that they should merge with their respective county forces.102  As the Police Review 
noted, police authorities in Scotland were ‘strongly and stubbornly opposed to any 
amalgamation’.103  In the event, all these forces remained independent for the duration 
of the war.104  Indeed, it was only after the war that the Secretary of State for Scotland 
was by the 1946 Act successful in amalgamating forces in the face of opposition from 
local authorities.105  By way of contrast, in England the Home Secretary amalgamated 
a number of forces during the war under the Defence Regulations.106  The assumption 
that the Defence Regulations wholly supplanted the existing system of police 
governance therefore requires qualification.   
 
The police authority, central government, and power-interdependence: 
the example of women police  
A great deal of the interaction on personnel matters between the SHD and the police 
authority in Edinburgh during the Second World War related to the issue of women 
police.  By 1939 there was a long continuity of hostility from police authorities, chief 
constables, the Police Federation, and regular male officers to the notion of women 
police.  From the outset in 1914 the movement for women police was decried as a 
‘farcical manifestation of feminist agitation’.107  Some of the leading figures in the 
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movement for women police were militant feminists and suffragettes.108  As Phillipa 
Levine found, some of the hostility also arose because the notion of women police 
challenged ‘traditional’ perceptions of a woman’s sphere by claiming an authoritative 
role in the public domain.109  At the same time, some of the resentment arose through 
the difference in social class between early women police and regular male officers.  
Although the personnel profile of regular male officers changed in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries as fewer agricultural labourers and farm servants were 
recruited, the majority still came from manual sectors of the economy.  In contrast, 
John Carrier found that nearly half of early women police were of private means.110  
Finally, homophobia was a factor: whilst none ever ‘came out’, Ray Douglas has 
found evidence that some in the voluntary women police movement were lesbians.111   
 
Despite the recommendation by a succession of committees for the employment of 
women police in the interwar years, the reports consistently recognised the discretion 
of local authorities and chief constables.112  As a consequence, and notwithstanding 
the introduction by the SHD of regulations for policewomen in 1932, which mirrored 
those in England and Wales, central government remained reluctant to interfere with 
local autonomy by imposing an establishment of women on forces.  The 
accompanying circular stressed that ‘the existing discretion of the police authority as 
to whether police women are to be so employed or not is maintained’.113  One 
consequence of this was that where women were employed they were restricted to 
dealing with women and children.  By 1939 there were two regular women police 
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officers in Edinburgh in a strength of 804, which suggests that there was some 
resistance to the notion of women in the police in the interwar period.114   
 
Thus, as Ewen noted in his interwar study of Leicester, the question of women police 
was negotiated in the interaction between central government and police authorities.115  
Indeed, in the preparations for war in March 1939 the SHD advised forces of the 
‘possibility’ of employing women as drivers and for clerical and canteen work.116  
Similarly, following the creation of the Women’s Auxiliary Police Corps by the SHD 
in July 1939, it pointed out in November that, whilst there might have been a case for 
vesting some with police powers in areas where there were military camps, the general 
principle regarding the employment of women remained at the discretion of police 
authorities and chief constables. 117   Morren recommended that 100 women be 
appointed and the Watching Sub-Committee agreed.118  Whilst this suggests a reversal 
of interwar hostility to the notion of women police, it must be seen in the context of 
two facts: the first, that, as with the regular women officers, the role was limited; and 
the second, as Louise Jackson identified in relation to women’s increased involvement 
in policing in both world wars, that this was ‘positioned as “war work” undertaken for 
“the duration” only’.119 
 
Furthermore, whilst the police authority had, certainly by early 1942, with the 
approval of the SHD, increased both the full-time and part-time establishments of 
auxiliary women, it was determined to resist any suggestion that some be given police 
powers.  Despite, as will be seen in relation to operational policing, a moral panic over 
a resurgence of ‘khaki fever’ and pressure from a variety of women’s social policy 
organisations to create women police patrols with authority to deal with women in the 
vicinity of military camps, the police authority remained resolute that no further action 
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would be taken.120  In this the police authority was clearly following the line taken by 
the chief constable, the ‘expert’.  Morren advised in a report to the Town Clerk that 
the allegations of women loitering for the purposes of importuning were ‘grossly 
exaggerated’ and that there was ‘no apparent need for the employment of women 
police to deal specially with this alleged problem’.121  At the same time, members of 
the town council clearly remained vehemently opposed to the idea of women police.  
Following the corporation’s approval to supply uniforms to members of the Women’s 
Auxiliary Police Corps, and despite the assurance of the Treasurer that a women’s 
police force had not been established, councillor Cormack retorted that he had ‘never 
approved of this war time business’.  Another councillor claimed that the women were 
‘uniform daft’, queried their usefulness, and whether they were thus avoiding other 
forms of war work.122 
 
Thus, notwithstanding the introduction of the Defence Regulations and the shortages 
of personnel caused by the release of regular male officers, central government was 
unable to force the police authority to augment its capacity by employing women with 
police powers.  Indeed, throughout late 1941 and early 1942 the police authority 
deflected the issue into one of dealing with social problems.  The focus therefore 
became one of developing a scheme to create social centres and entertainments as well 
as deploying women social workers.  Members of the Women’s Auxiliary Police 
Corps in Edinburgh, meanwhile, continued to be employed on driving, clerical, and 
canteen duties.123   
 
In mid-1942, however, there was a subtle change in the content and tone of SHD 
communications with the police authority in Edinburgh, which suggests a shift in the 
dynamics of power whereby central government was centralising.  With the release of 
88 regular officers to the armed services the Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom 
Johnston, announced that he had reviewed the authorised strength of the force and had 
‘decided’ that two members of the Women’s Auxiliary Police Corps would have 
                                                
120 ECA SL25/2/26, Minutes of Watching Sub-Committee, 10 September 1941., Minutes of Lord 
Provost’s Committee, 17 September 1941.   
121 Scottish Catholic Archives, DE/122/5/1, Report by Chief Constable City of Edinburgh Police, 12 
August 1941.  
122 Edinburgh Evening News 3/10/1941, 4., Edinburgh Evening Dispatch, 20/11/1941, 5.   
123 Edinburgh Evening Dispatch, 20 September 1941, 3., The Scotsman, 8 May 1942, 3.  
 90 
police powers.124  That said, whilst the Lord Provost’s Committee noted the circular, it 
clearly took no further action.125  Despite the existence of uniformed women police 
patrols engaged by London and North Eastern Railways at Waverley Station and 
uniformed women military police corps patrols throughout Edinburgh, councillors 
clearly felt that they could ignore Johnston’s decision in the knowledge that central 
government otherwise remained dependent on the police authority for the local 
delivery of policing.126   
 
Part of the explanation was related to Johnston’s democratic instincts.  Experience had 
shown showed that he was unlikely to force issues when faced with a larger council 
that was determined to resist.  In that respect, notwithstanding the potential for 
disruption over co-option, party politics, and the dispute over offices that arose during 
the war, there remained sufficient stability within the police authority and across the 
network of council committees to guarantee continuity in outcomes.  In this regard the 
Lord Provost was the pivotal figure.  Indeed, throughout the remainder of 1942 and 
into 1943 the police authority in Edinburgh continued to see the question of 
introducing women police in terms of addressing a specific social problem rather than 
one of police capacity.  Only when reviewed in early 1943 did a special sub-
committee that had been specifically convened to consider the ‘scheme for dealing 
with social problems’ recommend that because of particular concerns about girls over 
17 years of age ‘uniformed women police be added to the strength of the Police 
Force’.127  In what was described as a ‘new venture’, eight women, who would form a 
‘new branch’ of the Women’s Auxiliary Police Corps, were sworn-in and given the 
full powers of a regular constable to carry out patrols to deal with ‘special war-time 
problems’ in relation to the ‘behaviour and welfare of women and young girls’.128 
 
Whilst the approval by the police authority might suggest a forced change of attitude 
to the idea of women police it reflects three facts: the first, that the women were 
additional to the whole-time strength of the force; the second, that the deployment was 
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a ‘war-time measure only’;129 and the third, that it is difficult to assign cause and 
effect given the length of time between Johnston’s decision and the introduction of the 
women patrols.  In fact, by the time that the women patrols were introduced in 
Edinburgh other police authorities in Dundee, Glasgow, and Inverness, for example, 
had either introduced women police or increased existing establishments.130  Thus 
rather than taking direction from central government, the police authority in 
Edinburgh more than likely drew on developments elsewhere in Scotland.  One of the 
characteristics of policing in the UK in the early twentieth century was cross-
fertilisation between police forces of, for example, practices and personnel.  What 
further cautions against viewing the approval of women patrols in Edinburgh as the 
consequence of a change in the dynamics of power is the refusal by much smaller 
police authorities in East Lothian, Dumfries, and Stirling, for example, to accept an 
establishment of women police which Johnston subsequently sought to impose under 
the Defence Regulations.131  Thus, the issue of women patrols with police powers in 
Edinburgh and elsewhere further militates against any generalisation that the balance 
of power in police governance shifted decisively from local government in Scotland 
during the Second World War.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrates that by the Second World War most of what the police 
authority in Edinburgh dealt with related to minor administrative issues regarding 
infrastructure and personnel in particular.  However, whilst the chief constable 
enjoyed increasing operational autonomy and central government increasingly 
intervened in municipal policing through the acquisition of power and creating fiscal 
dependency, a complex pattern of interdependence existed where lines of authority 
were blurred at all levels of police governance.  The pattern of interdependence was 
partly a consequence of the organic way that the model of police governance had 
evolved.  At the level of the town council it was also the result of the increasing 
complexity of municipal business.  The consequent intricate committee structure 
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created an obvious interdependence of power between the police authority and the 
town council as members practised pluralist politics.  
 
Whilst central government utilised its general powers, and specifically the Defence 
Regulations, elsewhere in England and Wales and other areas in Scotland in other 
contexts during the Second World War, the police authority in Edinburgh remained a 
significant political actor in police governance.  Rhodes’ model therefore withstands 
historical analysis in relation to police governance in Edinburgh during the Second 
World War.  The example of women assuming police powers demonstrates that 
central government was unable to force the police authority to introduce them, despite 
problems with capacity.  Part of the explanation relates to the stability of local 
government in Edinburgh.  Despite co-option, political partisanship, and the furore 
over offices that arose as a consequence of the war, there was sufficient stability to 
ensure continuity in outcomes.  In this regard, the Lord Provost played the central 
coordinating role in the police authority and across the network of committees.  Power 
in the governance of the police in Edinburgh in the Second World War therefore 
continued to be negotiated in the interaction between central government, the chief 
constable, and the police authority.  The thesis that the introduction of the Defence 
Regulations generally marginalised the police authority in the model of governance 





The Police Federation 
In the last weeks of 1919 the first meetings of the local branches of the newly created 
Police Federation took place in Edinburgh City Police and in forces throughout 
Britain.  For the first time since the creation of the ‘new’ police the establishment of a 
recognised means of representation for rank-and-file officers offered the prospect of a 
mechanism to redress the harsh working conditions that were the catalyst for the 
strikes which took place in some English police forces in 1918 and 1919.  Some, 
however, saw the Police Federation as a poor substitute for a trade union, membership 
of which had been made illegal, and pejoratively described it as a ‘Goose Club’ in that 
it would ‘march in step’ with the authorities.1  
 
As the representative machinery for the majority of police officers the Police 
Federation therefore was and remains a very significant aspect of the police 
organisation.  The lack of detailed historical analysis, particularly in relation to the 
Second World War, thus represents a substantial omission.  Laybourn and Taylor’s 
study, for example, is limited to an outline of the creation of the Federation and its 
activities in England and Wales until 1939.2  The purpose of this chapter is to consider 
whether the Police Federation in Edinburgh was more or less successful in 
representing its members within the macro-structural context of the direction of the 
war effort on the home front.  As observed, by the Defence Regulations the Secretary 
of State for Scotland increased his control over municipal policing.  Furthermore, in 
addition to the extra operational demands associated with the war effort, officers were 
compulsorily retained beyond the point at which they would otherwise have been 
superannuated.  The application of discipline in Edinburgh during the war also became 
stricter by comparison with the pre-war period.  It might therefore be reasonable to 
expect the Police Federation to have been more active in an attempt to address these 
issues on behalf of its members.  Yet the degree to which the Police Federation in 
Edinburgh was an effective means of representation was dictated, in part, by the 
negotiations and positioning of the various parties.  Drawing principally on the minute 
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books of the Scottish Police Federation, the intricacies of these dynamics are 
examined in some detail.  
 
What will also be advanced here in terms of the Federation personnel is that becoming 
a representative did not prove to be a barrier to advancement.  Furthermore, that there 
was no correlation between experience of having been disciplined and becoming a 
Federation representative.  At the same time, representatives were more likely than not 
to have had previous employment in occupations where collective bargaining probably 
existed.   
 
The main point, however, is that there was no change in the pattern of Federation 
activity in Edinburgh during the Second World War.  Although the Federation arose in 
response to the fear of Bolshevism, its form and function were severely circumscribed 
by the context of ‘reactive underestimation’.  In this regard, the fragmented structure 
created a hierarchy of power-dependency.  The interaction between local and national 
policy communities was also characterised by factional rifts.  Together with structural 
fault lines and apathy this limited further what the Federation could achieve.  Most of 
the issues that the Federation pursued during the Second World War had been 
unresolved for decades.  Yet the withdrawal of the rest day and payment for overtime 
as a consequence of the war intensified the sense of frustration at what it had been able 
to achieve since its creation and a zeitgeist of dissatisfaction with the existing 
machinery emerged.  Nonetheless, there was uncertainty between the local and 
national policy communities and between the Federation in Scotland and England as 
to how to resolve the problem.  Mass meetings re-emerged as a tactic whilst existing 
structures continued to be utilised.  In any event, in the context of the war there was 
even less of an incentive for central government to concede the creation of a more 
effective means of collective bargaining for rank-and-file officers.  The Federation 
remained an ineffective mechanism of representation until 1949 at least.   
 
The legacy of the creation of the Police Federation 
Unsurprisingly, the harsh working conditions imposed on the ‘new’ police forces from 
their creation fomented discontent and led to calls for the right to confer.  Attempts 
throughout the nineteenth century, which precipitated small-scale strikes in England, 
however, were ruthlessly supressed.  The men who created the National Union of 
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Police and Prison Officers in the Metropolitan Police in 1913 therefore conducted its 
activities clandestinely.  Yet the reaction of the authorities was harsh.  This, together 
with the privations caused by the Great War, provided the immediate catalyst for the 
1918 strike in London.  
 
Given the context of the Great War and the Russian Revolution, central government, 
in a pre-eminent example of ‘reactive underestimation’, granted an immediate increase 
in pay and established the Desborough Committee.  In this respect, it mirrored a wide-
ranging programme of social reform that, as Mark Swenarton argued, had a counter-
revolutionary function.3 Although this upset temporarily the balance of power in the 
model of police governance, central government wasted no time in reasserting its 
position.  Whilst Lloyd George obfuscated the question of recognising the National 
Union of Police and Prison Officers, the martinet General Sir Nevil Macready was 
appointed overnight as Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.  Macready 
immediately made contingency plans to break the union in London and reform the 
representative boards that had been established, which were dominated by constables 
who were regarded as the most militant.4   In a strident example of ‘divide and rule’, 
which prefigured the creation of the Police Federation, he reasoned that those already 
promoted would be more concerned for their careers than those with no prospects and 
instituted separate boards for constables, sergeants, and inspectors.  Indeed, 
commentators during the Second World War perceived a structural weakness in the 
Federation given that representatives would be unwilling to press claims resolutely in 
case it prejudiced their chances of promotion.5  At the same time, in what was to 
become the pattern adopted by central government and police authorities for dealing 
with the Federation for the next three decades, Macready rejected most of the boards’ 
representations out of hand.6 
 
In Scotland, chief officers seized the opportunity to purge forces of members of the 
union.  Norman Morrison, a sergeant in the Argyllshire Constabulary, recalled that he 
and others were given five minutes by the chief constable to resign either from the 
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union or the police.7  At the same time, the Police Bill was rushed through Parliament 
and the consequent Act created the Police Federation and made unionisation and 
inciting disaffection illegal.  Whilst the chief Constable in Edinburgh, Roderick Ross, 
advised the force that he did ‘not propose to inquire into individual cases, whether an 
officer, who formerly belonged to a Union, has not abandoned membership’ he 
reminded officers of the ‘full consequences of remaining a member’.8  This, together 
with the acceptance of the recommendations of the Desborough Committee, which 
doubled pay, undermined the demands by the National Union of Police and Prison 
Officers for recognition and the subsequent strike in a handful of English forces was 
limited and the union quickly collapsed.9  The especially harsh reaction by central and 
local government to strikers in Liverpool was intended to demonstrate that any 
challenge to their power in the governance of the police would not be tolerated.10  
 
In an echo of Macready, the 1919 Act stipulated that the Police Federation would be 
based on separate boards.  Given the context of its creation, this was clearly perceived 
to be the least-worst option.  Branch Boards for constables, sergeants, and inspectors 
were to be established in every force, to which up to seven representatives would be 
elected depending on the authorised strength.  In Edinburgh, from the inception of the 
Federation and throughout the Second World War, there was one representative for 
each rank in each of the five territorial divisions as well as Headquarters.  To consider 
matters of common interest the three Branch Boards combined to form a Joint Branch 
Board.  The rank-specific boards were required to send up to four delegates each to an 
annual Central Conference and these could meet as a Joint Central Conference.  The 
delegates to the Central Conferences were required to elect six members to a Central 
Committee for each rank that together became the Joint Central Committee, the 
national executive.  As with the committee structure of Edinburgh Town Council, the 
organization of the Federation therefore created the potential for an intricate pattern of 
                                                
7 Morrison refused to leave the union and, notwithstanding that he had 27 years’ service, was forced to 
resign forthwith and told to vacate his police house.  Following a protest by ratepayers, however, he 
was reinstated.  Norman Morrison, My Story (Inverness: Highland News, 1937), 107-109.  
8 SPFE, Edinburgh City Police General Order 900, 24 October 1919.  
9 The Scotsman, 2 August 1919, 7; 5 August 1919, 5. 
10 For the background to the police strikes and aftermath see, for example, Kenneth Guy Jack Charles 
Knowles, Strikes: A Study in Industrial Conflict; with Special Reference to British Experience 
between 1911 and 1947 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952), 102., Reiner, The Blue-Coated Worker, 19-20., 
Jones, "The 'Spirit of Petrograd' ?," 3., Judge and Wales, The First Fifty Years, 2-5., The Force of 
Persuasion, 11-22., Brogden, On the Mersey Beat, 18. 
 97 
power-interdependencies as members interacted in a variety of policy communities at 
local and national levels.  As will be seen, however, a hierarchy of power-dependence 
existed in practice.  Furthermore, the interaction between the Federation at the local 
and national levels was characterised by factional rifts. 
 
Although the Act specified that the meetings could regulate their own procedures, it 
prescribed the amount of time that could be spent transacting business.  The quarterly 
Branch Boards and bi-monthly Central Committees were restricted to one day’s 
duration, whilst the Central Conference was limited to two days.  Additional meetings 
at the local level were at the discretion of the chief constable, whilst the approval of 
the Secretary for Scotland was required for those held nationally.  The form of the 
Federation was thus strictly controlled to minimise its impact.   
 
So too was its function.  Under the provisions of the 1919 Act, the Federation did not 
have any negotiating function; rather it was a mechanism of representation.  It was 
restricted to bringing to the notice of the chief constable, police authorities and the 
Secretary for Scotland all matters affecting welfare and efficiency, other than 
questions of discipline and promotion affecting individuals.  Furthermore, although 
the Act also made provision for the Secretary for Scotland to call and chair a Police 
Council comprising representatives of police authorities, chief constables, and 
superintendents, the participation of the Federation national executive was at his 
discretion.  As the Oaksey Committee found in 1948, the limitations on the activities 
and methods of the Federation ‘spared the authorities the anxiety they might otherwise 
have felt about the effects of such representative machinery upon discipline’.11   
 
Probably for this reason, from their inception the rank-specific boards in Edinburgh 
sought to reassure Ross in fairly obsequious terms of their loyalty.12  Notwithstanding, 
there is evidence of suspicion of the Federation and its activities.  In 1933, for 
example, the Joint Branch Board deprecated as a ‘betrayal of confidence’ the occasion 
when Ross instructed a representative to attend his office to discuss the work of the 
Federation.  Similarly, in its third decade of existence, in the last weeks of the Second 
                                                
11 Report of the Committee on Police Conditions of Service, Part II.  Cmd 7831, 1949, 64. 
12 SPFE, Minutes of Constables’ Branch Board, 19 November 1919, 1., Minutes of Sergeants’ Branch 
Board, 19 November 1919, 1., Minutes of Inspectors Branch Board, 17 November 1919, 1.  
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World War, the Joint Branch Board secretary explained that the reason the agenda had 
not previously been circulated was because it had on previous occasions been fully 
discussed by officers who were not Federation representatives prior to the meeting 
taking place.13   
 
As constituted by the 1919 Act, the Federation was therefore severely circumscribed 
in form and function.  It arose in the context of the fear of a Bolshevik uprising and 
‘reactive underestimation’.  Yet Laybourn and Taylor are not convinced that there was 
a serious revolutionary threat and therefore the extent to which this provided the 
impetus for the creation of the Federation.  They have argued instead that the police 
strikes merely ‘strengthened the conviction of inter-war governments that the police 
should have a formal, but largely toothless, influence over their pay and conditions’.14  
In any event, the Federation was set up to fail.  Rolph recalled on joining the police in 
the immediate aftermath that ‘everyone thought the whole thing a farce’. 15  It 
represented, as Reith identified a decade after the end of the Second World War, the 
‘setting up of a court in which officials against whom the police complained were the 
judges and these had untrammelled power to withhold justice if they wished’.16  Its 
legacy for the next thirty years was that the Federation was largely ineffective in 
representing its members.   
 
The personnel of the Federation in Edinburgh 
It might be assumed readily that the Federation would attract as representatives those 
with a previous occupation where unionisation was common, such as in industry.  
During the Second World War 52 officers served in the rank-specific boards in 
Edinburgh.  Of those who can positively be identified the occupation of 46 is known.  
They came from a wide range of occupations: carter and clerk, gardener and grocer, 
ploughman and postman, sailor and soldier.  As Table 4.1 shows, again based on the 
list of occupations in the 1911 census for Scotland, the largest single number of 
representatives, 23.9 per cent, came from the ‘Agriculture’ group.  Yet occupation 
groups ‘V’, ‘VI’, ‘X’, ‘XVII’, and ‘XX’ together account for 54.3 per cent of 
representatives.  The majority of those drawn to seek election to the Police Federation 
                                                
13 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 3 February 1933, 239-240; 16 August 1945, 322. 
14 Laybourn and Taylor, Policing in England and Wales, 15. 
15 C. H. Rolph, As I Was Saying (London: Police Review, 1985), 118. 
16 Reith, A New Study of Police History, 276. 
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therefore came from occupations where collective bargaining probably existed.  
Interestingly, although small in number in real terms, members of the Inspectors’ 
Branch Board were under-represented in the ‘Agriculture’ group which might support 
the hypothesis that officers were more likely to achieve middle rank if they had 
formerly been employed in more complex occupations.  Of the 146 officers who 
became an inspector at some point in their service, the previous occupation of 144 is 
known.  Only 10, however, had formerly been farm servants.  The single largest 
number – 44 or nearly one-third of the remainder – had been clerks of some kind.  As 
noted in chapter two, as a consequence of the growing complexity of policing, there 














General or Local 
Government of 
the Country 
2 2 0 4 8.7 
II Defence of the Country 1 1 3 5 10.9 
V Commercial Occupations 3 1 2 6 13.0 
VI 
Conveyance of 
Persons, Goods, & 
Messages 
2 3 3 8 17.4 






1 2 5 8 17.4 
XVII Paper, Stationery Books & Prints 0 1 0 1 2.2 
XX Food, Tobacco, Drink, & Lodging 1  1 2 4.3 
XXII 




1 0 0 1 2.2 
Total 15 15 16 46 100.0 
Table 4.1 Federation representatives by previous occupation  
[Source: ECA ED006/13/1-22] 
 
Part of the discontent in the police during the Great War was related to the harsh and 
arbitrary nature of discipline.  It might, therefore, be readily assumed that those who 
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had personal experience would, notwithstanding that the Federation was prohibited 
from interfering in individual cases, be attracted to any mechanism that offered the 
prospect of addressing its general application.  However, this research finds no 
correlation between those seeking election as a Federation representative and personal 
experience of having been disciplined.  Of those whose identity is known, just one-
fifth of constables had been disciplined before they became Federation representatives.  
Some one-fifth of all officers who served in Edinburgh during the Second World War 
were disciplined at some point in their career, which suggests that there was no greater 
incidence in Federation representatives at constable level.  
 
Given that it would be reasonable to assume that having a clean or minor disciplinary 
record would be a precondition for promotion, it might be expected that having been 
disciplined would be even less likely to feature as a possible incentive for becoming a 
Federation representative among those promoted.  Indeed, only two sergeants, or 12 
per cent of those whose identities are known, were disciplined before they became 
members of the Board.  Given that one was disciplined whilst a member of the 
Constables’ Branch Board, only one thus had experience of being disciplined before 
becoming a member of the Sergeants’ Branch Board.  As expected, having been 
promoted twice by the time they served on the Board, the incidence for inspectors is 
well below that for all officers.  Whilst two inspectors were disciplined during their 
career, only one had been disciplined before becoming a Federation representative for 
the first time.  
 
Rolph recalled that senior officers perceived Federation representatives as ‘crypto-
commies, agitators, mikers’ and that they therefore became ‘marked men’.17  There is 
some evidence during the Second World War to suggest that inspectors, in particular, 
were concerned that being an active representative would hamper their careers.  In late 
1940 the Inspectors’ Branch Board became so incensed that comments attributed to a 
named delegate to the Inspectors’ Central Conference had been included in the report 
of the proceedings that it convened an extra-ordinary meeting where they resolved to 
complain to the secretary of the conference.18  A further meeting was called in 
response to the reply received from the secretary which the Inspectors’ Branch Board 
                                                
17 Rolph, As I Was Saying, 117.  
18 SPFE, Minutes of Inspectors’ Branch Board, 6 February 1941, 51-52.  
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rejected as a ‘complete evasion of the points raised’.19  The fact that inspectors were 
still pursuing the issue a year later illustrates the extent of concern.  At the subsequent 
statutory meeting the Inspector’s Branch Board passed a resolution for the Central 
Conference to the effect that names of speakers should not be published and again 
requested an explanation.20  In the absence of an explanation in the minutes it is 
difficult to see why inspectors would otherwise have been so troubled if they had not 
feared for their careers; especially given that the other rank-specific boards did not 
have similar concerns.   
 
Many inspectors were, however, committed Federationists.  Indeed, notwithstanding 
their obviously greater mean service, which meant that they were more likely than 
constables and sergeants to have had proximity to the creation of the Federation and 
its negative associations, either through personal experience or association with 
officers who had served through the events of 1918 and 1919, they chose to become 
representatives.  Of those who served on the Edinburgh Inspectors’ Branch Board 
during the war, seven previously served on the Sergeants’ Branch Board.  They were 
therefore well placed to provide a degree of continuity in the Inspectors’ Branch Board 
and, significantly, in the Joint Branch Board.  
 
In any event, this research finds no evidence that becoming a Federation representative 
was detrimental to promotion.  For example, after being a member of the Inspectors’ 
Branch Board in the 1923 session, Morren was promoted to lieutenant and 
superintendent before being appointed chief constable in 1935, thereby by-passing the 
rank of assistant chief constable.21 Officers in each of the rank-specific boards were 
also promoted both in the pre-war era and during the Second World War whilst they 
were representatives.  In short, there is no evidence to suggest that the pattern of 
promotion for those who were Federation representatives was in any way different 
from the remainder of the officers who served during the Second World War.  
  
                                                
19 SPFE, Minutes of Inspectors’ Branch Board, 8 May 1941, 52-53. 
20 SPFE, Minutes of Inspectors’ Branch Board, 4 November 1941, 54-55. 
21 SPFE, Minutes of Inspectors’ Branch Board, 29 October 1923, 13. The rank of Lieutenant, which 
was particular to the police in Scotland, was imported from France.  See Barrie, Police in the Age of 
Improvement, 267.  In July 1948 the designation was changed to chief inspector.  See Cmd 7674, 47. 
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The rank-specific boards: power-dependence on the Joint Branch Board  
Given that - at least prior to 1919 - constables were perceived to be the most militant it 
might be expected that they would be the most enthusiastic advocates of representative 
machinery.  However, although the legislation made provision for quarterly meetings, 
the Constables’ Branch Board in Edinburgh during the Second World War only met a 
mean of twice a year.  Part of the explanation might have been a consequence of the 
consideration by Federation representatives at the local level that the war had created a 
different context, especially given the drive for national unity.  At the first meeting of 
the Joint Branch Board after the outbreak of war, for example, there was clearly some 
uncertainty as to how it should function.22  Similarly, at the national level, the Joint 
Central Committee accepted that the machinery of the Federation could not ‘operate 
normally in abnormal times’ and that ‘certain modifications’ were necessary.23  At the 
same time, the lack of meetings might also be the consequence of a concern by 
Morren to minimise abstractions from duty, given the additional demands on the 
police during the war.  Even in the final year of the war, and although the Joint Branch 
Board was statutorily entitled to a day for a meeting, he wrote to it questioning the 
need for it to take a whole day to transact business.24  
 
Nonetheless, in the preceding twenty years, from its inception when enthusiasm for 
the possibilities offered by a mechanism for representation might reasonably be 
expected to have been at its highest, it only met a mean of once a year on its own 
account.  The only year in which it held the statutory four meetings was 1920, the first 
full year of its existence.  The initial enthusiasm clearly did not last long.  Given that 
the Federation was perceived to be a ‘Goose Club’ by some, part of the explanation 
might have been related to a perception that it would be unable to effect change.  As 
will be seen, there certainly were instances during the Second World War that suggest 
a contemporary awareness of apathy and frustration.  Generally speaking, however, 
the Constables’ Branch Board deferred to the Joint Branch Board in matters of policy 
at the local level.   The majority of meetings of the Constables’ Branch Board from its 
creation until the end of the Second World War transacted little business other than the 
                                                
22 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 18 October 1939, 138. 
23 Police Review 24 November 1939, 415; 15 December 1939, 479. 
24 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 3 August 1944, 277. 
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election of office bearers.  In this sense the Constables’ Branch Board was largely 
power-dependant on the Joint Branch Board.   
 
On the other hand, the Constables’ Branch Board had occasionally demonstrated 
willingness in the interwar period to act unilaterally in relation to rank-specific 
matters.  In 1922, for example, after having failed to garner support at the Joint Branch 
Board on the basis that the issue of a special increment to officers who passed the 
promotion examination only affected constables, the Constables’ Branch Board made 
a representation to Ross.25  Similarly, in 1925 after the Joint Branch Board defeated a 
motion to make further representations relating to the pay increments of officers 
injured whilst released to the armed services during the Great War, the Constables’ 
Branch Board appealed to Ross on the grounds that the issue affected only those who 
had not been promoted.26  Outwith the Joint Branch Board, the Constables’ Branch 
Board also combined with other rank-specific boards to exercise power.  At its first 
meeting, for instance, it agreed to seek the cooperation of the Sergeants’ Branch Board 
to put forward a claim for the detective allowances recommended by the Desborough 
Committee to be paid to constables.27   
 
Yet given the lack of activity on its own account during the Second World War it is 
difficult to assess whether the Constables’ Branch Board was more or less successful 
in representing its members.  Judging by the interwar period there is nothing to 
suggest that it would have been considered an irrelevance by the chief constable.  Ross 
generally appears to have been willing to accede to reasonable requests.  Evidence 
emerges during the Second World War, however, of some disaffection with existing 
structures and outcomes and suggests that there was a perception of a lack of power at 
the level of the Constables’ Branch Board.  In February 1945, despite a statement by 
the Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom Johnston, that it would not be allowed, the 
Board unanimously passed a motion that it should meet with the Constables’ Branch 
Board of the City of Glasgow Police to progress issues that pertained only to 
constables and to continue to press for an ‘extended method of representation’.28   
                                                
25 SPFE, Minutes of Constables’ Branch Board, 1 November 1922, 38-39. 
26 SPFE, Minutes of Constables’ Branch Board, 4 November 1925, 55-56., Minutes of Joint Branch 
Board 4 November 1925, 93; 3 December 1926, 98.  
27 SPFE, Minutes of Constables’ Branch Board, 19 November 1919, 2. 
28 SPFE, Minutes of Constables’ Branch Board, 9 February 1945, 100. 
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Part of the rationale behind the fragmented structure of the Federation was to dilute 
the power of the constables in the representative machinery because they were 
regarded as the most militant.  It would, therefore, be reasonable to expect an inverse 
relationship between Federation activity and higher rank.  Meeting a mean of once a 
year during the Second World War, with the exception of 1941 when it met twice, the 
Sergeants’ Branch Board was even less active than the Constables’ Branch Board.  
Furthermore, notwithstanding that it had held twice as many meetings as the 
Constables’ Branch Board over the preceding twenty years, it transacted even less 
business on its own account.   
 
Part of the explanation for this inactivity during the war, and before, might be related 
to the fact that sergeants were, by comparison to constables, more content with their 
lot.  Having been promoted they were spared many of the hardships endured by 
constables on the beat.  Conversely, given the belief that being a representative was 
detrimental to career prospects, it might be that some, even though they sought 
election, tried to minimise the impact of the Federation in practice.  The lack of 
activity could also be a further symptom of longstanding apathy based on the 
perception that the Federation was ineffectual.  In 1929, for example, the chairman 
pointed out that two of the three members who had not attended the meeting had failed 
to give a reason.  He directed that, as the business was recognised as police duty, the 
secretary should communicate with them to ascertain their explanation and, as if to 
reinforce the point, the relevant parts of the minutes were underlined in red ink.29   
 
At the same time, the Sergeants’ Branch Board from its creation also clearly deferred 
to the Joint Branch Board as the principal local policy forum.  At its first meeting the 
Sergeants’ Branch Board discussed grievances in the delay in implementing the 1914 
Act in relation to rest days as well as the Desborough Committee recommendations 
relating to pay scales and allowances.  The Board agreed that is was preferable to 
pursue the issues collectively and to present a petition from all the Edinburgh Branch 
Boards.30  Similarly, in 1920 the secretary intimated that there was no business before 
the meeting ‘as it was the intention to explain what had been done with regard to rent 
                                                
29 SPFE, Minutes of Sergeants’ Branch Board , 23 February 1920, 4-5.  
30 SPFE, Minutes of Sergeants’ Branch Board , 19 November 1919, 3-4.  
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allowance to the Joint Branch Board’.31  In matters affecting all federated ranks the 
Sergeants’ Branch Board therefore was also power-dependant on the larger local 
‘policy community’ of the Joint Branch Board. 
 
Meanwhile, like their subordinate colleagues, the Sergeants’ Branch Board was 
willing to exercise power unilaterally in relation to rank-specific issues.  For example, 
in the first weeks of war the Sergeants’ Branch Board made representations to Morren 
requesting that he dispense with Sergeants’ Visiting Sheets.32  The Inspectors’ Branch 
Board had already made a representation with regard to Inspectors’ Visiting Sheets.33  
Whilst Morren approved the inspectors’ request he ‘declined to consider the proposal’ 
from the sergeants, which suggests that he perceived a power differential in the two 
boards or between the two ranks.34  Overall, however, given the lack of activity it is, 
as with the Constables’ Branch Board, difficult to arrive at an assessment as to 
whether the Sergeants’ Branch Board was more or less successful in representing its 
members’ interests during the Second World War.  
 
The Inspectors’ Branch Board held a mean of two meetings a year during the Second 
World War.  Although this was little different to the other boards, the Inspectors’ 
Branch Board was marginally more active on its own account than the other two.  Part 
of the explanation might be related to the fact that some of the representatives were 
experienced Federationists.  That said, the issues with which it concerned itself were 
minor and rank-specific.  In late 1941, for example, a special meeting was called to 
consider a resolution of the Joint Central Committee that inspectors should be issued 
with white shirts.35  Similarly, in late 1944 the Board discussed whether inspectors 
should wear leather Sam-Browne or cloth belts.36  Throughout its existence the 
Inspectors’ Branch Board appears to have been more concerned about their uniform 
than the other federated ranks, which was probably related to their perception of their 
status as the senior rank.  In the pre-war period, for instance, the Board successfully 
applied to Morren to change the issued waterproof coat for one similar to that worn by 
                                                
31 SPFE, Minutes of Sergeants’ Branch Board, 31 August 1920, 8.  
32 SPFE, Minutes of Sergeants’ Branch Board , 8 October 1939, 57-58.  
33 SPFE, Minutes of Inspectors’ Branch Board , 8 February 1939, 47. 
34 SPFE, Minutes of Inspectors’ Branch Board, 8 November 1939, 48., Minutes of Sergeants’ Branch 
Board, 8 November 1940, 59.  
35 SPFE, Minutes of Inspectors’ Branch Board, 7 October 1941, 53. 
36 SPFE, Minutes of Inspectors’ Branch Board, 5 October 1944, 60. 
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military officers.37  On the whole, though, little business was transacted other than the 
election of office bearers and as with the other rank-specific boards, the Inspectors’ 
Branch Board deferred to the Joint Branch Board where matters of policy affected all 
federated ranks.  At the statutory meeting in November 1942, for example, the 
Inspectors’ Branch Board resolved to request that the Joint Branch Board pursue the 
question of rent allowance for single officers and income tax on rent rebates.38  Yet 
given the lack of evidence it remains difficult to measure the extent to which the 
Inspectors’ Branch Board, as with the other rank-specific boards, represented its 
members’ interests during the Second World War.   
 
The significant point from all of this is that from their creation, and throughout the 
Second World War, all rank-specific boards in the Federation in Edinburgh met 
infrequently and conducted little substantial business.  Whilst they acted on their own 
account at different times in matters relating specifically to that rank, they deferred to 
the larger ‘policy community’ of the Joint Branch Board in issues of common interest.  
Part of the explanation was undoubtedly the legacy of the 1919 Act.  Although it 
created the potential for an intricate pattern of interactions at local and national levels 
its intention was to fragment the power of the Federation.  As will be seen, whilst this 
did not, in practice, appear to have set one rank against another in Edinburgh, it did 
create fractures in its relationship with the national executive, particularly over the 
power of the Federation in Glasgow.  In any event, a restricted remit and concerns 
over career prospects, engendered apathy within the rank-specific boards in Edinburgh 
and limited what they could achieve on their own.  
 
Furthermore, the local boards were dependent on the assent of the chief constable or 
local authority to their representations.  Given the lack of activity it is difficult to 
calculate the extent to which this was given.  Whilst Ross and Morren generally 
appear to have been ready to accede to requests that they thought ‘reasonable’, the 
legacy of ‘reactive underestimation’ suggests that this would otherwise be grudging.  
At a meeting of the Joint Branch Board in 1941, for example, the chairman pointed out 
that the Association of the Counties of Cities had been antagonistic towards the 
                                                
37 SPFE, Minutes of Inspectors’ Branch Board, 24 October 1938, 45; 8 February 1939, 47. 
38 SPFE, Minutes of Inspectors’ Branch Board, 5 November 1942, 58. 
 107 
Federation for 20 years.39  Fundamentally, however, since the 1919 Act empowered 
the Secretary of State for Scotland to make regulations as to pay and conditions 
nationally, there was little scope for the rank-specific boards at the local level to do 
much other than exert pressure through the larger local and national policy 
communities.  In practice, therefore, the rank-specific boards looked to the Joint 
Branch Board and Joint Central Committee as the mechanism to pursue issues 
common to all federated ranks.   
 
The Joint Branch Board 
By comparison with the rank-specific boards the Joint Branch Board met more 
frequently throughout its existence.  During the Second World War there was a mean 
of five meetings a year, with a maximum of eight in both 1942 and 1944.  This was 
consistent with the interwar figure of four and a maximum of seven.  Given the power-
dependence of the rank-specific boards on the Joint Branch Board the meetings were 
well attended.  With a maximum of six officers from each rank present, the mean 
attendance during the Second World War was 13, which was also reasonably 
consistent with the interwar figure.  The war therefore had no effect on the number of 
meetings or level of attendance.    
 
Issues discussed at the Joint Branch Board could, however, be divided by rank.  In the 
first months of the war, for example, whilst two constables moved that representation 
be made to Morren for his ‘sympathetic consideration’ to restore the weekly rest day, 
which had been suspended because of the war, two inspectors unsuccessfully moved 
that this be delayed.40  Likewise, in late 1940 whilst the constables moved that officers 
on rest days be excluded from turning out during the period of alert for an air raid, 
inspectors were successful in having the representation delayed for three months.41  
 
At times, meetings were acrimonious and otherwise divisive.  In May 1940, for 
instance, the minutes record that a ‘very heated debate’ took place and ‘some very 
personal remarks’ were made between the sergeant in the chair and an inspector over 
                                                
39 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 15 April 1941, 179.  The Association of the Counties of 
Cities, which met in Edinburgh, consisted of Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh, and Glasgow.  See Keir, 
The Third Satistical Account of Scotland, 279. 
40 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 8 November 1939, 141-142. 
41 SPFE, Minutes Joint Branch Board, 8 November 1940, 166. 
 108
the report of a deputation to the chief constable.  Although Morren had consented to 
all but one of the issues discussed, some were concerned that whilst it had been agreed 
at a previous meeting that the deputation would seek the reinstatement of the weekly 
rest day, it had pursued additional resolutions.42  Similarly, in late 1940 an inspector 
pointed out that a sergeant who had been defeated in the recent elections was, 
nonetheless, canvassing to be nominated to the Central Conference.  Although the 
sergeant was a very experienced member of the Federation, the inspector threatened 
that if the Sergeant’s Branch Board acceded, the inspectors and constables would sit as 
a ‘separate body’.43   
 
Nevertheless, the members of the Joint Branch Board were generally well-disposed to 
each other.  The minutes cite numerous occasions when officers of different ranks 
combined to propose and support resolutions and office bearers.  Indeed, whilst 
constables were, for reasons unknown, generally the lowest attendees, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the higher ranks sought to capitalise on their numerical 
advantage.  Indeed, the distribution of offices shows distinct impartiality.  Of the five 
chairmen during the Second World War three were constables, one was a sergeant, 
and one an inspector.  The two secretaries, meanwhile, were constables.  A remarkably 
similar pattern was evident among those who served in the pre-war period.  Of the 11 
chairmen there were three constables, four sergeants, and four inspectors.  Similarly, 
of the five secretaries, one was a constable, two were sergeants, and two were 
inspectors.  To function, the Joint Branch Board was therefore dependent on the 
members of the rank-specific boards.   
 
Branch Board	 Number 	Chairmen Secretaries Total 
Constables’  4 5 9 
Sergeants’  2 3 5 
Inspectors’  4 6 10 
Joint  5 2 7 
Table 4.2 Federation office bearers during the Second World War 
[Source: SPFE Minutes of Constables’, Sergeants’, Inspectors’, and Joint Branch 
Boards]  
  
                                                
42 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 5 February 1940, 146; 9 May 1940, 149.  
43 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 8 November 1940, 165., Minutes of Sergeants’ Branch 
Board, 8 November 1940, 59.  
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As Table 4.2 shows, with the exception of the Sergeants’ Branch Board, the Joint 
Branch Board had fewer changes in office bearers during the Second World War and 
was therefore generally more stable than the rank-specific boards.  Furthermore, as 
Table 4.3 reveals, there was a significant concentration of experience in Federation 
matters in the office bearers of the Joint Branch Board during the Second World War 










previous offices held 
Constable Watson X - 
Chairman Joint Branch Board 
Secretary Constables’ Branch 
Board 
Constable Dunn X X Chairman Constables’ Branch Board 
Sergeant Porteous X - Chairman Sergeants’ Branch Board 
Constable 
Campbell X - 
Secretary Joint Branch Board 
Chairman Constables’ Branch 
Board 
Constable Martin - X 
Chairman Constables’ Branch 
Board 
Secretary Constables’ Branch 
Board 
Inspector Smith X - Chairman Inspectors’ Branch Board 
Table 4.3 Joint Branch Board office bearers during the Second World War 
[Source: SPFE Minutes of Constables’, Sergeants’, Inspectors’, and Joint Branch 
Boards]  
 
On the other hand, the potential for stability and continuity was undermined by the 
amount of time given by chief constables to the secretary of the Joint Branch Board to 
conduct business.  Given the antipathy towards the Federation this might have been a 
tactic intended to limit its power.  In late 1932, for example, the secretary of the Joint 
Branch Board, and conterminously secretary of the Joint Central Committee, was 
restricted to two days per week on average throughout the year to carry out the duties 
associated with both boards and, as a consequence, had a ‘breakdown in health’.44  
Whilst Roderick Ross granted an extension the following year to four hours per day on 
average throughout the year, there is no evidence that the circumstances had changed 
by the Second World War.45  Indeed, although Morren had been a Federation 
representative, his concern in late 1944 over the time taken for meetings suggests that 
                                                
44 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 5 August 1932, 226; 25 October 1932, 229.  
45 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 25 October 1932, 231; 3 February 1933, 234.  
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some restrictions would remain.  As a result, there was clearly some disinclination to 
take the office of secretary of the Joint Branch Board.  In August 1942 the secretary, a 
constable, resigned due to the ‘pressure of other duties’ and the sergeant and constable 
who were proposed, in turn, declined to accept the office.46   
 
By the Second World War the Joint Branch Board had employed a variety of tactics in 
addition to meetings to maximise its impact given the constraints imposed by the 1919 
Act.  At one of its earliest meetings, it resolved to write to the MP for Central 
Edinburgh requesting that he ask a question in Parliament about the implementation of 
the recommendations by the Desborough Committee.47  Similarly, in 1922, probably 
in response to the drive for public economy and retrenchment as recommended by the 
Committee on National Expenditure (the Geddes Committee), it had sought to 
influence prospective MPs by asking them whether they would oppose any attempt to 
repeal the power of the Secretary of State for Scotland to make national regulations in 
respect of the governance of the police.48   
 
Central government, however, sought to ensure that the power of the Federation 
remained limited.  In the early 1930s, following a recommendation from the Joint 
Central Committee, the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh received permission from 
the chief constable, Roderick Ross, to uplift a subscription from the force to assist a 
Liverpool MP, who had provided ‘valuable assistance’ to the Federation in Parliament, 
in relation to the expenses incurred in contesting the seat.49  The Secretary of State for 
Scotland, however, was clearly concerned that this represented an attempt to subvert 
the limitations in the 1919 Act and instructed that the monies be returned on the 
grounds that the machinery of the Federation should not be used for political 
purposes.50  
 
Nevertheless, both before and during the Second World War, the Joint Branch Board 
utilised deputations to the police authority and, especially, the chief constable as a 
mechanism to press its representations in addition to or in place of correspondence 
                                                
46 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 13 August 1942, 207.  
47 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 27 May 1920, 6.  
48 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 1 November 1922, 45. 
49 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 23 October 1931, 193-194.   
50 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 5 February 1932, 199.  
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arising out of meetings.51  In late 1943, for example, a deputation was made to Morren 
on: auxiliaries; performing plain clothes duties; special increments; police doing duty 
as public dance-hall attendants; and the delivery of messages by police other than 
those of a humanitarian nature.  Given the absence of detail in the historical record it is 
difficult to assess how effective the deputations generally were.  In this instance the 
minutes of the regular meeting of the Board merely record that it was agreed that the 
‘replies be accepted as satisfactory’.52  Yet the Joint Branch Board persisted with 
deputations throughout the Second World War which suggests that it was at least 
perceived to be an effective mechanism for making representations.  Indeed, the Joint 
Branch Board demonstrated that it was willing to exploit the power-potential of 
deputations involving other representative organisations.  In the immediate pre-war 
era, the Board agreed to combine in a deputation with the local branch of the 
Superintendent’s and Lieutenant’s Representative Council to the Lord Provost’s 
Committee of Edinburgh Town Council to press for the revocation of the 
supplementary deductions which had been imposed as a consequence of the Report by 
the Committee on National Expenditure (the May Committee).53  The imposition of 
pay scale ‘B’ for new recruits resulted in a substantial differential between officers 
doing the same job and was viewed by the Joint Branch Board with ‘dismay’.54  As 
will be seen, it became one of the main strands of frustration at the inability of the 
Federation to effect change that found particular expression during the Second World 
War.  
 
Along with deputations, some of the functioning of the Joint Branch Board took place 
outwith official meetings.  Although his actions were subsequently endorsed by the 
meeting, which implies accountability, it is clear that the secretary to the Board 
exercised power unilaterally.  In 1940, for example, the meeting endorsed the 
correspondence which the secretary had undertaken with the Federation in the burghs 
of Ayr and Inverness variously relating to: hours of duty; the loss of the weekly rest 
                                                
51 For pre-war examples see SPFE, Minutes of Inspectors’ Branch Board, 23 February 1920, 5; 23 
October 1931, 196. 
52 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 22 November 1943, 259.  
53 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 22 January 1934, 25-26.  For a synopsis of the police 
representative organisations see NRS HH55/1073, Committee on Police Conditions of Service: SHD 
Memorandum of Evidence, 1949, 3-5.  
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day; carrying of respirators and steel helmets; and the wearing of greatcoats.55  This 
was, however, no wartime expedient.  In mid-1921, for instance, the secretary 
explained to the meeting what action he had taken with regard to the passing through 
Parliament of the Police Pensions Bill.  The minutes record that the Board was in 
agreement with what had been done and left the matter to the secretary to ‘take what 
further action seemed necessary’.56   
 
Some of the functioning of the Joint Branch Board during the Second World War and 
before also took place through sub-committees.  In mid-1941, for example, the Joint 
Branch Board agreed that the chairman, secretary, and one other member from each 
rank, inquire into the issue of pay scale ‘B’.57  Similarly, in early 1945, in response to 
the growing frustration at what the Federation had been able to achieve since its 
formation, the Joint Branch Board agreed to appoint a sub-committee to make the 
necessary arrangements to hold a mass meeting of Federation members in 
Edinburgh.58   
 
Although the Federation was forbidden from making representations on discipline 
affecting individuals, the Joint Branch Board from the outset pursued issues related to 
its general application.  In mid-1944, for example, a member of the Joint Branch 
Board related to the meeting the circumstances of his disciplinary case, which 
appeared to turn on the imposition of a punishment that was perceived to be 
unwarranted.  As a consequence, the Board agreed to ask the chief constable to review 
his decision but solely on the grounds that Morren had misinterpreted the instructions 
specified by the Secretary of State for Scotland.  The minutes show that in 
consequence the matter was referred to the Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom 
Johnston, and the Joint Central Committee, which suggests that the representation by 
the Joint Branch Board to Morren was, however, unsuccessful.59   
 
In the interwar period the Joint Branch Board also demonstrated that it was, despite 
prohibition, willing to make representations with regard to promotion affecting 
                                                
55 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 5 February 1940, 144.  
56 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 16 May 1921, 24-25.  
57 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 8 May 1941, 182.  
58 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 28 March 1945, 311. 
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individuals.  In mid-1933, for example, the secretary of the Joint Branch Board 
appears to have communicated with the Secretary of State for Scotland regarding the 
promotion of a sergeant who had not fulfilled the criteria as laid down in the 
Regulations and had ‘caused a great amount of discontent in the force’.  The sergeant 
in question had recently been a member of the Joint Branch Board as well as chairman 
of the Sergeants’ Branch Board.  The Joint Branch Board thus appears to have been 
prepared to act impartially, even to the detriment of those who had been Federation 
representatives.  Indeed, although the Secretary of State for Scotland replied to the 
effect that the promotion was in order, the Joint Branch Board agreed to pursue the 
matter with the Joint Central Committee for ‘definite action’ given that the 
Regulations had been broken.60  Whilst it is unknown how successful the Joint Branch 
Board ultimately was, the incident further demonstrates that the Board was willing to 
pursue the issue at more than one level and in contravention of the limitation on the 
extent of Federation activities.  
 
Most of the business of the Joint Branch Board before and during the Second World 
War, however, related to a myriad of minor issues.  In early 1945, for instance, the 
Board passed a motion asking Morren to review police duties with regard to the 
measuring and monitoring of ice on public lochs and ponds and suggested that the role 
should be carried out by the City Engineers and Parks Department.61  This duty 
represented a direct continuity with the activities of the force nearly a century before 
and suggests that the extent to which the war impacted on operational priorities was 
limited.62  As Laybourn and Taylor likewise found in relation to the Federation in 
England and Wales in the interwar period: ‘Most of the business it conducted was 
about the pedestrian, day-to-day activities of policing.’63   
 
Part of the explanation for the concentration on comparatively minor issues by the 
Joint Branch Board was a consequence of apathy.  Notwithstanding that meetings 
were generally well attended, there was repeated absenteeism.  In 1942, and twice in 
1943, for example, as the quorum of two-thirds of members was not present, the 
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Standing Orders had to be suspended to enable the business of the meeting to be 
conducted.  Likewise, in 1944 it was agreed that the secretary should write to 
members who were absent and from whom no apology had been received.64  Whilst 
this might readily be attributed to the additional demands of war, the pattern was 
similar in the pre-war period.  In late 1935, and again in 1937, the chairman had drawn 
attention to the number of those who had failed to attend without explanation.65 
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh recognised that 
apathy was an issue and sought in a variety of ways, such as open meetings and 
lectures, to ‘stimulate interest’ in the activities of the Federation.66  Similarly, in 1943, 
in contrast to the attempts by the Inspectors’ Branch Board in late 1940 to conceal the 
names of those voting for and against resolutions, the Joint Branch Board passed a 
motion asking the Joint Central Committee to include candidates’ names in its report 
on the basis that it would enable Federation members to vote for progressive 
representatives.67  The Joint Branch Board also agreed to ask Morren to circulate in 
the Daily Information Sheets the resolutions adopted so that members could see what 
was ‘being done on their behalf’ and ‘consequently increase interest’ in the 
Federation.  However, although Morren subsequently agreed, it is clear that he 
exercised editorial control, which further illustrates the relative impotence of the 
Federation at the local level.68 
 
For the most part, the relatively minor level of issues with which the Joint Branch 
Board concerned itself was a reflection of the fact that whilst local boards could make 
representation on pay, allowances, and pensions these were established by central 
government and were therefore generally pursued by the national executive.  Indeed, 
as the Oaksey Committee subsequently noted, although the rank-specific and Joint 
Branch Board could make representations to the Secretary of State for Scotland on 
national issues, ‘in practice most of their work is done by the Joint Central 
Committee’.69  In 1942, and again in 1943, for example, the Joint Branch Board in 
Edinburgh passed a resolution to support the Joint Central Committee in its attempts to 
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secure payment for overtime, the right to which had been lost on the outbreak of war.70  
In short, the Joint Branch Board was in effect power-dependant on the Joint Central 
Committee.   
 
Factional rifts at the national level 
Notwithstanding that the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh was power-dependant on 
the Joint Central Committee, the interaction between the policy communities was 
characterised, in large measure, by factional rifts.  The explanation lay in the legacy of 
the creation of the Federation.  In addition to structural fault lines, rank-and-file 
officers throughout the nineteenth and first two decades of the twentieth centuries had 
never had an official means of representation and therefore, by comparison with a 
trade union, had, even two decades later, by the Second World War, not evolved 
sufficiently comprehensive procedures.   At the first meeting of the Scottish Central 
Conferences in December 1919 it was carried that the Standing Orders adopted by the 
English Constables’ Central Conference the previous month be utilised for the conduct 
of business (see Appendix ‘9’).71  In this sense, there was cross-fertilisation across the 
UK in the development of organisational aspects of the ‘new’ police.  The Joint 
Branch Board in Edinburgh, however, did not have any regulations governing 
procedure until a sub-committee was established to compile them in 1933.72  Although 
the content remains unknown they were clearly insufficiently comprehensive: at the 
election of office bearers in 1936 a dispute arose over the legality of the chairman 
casting the decisive vote in his own favour.73  Significantly, further regulations were 
not enacted to prevent similar situations from arising.  As will be seen, this again 
became a divisive issue during the Second World War in relation to those who were 
members of both the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh and the Joint Central 
Committee. 
 
The interaction between the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh and the Joint Central 
Committee both before and during the Second World War was characterised, in 
particular, by squabbling over the power of the Federation in Glasgow in the national 
structures.  In parallel to the provisions that applied in England in respect of the 
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Metropolitan Police, the Schedule to the 1919 Act stipulated that two members of each 
Central Committee should be from Glasgow on the basis that the force had an 
authorised strength of about one third of the total number of police officers in 
Scotland.  Of the remaining four, two were to be elected from county forces and two 
from the city and burgh forces.  The Federation in the City of Glasgow Police 
therefore had an assured representation of one-third on the national committees.  
Notwithstanding the limited power of the Federation, there was clearly an advantage 
in having representation on the Joint Central Committee in terms of influencing 
national policy.  The City of Edinburgh Police, which was the second largest force in 
Scotland by some margin, however, had no guaranteed representation.  As a 
consequence, representatives in Edinburgh made repeated attempts to redress what 
they perceived to be an inequality of power in the Federation.  What transpired during 
the Second World War must therefore be seen in the context of a continuity of 
activity.   
 
At the Inspectors’ Central Conference in late 1936, for example, an Edinburgh 
delegate questioned the legality of those from Glasgow voting for city and burgh 
nominees for the Inspectors’ Central Committee in addition to electing the Glasgow 
nominees.  Although section 12 of the 1919 Act specifically stated that Glasgow 
members should vote as a separate unit the challenge by the Edinburgh delegate was 
unsuccessful.  As a consequence, the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh repeatedly 
pressed for the secretary of the Joint Central Committee to be asked to draw up 
regulations to ensure that there was no repetition.  The discussions of the Joint Branch 
Board in Edinburgh clearly divided the loyalties for those who were also members of 
the Joint Central Committee however.  In particular, a constable who was a member of 
both boards repeatedly moved, against the tenor of the meeting, that no further action 
be taken.  In the event, the Joint Branch Board appealed to the Secretary of State for 
Scotland who upheld the actions of the Joint Central Committee thus underscoring the 
relative power impotence of the Federation at the local level.74   
 
Indeed, at the outbreak of war, following the example of England, the Joint Central 
Committee in consultation with the SHD suspended the Central Conferences for the 
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first time since the creation of the Federation.75  Significantly, as a consequence, the 
Joint Central Committee, which had been elected in 1938, continued to hold office.  
The Standing Orders, which the Joint Central Committee had in common with the 
Central Conferences adopted at its first meeting, however, made no provision for such 
an arrangement. 76   Furthermore, whilst specific legislation covered municipal 
elections, no warrant or emergency procedure had been enacted to suspend the 
provisions of the 1919 Act with regard to the Federation.  At its first meeting 
thereafter the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh unanimously moved that it record its 
‘great alarm’ at the attitude adopted by the Joint Central Committee in deviating from 
the 1919 Act.  The Joint Central Committee, however, saw the motion as a censure 
and refused to accept it and posited that the Central Conferences were the appropriate 
bodies to deal with the motion.  Given that the Central Conferences had been 
suspended, the Joint Central Committee clearly perceived itself to be in a sufficiently 
powerful position in relation to the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh to deny the 
motion in such a disingenuous way.    
 
As before, the issue divided loyalties for those who were members of both boards.  In 
this case, the chairman and one other member of the Edinburgh Joint Branch Board 
were also members of the Joint Central Committee.  At the vote over what further 
action should be taken, the chairman, in an echo of 1936, gave the casting vote in 
favour of no further action.77  Those who were also members of the Joint Central 
Committee nullified criticism of the national executive against the wishes of half of 
the members of the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh creating a divisive legacy at the 
local level and at the interface between the local and national level of the Federation. 
 
In fact, in the decade before the Second World War Edinburgh always had one, and 
more often than not two, representatives on the Joint Central Committee.  In 1940-
1941, however, it had none.  Clearly, something unprecedented occurred at the Central 
Conferences which, unlike in England, had been reinstituted in November 1940.78  No 
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delegate from Edinburgh was elected.  Furthermore, delegates from Edinburgh were 
not well-placed on the reserve list to fill vacancies.  Whilst a sergeant was second 
reserve and a constable fourth reserve, no inspector was even on the list.  Given that 
this was the first election after the motion of censure of the Joint Central Committee 
by the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh it was clearly a backlash.  
 
As a consequence, the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh made representation to the 
Secretary of State for Scotland to amend the 1919 Act.  It pointed out that Glasgow, 
with an authorised strength of 2361, had six members on the Joint Central Committee 
giving it an assured representation of 1:393.  With an authorised strength of 2503 and 
six representatives the county forces, meanwhile, had a ratio of 1:417.  Despite having 
an authorised strength of 858 Edinburgh had no assured representation.  The Joint 
Branch Board therefore requested that it be guaranteed one representative at each rank.  
The Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom Johnston, refused to take action, however, 
despite a further representation asking him to reconsider on the grounds of the 
‘injustice’ and the ‘futility’ which members of the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh 
felt in ‘representing the force under such conditions’.79  Although Edinburgh had one 
representative on the Joint Central Committee in each of the subsequent years of the 
Second World War, Aberdeen City, for example, which had an authorised strength 
marginally over one-quarter of that of Edinburgh, had two in contrast to the previous 
decade when it more often had one.  Thus the consequence of the censure of the Joint 
Central Committee by the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh casts some doubt on the 
cohesiveness of the Federation at the national level and the notion of solidarity during 
the Second World War.  At the same time, the squabbling over relative power clearly 
diverted representatives’ time and energies and, notwithstanding the structural 
limitations of form and function, restricted what they could achieve, which might 
indeed have been what those who created the Federation intended.   
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The zeitgeist of dissatisfaction  
The dominant theme to emerge in relation to Police Federation during the Second 
Wold War was the growing frustration at the ineffectiveness of the negotiating 
machinery, both locally and nationally in Scotland as well as England and Wales.  In 
1940, for example, the Joint Central Committee in Scotland threatened to resign en-
masse in protest at the manner in which it had failed to achieve little more than a 
formal acknowledgment from the Secretary of State for Scotland to its representations 
and, as the Police Review reported: ‘much the same sense of futility was prevalent 
among the police of England and Wales’.80  Later that year the Police Review 
underlined the power-dependence of the Scottish Police Federation on the Secretary of 
State for Scotland when it reported the ‘cavalier manner’ in which representations and 
requests were dealt with: ‘only formal acknowledgments were sent in reply to 
resolutions and more or less polite negatives were answer to others’.81   
 
At the local level in Edinburgh, whilst Morren had been prepared to receive 
deputations from the Joint Branch Board and approve some of its representations, 
there was clearly a sense by the end of the war that he had generally been obstructive 
and, at times, had not even acknowledged Federation communications.82  At a meeting 
in the last months of the war the Joint Branch Board moved that, given the 
‘unsatisfactory attitude’ adopted by Morren it should, in future, make representations 
direct to the police authority.83  Much of the frustration at the local level, however, 
arose from issues at the national level such as the ability to appeal against the 
punishment imposed by the chief constable for disciplinary offences.  Whilst some 
modifications had been made in 1927, and again in 1943, it remained a grievance that 
officers were ‘denied the most obvious elementary and fundamental principles of 
justice’.84  As a consequence, the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh asked the Joint 
Central Committee to pursue the issue with the Secretary of State for Scotland.85 
 
Whilst the Federation in Scotland was frustrated by what it saw as the Secretary of 
State’s ‘repeated refusal to concede … just and reasonable demands’, there was 
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similar frustration in the relationship between the Federation in England and Wales 
and the Home Office.86  The Police Review reported in mid-1942 that there was: 
 
a growing feeling of disappointment at the apparent impotence of this 
organisation to effect reforms and improvements … There can be no denying 
the spread of a sense of frustration and futility within the ranks of the service 
… There are members who are now so disgusted with the treatment of the 
Federation that they are in favour of something like the old Police Union.87 
 
The imbalance in power between the Federation at the national level and the Secretary 
of State for Scotland increasingly became a matter of concern for the Joint Branch 
Board in Edinburgh and by early 1943 it began to propose structural change.  At its 
meetings early that year it passed a motion that, as the Federation in Scotland could 
find no hope of settlement in such issues as pay scale ‘B’, widows’ pensions, and 
compulsory retirement after 30 years’ service, the Joint Central Committee should 
press the Secretary of State for Scotland to amend the 1919 Act so that these and other 
outstanding issues could be considered by the National Arbitration Tribunal. 88  
Similarly, in mid-1943 the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh agreed that a resolution 
be forwarded to the Secretary of State for Scotland pointing out that his ‘dictatorial 
manner of treating the police increases the feeling of frustration which in turn is 
inducing the feeling of bitterness which is spreading throughout the forces in 
Scotland’.  In this respect, the meeting catalogued the outstanding issues highlighting 
the period of time that they had been under consideration.  Furthermore, given the 
expression by members of the force in Edinburgh on the ‘ineffectiveness of the 
machinery’ of the Federation, it was ‘more than ever convinced’ that the 1919 Act 
should be amended and again argued that these and other issues should be put direct to 
the National Arbitration Tribunal.89  Johnston’s attitude towards the Federation clearly 
contrasted with his democratic instincts in relation to the police authority, for instance, 
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to the extent that it suggests it might have been an aspect of ‘reactive 
underestimation’.   
 
As Table 4.4 shows, all the grievances that the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh were 
concerned with were at the national level and related to pay and conditions, the 
regulation of which was the purview of the Secretary of State for Scotland.  
Furthermore, all but the issue of payment for overtime, which had been suspended 
because of the war, pre-dated the onset of hostilities by some years.  Thus the 
ineffectiveness of the Federation at the national level was not related to the war.  
Indeed, the majority of the outstanding issues were, by 1943, a mean of over two 
decades old.  On the other hand, the loss of rest days, the suspension of the right to 
retire, and other conditions under which the police were required to operate as a 
consequence of the war, undoubtedly intensified the sense of grievance and 
dissatisfaction with the machinery of representation.  
 
Issue 
Year first raised with  
Secretary of State for 
Scotland 
Period of time 
unresolved by  
August 1943 
Compulsory retirement after 30 
years’ service 1920 23 years 
Discipline Appeals 1922 21 years 
Increase in widows’ pensions 1924 19 years 
Scale ‘B’ 1935 8 years 
Payment for overtime 
(other than during enemy action) 1941 2 years 
Table 4.4 Outstanding Federation issues  
[Source: SPFE Minutes of Joint Branch Board, 5 August 1943]  
 
At the national level, however, the Federation resisted calls for an amendment to the 
1919 Act and the resolution of the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh was defeated – if 
only narrowly.  As with the issue of power relative to Glasgow, the Joint Branch 
Board in Edinburgh was unable to effect structural change in the face of opposition by 
the Federation at the national level.  Instead, the Joint Central Committee proposed 
that the Secretary of State for Scotland establish a tribunal similar to the Desborough 
Committee to report and make recommendations on all outstanding matters.  In 
contrast, the position of the Federation at the national level in England and Wales was 
in line with that of the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh.  The Annual Conference in 
England and Wales in 1943 passed a resolution seeking national arbitration.  Thus 
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there was uncertainty within the Federation in Britain during the Second World War of 
the best way to overcome the legacy of restrictions in the 1919 Act.  
 
Part of the explanation for the difference in approach at the national level between 
Scotland and England was that, whilst much of the frustration in both countries was 
directed at central government, police authorities were, because of ‘reactive 
underestimation’, perceived to be more complicit in Scotland: ‘cheese-paring and 
petty meanness of local authorities’, noted the Police Review in late 1943, ‘is said to 
be more pronounced in Scotland than in England and Wales’.  The consequent 
dissatisfaction at the ‘shabby way the police [had] been treated by police authorities’ 
also led to calls to nationalise the police in Scotland on the grounds that it would lead 
to uniformity.   
 
Despite the clamour, the Federation at the national level in Scotland remained power-
dependent on the Secretary of State.  The SHD advised a Joint Central Committee 
deputation in early 1944 that the Secretary of State would take its views on a 
Desborough-type committee into account.  In contrast, whilst the SHD and the Home 
Office consulted regularly and in detail to ensure that Regulations were as far as 
possible applicable throughout Britain, the Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, 
announced in Parliament in late 1944 that he would meet Federation officials to 
discuss proposals for establishing national conciliation and arbitration machinery in 
England and Wales.90   
 
Meanwhile, given the evident impotence of the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh to 
effect change through procedural means, it sought what it subsequently recorded as a 
‘new method’ of trying to resolve the outstanding issues.  At its meeting in March 
1945, it passed a resolution to hold a mass meeting of federated ranks in the force to 
protest at conditions of service, despite the fact that those which took place in England 
consequent to the report of the May Committee in the early 1930s had been banned by 
central government.91  Its explicit aim was to demonstrate to the Secretary of State for 
Scotland the level of discontent given that ‘available methods of representation to the 
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police are useless’.  At the same time, however, the Joint Branch Board continued to 
utilise established Federation procedures.  For example, it passed a resolution asking 
that the Joint Central Committee make representation to the Secretary of State to 
amend the 1919 Act in order to institute area conferences for the Federation and to 
enable local boards to meet monthly instead of quarterly so that these could 
synchronise with meetings of the national executive.   
 
Some 407 officers attended the meeting in Edinburgh that April.92  Given an actual 
strength of regular officers in the region of 587, and discounting those on duty and 
non-Federation members such as higher ranks, the majority of officers in Edinburgh 
therefore supported the tactic of a mass meeting and the implied dissatisfaction with 
the established mechanism of representation.  In contrast to the position adopted by 
the Federation at its creation, the agreement that the meetings should be given 
publicity in the press was also a change in strategy clearly intended to enlist wider 
public, rather than purely political, support.  Yet despite the adoption of a method 
outwith the structure of the 1919 Act, those attending the meeting adopted the modus 
operandi of a conventional Branch Board meeting.  For example, the office bearers of 
the Joint Branch Board were appointed to parallel positions at the mass meeting and 
resolutions were passed.  Indeed, at the subsequent Joint Branch Board meeting it was 
agreed that the resolutions protesting against the conditions of service that arose at the 
mass meeting should be ‘pursued through constitutional channels’.  At the same time, 
whilst the Joint Branch Board had advocated that outstanding matters should be 
resolved through the National Arbitration Tribunal, the mass meeting passed a 
resolution proposing the establishment of an independent tribunal which was, 
therefore, more in line with Federation policy at the national level.93  Thus, the Joint 
Branch Board in Edinburgh was out of step with the wider opinion as to how the 
outstanding issues could best be resolved.  
 
At the same time there was clearly support elsewhere for the Joint Branch Board’s 
tactic of a mass meeting, which was the first of its kind to be held in Scotland since 
1919.  Indeed the Edinburgh Evening Dispatch reported that several visitors from 
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other police forces attended and similar meetings were to be held throughout Scotland.  
Later that month it reported that a meeting had been held in Glasgow attended by 
‘11,000 police representatives from various parts of Scotland’.94  Given that the actual 
whole-time police strength in Scotland is likely to have been less than 7,000, and the 
meeting was held in a cinema, the number attending was clearly exaggerated.  
Nonetheless, it is suggestive of the extent of discontent with the existing machinery of 
the Federation in Scotland.  Yet given the context of war central government had even 
less of an incentive to create an effective means of collective bargaining for rank-and-
file officers.   
 
Indeed, the mass meetings did not alter the balance of power in the governance of the 
police and the Federation remained as impotent in relation to the Secretary of State as 
it had been since it creation.  At its meeting in the last weeks of war, in mid-August 
1945, the Joint Branch Board in Edinburgh unanimously passed a resolution 
requesting that the Joint Central Committee again take the necessary steps to have the 
1919 Act repealed and, in an echo of the demands made in the second decade of the 
twentieth century, called for the right to form a union. 95   Whilst the Oaksey 
Committee, in the immediate post-war period, did lay the foundations for improved 
bargaining machinery and empowered it to collect subscriptions, which had, until 
then, been resisted in the belief they would be used as a strike fund, the effect of the 
1919 Act remained essentially unaltered.96  
 
Conclusion 
In terms of Federation personnel this research finds, contrary to the prevalent belief, 
no evidence that becoming a representative was a barrier to advancement.  As much as 
senior officers and chief constables might have been suspicious of the Federation, 
there are examples in all-rank-specific boards in Edinburgh during the Second World 
War of officers being promoted whilst in office or subsequently.  Similarly, there is no 
correlation between personal experience of having been disciplined and becoming a 
representative.  On the other hand, there is some suggestion of a correlation with 
previous occupations where collective bargaining was likely to have existed.  
                                                
94 Edinburgh Evening Dispatch, 23 April 1945, 3.  
95 SPFE, Minutes of Joint Branch Board 16 August 1945, 325.   
96 Judge and Wales, The First Fifty Years, 76-77. 
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The main point, however, is that the Federation in Edinburgh was no more or no less 
successful in representing its members during the Second World War than it had been 
in the immediate pre-war era.  Put simply, it remained an ineffective means of 
representation from its creation until at least 1949.  ‘Reactive underestimation’ created 
the conditions that led to the strike in 1918 in London.  The strike, together with the 
fear of a Bolshevik revolution, was the immediate catalyst for the creation of the 
Federation.  ‘Reactive underestimation’, however, also circumscribed severely its 
form.  In particular, the stipulation in the 1919 Act of three separate boards was a 
legacy of the doctrine of ‘divide and rule’ that had been applied to break the power of 
the National Union of Police and Prison Officers and was similarly intended to 
fragment the power of the Federation.  At the same time the remit was restricted to 
limit its impact.  For those concerned with the governance of the police it was the 
least-worst option.  In effect, it was set up to fail. 
 
As a consequence, the rank-specific boards in Edinburgh conducted little activity on 
their own account and were power-dependent on the Joint Branch Board at the local 
level.  The issues with which the Joint Branch Board was most evidently concerned 
during the Second World War related to pay and conditions.  The relevant regulations 
were, however, made at the national level and the Joint Branch Board was, in turn, 
therefore power-dependent on the Joint Central Committee.  The Joint Branch was 
resultingly was therefore left with the rump of issuing resolutions in support of the 
Joint Central Committee or taking action over minor matters through formal meetings 
and deputations.  In turn, the Joint Central Committee also reflected the 
ineffectiveness of the Federation and the imbalance of power in relation to the 
Secretary of State for Scotland.  At the same time, interaction within the Federation 
policy communities was characterised by factional rifts that, together with apathy, 
further limited what the Federation could achieve.   
 
Whilst there was little change in the activity of the Federation in Edinburgh during the 
Second World War the withdrawal of the rest day and the payment for overtime did 
lead to an increase in dissatisfaction at what it had been able to achieve since its 
creation and the existing machinery.  In this sense, the chapter further supports 
revisionist historiography which questions the existence of a shared sacrifice and 
social solidarity that underpin the ‘people’s war’ hypothesis.  A difference of opinion, 
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however, existed between the Federation policy communities as to how best to rectify 
the problem.  Concurrently, there was consensus over the revival of the tactic of mass 
meetings.  In the event, all attempts to force central government to amend or supersede 






In November 1944 in a ‘tacit agreement that the last serious risk to internal security 
[had] been removed’, as the prosecution of the Second World War appeared to have 
turned decisively in favour of the allies, Brigadier Sir David Petrie, director general of 
MI5 since April 1941, paid tribute, with the endorsement of the Secretary of State for 
Scotland, Joseph Westwood, to Scottish police forces for their valuable contribution to 
‘Defence Security’.  The demands made on them, Petrie acknowledged, were 
‘constant and heavy’.  He pointed out that whilst there had been ‘spies and other 
nuisances’ in the Great War, the stream of refugees coming from occupied countries 
during the Second World War had offered the unprecedented opportunity ‘for the 
introduction of enemy agents’.1  Indeed, Merrilees, famously disguised as a railway 
porter, arrested the spy Werner Walti at Waverley Station in Edinburgh in September 
1940.2   
 
During the war the police in Edinburgh and throughout Britain were also required to 
undertake the duties as outlined in the Police War Instructions.  Appendix ‘1’ points to 
a myriad of operational requirements: billeting; requisitioning; protecting vulnerable 
points and prohibited places; dealing with air raids; enforcing the ‘Lighting 
Restrictions’; controlling aliens; and dealing with subversives.  These Instructions 
were supplemented throughout the war by what Morren saw as a ‘flood of circulars 
emanating from Government Departments’, especially the SHD, relating to, for 
example, direction signs, maps, waste materials, and camping.3   
 
This chapter demonstrates that much of war-related policing in Edinburgh was, 
however, not new.  Many of the functions had been carried out in the pre-war era.  
Police surveillance of political groups, for example, had been in place in some 
instances for decades before the outbreak of the Second World War.  In a similar 
                                                
1 NRS HH48/66/3, Circular 5849, 16 November 1944.  For Petrie in MI5 see Christopher M. Andrew, 
The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London; New York: Allen Lane, 2009), 
236. 
2 The Scotsman, 7 August 1941, 3., Merrilees, The Short Arm of the Law, 140-141. 
3 ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1944, 1. 
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manner, pacifists had been subject to surveillance by the police during the Great War.  
At the same time, some of the tasks that the police carried out during the Second 
World War, such as the regulation of aliens and enforcement in relation to the evasion 
of duty and identity fraud represented an intensification of interwar policing.  On the 
other hand, the war did impose some entirely new requirements on the police.  The 
enforcement of the ‘Lighting Restrictions’, ‘War Legislation’, and the investigation of 
suspected sabotage were solely related to the war on the home front.  The chapter 
therefore demonstrates that operational policing in Edinburgh during the Second 
World War was partly an extension of that in peacetime, whilst at the same time there 
was indeed a paradigm shift in demands.  
 
Much of the police activity in Edinburgh during the Second World War was a 
consequence of objectives set at the national level related to the prosecution of the 
war.  At the same time, it is clear that some operational policing took place in response 
to priorities established locally by the chief constable, William Morren.  In most cases 
these coalesced but in relation to strikes a difference of opinion existed between 
Morren and central government over the role of the police.  In particular, although the 
‘new’ police had, since their creation, been responsible for maintaining public order 
attendant to strikes, they disagreed as to whether they should investigate the cause of 
strikes.   
 
The chapter also demonstrates that the police in Edinburgh adopted a combination of 
proactive and reactive, overt and covert tactics to achieve these national and local 
objectives.  The police were, for example, proactive in gathering intelligence covertly 
through officers in plain clothes and the deployment of agents, whilst they overtly 
enforced legislation.  Meanwhile, the police were, for instance, required to react 
overtly to the demand caused by reports of suspected sabotage and the registration of 
aliens.  
 
The chapter thus examines police war-related functions in Edinburgh.  Much of the 
analysis draws on the entries made under the various headings in the monthly reports 
compiled by the Special Branch in Edinburgh and, as a point of comparison, the 
summary compiled by the SHD of the reports submitted by Special Branches across 
Scotland.  These summaries include numerous individual and composite entries made 
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under the various headings.  In 1883 the Special Irish Branch was created in the 
Metropolitan Police in response to the Fenians’ bombing campaign in London.  By 
1886 it was known as the Special Branch and from then variously had responsibility 
for dealing with political extremists, revolutionaries, and matters relating to national 
security.4  Merrilees recalled being put in charge of the newly created Special Branch 
in Edinburgh in early 1939 as a detective inspector and the department making plans 
for the arrest of enemy nationals on the outbreak of hostilities.5  Indeed, given the 
pervasive fear of fifth columnists in the aftermath of the fall of the Low Countries and 
France, the Secretary of State for Scotland, Ernest Brown, circulated chief constables 
in Scotland pointing out that it was ‘essential’, in all but the smallest of forces where 
this was not already in place, that detectives should be ‘immediately’ designated to 
deal ‘exclusively’ with investigations into possible ‘fifth column activities’.  Whilst 
the circular made no reference to a Special Branch, the subsequent reports by Scottish 
police forces were submitted under that title.6  The reports by the Special Branch in 
Edinburgh and the SHD summary under a number of headings as outlined in 
Appendix ‘2’ were compiled between November 1940 and June 1945.7 
 
The reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh are, however, inconsistent.  Entries as 
well as updates from previous reports are reported under different headings.  Those 
that should have been made under heading ‘12’ relating to ‘Notes on Current 
Enquiries’, for example, have been made erroneously under heading ‘13’ which relates 
to ‘Sabotage’.  Part of the explanation undoubtedly relates to the fact that some of the 
requirements of ‘Defence Security’ policing were new and a consequence of the 
emergency.  It therefore seems understandable that there would have been some 
ambiguity around the classification of entries in the reports.  For the purposes of 
analysis in this chapter the patently obvious error in the reports by the Special Branch 
                                                
4 Rupert Allason, The Branch: A History of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, 1883-1983 
(London: Secker & Warburg, 1983), 1-108., Porter, The Origins of Britain's Political Police, 3. 
5 Merrilees, The Short Arm of the Law, 139. 
6 NRS HH52/28, Circular 4053, 1 July 1940.   
7 For the requirement to submit reports under headings ‘1’ – ‘12’ see NRS HH52/28, Circular 4246, 
20 November 1940.  The SHD Summary of the reports included heading ‘13’ which was compiled 
from both monthly Special Branch reports and responses to a circular issued in October 1940.  See 
NRS HH48/66/1, Circular 4193, 2 October 1940.  Reports by the City of Edinburgh Police Special 
Branch date from November 1940 - June 1945, whilst SHD summaries were compiled from 
November 1940 - December 1944 and in March 1945.  For the remainder of the first half of 1945 
minutes record that the SHD was of the view that there was insufficient material to justify the issue of 
a summary.  For the termination of the requirement to submit reports due to the ‘changed security 
situation’ created by the allied victory in Europe see NRS HH48/66/3, Circular 6082, 16 July 1945.   
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in Edinburgh where entries were made under heading ‘13’, instead of heading ‘12’, 
has been corrected.  No attempt has been made, however, to rationalise the other 
headings or indeed the entries in the SHD summary since this would involve 
unpacking every incident as well as applying a degree of approximation.  Figures 
derived from the reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh and the SHD summary 
should therefore be regarded as providing an indicative rather than precise picture of 
activity. 
 
The size of the Special Branch in Edinburgh in terms of manpower during the Second 
World War is unknown.  However, judging by its reports it is likely to have been a 
small department of perhaps a handful of officers comprised of detectives and or 
supplemented by plain-clothes officers.  Thus the picture of war-related duties derived 
from the reports by the Special Branch related to a comparatively small fraction of the 
actual strength of regular officers of the City of Edinburgh Police.  Nonetheless, the 
Special Branch reports and SHD summary provide evidence of an aspect of police 
war-related duties that has ordinarily been unavailable to historians.  That said, it is 
difficult to infer much about more general policing from most of the entries in the 
reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh and the SHD summary.  To provide a 
clearer picture of policing priorities and tactics the chapter therefore also draws on the 
Home Intelligence reports submitted by Morren during the Second World War under 
the headings as outlined in Appendix ‘3’ as well as his annual reports to the town 
council.  These further provide evidence of war-related duties undertaken by officers 
other than those in Special Branch.  Thus, in addition to ‘Defence Security’, this 
chapter examines some of the wider aspects of policing the home front in Edinburgh.   
 
Defence Security Policing: preamble 
As table 5.1 shows, the majority of entries in the reports by the Special Branch in 
Edinburgh were made under headings ‘1’, ‘4’, ‘5’, and ‘12’.  Together they account 
for some 96 per cent of all entries.  Those made under headings ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘6’, ‘8’, ‘10’, 
and ‘11’ meanwhile were minimal, whilst there were none under headings ‘7’, ‘9’, and 
‘13’.  That said, items relating to sabotage could be submitted separately.  
Notwithstanding that a number of forces consistently failed to submit a report, the 
general pattern of reporting across Scotland, judging by the SHD summaries, was 
broadly similar to that which prevailed in Edinburgh.  As Table 5.1 also shows, whilst 
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there are obvious differences, reporting under the headings ‘1’, ‘4’, ‘5’, and ‘12’ 
represented a large proportion of work for Special Branches across Scotland.  Indeed, 
nearly half of all SHD summaries contained individual and composite entries by the 
police forces across Scotland made under these headings.  This chapter will therefore 
focus, in part, on those four headings.   
 
Heading Subject 
Reports by the 
Special Branch in 
Edinburgh by entries 
in headings 
SHD Summaries  
by the frequency 
with which the 
heading contains 
entries  
Number % Number % 
1 
Arrests, searches, 
prosecutions, detentions and 
restrictions of movements of 
special importance 
310 51.3 50 12.8 
2 
Cases of special importance in 
which the offender has not 
been traced or arrested 
6 1.0 21 5.4 
3 
Objects of special interest 
(including arms and 
explosives) discovered on the 
search of the person or 
premises of suspects or 
otherwise 
4 0.7 29 7.5 
4 
Organisations of a hostile, 
subversive or doubtful 
character 
124 20.5 46 11.9 
5 
Publications of a hostile or 
subversive or doubtful 
character 
102 16.9 38 9.8 
6 
Attempts to tamper with or 
create disaffection among 
members of HM forces or 
police or Civil Defence 
Services 
5 0.8 14 3.6 
7 Illicit signalling 0 0.0 10 2.6 
8 Unusual or suspicious markings 1 0.2 14 3.6 
9 False messages 0 0.0 7 1.8 
10 Thefts of explosives 3 0.5 46 11.9 
11 Leakage of secret information which might assist the enemy 2 0.3 36 9.3 
12 Notes on current enquiries 46 7.6 46 11.9 
13 Sabotage 0 0.0 31 7.9 
 Other 1 0.2 0 0.0 
Total  604 100.0 388 100.0 
Table 5.1 Reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh and Summaries by 
the SHD 
[Source: NAS HH55/50/1-61/1] 
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The largest single category of entries in the reports by the Special Branch in 
Edinburgh during the war related to ‘subversion’.  Those made under headings ‘4’ and 
‘5’ together account for some 37 per cent of the total.  Judging by the frequency with 
which these two headings contained entries in the SHD summaries it was also the 
single largest category of reporting in Scotland, which was a reflection of the 
pervasive fear of fifth columnists.  Entries in reports by the Special Branch in 
Edinburgh made under heading ‘5’, however, sometimes consisted of little more than 
a list of items published by a variety of organisations.  The report for May 1942, for 
example, enclosed copies of the ‘Moscow News’ and the ‘Western Front Special’ by 
the Communist Party, ‘Protestant Action’ by the Protestant Action Society, and the 
‘The New Leader’ and ‘The Edinburgh Clarion’ by the Revolutionary Socialist Party.8  
Likewise, in July 1943 the report included copies of ‘Scots Independent’, ‘Scotland 
Declaration of Independence’, and other pamphlets dealing with the Battle of 
Bannockburn, housing, and the war effort which were being sold by the Scottish 
National Party.9  It is impossible to speculate how these publications came to be in the 
possession of the police.  They might have been obtained by a police officer or ‘agent’ 
acting covertly, been handed over by members of the public, or otherwise.  Thus, 
whilst the reports submitted by the Special Branch in Edinburgh and the SHD 
Summary give an indication of what the force and central government considered 
subversive, it is difficult to infer much about policing tactics.   
 
Policing subversion: communists and the Protestant Action Society 
The largest single subject of entries in the reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh 
made under this category - some 75 per cent - related to the Communist Party.  
Likewise, the largest single subject - some 84 per cent – of heading ‘4’ in the SHD 
summaries was the party.  It was clearly considered a significant threat at the local and 
national level.  As the first SHD summary noted in 1940 in relation to subversion, the 
Communist Party was the ‘only organisation of this nature with branches throughout 
the Region’.10  In particular, notwithstanding that strikes and lockouts were illegal, the 
party was perceived to be instigating industrial unrest hindering the mobilisation of the 
economy, especially in the period before the Soviet Union entered the war in June 
1941.  In this respect the activities of the party interfered with the control of 
                                                
8 NRS HH55/53/1, Report by City of Edinburgh Police Special Branch, May 1942. 
9 NRS HH55/56/1, Report by City of Edinburgh Police Special Branch, July 1943.  
10 NRS HH55/50/1, Summary of Special Branch reports, November 1940. 
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manpower which, as Gordon Wright argued, was a ‘key device in the direct central 
planning of the total-war economy’. 11   Morren’s Home Intelligence Report in 
December 1940, for example, recorded that the party ‘has its agents in all industries 
and  … will be very active in … the fomenting of unrest’.12  Likewise the report in 
January 1941 recorded with regard to the party that ‘sinister influences are at work in 
some industrial concerns’.13  As Churchill saw it following the Fall of France: ‘We 
were left alone for a whole year while every Communist in England, under orders 
from Moscow, did his best to hamper our war effort.’14 
 
The concern over communists was, however, not new.  The years immediately after 
the Great War witnessed the culmination of a ‘profound challenge to the ideological 
hegemony of capitalism’.15  Sympathy for the Bolshevik Revolution in Britain in 
particular generated widespread alarm amongst the establishment and provided the 
context for the concessions made by the central state to the police following the strike 
of 1918 in the context of ‘reactive underestimation’.16  The Communist Party of Great 
Britain (hereafter CPGB), inaugurated in 1920, and associated organisations such as 
the National Unemployed Workers’ Movement created in 1921, were therefore seen as 
significant targets for surveillance in an attempt to ‘limit the spread of Communism at 
all costs’.17  An extensive historiography exists in relation to the penetration of these 
organisations by police officers in plain-clothes, informers, and agents provocateur 
during the interwar years.18  Thus, the surveillance of communists during the war 
represented a continuity and, perhaps, intensification of pre-existing policing.    
                                                
11 Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 51. 
12 NRS HH55/25, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 20 December 1940.  
13 NRS HH55/26, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 31 January 1941. 
14 Cited in Martin Gilbert, Finest Hour: 1939-1941, Vol. 6, Winston S. Churchill, 8 Vols. (London: 
BCA, 1983), 1228. 
15 Robert Duncan, "Combatting the Left: Victimisation and Anti-Labour Activities on Clydeside, 
1900-1939," in Militant Workers: Labour and Class Conflict on the Clyde, 1900-1950 ed. Harry 
McShane, Robert Duncan, and Arthur McIvor (Edinburgh: J. Donald, 1992), 130-138. 
16 Raymond Challinor, The Origins of British Bolshevism (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 196. For a 
survey of why Britain did not produce a mass Marxist following see Ross McKibbin, The Ideologies 
of Class: Social Relations in Britain, 1880-1950 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 1-41. 
17 R. J. Overy, The Inter-War Crisis 1919-1939 (Second Edition), Seminar Studies in History 
(London: Longman, 1994), 24. 
18 See, for example, Bernard Porter, Plots and Paranoia: A History of Political Espionage in Britain, 
1790-1988 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 160-169., Ralph Hayburn, "The Police and the Hunger 
Marchers," International Review of Social History 17 (1972)., Barbara Weinberger, "Police 
Perceptions of Labour in the Inter-War Period: The Case of the Unemployed and of Miners on 
Strike," in Labour, Law and Crime: An Historical Perspective, ed. Francis G. Snyder and Douglas 
Hay (London: Tavistock, 1987), 163., Thurlow, The Secret State, 116, 162.  
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In addition to ‘Criminal’, it is clear that the police in Edinburgh collated ‘Political’ and 
‘Subversive’ records during the war.19  A Special Branch report in May 1941, for 
example, recorded that an apprentice engineer suspected of using his influence to 
bring apprentice platers at a firm of shipbuilders out on strike was ‘known to be a 
member of the Communist Party’.20  Part of the impetus for the identification of 
communists arose from a request by the SHD in late 1940 for the police to take steps 
to ensure persons of doubtful loyalty, such as those who were members of 
organisations with subversive aims, like the CPGB, were eliminated from industries or 
places particularly associated with the war effort.21   
 
Almost all of the reports of CPGB activity in Edinburgh related to meetings, the 
majority of which were held in public.  A Special Branch report for July 1941, for 
instance, recorded that ‘the usual outdoor meetings’ by the CPGB had taken place.22  
In many instances The Mound, an established location for public speakers in 
Edinburgh, was specifically identified.23  The CPGB along with other organisations 
used The Mound as a political platform.  As a Home Intelligence Report in October 
1939 identified: ‘as many as six different organisations’ held meetings there on 
Sundays.24  The meetings were clearly something of a preoccupation for Morren.  In 
his Home Intelligence Report in March 1940 he referred to the ‘reckless and almost 
seditious utterances’ made there: ‘There is a point at which so-called liberty of speech 
degenerate into license, and though in time of peace it may often be sound policy to 
ignore it, in time of national crisis it becomes intolerable.’25  In May that year he 
argued that: ‘the time has come for stronger measures to be taken against such 
persons, who cannot be described as other than dangerous pests’.26  As a consequence, 
the meetings at The Mound became a local policing priority and subject to proactive 
                                                
19 NRS HH55/53/1, Report by City of Edinburgh Police Special Branch, April 1942. 
20 NRS HH55/51/1, Report by City of Edinburgh Police Special Branch, May 1942. 
21 NRS HH55/864, Circular 4180, 25 September 1940.  The police were instructed to make inquiries 
with the ‘utmost discretion’ to, somewhat paradoxically, ensure that they could not be exposed to the 
‘suspicion of having prejudiced a man because of his political views’.  NRS HH48/66/2, Circular 
4925, 22 May 1942. 
22 NRS HH55/52/1, Report by City of Edinburgh Police Special Branch, July 1941. 
23 See, for example, NRS HH55/54/1, Report by City of Edinburgh Police Special Branch, December 
1942. 
24 NRS HH55/17, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 10 November 1939. 
25 NRS HH55/20, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 29 March 1940. 
26 NRS HH55/21, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 24 May 1940. 
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covert surveillance by police officers in plain-clothes.27  The targets of the surveillance 
were, however, clearly aware of police tactics.  At a CPGB meeting in July 1941, for 
example, the speaker was noted by the officer in attendance to have informed the 
audience that ‘members of the Intelligence Department and the CID’ attended their 
meetings.28  
 
Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 the CPGB performed an 
ideological volte-face by supporting the war effort.29  Subsequent reports by the 
Special Branch in Edinburgh recorded, for example, that meetings were poorly 
attended and that nothing of importance took place.  A similar trend was evident 
elsewhere in Scotland.  The SHD summary in January 1942, for example, recorded 
that the CPGB was at ‘low ebb’ and as a consequence attempts were being made to 
obtain new recruits.30  Notwithstanding, it was still perceived to have a revolutionary 
agenda and therefore remained subject to surveillance by the police at least until the 
requirement to submit reports to central government was terminated in June 1945.  
Special Branch and plain-clothes police officers in Edinburgh continued to infiltrate 
public meetings.  A Special Branch report in May 1942, for instance, contained a 
detailed record by a Special Branch officer who, along with another detective, was 
present at a communist demonstration for a Second Front held at the Hibernian 
Football Ground, which was attended by 3,000-4,000 people.  The officer took note of 
the content of speeches given by the speakers.  He recorded that a member of the 
Central Committee of the CPGB gave a ‘most vigorous and militant’ speech in support 
of a Western Front.31  A subsequent Special Branch report in December that year 
likewise gave a detailed account of a meeting at the Usher Hall addressed by the 
General Secretary of the CPGB, Harry Pollit.32 
 
At the same time, the police in Edinburgh proactively deployed agents against 
organisations that were considered subversive.  A Special Branch report in March 
1943, for example, recorded that local communists had received instructions from the 
                                                
27 NRS HH55/13, Letter from Morren to SHD, 18 March 1940.  
28 NRS HH55/29, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 18 July 1941.  
29 Andrew Jeffrey, This Present Emergency: Edinburgh, the River Forth, South-East Scotland and the 
Second World War (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1992), 144., Allason, The Branch, 118.  
30 NRS HH55/53/1, Summary of Special Branch reports, January 1942. 
31 NRS HH55/53/1, Report by City of Edinburgh Police Special Branch, May 1942.  
32 NRS HH55/59/1, Report by City of Edinburgh Police Special Branch, December 1942. 
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headquarters of the CPGB in Edinburgh to indulge in propaganda activity.  
Consequently, slogans like ‘Second Front Now’ and ‘Invade Europe Now’ were 
daubed on walls throughout the city.33  It seems inconceivable that the police could 
have deduced the CPGB directive from the slogans alone.  Indeed, a Home 
Intelligence Report in March 1945, which advised that communists were directing the 
strike involving dock labourers, is recorded as arising from ‘information confidentially 
received’.34  More unequivocally, however, and unusual in the historical record, a 
Home Intelligence Report in May 1942 advised that a ‘police informant’ had been in 
attendance at a meeting at The Mound of the Independent Labour Party.35 
 
In addition to proactively and covertly gathering intelligence, the police were also 
required to be overtly reactive to the threat of disorder arising from meetings of these 
organisations.  A report of meetings at The Mound in early March 1940 in a letter 
from Morren to the SHD gave an example of the scale of that requirement.  Given that 
the police were in receipt of ‘information’ that an outbreak of disorder was likely to 
occur between the CPGB and the Protestant Action Society, the ‘precaution’ was 
taken to deploy a ‘strong force’ of ten uniformed officers along with seven plain-
clothes officers.  A further nine officers in reserve also had to be utilised when a 
‘general melee’ ensued.36  Some days later nine uniformed and nine plain-clothes 
officers were in attendance at a meeting of the CPGB in Leith Town Hall.37 
 
Two days before the outbreak of war the government introduced Defence Regulation 
18B, which allowed the Secretary of State to make detention orders in respect of those 
believed to be a threat to national security.  An extension in May 1940 offered the 
police the prospect of detaining members of the CPGB.  By the provisions, detention 
orders could be made for members of organisations subject to foreign influence or 
control.  It was a tactic the police in Edinburgh readily adopted.  In May 1941, for 
example, a report was submitted advocating the detention of a ‘lad’, believed to be a 
communist, who was the ‘storm centre’ of widespread unrest amongst engineering and 
                                                
33 NRS HH55/55/1, Report by City of Edinburgh Police Special Branch, March 1943. 
34 NRS HH55/41, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 23 March 1945. 
35 NRS HH55/13, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 7 May 1942.  
36 NRS HH55/13, Letter from Morren to SHD, 7 March 1940. 
37 NRS HH55/13, Letter from Morren to SHD, 12 March 1940.  
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shipbuilding apprentices in a firm engaged in ‘important’ war work.38  The local 
preoccupation with those Morren considered ‘dangerous pests’, however, could 
conflict with priorities at the national level.  As historians have identified, there was 
concern in central government that, given the power of the CPGB by comparison to 
other organisations, the detention of members could instigate further industrial unrest.  
At the same time, the authorities were more relaxed about the CPGB given the level of 
infiltration.  As a consequence, although a number of fascists and others were interned 
in Britain during the war, only one member of CPGB was detained.39   
 
The second largest subject of entries - some 65 per cent - in reports by the Special 
Branch in Edinburgh made under the category of ‘subversion’ was the Protestant 
Action Society.  It therefore represented a significant operational commitment.  It was, 
however, mainly active in Edinburgh and therefore was not considered a threat at the 
national level.  Indeed, whilst the Society instigated sectarian disturbances and was, 
therefore, a threat to public order and had a political agenda, it was not, like the 
CPGB, revolutionary.  As a consequence, it only featured four times under heading ‘4’ 
in the SHD summaries.  Although there is no direct evidence that the Protestant Action 
Society was under surveillance by the police in the pre-war period, there was an 
extensive inquiry into it by the procurator fiscal and the SHD in the aftermath of the 
disturbances in Edinburgh in the mid-1930s.  It would therefore seem reasonable to 
conclude that the police would, in addition to reacting to the threat of public disorder, 
attempt to proactively gather intelligence about the Society’s activities.  Indeed, David 
Ritchie has concluded that the approach adopted by the SHD, the town council, and 
the legal authorities, in relation to Cormack, the founder of the Society, was to ‘ignore 
him as far as possible, while keeping a close watch on his activities’.40  Thus, as with 
the CPGB, the surveillance by the police of the Protestant Action Society during the 
war partly represented a continuation of pre-war activity.  
 
The reports by the Special Branch during the Second World War show that Cormack 
was under surveillance from at least 1940.  Most of these recorded that the ‘usual’ 
meetings took place and, apart from ‘Anti-Catholic rhetoric’, ‘nothing of interest’ 
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occurred.  Given the limited extent of the Society by then, this more than likely 
referred to Cormack giving a speech at The Mound.  A Special Branch report in April 
1945, for example, specifically recorded that ‘meetings’ took place there.41  Given 
Morren’s preoccupation with meetings there, they were clearly infiltrated.  Indeed, 
other than the interception of communications, of which there is no evidence, the 
option to otherwise acquire intelligence on Cormack was limited. 
 
The Special Branch reports in 1942, and more specifically 1943, however, contained 
more detail of Cormack’s speeches.  That in September 1943, for instance, recorded 
his allegation that the BBC was controlled by ‘papists’; the spread of venereal disease 
was caused by prostitutes, the majority of whom were Catholics; and that Catholics 
should be barred from holding government office or serving in the armed forces.42  
Likewise, the report in November 1943 contained a detailed account of his criticism of 
Edinburgh magistrates for attending a ‘Popish’ mass.43   
 
The more intense scrutiny of Cormack’s rhetoric was undoubtedly a consequence of 
the riots that occurred in the aftermath of the internment of Italians subsequent to the 
entry into the war of Italy in June 1940.  Whilst disorder broke out in a number of 
cities throughout the UK, it was especially riotous in Edinburgh.44  The Archbishop of 
St. Andrews and Edinburgh was of the view that Cormack’s agents had instigated the 
disturbances in Edinburgh on the basis of anti-Catholic prejudice.  As observed, 
Edinburgh had a legacy of violent anti-Catholic sentiment.  In a letter to the Secretary 
of State for Scotland, Ernest Brown, in June 1940 the archbishop alleged that Cormack 
was making ‘a deliberate attempt to resuscitate sectarian trouble … [and] … openly 
incites to violence against Catholics in public speeches’.45  Whilst the police in 
Edinburgh subsequently advised the SHD that the claims could not be substantiated, it 
nevertheless reported that ‘strict observation [was] being kept on the [organisation]’.46  
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SHD minutes suggest that it viewed Cormack as a threat to public order rather than a 
political subversive and, as in the 1930s, the objective was to obtain the basis for a 
criminal prosecution under Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936.  As an SHD 
official recorded: ‘we have been watching and waiting for Cormack to give himself 
away for a long time but so far have failed to get a feasible case.  We shall continue to 
do so.’47   In late 1941 local newspapers reported that Cormack had been convicted 
and fined £10 in camera at Edinburgh Sheriff Court for a contravention of the Defence 
Regulations arising from comments made at an open-air meeting at The Mound.48  
Whilst there is no reference to the incident in either Special Branch or Home 
Intelligence reports by the police in Edinburgh, given Morren’s preoccupation with 
speakers at The Mound it is reasonable to conclude that the evidence arose from police 
surveillance.  Indeed, it is clear that Cormack remained under surveillance for the 
duration of the war in Europe.  
 
Policing subversion: the Campaign Pension League and pacifists 
In contrast to the surveillance of the CPGB and Cormack, other policing requirements 
arose solely as a consequence of the war.  Whilst it does not feature until December 
1942 in the reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh, the third largest subject of 
entries made under the category of ‘subversion’ - some 49 per cent - related to the 
Campaign Pension League.  Like the Protestant Action Society it was, however, small 
scale and of purely local interest.  Only three speakers are named in the reports and it 
featured only three times under heading ‘4’ in the SHD summaries, even then merely 
noting that a meeting took place.  
 
It is difficult to discern exactly what the objective of the League was.  Most of the 
detail noted in the reports of what transpired at the meetings is related to criticism of 
the conduct of the war and, in particular, the mistreatment of those in the armed 
services.  The Special Branch report for August 1943, for example, recorded that the 
speaker criticised central government for: the preferential treatment given to 
Churchill’s daughter in the ATS; food queues; and for doing nothing for ‘the heroes 
who came back to poverty and empty promises’.49  Similarly, in April 1945 the report 
                                                
47 NRS HH1/777, SHD minutes, 4 & 25 July 1940. 
48 Edinburgh Evening Dispatch, 6 October 1941, 5.  
49 NRS HH55/56/1, Report by City of Edinburgh Police Special Branch, August 1943. 
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noted that the speaker stated the men returning from active service were being ‘treated 
in the same miserable way’ as those returning from the Great War.50   
 
Thus, whilst the agenda of the league was neither revolutionary nor a threat to public 
order, given the context of a total war, its activities were perceived to be inimical to 
the effort and it therefore became a target for surveillance until at least July 1945.  
Indeed, in April 1940 in a parallel request made by the Home Office to police forces in 
England and Wales, the SHD asked chief constables in Scotland to develop their 
Home Intelligence reports in relation to pacifist and subversive organisations.  Richard 
Thurlow has argued that this was the consequence of a concern that fascists had 
infiltrated pacifist organisations.51  The SHD requested information on ‘all kinds of 
public meetings concerned with the prosecution of the war’ to identify ‘tendencies 
among particular classes of the community, or in particular areas, which, if unchecked, 
might have prejudicial effects’.52  As a consequence, coterminous with the first 
reference to the League in reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh, the report 
recorded that the speaker had been reported for a contravention of the Defence 
Regulations in relation to comments made at an open-air meeting, most probably at 
The Mound, that were likely to influence public opinion in a manner likely to be 
prejudicial to the efficient prosecution of the war or the defence of the realm.53  The 
tactics used to maintain surveillance and gather evidence against the League were, 
therefore, similar to those used against Cormack the year previously.   
 
Whilst the League was not a policing priority nationally, central government was 
concerned about organisations that were in some way pacifist.54  In particular, this 
included those who sought to undermine military conscription, which had been 
introduced in April 1939 and successively widened to include women by December 
1941.  In the Great War a number of organisations had similarly been founded with 
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the ‘avowed object of resisting conscription’ and had been subject to surveillance by 
the police.55   
 
The Peace Pledge Union (hereafter PPU), which advised conscripts on the right to 
claim conscientious objection during the Second World War, appeared in some 12 per 
cent of the SHD summaries that included entries made under heading ‘4’.  By contrast 
only two reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh contained details of activity by 
the PPU.  A report in February 1942, for example, noted that a member of the PPU 
had arrived in Edinburgh and had established a local headquarters in Frederick Street, 
which would also be used by other pacifist organisations.56  Thus, whilst surveillance 
of the PPU made demands on some Scottish police forces, it clearly did not in 
Edinburgh.  
 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, who urged their co-religionists to be neutral and resist 
conscription, were considered especially seditious by central government.57  By mid-
1942 the majority of men amongst its 12,000 active members in the UK claimed to be 
conscientious objectors.  Over 100 had been imprisoned in connection with failing to 
comply with National Service directives.58  Duff Cooper, chairman of the Security 
Executive, perceived Jehovah’s Witnesses as having a ‘near-subversive’ policy of 
‘propagating defeatism and “conscientious objection’”.59  As a consequence, the 
Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, advised Parliament that a ‘watch is, of course, 
kept on its activities’.60  Jehovah’s Witnesses featured in some 30 per cent of the SHD 
summaries that included entries made under heading ‘4’ but not in any reports by the 
Special Branch in Edinburgh under the category of ‘subversion’.  Indeed, although the 
Edinburgh Evening Dispatch reported in 1942 that there were 120 members in the 
Edinburgh Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses, the police advised the SHD that its 
following was ‘slight’ and that the ‘organisation was ‘not viewed with any great 
concern’.61  Part of the explanation for the relaxed attitude in Edinburgh might be 
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related to the fact that the planned Scottish convention in late 1942, which so 
exercised the SHD, was held in Glasgow.62  Thus, as with the PPU, whilst Jehovah’s 
Witnesses were clearly an issue for the police elsewhere in Scotland, they did not 
become one in Edinburgh.  The surveillance of pacifists by the police in Edinburgh 
during the Second World War was therefore very slight.  
 
Policing subversion: Scottish nationalists and other political groups  
In terms of impeding the war effort Scottish nationalists, however, were considered a 
policing priority in Edinburgh.  Keith Webb has identified a ‘strong element’ of 
pacifism within Scottish nationalism in the first half of the twentieth century.  In 1934 
there was, for example, a nationalist Anti-Conscription League.  Furthermore, the 
Scottish National Party (hereafter SNP) conference in 1937 passed a resolution that all 
male members should refuse to ‘serve with any section of the Crown forces until the 
programme of the SNP had been fulfilled’.  Members who were radically opposed to 
cooperation with the war effort, and particularly conscription, moreover, won control 
of the party in 1942.  The Scottish Neutrality League, composed of hard-line 
nationalists, meanwhile, maintained an even more militant position.63  There was also 
a strong socialist tendency in Scottish nationalism that further alarmed the central 
state.  At the foundation meeting of the Scottish Socialist Republican Party in May 
1940, for instance, a resolution was passed to the effect that it would ‘do all within its 
power to assist those bodies working for the earliest possible cessation of hostilities, 
and the establishment of a socialist peace’.64   
 
Prominent Scottish nationalists like Hugh McDiarmid (Christopher Murray Grieve), 
who was viewed by MI5 as a ‘menace’ to the British state, were subject to 
surveillance in the 1930s.65  Thus, as with the CPGB, surveillance by the police during 
the Second World War represented a continuation and perhaps intensification of 
existing policing.  The activities of nationalist organisations featured in some 20 per 
cent of entries in reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh under the category of 
‘subversion’ and 25 per cent of the SHD summaries that contained entries made under 
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heading ‘4’.  Scottish nationalists were therefore also a policing priority elsewhere in 
Scotland.  Indeed, the SHD summary in November 1940 pointed out that, apart from 
the CPGB, the only organisation with ‘more than local influence’ were those 
associated with Scottish nationalism. 66   The report by the Special Branch in 
Edinburgh, meanwhile, noted that the objective of nationalist organisations like the 
Edinburgh University Nationalist Association was to ‘cause discontent and dis-
satisfaction [sic] with the present Government on nationalistic bases and … object to 
conscription and generally assist’ conscientious objectors.67   
 
The surveillance of Scottish nationalists by the police during the Second World War 
was, however, most intense in 1942-1943.  Some 80 per cent of the entries in the 
reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh that related to Scottish nationalists 
occurred between March 1942 and the last entry in September 1943.  Similarly, some 
83 per cent of the entries under heading ‘4’ in the SHD Summary that related to 
Scottish nationalists, some of which were based solely on Edinburgh reports, occurred 
between October 1941 and the last entry in September 1943.  The intensification of 
surveillance was the consequence of raids conducted by the police in Edinburgh and 
elsewhere in Scotland in May 1941 on 17 premises occupied by Scottish nationalists.  
Judging by the content of subsequent reports the police were responding to 
intelligence that active assistance was being given to those seeking to evade 
conscription.  Although the search of four houses in Edinburgh was unproductive, the 
police in Glasgow recovered documents showing that Scottish nationalists were 
providing logistical and financial aid to conscientious objectors, and, moreover, were 
in correspondence with a known Nazi agent.68  In the immediate aftermath nationalists 
became subject to especial scrutiny by the police in Edinburgh and elsewhere in 
Scotland.   
 
Although just over half the entries in the reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh 
thereafter merely referred to a meeting having taken place where nothing of interest 
occurred, some of the rest contained detailed accounts of public meetings.  A report of 
a meeting in October 1942 in the Gorgie Memorial Hall, for example, recorded that 
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the speaker criticised the government for sending Scottish women to work in English 
factories.69  As with other organisations subject to surveillance during the Second 
World War, the police infiltrated public meetings of Scottish nationalists.  From late 
1942, however, the requirement for the police to maintain surveillance on Scottish 
nationalists receded.  Reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh suggested that the 
SNP in particular was struggling to attract support.  The report of the meeting in the 
Masonic Halls in Leith in March 1943, for instance, recorded that the response to form 
an SNP branch in Leith was ‘poor’.70  Special Branches elsewhere in Scotland noted a 
similar tendency.  Part of the explanation related to fractures within the membership of 
the SNP that reduced it as a political and social force.  The last related report by the 
Special Branch in Edinburgh in September 1943 recorded that there was internal 
‘discontent’ over whether a demonstration on St. Andrew’s day should be used as a 
platform to attack central government.71  Thus, unlike the CPGB, Scottish nationalists 
were not subject to police surveillance in Edinburgh for the duration of the war.  
 
Together, some 69 per cent of the entries in the reports by the Special Branch in 
Edinburgh made under the category of ‘subversion’ related to the Independent Labour 
Party (hereafter ILP), the Revolutionary Communist Party, and the Anarchist 
Federation (hereafter AF).  The ILP and AF also feature in some 47 per cent of the 
SHD summaries that contained entries made under heading ‘4’.  These groups were 
therefore subject to surveillance by Special Branches elsewhere in Scotland.  As with 
other organisations subject to surveillance during the war this represented a continuity 
in policing from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.72  By comparison with 
some others considered subversive in the Second World War, however, their 
membership was small.  The ILP, whose complex ideology was in any event more 
pacifist than revolutionary was, for example, only significant in Glasgow.  As a 
consequence, the first SHD Summary concluded that the influence of these 
organisations ‘does not extend beyond their members, who are few in number’.73  
Notwithstanding, whilst the potential of these organisations to impede the war effort 
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was limited compared to some others, they continued to be a policing priority for the 
Special Branch in Edinburgh and elsewhere in Scotland for the duration.   
 
Most of the reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh that related to ‘subversion’ 
referred to meetings, many of which took place at The Mound.  As such, the 
established tactic of infiltration was undoubtedly the source of the reports.  The report 
for June 1944, for example, contained a detailed record from someone who was 
clearly in attendance at a speech given by a member of the AF in relation to the 
Second Front.74  As with other groups it is clear that the police tactic was recognised 
by the target of surveillance.  At an anarchist meeting in August 1944 the speaker 
stated that he would have exposed the true extent of casualties caused by flying bombs 
to prove the degree to which people had been deceived by central government had ‘the 
boys in blue … not [been] present at [the] meeting’.75  
 
Given that UK’s war was against National Socialism, it might, at first, seem surprising 
that none of the reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh or the SHD summaries 
refer to a fascist organisation.  Part of the explanation relates to the fact that the British 
Union (until 1936, the British Union of Fascists) failed to gain a mass following in 
Scotland in the interwar period.  Furthermore, whilst organisations like the Right Club 
had gone to ground at the outbreak of war, the British Union were proscribed and 
some 750 people associated with the organisation were interned as a consequence of 
the extension to Defence Regulation 18 in mid-1940.76  Thus, by the time of the first 
reports by the Special Branches in November 1940, domestic fascism as a political 
and social force was largely an irrelevance, especially in Scotland, and it therefore did 
not become a policing priority for the remainder of the duration.  
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Policing identity fraud and the evasion of duty  
In addition to the largely covert gathering of intelligence in relation to subversion, the 
police in Edinburgh and elsewhere in Scotland carried out overt policing in relation to 
war-related duties.  The SHD summaries made under heading ‘1’ of the Special 
Branch reports are a digest of the wide variety of arrests, searches, and prosecutions 
made by forces from late-1940 to mid-1945.  Apparently similar incidents are, 
however, reported by forces in a variety of narratives and under different headings.  Of 
the entries made under heading ‘1’ in the reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh 
the largest subject - some 89 per cent - representing any number of incidents, related 
to offences in connection with ‘registration’.  A brief survey of the SHD summaries 
suggests that the pattern was broadly similar across Scotland.   
 
As part of the preparations for total war, the National Registration Act, introduced on 
1 September 1939, established a national register and made it compulsory for 
everyone to carry an identity card that had to be produced on demand to police 
officers, amongst others.77  Many of the incidents reported by the Special Branch in 
Edinburgh related to individuals being in possession of cards belonging to someone 
else.  The report of June 1941, for example, recorded that a man had been charged 
with stealing a card.78  The following month the report noted that a probationary nurse 
at the Royal Edinburgh Hospital had been charged for using her sister’s card, whilst a 
member of a ship’s crew was charged for using his son’s.79  The report in September, 
meanwhile, listed five separate incidents of individuals in possession of ‘false’ or 
‘falsified’ cards.80  Coterminous to these incidents, approximately 44 per cent of 
entries in the reports by the Special Branch made under heading ‘1’ related to 
contraventions of the Defence Regulations.  Of these, the single largest subject - some 
48 per cent - related to Regulation 20, which referred to adopting a name other than 
that by which the individual was known prior to the Regulations coming into force.  
The report for January 1944, for instance, recorded that a disqualified motor driver had 
been arrested for assuming another name in order to obtain a driving licence.81   
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In addition, some 27 per cent of entries in the reports by the Special Branch in 
Edinburgh made under heading ‘1’ related to impersonators of members of the armed 
forces, which was also an offence under the Defence Regulations.  That for April 
1943, for example, recorded the arrest of an Edinburgh man who ‘through sheer vanity 
had been in the habit of going about in the uniform of a naval captain’.82  Similarly, 
the report in May 1944 noted the arrest of a sergeant glider pilot for wearing the 
uniform of a captain, along with that of an unemployed man for wearing the uniform 
of a squadron leader.83  
 
Most entries in the Special Branch reports are silent about how the incidents came to 
the attention of the police and therefore there is a limit to what can be inferred about 
police tactics.  Unusually, the report by the Special Branch in Edinburgh in September 
1943 recorded that offences were identified when an individual was ‘questioned by 
two detective officers regarding his identity’.84  It might be assumed that the police 
would have undertaken an identity check for those arrested or charged with any 
offences.  As an example, the report for October 1942 recorded incidents where 
individuals arrested for crimes of dishonesty were also charged with registration 
offences.85  In that sense, part of policing of identity fraud during the war remained 
reactive and was therefore not entirely a new requirement.  At the same time the 
prosecution of total war created an impetus for proactive activity.  A circular in late 
1940, for example, requested that the police in Edinburgh and a number of other 
specified forces, institute periodic roadblocks to check the identity of people in the 
area.86 
 
The majority of incidents of identity fraud dealt with by the police in Edinburgh 
related to members of the armed forces who were in some way absent without leave 
(hereafter AWOL).  The Special Branch report for February 1942, for example, noted 
that a man was arrested for desertion from the army, bigamy, and joining the Royal 
Navy under an assumed name.87  Whilst the police had, since the nineteenth century, 
power to arrest a person suspected of being a deserter, the introduction of conscription 
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in preparation for the Second World War increased the demand.  By the end of the war 
about 20,000 deserters were at large.88  Given that some 64 per cent of the entries in 
the reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh made under heading ‘1’ related to 
those who were AWOL, it appears that it was a police priority to support the armed 
forces in apprehending deserters.  One of Donaldson’s interviewees recalled that the 
police in Manchester raided public houses specifically for deserters and it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the tactic was used by police forces elsewhere.89  Thus 
proactive overt police activity supported covert surveillance to combat the evasion of 
duty.  At the same time there was a local imperative to identify deserters.  Without an 
identity card it was impossible to obtain a ration book and therefore there was little 
alternative to turning to crime.  Colquhoun recalled that Glasgow in the blackout was 
turned into a ‘shadowy cesspool of crime, thickened in violence and intensity by a 
constant addition of deserters and men on the run from military service notices’.90 
 
As part of policing the evasion of duty the police in Edinburgh were not only required 
to deal with those going AWOL from the armed services.  Some 81 per cent of the 
entries in the reports by the Special Branch made under heading ‘1’ referred to a 
contravention of Defence Regulation 47A, which related to merchant seamen 
deserting or absenting themselves from a ship.  Of these, some 88 per cent of 
incidents, involving nearly 200 individuals, were specifically identified as merchant 
seamen.  The report in December 1941, for example, recorded that the police in 
Edinburgh dealt with an offence committed in the Soviet Union involving 19 merchant 
seamen, nine of whom were from the same crew.91  Similarly, in January 1942 another 
19 merchant seamen were arrested, where 10 were members of the same crew.92  
Whilst the police had power under Merchant Shipping Acts in the pre-war era to arrest 
seamen for neglect of duty, the outbreak of hostilities increased this aspect of police 
work as merchant seamen refused to board ships, particularly in 1942, when merchant 
shipping losses in the Atlantic were at their highest.93   
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Policing suspected sabotage and strikes 
The joint highest number - some 50 per cent of entries – in the reports by the Special 
Branch in Edinburgh made under heading ‘12’ related to policing suspected sabotage.  
As in the First World War, it was imagined that many thousands of agents were 
plotting acts of sabotage.  Spy ‘mania’, as Basil Thomson, Head of CID in the 
Metropolitan Police in the Great War, observed ‘assumed a virulent epidemic form 
accompanied by delusions which defied treatment’.94  As a consequence, the police in 
Edinburgh during the Second World War were called to investigate apparently minor 
incidents of damage and suspected damage to, amongst others, shipping and industrial 
machinery.  In this sense, police activity was reactive and overt rather than proactive.  
The report for November 1943, for example, recorded that the police had interviewed 
the crew of the SS Cromarty after a piece of wood was found in the sounding pipe of 
the oil tank, even although no damage could have transpired.95  In a similar vein, in 
August 1944, the police interviewed ‘several persons’ after a leak was found in a 
boiler of the SS Empire Wyclif.96   
 
Given that actual incidents of sabotage should have been submitted to the SHD 
separately, and notwithstanding the inconsistencies in reporting, it is an axiom that 
entries made under heading ‘12’ in relation to sabotage were likely to be unfounded.  
Indeed, the incidents investigated by the Special Branch in Edinburgh were found to 
be either unsubstantiated or the consequence of something other than political 
sabotage.  The report for August 1942, for example, noted that the inquiry into the 
cause of damaged steering gear on-board a vessel established that it was due to a lack 
of proper examination at overhaul.  Likewise, the investigation of the cause of a hole 
in the circulating water inlet of the condenser on the SS Baranda found that it was the 
consequence of ‘ordinary wear and tear’.97  In a similar fashion, the investigation in 
November 1943 following the discovery that two iron levers had been placed in the 
coal breaker of a gas works concluded that there was no evidence of discontent within 
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the workforce or apparent motive and that ‘no person would have made such a trifling 
attempt to commit sabotage’.98 
 
Thus, whilst the police in Edinburgh responded in the pre-war era to complaints of 
malicious mischief as part of the core duty of protecting property, the paranoia during 
the Second World War surrounding fifth columnists increased the demand to 
investigate incidents, the cause of which would otherwise have been viewed as arising 
from something less sinister and therefore unlikely to have been made known to the 
police.  As a Home Intelligence Report in this regard concluded in July 1941: ‘A good 
deal of police time is taken up with fruitless investigations.’99  The SHD summaries of 
Special Branch reports under heading ‘13’ indicated that this was a common 
requirement for forces in Scotland.   That for July 1941, for instance, noted: ‘in all 
cases so far investigated it has been found that the minor damage caused was due to 
carelessness or mischief and not with any intention to assist the enemy’.100  Indeed, in 
the immediate aftermath of the war HMICS praised the ‘security work’ of detectives 
that ‘prevented sabotage’, which suggests that genuine incidence was minimal at 
most.101  
 
The remaining joint highest number of entries in the reports by the Special Branch in 
Edinburgh - also some 50 per cent - made under heading ‘12’ related to strikes.   The 
‘new’ police had, since their creation, been involved in policing the conflict arising 
from strikes as part of their core operational role to maintain public order.  In the Great 
War, although unions accepted compulsory arbitration, it did not stop strikes.  The 
National Arbitration Tribunal was introduced in the Second World War to prevent a 
recrudescence.  Whilst it did not go as far as the Emergency Regulations made in 1921 
and 1926, it made strikes and lockouts illegal and provided machinery for collective 
agreements.  Yet despite the Order being reinforced in 1944 by Defence Regulation 
1AA, there was, as Figure 5.1 illustrates, a record number of strikes in Great Britain, 
which further questions the existence of social solidarity and notions of a people’s 
                                                
98 NRS HH55/57/1, Report by City of Edinburgh Police Special Branch, November 1943. 
99 NRS HH55/22, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 5 July 1940. 
100 NRS HH55/52/1, Summary of Special Branch reports, July 1941. 
101 Eighty-Third Report of HMICS, 4. 
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war’.  Indeed, as Neil Stammers has pointed out, the strikes were seen as a ‘real threat 
to the production programmes necessary to support the invasion of Europe’.102   
 
 
Figure 5.1 Number of strikes, workers involved, and working days lost in  
Great Britain, 1933-1952  
[Source: Ministry of Labour Gazette, May 1953103]  
 
The reports by the Special Branch in Edinburgh confirm that the police regularly 
investigated the cause of strikes.  Thus, although there had been a long continuity of 
policing any attendant disorder, interceding in the strike itself embroiled the police in 
what had hitherto principally been a civil matter.  In this sense, police activity was 
reactive and overt.  The report for August 1943, for example, recorded that a police 
inquiry into a complaint from a firm of shipbuilders that 52 riveters and holders-on 
had gone on strike established that it was a consequence of a refusal by the 
Shipbuilders’ Federation to grant an increase in wages.104  In a similar fashion, a 
police inquiry into information received from a firm of Fellmongers or Skinners that 
10 employees had gone on strike for no apparent reason in April 1944 established that 
                                                
102 Stammers, Civil Liberties, 208., John Price, Organised Labour in the War (Harmondsworth; New 
York: A. Lane, Penguin 1940), 140-142., Kahn-Freund, "Legal Framework," 42-127., Knowles, 
Strikes, 118. 
103 In Allan D. Flanders, "Collective Bargaining," in The System of Industrial Relations in Great 
Britain: Its History, Law, and Institutions, ed. Allan D. Flanders and Hugh Armstrong Clegg (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1954). 














the immediate cause was a grievance over defective heating apparatus in the business 
premises.105   
 
The objective of most police activity was to determine whether there was a 
contravention of the prohibiting legislation.  The Special Branch report of a strike 
involving 19 employees of a wool merchant who were contracted to work on behalf of 
the Minister of Supply in February 1943, for example, noted that the police had 
reported the circumstances to the procurator fiscal.106  The Home Intelligence reports, 
however, show that the police in Edinburgh sometimes intervened in strikes in an 
unprecedented way.   
 
In the early weeks of 1942, the manager of the Scottish Motor Traction depot in 
Roseburn contacted the police asking for officers to be present whilst he interviewed 
workers involved in a trade dispute.  Officers attended and one worker was sacked.  
The following day the manager telephoned the Special Branch to advise that the 
dispute was impeding the war effort and again requested the presence of the police.  
Two plain-clothes officers attended and took statements from workers, two of whom 
were sacked.  In consequence, a number of organisations wrote to the Secretary of 
State for Scotland, Tom Johnston, and the Regional Commissioner regarding the 
‘illegal’ use of the police to intimidate workers for ‘private purposes’.  Morren 
explained that the procurator fiscal had instructed that officers be deployed to 
determine whether there was a contravention of the Defence Regulations and to 
prevent a breach of the peace.  More significantly for an understanding of police 
tactics, however, he also advised: ‘it has always been the procedure in this department, 
on receipt of information that a stoppage of work has taken place, or is likely to take 
place, to dispatch officers at once so that they can report to the various officials as 
soon as possible’.107  Morren’s statement suggests intervention was appropriate even 
in circumstances where no offence was evident.  Given Tom Johnston’s Fabian 
background, this was probably at variance with the Secretary of State’s view of the 
police role.  In his reply to the Edinburgh and District Trades Council regarding the 
intervention, Johnston advised that he ‘held strongly to the view that the police should 
                                                
105 NRS HH55/58/1, Report by City of Edinburgh Police Special Branch, April 1944.  
106 NRS HH55/55/1, Report by City of Edinburgh Police Special Branch, February 1943. 
107 NRS HH55/13, Letters from Morren to Johnston, 10 February 1942, 23 February 1942. 
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not be present at meetings between employers and employees unless for purposes 
connected with the preservation of law and order or the detection of offences’.108   
 
The strident tone in a succession of entries in Morren’s Home Intelligence reports 
suggests that strikes and related government inaction was, however, something of a 
personal preoccupation.  In July 1941, for example, he reported that despite having 
submitted ‘many’ reports on strike meetings no action had been taken.  The 
‘ringleaders’, he argued, needed to be ‘taught’ that they ‘cannot wantonly and with 
impunity disrupt the efforts of a country that is fighting for its life’.109  Again in 
October 1943, he reported that there was a public perception that the government had 
shown weakness in its ‘manifest reluctance to exercise the powers it possesses’ in 
response to a ‘wave of unrest’ and the ‘defiance by the rank and file of industry’.110  
Similarly, following the introduction of Defence Regulation 1AA in 1944, he reported 
that there would be the ‘fullest support everywhere’ for the ‘vigorous enforcement’ 
against ‘those who instigate strikes’.111  Whilst none of the reports suggested that 
employers were culpable, one entry under heading ‘1’ in a Special Branch report in 
September 1943 recorded that, following a report to the procurator fiscal of a strike of 
90 platers in a number of shipbuilding firms, the police were instructed to charge them 
all with a contravention of the Order.112  The SHD summaries confirm that similar 
requirements were made on forces elsewhere in Scotland.  That in March 1942 noted 
that the police in Dundee, for example, reported 116 riveters and holders-on employed 
in shipbuilding to the procurator fiscal.113  Stammers has argued that of the 6,300 
strikers prosecuted during the war the majority were in Scotland.114  The requirement 
on the police was clearly greater in this regard in Scotland than elsewhere in Britain.  
 
Policing the ‘Lighting Restrictions’ and aliens 
In the days immediately before the outbreak of war the blackout was imposed 
throughout the UK as a precaution against enemy air raids.  ‘All car head-lamps had to 
be hooded’, recalled St. Johnston in Oxfordshire, ‘while lighted street lamps became a 
                                                
108 NRS HH55/13, Letter from Johnston to Edinburgh and District Trades Council, 9 March 1942. 
109 NRS HH55/29, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 4 July, 1941. 
110 NRS HH55/38, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 8 October 1943.  
111 NRS HH55/39, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 21 April 1944.  
112 NRS HH55/56/1, Report by City of Edinburgh Police Special Branch, September 1943.  
113 NRS HH55/53/1, Summary of Special Branch reports, March 1942.  
114 Stammers, Civil Liberties, 208.  
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thing of the past’.115 Enforcement of the manifold and technical restrictions thus 
became a major preoccupation for the police.  The restrictions covered, for example, 
the time of operation, obligatory lights, the limitations as to type, position, and number 
in vehicles, as well as traffic signs and street lighting.116  In that sense, police activity 
was reactive and overt and in support of a national objective.  Smale found, for 
example, that contraventions of the ‘Lighting Restrictions’ were the largest category 
of offences dealt with by the police in the Scottish Borders during the war.117   
 
 
Figure 5.2 Number of crimes and offences related to the ‘Lighting  
Restrictions’ made known to the police in Edinburgh, 1939-1944 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/10-11] 
 
In contrast to some other aspects of policing during the war, that related to the 
‘Lighting Restrictions’ was solely a wartime task.  As Figure 5.2 shows, there was a 
sharp increase in police activity in relation to ‘Lighting Restrictions’ in Edinburgh in 
the first year of the war.  Put another way, under the classification of crimes and 
offences reported annually to the town council there was an increase in policing in 
relation to the ‘Lighting Restrictions’ as a percentage of all Class VII, ‘Miscellaneous 
Offences’.  A similar pattern was evident in England and Wales, and Northern 
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Ireland.118  The explanation in Edinburgh relates to the increasing ‘vigilance’ by the 
police as a consequence of what Morren saw as the ‘laxity’ of members of the public 
to observance.119  In the first three months of the ‘Phoney War’, 578 contraventions 
had been reported in Edinburgh. 120   Norman Longmate observed that courts 
throughout the UK became ‘choked with black-out cases’ and that the police had a 
‘thankless job’ in this regard.121  The demand on policing decreased after the first year 
of the war and for the remainder of the duration due to three factors unrelated to 
enforcement however: firstly, central government extended the daylight hours by 
introducing ‘Summer Time’ and ‘Double Summer Time’ which reduced the potential 
for offending;122 secondly, as Morren explained in a Home Intelligence Report in late 
1943, ‘the public … [became] … habituated to black-out conditions’;123 and lastly, as 
the war turned decisively in favour of the allies, some of the restrictions were relaxed. 
Some lighting was resumed in Edinburgh in 1944 for example.124 
 
Thus, whilst enforcing the ‘Lighting Restrictions’ was a significant part of policing in 
Edinburgh it did not, as in the Borders, become the largest category of offences dealt 
with by the police.  Part of the explanation might be related to the fact that, given they 
lived in largely rural areas, some of the population in the Borders were of the view that 
they were less likely to be a target of air raids and therefore more readily flouted the 
restrictions.  At the same time, police in rural areas were not otherwise engaged 
otherwise on war-related duties to the same extent as their urban colleagues and 
therefore had more time for enforcement.  
 
In contrast to policing the ‘Lighting Restrictions’, which was a wartime expedient, that 
in relation to aliens during the Second World War was an intensification of existing 
requirements.  As a consequence of the Great War, Acts of 1914 and 1919 and an 
                                                
118 cf Great Britain. Central Statistical Office., Statistical Digest of the War, History of the Second 
World War United Kingdom civil series (London: HMSO, 1951), 48, 50.  A comparable figure is not 
given in the Criminal Statistics Scotland: Summary of Statistics relating to Police Apprehensions and 
Criminal Proceedings for the years 1939-1945. Cmd 7505, 1948. 
119 NRS HH55/17, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 10 November 1939. 
120 NRS HH55/17, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 24 November 1939.   
121 Norman Longmate, How We Lived Then: A History of Everyday Life During the Second World 
War (London: Pimlico, 2002), 42-43. 
122 How We Lived Then, 47. 
123 NRS HH55/38, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 3 December 1943.  
124 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1944, 12. 
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Order of 1920 placed restrictions on aliens in the UK.125  They were, for example, 
required to register with the police whilst requirements were also imposed on those 
who, for example, provided lodgings.  As Colin Holmes has argued, this ‘swept aside 
the vestiges of the traditional laissez-faire approach which had generally prevailed 
during periods of peace’ with regard to aliens.126  
 
 Number  Number of crimes and 
offences related to 
aliens made known to 
the police as % of 
number of aliens 
registered 
Aliens registered 
Crimes and offences 
related to aliens made 
known to the police  
1935 1472 6 0.4 
1936 1443 24 1.7 
1937 1537 77 5.0 
1938 1547 92 5.9 
1939 1401 23 1.6 
1940 834 272 32.6 
1941 1427 110 7.7 
1942 1655 112 6.8 
1943 1851 290 15.7 
1944 2216 158 7.1 
1945 2288 3 0.1 
1946 2108 9 0.4 
1947 2571 7 0.3 
1948 3003 111 3.7 
Table 5.2 Aliens registered with the police and crimes and offences related 
to aliens in Edinburgh, 1935-1948 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/10-12]  
 
As Table 5.2 shows, police activity in Edinburgh in respect of aliens increased sharply 
during the Second World War by comparison with the pre-war era.  In the period 
1935-1938 the mean number of crimes or offences made known to the police as a 
percentage of the number of aliens registered with the police was 3.3, whilst in the 
period 1946-1948 it was 1.5.  During the war, however, it was 10.2.  Put simply, the 
policing of aliens, which had increased in the immediate pre-war years as a 
consequence of the immigration into Britain of around 60,000 German, Austrian, and 
Czech refugees, intensified further, most notably between 1939 and 1940 and between 
                                                
125 Police Manual for Scotland, 47-51. 
126 Colin Holmes, John Bull's Island: Immigration and British Society, 1871-1971 (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1988), 95.  
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1942 and 1943.127  As a percentage of all Class VII ‘Miscellaneous Offences’, there 
was an increase in policing in Edinburgh with regard to aliens during the war and the 
pattern was repeated in general terms across Scotland as a whole.128 
 
Part of the explanation relates to the additional restrictions placed on aliens.129  
Immediately on the outbreak of war, the Order of 1920 was amended, as the Home 
Secretary, John Anderson, advised Parliament, with the intention of rendering 
‘harmless all aliens who might be hostile to this country’.130  Aliens were further 
restricted with regard to residence and travel.  By June 1940, in the context of the 
panic surrounding fifth columnists, these were extended to include, for example, a 
night-time curfew and a prohibition on possession of bicycles and motor cars, 
especially in ‘Protected Areas’ like the Firth of Forth.131   In short, the consequence of 
the closer scrutiny paid to aliens by the police meant that there was more likelihood of 
being found to have contravened the myriad of restrictions.  Indeed, Ingleton has 
argued that they were enforced with ‘desperate severity’ in places.132  In this context, 
the reduction in police activity in Edinburgh after 1940 can be seen as a consequence 
of the reduction in the number of aliens at large as a result of the introduction of 
internment for Germans and Austrians following the Fall of France, and Italians after 
Italy’s declaration of war.133   
 
As a consequence of the sweeping additional requirements with regard to registration, 
the Aliens Department of the City of Edinburgh Police was inundated to the extent 
that extra staff had to be brought in and additional buildings utilised.  The Edinburgh 
Evening Dispatch reported that nearly 1,000 aliens had been registered in Edinburgh 
in the three days after the outbreak of war and the department ‘dealing with this 
branch of registration has been kept busy all the time … there have been occasions 
                                                
127 cf Hylton, Their Darkest Hour, 2., Calder, The People's War, 130. 
128 cf Cmd 7505, 14-15. 
129 The Scotsman, 4 September 1939, 5.  
130 The Scotsman, 5 September 1939, 4.  
131 The Scotsman, 13 May 1940, 5; 17 May 1940, 6. 
132 Ingleton, The Gentlemen at War, 89. 
133 For the internment of aliens see, for example, François Lafitte, The Internment of Aliens (London: 
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Austrian Exile Studies (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005)., Matthew Stibbe, "Civilian Internment and 
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when the rush was so great that staff, to use their own words, have been “snowed 
under”’.134   Furthermore, as Morren noted in his annual reports to the town council, 
his appointment as coordinating officer for the Protected Areas of both the Firth of 
Forth and the Firth of Tay led to a large increase in work as the Aliens Department in 
Edinburgh assumed responsibility for applications to enter both areas.  That year it 
dealt with 9,000 applications, whilst in 1941 it dealt with 7,000.  In addition the 
department dealt with the registration of seamen engaged on coastal traffic as well as 
refugees from Europe and the re-registration on British-born women who had lost 
their nationality by marrying aliens.135  Yet as Table 5.2 also shows the work 
intensified in the post-war era in relation to the number of aliens registered.  Part of 
the explanation relates to de-militarisation and the Polish Resettlement Corps in 
particular.136  By contrast, the number of related crimes and offences reduced due to 
the rescinding, with the cessation of hostilities, of many of the prohibitions. 
 
Policing ‘War Legislation’ and military laws 
In a similar manner to the ‘Lighting Restrictions’, that with regards to ‘War 
Legislation’ was a function that arose solely as a consequence of the war.  Whilst it is 
unknown what was otherwise included in this category, it partly related to the 
continually evolving Defence Regulations.  In 1941 Morren commented in his annual 
report on the ‘ever increasing mass of legislation and the resultant additional new 
types of offences thereby created’.137  As Table 5.3 shows there was an increase in 
policing demand in Edinburgh in that regard between 1940 and 1941 and between 
1944 and 1945.  As with some other aspects of Class VII ‘Miscellaneous Offences’, 
there was an increase in policing with regard to ‘War Legislation’.  Many of the 
Defence Regulations were intended to prohibit actions deemed to be prejudicial to the 
efficient prosecution of the war or the defence of the realm and were thus part of the 
mobilisation for total war.  Edward Smithies found, for instance, that after the Fall of 
France there was a wave of prosecutions for talk deemed careless or likely to 
                                                
134 Edinburgh Evening Dispatch, 7 September 1939, 3.  
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undermine morale that were as much related to deterrence as punishment.  Similarly, 
as the war progressed and the threat of invasion receded, the objective of prosecutions 
was to maintain ‘industrial and political discipline’.138  In this sense, local police 
activity was reactive and overt in response to national objectives that reflected the 
progress of the war.  In that regard, although the Defence Regulations expired in 1946, 
the continued demand on the police in the post-war period might have been related to 
the continuation of conscription.139 
 
 Number made know to the police  








1940 104 339 
1941 966 565 
1942 58 484 
1943 15 360 
1944 73 334 
1945 478 243 
1946 317 132 
1947 179 123 
1948 207 142 
1949 152 122 
Table 5.3 Crimes and offences related to ‘War Legislation’* and military 
laws in Edinburgh, 1935-1949. 
* Other than the ‘Lighting Restrictions’ 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/10-12] 
 
1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
1.97 2.43 10.99 15.85 18.54 21.36 22.56 23.51 
Table 5.4 Total working population in the armed forces and auxiliary 
services in Great Britain, 1938-1945 (%) 
[Source: Statistical Digest of the War, 8] 
 
Policing with regard to military personnel in the Second World War, which included 
impressment, billeting, deserters, and absentees, was, in contrast, a continuation of 
peacetime activity.  Yet as Table 5.3 also shows the demand increased dramatically in 
Edinburgh with the outbreak of war and a similar pattern was evident across Scotland 
                                                
138 Smithies, Crime in Wartime, 14-20. 
139 Conscription continued until the end of the 1950s.  Calder, The People's War, 569. 
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as a whole.140  Table 5.4 reveals that, as a consequence of conscription, the percentage 
of the total working population in the armed forces and auxiliary services in Great 
Britain increased from 1.97 per cent in 1938 to 23.51 per cent by 1945.  Furthermore, 
during the war there were millions of allied service personnel in the UK, particularly 
in preparation for ‘D-Day’.  There was therefore a greater potential for offences 
related to military laws, like desertion, to occur.  In 1941, for example, the ratio of 
those going AWOL from the armed forces was about 1:100. At the same time, central 
government required a local policing response.  In that sense, policing was again 
reactive and overt in support of national objectives.   
 
Conclusion 
In his message to police forces in England and Wales at the end of the war in Europe 
the Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, paid tribute to the ‘innumerable tasks’ 
performed by the police which ‘were of the ‘greatest importance to the Home Front’.  
These duties were, he acknowledged, ‘sometimes unspectacular’.141  In contrast to 
Petrie’s suggestion of the threat posed by enemy agents, this chapter has demonstrated 
that war-related policing in Edinburgh was largely mundane.   
 
Much of what the police were required to do was intended to support the prosecution 
of the war on the home front.  However, notwithstanding the introduction of the Police 
War Instructions, a great deal was a continuation and intensification of existing 
policing practice.  Police surveillance of the CPGB and SNP, for example, had taken 
place in the interwar period because of their respective revolutionary and secessionist 
agendas.  During the war their activities were perceived to be inimical to the war 
effort.  In a similar vein, whilst the police did enforce military laws and those relating 
to the evasion of duty in the interwar period, police activity increased during the war 
to support the mobilisation of the economy generally and enforce conscription.  
Concurrently, the war did impose new demands on the police in relation to ‘War 
Legislation’, including the ‘Lighting Restrictions’ and, notably, the investigation of 
suspected sabotage which was a consequence of the milieu of paranoia around fifth 
columnists.  Thus the hypothesis that operational policing in Edinburgh during the 
Second World War represented both continuity and change withstands historical 
                                                
140 cf Cmd 7505, 14-16. 
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analysis.  Notwithstanding the recruitment of police auxiliaries, with a limited 
capacity, the question thus arises as to the extent to which this affected core policing 







Core policing  
As part of his tribute to police forces in England and Wales in 1945 the Home 
Secretary,  Herbert Morrison, acknowledged that the police had, in addition to the 
many war-related duties, ‘cheerfully carried on [their] ordinary day-to-day work’.1  
Along with political, economic, social, and intellectual factors, the creation of the 
‘new’ police in Scotland was premised on the desire for a more effective means of 
protecting property.2  From the outset, the core duty was therefore to overtly and 
proactively fulfil this function, as well as protecting life and keeping the peace.3 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether these core functions changed in 
Edinburgh during the Second World War from that which prevailed in the pre- and 
immediate post-war eras.  It is argued that policing with regard to core functions 
represented both continuity and change.  For example, policing with regard to the 
protection of property and life remained largely unchanged during the war from that 
which prevailed in the pre-war period.  On the other hand, there was an intensification 
of police activity with regard to some crimes and offences within these classifications, 
in particular housebreaking, sexual offences, the mistreatment of children, and 
assaults.  At the same time, there was a sharp decline in police activity in relation to 
the maintenance of order and civic regulation during the war by comparison with the 
pre-war period.   
 
As this chapter will demonstrate, changes in the pattern of policing during the war 
were a consequence of the legacy of pre-war political, social, and economic factors 
that were specific to Edinburgh.  In particular, suburbanisation increased the 
opportunities for housebreakers, whilst the failure to reintroduce a system for warning 
juvenile offenders likely compounded the increased demands on the police.  The 
introduction of police boxes in the 1930s, meanwhile, eroded police capacity and 
                                                
1 Cited in Dixon, "The Emergency Work of the Police Forces," 224-225.	
2 See, for example, Barrie, "Patrick Colquhoun, the Scottish Enlightenment and Police Reform in 
Glasgow," 71-73., McGowan, Policing the Metropolis of Scotland, 80. 
3 The 1805 Act in Edinburgh, for example, provided regulations to establish a system of police, for 
apprehending vagrants and disorderly persons, preserving the peace, suppressing common begging, 
removing nuisances, and for cleansing and lighting the streets.  45 Geo. 3, cap. 21 (1805).  
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effectiveness.  To add to this, policing was affected by factors associated with the war.  
In particular, the introduction of the blackout increased the incidence of housebreaking 
and sudden deaths from accidents.  Concurrently, the blackout obscured victimless 
offences, such as street betting, that only became known at the point of detection, 
thereby reducing the demand on the police.  In a similar vein, military conscription 
and essential war work relocated some young adult males who would otherwise have 
committed offences.4   
 
Policing during the war was also affected by the release of regular officers to the 
armed forces.  Together with the pressure of war-related duties, and notwithstanding 
the recruitment of police auxiliaries, this reduced the visibility of the police, 
particularly in relation to those with experience and local knowledge.  In this context 
officers were more likely to exercise their discretion to ignore some crimes and 
offences, especially those that were victimless or ones to which they were otherwise 
apathetic.  As a consequence, there was an increase in the use of summons rather than 
apprehension as a means of dealing with incidents relating to all crimes and offences.  
 
The chapter examines core policing in Edinburgh during the Second World War.  For 
the most part, the analysis is based on the annual reports by the chief constable to the 
town council on the state of crime and the police establishment.  These reports contain 
statistics relating to the number of crimes and offences made known to the police, and 
cases where one or more persons were arrested or cited, and thus provide an overview 
of operational policing.   
 
The legacy of interwar policing 
In many respects the general picture of operational policing on the eve of the Second 
World War was similar to the nineteenth century.  In an echo of instructions given to 
officers of the ‘new’ police forces in the nineteenth century, the 1931 Manual 
reminded Scottish officers that their primary object, to which their efforts must be 
‘constantly directed’ was the ‘prevention of crime’, the ‘preservation of peace and 
                                                
4 In his study of Glasgow in the interwar period, Andrew Davies identified that the average age of 
men who were members of the criminal gang the ‘Beehive Boys’ was just under the age of twenty-
four.  Andrew Davies, "Street Gangs, Crime and Policing in Glasgow during the 1930s: The Case of 
the Beehvive Boys," Social History 23, no. 3 (1998): 257. 
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good order’, the ‘safety of the lives and property of the Lieges’, and the ‘detection of 
offenders’.5  
 
The basis of the system of rigid preventive surveillance in Edinburgh, as in other 
urban areas, remained the policeman patrolling a beat on foot.  As English-based 
studies have identified, mechanisation of the police before the war was ‘rudimentary’.6  
In Edinburgh the use of motor vehicles throughout the early 1930s was restricted to 
traffic patrols and the conveyance of prisoners and the injured, whilst detectives did 
not regularly use cars until April 1934 when three were purchased.7  Michael Brogden 
found that for ninety per cent of officers in Liverpool in the interwar period the beat 
represented the ‘reality of the normal working day’.8  On joining the police in 
Glasgow in the early 1920s, Colquhoun recalled being told that ‘the beat man formed 
the first line of defence against crime’ and that ‘when [he] came tramping down the 
street [he] should be a walking crime prevention campaign’.9  During the war, and 
notwithstanding the additional war-related tasks, the City Prosecutor in Edinburgh 
reminded officers that their first function ‘to prevent crime and to maintain unbroken 
the public peace’ was to be achieved by ‘patrolling the streets’ in a ‘scrupulous and 
diligent’ manner.10   
 
As Klein found in her study of three English forces, beyond their core duties, the 
police in the interwar period also carried out a ‘baffling variety of activities that 
appeared to have little to do with lawbreaking’.11 The police in Scotland were, for 
example, responsible for a range of regulations related to civic well-being, which was 
a legacy of the improvement legislation that gave rise to the creation of the ‘new’ 
police forces.  Between 1930 and 1938 the Edinburgh police made a mean annual 
12,619 reports to municipal and central government agencies such as the Road, Burgh, 
and Water Engineers relating to lighting, cleansing, and sanitation.  Furthermore, the 
Coal Weighing Inspector, who was responsible for visiting depots from which coal 
was sold, weighed, and delivered to the public, was, until 1934, attached to the 
                                                
5 Police Manual for Scotland, 19. 
6 Weinberger, The Best Police in the World, 37. 
7 ECA ED06/1/10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1934, 32. 
8 Brogden, On the Mersey Beat, 36. 
9 Colquhoun, Life Begins at Midnight, 19. 
10 Mill, The Scottish Police, 38. 
11 Klein, Invisible Men, 43. 
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Watching Department. Indeed, during the early decades of the twentieth century the 
responsibility of the police for a range of public services increased.  In the late 1920s 
HMICS commented on the ‘constantly increasing demands for the services of the 
police on work other than ordinary patrol duty’.12  Klein has argued that part of the 
explanation related to the increased availability of the telephone ‘as more and more of 
the public decided that calling the police was the simplest way to resolve a problem, 
regardless of its relationship to law and order’.13  For instance, lost and found property 
increasingly became an issue for the police.  Between 1930 and 1935 the police in 
Edinburgh dealt with a mean annual 23,772 items of found property and 9,856 reports 
of lost property.  Over the same period, they also dealt with a mean 1,131 stray dogs, 
returned 1,036 lost children to their parents, and assisted 2,289 people to their homes 
or other institutions.  At the same time, as will be seen in chapter seven, dealing with 
traffic created the exponential demand.  
 
All this created a problem of capacity.  At a strategic level police authorities and chief 
constables in urban areas rationalised their infrastructure and, drawing on the 
experience in England, widely adopted the police box system.14  In Edinburgh 141 
boxes and 13 pillars were introduced between 1931 and 1933, whilst the five territorial 
divisions were reduced to four and 25 of the 31 police stations were closed.  The 
police authority in Edinburgh took this as an opportunity to save money and dispensed 
with the services of three inspectors, 10 sergeants, and 18 constables.  Whilst HMICS 
advised that the value of the police boxes could ‘hardly be overestimated’, the 
consequences of their introduction in Edinburgh aggravated the problem of capacity 
and eroded further the ability of the police to discharge their core functions.15  Indeed, 
the chief constable, Roderick Ross, ‘deprecated’ the ‘very serious reduction’ and 
pointed out to the police authority that any advantage gained from the introduction of 
the police boxes had thus been ‘nullified’.  Furthermore, he reasoned, suburbanisation, 
together with the deployment of officers to specialist areas of policing, should have 
led to an increase in strength.  It is a ‘fundamental fact’, he argued, ‘that good patrol 
work carried out by an adequate personnel and resulting in crime prevention, is 
                                                
12 Seventy-First Report of His Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland, 1929, 5. 
13 Invisible Men, 54. 
14 Williams, Police Control Systems, 131. 
15 Seventy-Ninth Report of His Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland, 1937, 4. 
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infinitely more efficacious than a highly efficient department wholly engaged in 
detection’.16  
 
In response to the problem of capacity police officers exercised discretion in 
enforcement.  As the 1928 Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure in 
England and Wales concluded, given the ‘variety and complexity’ of the police role, 
and that a constable’s power was not delegated, it would be ‘impossible to issue hard 
and fast instructions’.17  As a consequence, officers adopted a variety of procedures.  
The situation was even more imprecise in Scotland due to the absence of the Judges’ 
Rules that originated in England and Wales in 1906 which was binding in practice if 
not law.18  At the tactical level, English-based studies have identified that meting out 
physical violence was rationalised by police officers as a legitimate punishment and 
means of preventing crime.19  One of the features of policing in Britain in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries was violence.  As Emsley argued in relation to 
England in the nineteenth century:  
 
With little training, little concept of status, and subjected to both verbal abuse 
and physical violence, the temptation to lash out at tormentors and potential 
tormentors must have been enormous for members of the new police; and 
fragmentary evidence suggests that, throughout the century, illicit violence 
was not uncommon.20   
 
Colquhoun recalled that in Glasgow in the 1920s: ‘a man on the beat … had to be 
ready to use his fists and his baton at a moment’s notice’.21  Likewise, at a strategic 
level, Sillitoe saw the streets as a ‘battleground’ and legitimised violence by the police 
as an effective way of dealing with gangs in Sheffield and Glasgow in the 1930s.22  
The relationship between the police and gangs like the ‘Beehive Boys’ was, according 
                                                
16 ECA ED0006/1/9, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1933, 24. 
17 Cmd 3297, 8, 18, 33.  
18 Robert Mark, In the Office of Constable (London: Collins, 1978), 57.  For jurisprudence in Scotland 
see, for example, Andrew Gibb, "Scottish Criminal Procedure Comparatively Considered," The Police 
Journal 1, no. 4 (1928). 
19 Clapson and Emsley, "Street, Beat and Respectability," 123. 
20 Clive Emsley, "'The Thump of Wood on a Swede Turnip': Police Violence in Nineteenth-Century 
England," Criminal Justice History 66 (1985): 130. 
21 Colquhoun, Life Begins at Midnight, 20. 
22 Percy Joseph Sillitoe, Cloak without Dagger (London: Cassell, 1955), 64-67. 
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to one historian, consequently ‘characterised by violence’.23  ‘Rough handling’ was an 
‘accepted and integral style of policing’ in Scotland.24   
 
Mark Roodhouse has pointed out correctly that it is difficult to study the exercise of 
discretion.25  In practice, it is impossible to discern in the historical record where it 
was exercised at the tactical level.  Occasional glimpses are afforded in some memoirs 
by police officers.  Robert Mark described the discretion used by the police in, for 
example, arresting bookies in Manchester in the interwar period.26  Nevertheless, 
given the additional demands in connection with policing the home front during the 
Second World War, and the shortage of regular officers there was clearly greater 
pressure to turn a ‘blind eye’ to some offences and this undoubtedly helps explain 
differences in the pattern of policing during the war from that of the immediate pre-
war years.  
 
 Number % 
Apprehended Summoned Total Apprehended Summoned Total 
1934 4243 4097 8340 50.9 49.1 100.0 
1935 4446 4523 8969 49.5 50.5 100.0 
1936 4650 4829 9479 49.0 51.0 100.0 
1937 4951 4970 9921 49.9 50.1 100.0 
1938 4390 5803 10193 43.1 56.9 100.0 
1939 4381 4423 8804 49.8 50.2 100.0 
1940 3945 5593 9538 41.4 58.6 100.0 
1941 3959 5394 9353 42.3 57.7 100.0 
1942 3508 4658 8166 43.0 57.0 100.0 
1943 3053 3785 6838 44.6 55.4 100.0 
1944 *2720 3108 5828 46.7 53.3 100.0 
*Not including 114 persons apprehended for other forces. 
Table 6.1 Persons proceeded against at the instance of the police in 
Edinburgh, 1934-1944 
 [Source: ECA ED006/1/11] 
 
As Table 6.1 shows, the headline figures identify a decrease in the number of persons 
proceeded against in Edinburgh at the instance of the police during the war by 
comparison with the pre-war period when it was increasing.  Indeed, the figures in 
1943 and 1944 together include 337 persons who were subject to proceedings at the 
instance of other authorities for contraventions of the Defence (Home Guard) 
                                                
23 Davies, "Street Gangs, Crime and Policing in Glasgow," 253. 
24 Bartie and Jackson, "Youth Crime and Preventive Policing " 99. 
25 Roodhouse, Black Market Britain, 159. 
26 Mark, In the Office of Constable, 30. 
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Regulations, Edinburgh Corporation Act, education acts, factory acts, food and drugs 
acts, Petroleum Act, Poor Law Act, public health acts, roads acts, weights and 
measures acts, and for cruelty to children.  Put another way, the mean number of 
person proceeded against in the war years 1939-1944 was some 14 per cent less than 
in the immediate pre-war years 1934-1938.  By comparison with the immediate pre-
war era, there was also a mean increase of some eight per cent in the use of summons 
during the war with a corresponding decrease in apprehensions.  In the context of the 
reduced visibility of the police, and the additional war-related functions, officers were 
more likely to view processing an apprehension as an avoidable distraction.  It was, as 
will be seen, similar to the increased use of a caution by traffic officers as a means of 
disposal in dealing with the regulation of road traffic.  
 
Policing in relation to the protection of property 
Under the classification of crimes and offences in reports made by the chief constable 
to the town council, Class II, ‘Crimes Against Property with Violence’, Class III, 
‘Crimes Against Property without Violence’, and Class IV, ‘Malicious Injuries to 
Property’ have the most bearing on the protection of property.  As Table 6.2 suggests, 
the pattern of crime and offences made known to the police, and those cases where 
one or more persons were arrested or cited, remained relatively stable in the period 
1935-1949.  Thus, despite Mannheim’s prediction, the figures suggest some support 
for Weinberger’s finding, in relation to crime rates in general in England, that ‘the war 
appears to have had very little immediate effect’.27   
  
                                                
27 Weinberger, The Best Police in the World, 135. 
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	 Number  
Detection/Solution 
rate (%)	Made known to the police  
Cases where one or more 




















1935	 1810 6073 61 7944 557 1315 61 1933 30.8 21.7 100.0 
1936	 2001 6341 265 8607 779 1557 265 2601 38.9 24.6 100.0 
1937	 2009 6961 394 9364 595 1674 393 2662 29.6 24.0 99.7 
1938	 2274 6419 345 9038 828 1613 345 2786 36.4 25.1 100.0 
1939	 2549 6503 405 9457 785 1290 402 2477 30.8 19.8 99.3 
1940	 2151 6394 591 9136 537 1324 591 2452 25.0 20.7 100.0 
1941	 2303 6749 485 9537 561 1495 485 2541 22.4 22.2 100.0 
1942	 2348 6758 244 9350 645 1503 244 2392 27.5 22.2 100.0 
1943	 2330 6928 227 9485 1087 1769 227 3083 46.7 25.5 100.0 
1944	 2650 6411 617 9678 914 1486 615 3015 34.5 23.2 99.7 
1945	 3658 6457 96 10211 928 1477 96 2501 25.4 22.9 100.0 
1946	 3373 5969 115 9457 1083 1724 107 2914 32.1 28.9 93.0 
1947	 2653 6339 83 9075 683 2066 70 2819 25.7 32.6 84.3 
1948	 3197 6260 107 9564 821 2055 99 2975 25.7 32.8 92.5 
1949	 2929 5655 118 8702 765 1911 117 2793 26.1 33.8 99.2 
Table 6.2 Class II, ‘Crimes Against Property with Violence’,  
Class III, ‘Crimes Against Property without Violence’ and,  
Class IV, ‘Malicious Injuries to Property’ in Edinburgh, 1935-
1949 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/10-12]   
 
The table also shows the percentage difference in each Class between the number of 
crimes and offences made known to the police and the number of cases where one or 
more persons were arrested or cited, and suggests what could be characterised as the 
detection or solution rate.  In very broad terms, the mean detection rate for all Classes 
during the war years 1939-1945 remained reasonably consistent with the pre-war era, 
1935-1938 in particular.28  Whilst the rates for Classes II and III are similar, that for 
Class IV is, however, markedly different.  The explanation was probably related to the 
fact that complainers were unlikely to report some minor offences where there was 
little chance of the offender being traced.  Furthermore, even if a complainer reported 
offences of malicious mischief or damage, officers did not record it officially as a 
crime unless there was a culprit.  In effect, almost all these recorded offences were 
solved.   
 
                                                
28 Notably, the mean detection/solution rate for Class III increased from 22.4 per cent during the war 
to 32.0 per cent in the period 1946-1949, whilst the mean number of crimes and offences made known 
to the police was 8.2 per cent less than during the war.  Put simply, the detection rate increased in the 
post-war period even though there were fewer crimes and offences being reported which suggests that 
it had become something of an operational priority. 
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Yet the figures conceal a significant trend.  As a percentage of all crimes and offences, 
the police were increasingly active with regard to those related to the protection of 
property as the war progressed.  In Class II, the majority of crimes and offences made 
known to the police, and cases where one or more persons were arrested or cited, 
were: Theft by Housebreaking; Housebreaking with Intent to Steal; Theft by opening 
Lockfast Places; and, Opening Lockfast Places with Intent to Steal.  Likewise, in Class 
III the majority related to Theft, whilst in Class IV the majority were Malicious 
Mischief.  In this regard, Table 6.3 shows the number of crimes and offences made 
known to the police, and cases where one or more persons were arrested or cited, 
together with the detection/solution rate.   
 
The significant point to be drawn here is that police activity during the war with regard 
to crimes and offences related to housebreaking and, to a much lesser numerical 
extent, Malicious Mischief, increased by comparison with either or both the pre- and 
the post-war eras.  In contrast, the pattern of police activity during the war with regard 
to crimes and offences related to Opening Lockfast Places declined whilst that for 
Theft remained stable. Although fluctuations in the number of cases where one or 
more persons were arrested or cited in relation to housebreaking are noted in passing 
in Morren’s reports to the town council during the war, there was no explanation given 
for the increase in the number of crimes and offences made known to the police.  
Indeed, the mean annual number made known to the police during the war was 27.8 
per cent greater than in the period 1935-1938.  There was a similar increase in reports 
made known to the police in relation to housebreaking across Scotland during the war, 
whilst in the rest of the UK there was an increase in offences made known to the 
police, and persons proceeded against and found guilty, of Breaking and Entering.29  
In short, there was an increased demand on the police throughout the UK during the 
war because of housebreaking.  
 
  
                                                
29 cf Cmd 7505, 12-13., Statistical Digest of the War, 48. The figure relating to the rest of the UK 
obviously excludes those offences made known to the police where either no one was proceeded 
against or was not convicted.   
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	 Number made known to the police 
Theft by Housebreaking; 
Housebreaking with Intent to 
Steal 
Theft by Opening Lockfast 
Places; Opening Lockfast 
Places  
with Intent to Steal 
Theft Malicious Mischief 
1935 1368 424 5277 61 
1936 1514 461 5644 264 
1937 1510 492 6405 392 
1938 1657 600 5837 341 
1939 1729 817 5972 400 
1940 1619 530 6011 591 
1941 1617 686 6449 485 
1942 1834 511 6496 244 
1943 1251 415 6632 227 
1944 2266 346 6082 609 
1945 3215 411 6025 89 
1946 3049 280 5468 104 
1947 2360 264 5564 80 
1948 2827 328 5627 104 
1949 2586 295 4902 114 
	 Number of cases where one or more persons were arrested or cited 
1935 420	 130	 866	 61	
1936 656	 115	 1120	 264	
1937 479	 114	 1309	 392	
1938 678	 133	 1207	 341	
1939 657	 126	 973	 400	
1940 464	 71	 1097	 591	
1941 440	 121	 1210	 485	
1942 546	 96	 1253	 244	
1943 793	 125	 1534	 227	
1944 823	 91	 1163	 609	
1945 841	 77	 1050	 89	
1946 979	 99	 1299	 103	
1947 624	 49	 1347	 70	
1948 696	 110	 1531	 98	
1949 652	 96	 1256	 113	
	 Detection/Solution rate (%) 
1935 30.7	 30.7	 16.4	 100.0	
1936 43.3	 24.9	 19.8	 100.0	
1937 31.7	 23.1	 20.4	 100.0	
1938 40.9	 22.1	 20.7	 100.0	
1939 38.0	 15.4	 16.3	 100.0	
1940 28.7	 13.4	 18.2	 100.0	
1941 27.2	 17.6	 18.8	 100.0	
1942 29.8	 18.8	 19.3	 100.0	
1943 63.4	 30.1	 23.1	 100.0	
1944 36.3	 26.3	 19.1	 100.0	
1945 26.1	 18.8	 17.4	 100.0	
1946 32.1	 35.4	 23.8	 99.0	
1947 26.4	 18.6	 24.2	 87.5	
1948 24.6	 33.5	 27.2	 94.2	
1949 25.2	 32.5	 25.6	 99.1	
Table 6.3 Crimes and offences of: Theft by Housebreaking and 
Housebreaking with Intent to Steal; Theft by Opening Lockfast 
Places and Opening Lockfast Places with Intent to Steal; Theft; 
and Malicious Mischief in Edinburgh, 1935-1949 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/10-12] 
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By it’s very nature, housebreaking is more or less confined to the public domain and 
the level is, therefore, more likely to be influenced by preventative policing.  Although 
in 1937 Robert Mark in Manchester saw the ‘futility of shaking hands with doorknobs 
all night’ as a means of preventing crime, checking property had been seen as a 
sacrosanct element of patrolling the beat and protecting property throughout Britain 
from the outset.30  As Goldsmith found, constables in Glasgow in the 1880s were 
instructed to stick small pieces of paper over the gap between the door and lintel of 
unoccupied premises so that any breach of security might readily be seen.31  In 
Edinburgh, checking property was seen as of such significance that it was included in 
the chief constable’s annual report.  In comparison to reacting to and investigating 
reports of housebreaking, it was intended to show the extent to which the police were 
proactive.  Between 1930 and 1939, for example, the police recorded that they had 
found a mean annual 8,171 insecurities, mostly in shops and warehouses.32  Similarly, 
between 1930 and 1938 the police visited a mean annual of 5,000 unoccupied 
dwelling houses between May and October, when presumably some occupiers were 
taking a summer holiday.  By 1938 the police were checking 59 per cent more 
unoccupied houses than they were in 1930.  
 
However, after 1940 no figures relating to the checking of property are given in the 
chief constable’s annual reports to the town council for the remainder of the period 
under consideration.  Given the limited content of the reports during the war it is 
possible that the detail was merely omitted.  In that event, it would have been 
reasonable to expect it to have reappeared in the immediate post-war reports.  It seems 
likely, however, that given the pressure of war-related duties, the police were not 
required to carry out checks on property or at least not record them.  Thus, it seems 
probable that the police did not proactively protect property during the war to the same 
extent that they did during the 1930s and therefore this contributed to the increase in 
housebreaking.   
 
A degree of protection of business premises was, however, still regarded as an aspect 
of policing during the war.  For the duration, the police continued to hold some shop 
                                                
30 Mark, In the Office of Constable, 25. 
31 Goldsmith, "The Development of the City of Glasgow Police," 187. 
32 cf ECA ED006/1/9-10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1930, 52; 1931, 
42; 1932, 42; 1933, 48; 1934, 60; 1935, 28; 1936, 30; 1937, 34; 1938, 35. 
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and warehouse keys at police stations where the time of delivery and deposit were 
recorded.  Given, however, that each business paid one guinea annually there might 
have been a financial imperative for the police to continue to provide the service.  At 
the same time, in contrast to unoccupied houses, businesses increasingly saw the 
security of their premises as less of a police responsibility.  As Figure 6.1 shows, the 
general trend over the period 1930-1942 was a steady decline in the requirement for 
the police to hold keys for business premises.  Whilst there was a small increase from 
1943, the number for the remainder of the period under consideration was less than 
half that which prevailed in the period 1930-1933.  The trough in numbers was at its 
lowest in 1942, which might suggest that proprietors recognised the police were 
preoccupied by more significant war-related duties.   
 
 
Figure 6.1  Number of shop and warehouse keys held by the police  
in Edinburgh, 1930-1948 
[Source: ECA, ED/006/1/9-12] 
 
Part of the explanation for the increase in housebreaking undoubtedly relates to the 
reduction in the number of regular male constables.  As Figure 6.2 demonstrates, the 
proportion of regular male constables as a percentage of the actual regular strength 
declined dramatically during the war.  Although auxiliaries were recruited to replace 
regular officers, they did not, for the most part, have the same experience or intimate 
local knowledge of beats and thus potential insecurities in domestic and business 
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were in the First Police Reserve, which was comprised of retired regular officers.  Of 
the remainder, 179 were members of the Police War Reserve who had, in their first 
year, received a mere three hours’ instruction on beat patrol with a regular constable.33  
The majority of police auxiliaries who were members of the Police War Reserve were 
not therefore as experienced as either regular male constables or the First Police 
Reserve.  At the same time, the requirement to undertake war-related duties was, as 
observed, significant.  Although not patrolling a beat in Edinburgh, Merrilees recalled: 
‘the multiplicity of war-time duties kept me, like other police officers, constantly 
busy’.34  In Oxfordshire, St. Johnston remembered that as a consequence of the war 
‘much ordinary police work had to go by the board’.35  Within a month of the end of 
the war, A.M. Struthers, the regional officer in Glasgow for the National Council for 
Social Service, had attributed the increase in housebreaking in Scotland to the 
depletion of police forces, and the extra demands, which had reduced the amount of 
time available for beat patrol.36 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Actual regular male constables as a percentage of the total actual  
regular police strength in Edinburgh, 1930-1948 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/9-12] 
 
                                                
33 ECA ED0006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1944, 5., NRS 
HH52/27/1, Circular 3545, 18 May 1939. 
34 Merrilees, The Short Arm of the Law, 147. 
35 St. Johnston, One Policeman's Story, 76. 
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Furthermore, whilst the introduction of police boxes in the pre-war era had 
exacerbated the problem of capacity in Edinburgh, they had also affected efficiency.  
As Morren admitted during the war: ‘the public has not taken to the Boxes or used 
them to the extent envisaged’.  As a consequence, officers were losing ‘local contacts’, 
public ‘good-will’, and the co-operation necessary for the effective operation of the 
‘Police machine’.  In addition, officers could not discuss police trends and exchange 
intelligence with each other to the same extent that they had done when deployed from 
police stations before the introduction of the police boxes.  As Morren put it: ‘The 
men themselves also deplore the loss of benefits which formerly accrued by daily 
intercourse and discussion on Police Matters with their colleagues’.  As a 
consequence, whilst he did not advocate re-opening the closed police stations, he 
considered proposing to the police authority what would be known as a ‘Sergeant’s 
Sections Box, on the lines of a miniature Police Station, at several strategic points 
throughout the City’.37  There is no evidence that the scheme was ever progressed in 
the period under consideration however.  
 
The legacy of more extrinsic social factors also had an impact on policing capacity 
during the war, in particular suburbanisation and the opportunities this afforded 
housebreakers.  As Morren pointed out in 1935:  
 
The increase in the number of housebreakings can only be accounted for by 
the continued ‘ribbon’ development.  It is found that the housebreaker has 
very little difficulty in breaking into this class of dwelling-house as the doors, 
windows etc., are easily opened and there is not the same likelihood of 
unusual noise being heard by neighbours.38 
 
The problem of suburbanisation was compounded by the fact that many of the 
developments did not have street lighting.  Roderick Ross, the chief constable in 1933, 
noted that this ‘provided a decided advantage to the evil-doer’ and ‘greatly 
handicapped’ the police in discharging their role of protecting property: ‘There is no 
doubt that the thief and housebreaker hesitate to pursue their nefarious callings 
without the cloak of semi-darkness’.39  The imposition of the blackout at the outbreak 
                                                
37 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1943, 7. 
38 ECA ED006/1/10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1935, 15. 
39 ECA ED006/1/9, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1933, 7. 
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of the war clearly enhanced the opportunities for housebreakers.  As the Edinburgh 
Evening News reported after the first week of hostilities: ‘An unprecedented crime-
wave has swept the city during the last week since the blackout came into force’ and 
that the police had been ‘badly hampered in their investigations by the black-out 
restrictions’.40  At the same time, Morren thought that part of the explanation for 
housebreakings lay in the carelessness of the occupiers.  Before and after the war he 
made repeated appeals in his annual reports to householders not to leave doors and 
windows insecure and to install burglar catches.  It is reasonable to assume that similar 
pleas were only omitted from his wartime reports to the town council because these 
were condensed.   
 
In his study of the black-market during the war, Roodhouse identified that, in contrast 
to ‘contingent consent’, which might explain ‘voluntary compliance’, individuals 
utilised the discourse of ‘fair shares’ or ‘entitlement’ to justify their involvement in 
criminal activity.  In this sense, a ‘little bit extra’, or a ‘decent return’, was perceived 
as ‘compensation for the many personal sacrifices that they made at central 
government’s behest’.41  Thus from this perspective the increase in housebreaking was 
a consequence of total war and further questions the existence of social solidarity on 
which the concept of a ‘people’s war’ is premised.  
 
Many of those who committed the housebreakings in Edinburgh during the war were, 
however, juveniles.  Morren’s first report during the war period pointed out, for 
example, that ‘two young brothers’ were charged with 85 offences and that the 
number of housebreakings in which boys aged 14-17 years were involved had ‘greatly 
increased’.42  Likewise, after the first full year of war, Morren pointed out that the 
number of juveniles convicted, especially in relation to housebreaking, had reached an 
unprecedented level.  As Figure 6.3 demonstrates, the number of juveniles convicted 
for all crimes and offences increased dramatically during the war by comparison with 
the immediate pre- and post-war eras.  
  
                                                
40 In France and Germany the death penalty had been imposed for crimes committed during the 
blackout.  Edinburgh Evening News, 16 September 1939, 8.  
41 Roodhouse, "Popular Morality and the Black Market in Britian, 1939-55," 244-258. 
42 ECA ED006/1/10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1939, 13. 
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Figure 6.3 Number of juveniles convicted for all crimes and offences in  
  Edinburgh, 1935-1949  
[Source: ECA, ED/006/1/10-12] 
 
David Smith has identified a similar trend throughout Scotland during the Second 
World War.  He found that ‘nearly twice as many children and young persons were 
proceeded against for housebreaking in 1943 as in 1937, while housebreaking arrests 
of adults hardly increased during that same period’.  The increase in housebreaking 
was, he identified, contemporarily attributed by experts to a number of factors 
including the introduction of the blackout, the scarcity of household goods, and the 
fact that the police were preoccupied with other war-related duties.43   From his 
perspective, Morren saw the increased demand on the police caused by juvenile 
housebreakers as a consequence of external social factors associated with the 
emergency.  In his report for 1939, for example, he identified the ‘misplaced leniency’ 
and ‘clemency’ of the Probation System as contributory factors and cited the case 
where three youths committed three separate series of housebreakings whilst on 
suspended sentence and probation.44  In 1943 he opined: ‘one of the main causes is 
lack of parental control, either through apathy or the unfortunate absences of one or 
other of the parents on war service’.  He recommended the establishment of youth 
                                                
43 Smith, "Official Responses to Juvenile Delinquency " 83, note 23; 89.  For a study of juvenile 
delinquency in the Great War see, for example, David Smith, "Juvenile Delinquency in Britain in the 
First World War," Criminal Justice History 11 (1990).  For the post-war era see Louise A. Jackson 
and Angela Bartie, Policing Youth: Britain, 1945-70 (Manchester; New York: Manchester University 
Press, 2014).  
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clubs to ‘counteract juvenile delinquency and afford youngsters legitimate channels in 
which to expand their surplus energy, as well as giving them an opportunity to study 
and practice good citizenship’.45 
 
Policing capacity in Edinburgh in relation to juvenile offenders was, however, also 
likely to have been affected by the legacy of a strategic police policy decision.  In 
particular, processing them formally through the Sheriff and Burgh Police court 
system, rather than utilising, until the last months of the war, an extra-legal system of 
warnings.46  Forces that operated a system of warning juvenile offenders claimed to 
have reduced the level of recidivism.  Indeed, Smithies argued that the different rate of 
juvenile delinquency between towns, and over time, in the Second World War was a 
reflection of different approaches to criminal justice.47  In response to the increase in 
juvenile offending across Scotland the Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom Johnston, 
instituted a number of inquiries including a convention in Edinburgh in January 1944.  
As a consequence, he established the Scottish Advisory Council on the Treatment and 
Rehabilitation of Offenders in September that year and asked it to consider whether 
the system of police warnings of juvenile offenders as an alternative to prosecution 
should be extended.   
 
The Advisory Council established that the practice of police warnings operated in six 
of the 18 large burghs with separate police forces and in 20 of the 31 county forces.  It 
further found that about 90 per cent of juveniles who had been warned in Glasgow had 
not reoffended, whilst the figure was 88 per cent in Dundee and Kilmarnock, and 97 
per cent in Coatbridge.48  Yet although it did issue formal warnings on the instructions 
of the procurator fiscal, the police in Edinburgh did not operate an informal system 
where the decision to warn as an alternative to prosecution was taken by a police 
officer.  In evidence before the Advisory Council in December 1944, Morren reported 
that an informal scheme had been in operation until at least 1905 but his predecessor, 
Ross, had stopped it at some unknown time as a consequence of a question over its 
                                                
45 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1943, 9.  
46 Juvenile courts under the provisions of 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, cap. 37 (1937) were set up only in the 
counties of Ayr, Fife, and Renfrew and, the city of Aberdeen.  See Jackson and Bartie, Policing 
Youth, 25. 
47 Smithies, Crime in Wartime, 181. 
48 NRS HH57/288, 'Police Warnings'.  Report by the Scottish Advisory Council on Treatment and 
Rehabilitation of Offenders, 1945, 1-2. 
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legality.49  Indeed, a minute by the SHD in early 1944 cautioned that an informal 
scheme of warnings involved the police in ‘deciding whether or not a particular 
offender is to be dealt with in the way prescribed by Parliament or by an informal 
method of administering justice which has no Parliamentary sanction’ and was 
‘usurping a function which ought to be exercised by a court’.50   
 
Nonetheless, the Advisory Council argued that the ‘case for the general adoption of a 
system showing so great a measure of success is difficult to resist’ in relation to first-
time offenders.51  As a consequence, Johnston issued a draft circular commending its 
general adoption to ‘the sympathetic consideration’ of police authorities and chief 
constables, which again underscores the power-dependence of the Secretary of State 
for Scotland on the other agents in the system of police governance.52  But the tone of 
Morren’s response suggests some resistance to the scheme.  In a letter to the SHD he 
advised that most of the reports against young offenders arose from a complaint from 
a member of the public who generally insisted that the culprit should be dealt with in 
court: ‘if the Police were to inform them that the offender was warned … they would 
be far from satisfied and would consider the delinquent had been let off … particularly 
where the complainer has suffered financially as a result of the delinquency’.  He also 
pointed to the ‘absence of detailed information as to the efficacy of the proposed 
procedure in other areas’.  Notwithstanding these issues, he advised that ‘only good 
would accrue if it were adopted’ and saw no difficulties in making the arrangements 
effective if the circular was approved.  Whilst this might appear ultimately to be 
approving, he concluded by advising that ‘should any exception be taken to the 
procedure, I would be able to quote the circular as conveying the necessary authority’, 
which suggests that he was, to a degree, absolving himself of responsibility for the 
scheme.53 
  
                                                
49 NRS HH57/288, Scottish Advisory Council on the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Offenders: 
Police Warning System, Notes of evidence, 7 December 1944, 5-6.  
50 NRS HH60/434, Minute to the Lord Advocate, 24 February 1944. 
51 'Police Warnings'. Report by the Scottish Advisory Council, 2, 4. 
52 NRS HH60/434, draft Circular, undated. 
53 NRS HH60/434, Letter from Morren to SHD, 17 March 1944.  
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	 Number  
 Warned by the 
police  
Warned for crimes of 
dishonesty 
Warned for crimes of 
dishonesty that reoffended * 
1946 115 88 2 
1947 248 177 11 
1948 321 231 14 
1949 334 279 7 
* The number of those warned for other crimes or offences that reoffended is unknown. 
Table 6.4 Juvenile offenders warned by the police in Edinburgh, 1947-1949  
[Source: ECA, ED/006/1/11-12] 
 
In the event, the circular was issued in mid-June 1945 and the scheme was adopted in 
Edinburgh in July.54  In his annual reports to the town council in the immediate post-
war years Morren repeatedly recorded that the ‘police warning system continues to 
prove effective as an initial deterrent to juveniles who are implicated in minor crimes 
or offences’.55  As a consequence, in 1947 he advised that the scheme was being 
extended and more than double the number of juveniles were warned that year.  Table 
6.4 shows that of those warned for crimes of dishonesty the rate of reoffending 
declined from 6.2 per cent in 1947 to 2.5 per cent in 1949.  This suggests that it would 
have done likewise had it been in operation in Edinburgh during the war as it was in 
other forces.  This indicates some corroboration for Weinberger’s finding that there 
was a connection between police discretion in the procedures adopted and the level of 
delinquency.56  At the same time, however, Morren continued to argue that the ‘high 
figures for juvenile delinquency during the war were due in no small measure to an 
unavoidable lack of parental control’. 57   The point is that, notwithstanding the 
additional requirements of administering an informal system of cautioning juvenile 
offenders, the consequences of continuing to adhere to the formal judicial process 
most likely increased the demand on the police in Edinburgh during the Second World 
War in relation to juvenile offenders. 
  
                                                
54 NRS HH60/434, Circular 6042, 19 June 1945., ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and 
the Police Establishment, 1946, 15. 
55 cf ECA ED006/1/12, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1948, 11; 1949, 
12. 
56 Weinberger, The Best Police in the World, 149. 
57 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1947, 16.  
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Policing in relation to the protection of life 
Along with property, the protection of life was a core duty for the ‘new’ police.  
Drawing on the experience in England, historians have argued that violent crime did 
not, however, make significant demands on policing in the early decades of the 
twentieth century.  Emsley, for example, found that notwithstanding an increase in the 
statistics for crime after the Great War, ‘violent offences did not figure significantly 
… during the first half of the twentieth century’.58  Likewise, Weinberger found that 
‘violence was not regarded as a major social problem’ from the 1930s to the 1960s.  
Part of the explanation relates to the ‘decline and acceptability of violence as a means 
of social interaction’ in Britain in the nineteenth century.  As Williams concluded: ‘A 
society which had seen violence as an essential prop of the social order and source of 
power changed into one that condemned most of its manifestations and sought to limit 
their effect.’59  Part of the explanation also relates to the exercise of discretion by 
police officers.  Rather than processing some offences officially through the court 
system, some police officers utilised illicit violence against offenders and this might 
have been particularly the case when dealing with some crimes of violence.  Indeed, 
Weinberger found that ‘the threat, and reality, of physical force by the police [was] 
regarded as a vital ingredient of the qualities needed to make a good copper’.  Some 
violent crimes and offences therefore became part of the ‘dark figure’ of hidden crime.  
Domestic assault, for example, ‘did not figure in the statistics or the public 
consciousness as a criminal act’.60 
 
Smithies found that during the Second World War, however, in parallel to an increase 
in pilfering and robbery as a consequence of the demands of the black-market, there 
was an ‘alarming increase in violence’ which created problems of capacity for 
policing given the additional war-related demands and the shortage of regular 
officers.61  Indeed, the statistics between 1939 and 1945 in England and Wales show 
an increase of 18.7 per cent in the total number of indictable crimes of violence 
                                                
58 Emsley, Hard Men, 19, 25. 
59 Williams, "Police Governance: Community, Policing, and Justice in the Modern UK," 52. 
60 Weinberger, The Best Police in the World, 156-158. 
61 Smithies, Crime in Wartime, 4. 
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against the person and non-indictable assaults made known to the police and persons 
proceeded against and found guilty.62   
 
Under the classification of crimes and offences in reports by chief constables in 
Scotland, Class I, ‘Crimes Against the Person’, clearly relates to the protection of life.  
Between 1939 and 1945 there was, contrastingly, a decrease of 12.3 per cent in the 
number of Class I crimes and offences made known to the police.63  This was part of a 
more general trend that suggests Scotland was becoming less violent by the mid-
twentieth century, which lends support to both Emsley’s and Weinberger’s broad 
arguments.  There were clearly differences across Scotland however.  As Smithies 
concluded in relation to Glasgow during the Second World War: ‘the problems of 
violence, gang warfare, drunkenness and juvenile delinquency were more serious than 
in any other large city’ in the UK.64  Thus, policing demand in relation to the 
protection of life during the war was different across Scotland, and between Scotland 
and England and Wales.   
 
In relation to Edinburgh, as Table 6.5 demonstrates, there was no significant increase 
during the Second World War in the number of Class 1 crimes and offences made 
known to the police and those cases where one or more persons were arrested or cited.  
Furthermore, in very broad terms at this point, the mean detection rate during the war 
years 1939-1945 remained consistent with the pre-war era, in particular 1935-1938.  
As Morren reported repeatedly throughout the war: ‘there had been comparatively 
little serious crime in the City during the year, and it is gratifying to note that of the 
number of crimes in this category a creditably high proportion of solutions was 
obtained’.65  It is safe to assume that Morren would have associated his comments 
with significant crimes or offences against the protection of life.  Indeed, historians 
have argued that, in comparison to other offences of violence, statistics relating to 
homicide bear ‘the closest relationship’ to actual incidences of violence.  Thus, 
changes in the rate can be seen as ‘an indicator of a society becoming more or less 
                                                
62 Statistical Digest of the War, 48.  Again, this excludes crimes and offences made known to the 
police where either no one was proceeded against or was not convicted.  
63 Cmd 7505, 12.  
64 Smithies, Crime in Wartime, 181. 
65 ECA ED006/1/10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1940, 4; ED006/1/11, 
1941, 4; 1942, 6; 1943, 8.  
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violent’.66  The mean annual rate of Murder, Attempted Murder, and Culpable 
Homicide in Edinburgh made known to the police in Edinburgh in the period 1940-
1945 was 3.5, which was marginally less than the period 1935-1939 when it was 4.0, 
whilst in the period 1946-1949 it was 2.2.67  That said, the differences are clearly 
small in real terms.  Thus, this research finds that the demands on the police in 
Edinburgh with regard to the most serious crimes associated with the protection of life 





rate (%) Made known to the police 
Cases where one or more 
persons were arrested or 
cited 
1935 301 198 65.8 
1936 260 174 66.9 
1937 292 202 69.2 
1938 479 335 69.9 
1939 275 177 64.3 
1940 220 136 61.8 
1941 233 120 51.5 
1942 244 133 54.5 
1943 201 149 74.1 
1944 285 154 54.0 
1945 238 160 67.2 
1946 232 139 59.9 
1947 251 157 62.5 
1948 237 129 54.4 
1949 250 147 58.8 
Table 6.5 Class I, ‘Crimes Against the Person’ in Edinburgh, 1935-1949 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/10-12]   
 
In contrast to housebreaking, caution is, however, required in ascribing the pattern of 
statistics in relation to Class I crimes and offences to the character of policing.  The 
most numerical categories in the classification relate to Sexual Crimes and Offences, 
Assault, and Cruel and Unnatural Treatment of Children.  Whilst some will have been 
committed in the public domain, many, by the intrinsic nature of the offences, will 
have occurred in the private where there was a domestic relationship between the 
victim and the offender.  As Table 6.6 demonstrates, the difference between the 
number of cases of Assault and Cruel and Unnatural Treatment made known to the 
police, and the number of cases where one or more persons was arrested or cited, was 
                                                
66 Jackson and Bartie, Policing Youth, 91. 
67 Culpable Homicide refers to causing death by an unlawful act, or a lawful act negligently performed 
where there is no intention to kill.  See Police Manual for Scotland, 111-112. 
 185 
minimal, if any.  The explanation for the high mean detection or solution rate of 99.6 
per cent for both categories over the period under consideration, by comparison with 
housebreaking for example, was probably related to the fact that the victim knew the 
culprit.  Indeed, from 1930-1936 Assaults by Husbands on Wives was a separate and, 
apart from 1935 and 1936, the largest single category of crime or offence in Class I.  
From 1937 onwards, however, it does not feature in the reports and clearly became 
included in the general category of Assault.  Put simply, many of the crimes and 
offences recorded as Assault after 1937 were domestic–type incidents.  
 
Notwithstanding the general pattern indicated by the statistics in relation to all Class I 
crimes and offences, there was an increase in policing demand with regard to the 
protection of life during the Second World War.  As a percentage of all crimes and 
offences made known to the police there was a steady increase in police activity in 
relation to those in Class I from 1.0 in 1939 to 1.6 in 1945, whilst the percentage of 
those cases where one or more persons were arrested or cited increased from 0.9 to 
2.5.   As Table 6.6 shows, although small in real terms, at some points in the war there 
was an increase in the number of crimes and offences made known to the police, and 
cases where one or more persons were arrested or cited, in the three most numerical 
categories in Class I, although, with the notable exception of sexual offences, this was 
a temporary phenomenon with the general pattern of decline continuing in the 
immediate post-war years.  
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 Number made known to the police 
 Sexual Crimes and Offences Assault Cruel and Unnatural  Treatment of Children 
1935 168 85 28 
1936 145 65 28 
1937 133 102 44 
1938 186 90 74 
1939 152 91 15 
1940 120 49 23 
1941 142 47 20 
1942 148 37 38 
1943 107 32 32 
1944 180 50 28 
1945 126 61 25 
1946 157 23 19 
1947 171 25 19 
1948 181 16 22 
1949 192 13 24 
 Number of cases where one or more persons were arrested or cited 
1935 50 85 43 
1936 45 65 42 
1937 47 102 44 
1938 142 90 74 
1939 54 91 15 
1940 36 49 23 
1941 29 47 20 
1942 37 37 38 
1943 55 32 32 
1944 54 48 28 
1945 57 52 25 
1946 73 14 19 
1947 82 21 18 
1948 76 14 22 
1949 92 10 24 
 Detection/Solution rate (%) 
1935 29.8 100.0 153.6 
1936 31.0 100.0 150.0 
1937 35.3 100.0 100.0 
1938 76.3 100.0 100.0 
1939 35.5 100.0 100.0 
1940 30.0 100.0 100.0 
1941 20.4 100.0 100.0 
1942 25.0 100.0 100.0 
1943 51.4 100.0 100.0 
1944 30.0 96.0 100.0 
1945 45.2 85.2 100.0 
1946 46.5 60.9 100.0 
1947 48.0 84.0 94.7 
1948 42.0 87.5 100.0 
1949 47.9 76.9 100.0 
Table 6.6 Sexual crimes and offences; Assault; and Cruel and Unnatural 
Treatment of Children in Edinburgh, 1935-1949 
Note: No explanation is given in Morren’s annual reports to the town council as to why the number of 
cases where one or more persons were arrested or cited for Cruel and Unnatural Treatment of Children 
in 1935 and 1936 is greater than the number of crimes and offences made known to the police.  It might 
be that these figures are, in some way, a reflection of historical incidents.  
[Source: ECA ED006/1/10-12]  
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Given the inherent nature of the offences it is difficult to perceive what this might 
suggest about the character of wartime policing.  Part of the explanation with regard to 
assaults, for example, might be related to the increased presence of armed forces 
personnel, particularly in relation to the preparation for ‘D-Day’.  Juliet Gardiner 
found that by 1943 there were ‘some 25,000 Polish servicemen in the UK, 3,200 
Czechs, around 1,750 Norwegians, approximately 2,000 Belgians and the same 
number of Dutch, and 35,000 Free French’.  By 1944 1.5 million Americans were also 
stationed in the UK.  Although many were based in England, Edinburgh was a popular 
destination for those on leave.68  In his annual report to the town council in 1942 
Morren complimented the good behaviour of the citizens of Edinburgh and 
specifically included ‘the members of the armed forces stationed in and around the 
City or who spend their leave periods in our midst, including the men from H.M. 
Dominions and other nationals’.69   
 
However, a number of historians point to acrimony between units and nationalities in 
the various armed forces in the UK during the Second World War.  C. P. Stacey and 
Barbara Wilson, for example, found that about half a million Canadians were posted to 
Britain and fighting between them and the British armed services was reported almost 
as soon as the first arrived.  Whilst many were stationed in England, some spent their 
leave in Edinburgh.70.  Likewise, Peter Lewis found that there was a bitter anti-British 
feeling amongst American service personnel whilst, at the same time, the British 
armed forces resented the fact that their American counterparts were paid more.71  
Donald Serrell Thomas has argued that American servicemen thus had more to offer 
women.  A prime reason for the hostility between the British and Americans was 
‘sexual jealousy’.72   
 
                                                
68 Juliet Gardiner, 'Over Here': The GIs in Wartime Britain (London: Collins & Brown, 1992), 6, 92., 
Wartime, 541. 
69 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1942, 1. 
70 C. P. Stacey and Barbara M. Wilson, The Half Million: The Canadians in Britain, 1939-1946 
(Toronto; London: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 77, 106. 
71  Peter Lewis, A People's War (London: Thames Methuen, 1986), 206-208.  George Orwell 
contemporarily observed that American soldiers’ rate of pay was five times that of their British 
counterparts.  George Orwell, Sonia Orwell, and Ian Angus, The Collected Essays, Journalism and 
Letters of George Orwell. Vol. 3, As I Please, 1943-1945 (London: Secker & Warburg, 1969), 55. 
72 Thomas, An Underworld at War, 237. 
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Violence between members of the various armed forces may therefore go some way to 
explaining the increased policing demand in relation to assaults in Edinburgh during 
the Second World War.  In mid-1943, for example, a naval rating stabbed another 
sailor to death in Princes Street Gardens, whilst in 1944 three soldiers assaulted and 
robbed a Canadian soldier on Calton Hill.73   Significantly, however, crimes or 
offences committed by American service personnel were not likely to have been 
included in the statistics in Morren’s annual reports to the town council.  Whilst 
members of the American armed forces could be arrested, unlike those of all other 
nationalities in the UK during the war, they were not subject to prosecution for 
criminal offences.  Historians have argued that US domestic opinion would have 
resented the principle of its troops being held accountable by a foreign court.74  As a 
consequence, the United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act was passed in 1942 
and provided that US Service Courts had ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ in respect of 
members of the American forces alleged to have committed a criminal offence in the 
UK.  As the Schedule to the Act recognised, this represented a ‘very considerable 
departure … from the traditional system and practice of the United Kingdom’.75  As a 
consequence, a ‘dark figure’ of hidden police activity undoubtedly exists in this regard 
in relation to Edinburgh and elsewhere in the UK. 
 
By the same token the social dislocation of war might help explain the increased 
demand on the police in Edinburgh in 1941-1942 in relation to the Cruel and 
Unnatural Treatment of Children.  Whilst this was less than in 1937-1938, which was 
probably a consequence of the introduction of the Children and Young Persons Act in 
1937, it stands in contrast to the remainder of the period 1930-1949.76  In addition to 
the absence of parents on war-related service there were, for example, some 60 million 
changes of address during the Second World War amongst a population of 38 
million.77  It is therefore not difficult to envisage how children might have been 
                                                
73 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1944, 8; 1945, 9. 
74 Thomas, An Underworld at War, 227., Stacey and Wilson, The Half Million, 157., Smithies, Crime 
in Wartime, 156. 
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neglected.  More specifically, however, historians have argued that the evacuation of 
children led to an increase in the number of prosecutions for cruelty and neglect, if not 
necessarily an increase in the incidence of offences.  Something in the vicinity of 10 
per cent of evacuated children were physically or sexually abused by their hosts.78  As 
Gardiner has argued: ‘evacuation schemes opened to the official gaze cases of gross 
neglect often amounting to deliberate cruelty … And there was a righteous demand 
that once such atrocities had been brought out into the open, the perpetrators should be 
prosecuted’.79  In England and Wales the number of persons found guilty in court of 
the cruelty and neglect of children between 1939 and 1945 more than doubled.80  In 
Scotland over the same period there was an increase of nearly eight per cent in the 
number of crimes and offences related to Cruel and Unnatural Treatment of Children 
made known to the police.81  Thus, the growing concern about neglect and cruelty to 
children during the Second World War, which was highlighted by evacuation, helps 
explain the increase in the number of incidents reported to the police in Edinburgh.   
 
In addition to these crimes, the police in Edinburgh continued to investigate sudden 
deaths, including suicides, throughout the war.  The 1931 Manual reminded Scottish 
officers that it was their duty to investigate and report all such cases to the procurator 
fiscal.82  As the City Prosecutor explained, a sudden death, ‘is one which has happened 
unexpectedly – so that the safeguards afforded by regular visits of a doctor over a 
period of time before the death are absent’.  They could have been due to accident, 
natural causes, suicide, or violence.83  As Table 6.7 shows, by comparison with other 
sudden deaths, the demand made on the police in relation to the investigation and 
reporting of suicides remained stable in the period 1930-1949.84  The demand in 
relation to other sudden deaths, however, increased sharply during the Second World 
War.  The rate of sudden deaths other than suicides in 1942, for example, was 132 per 
cent greater than that in 1930, whilst the mean number in 1940-1945 was some 60 per 
cent greater than in the immediate pre-war years 1934-1939.  In his annual report for 
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82 Police Manual for Scotland, 118. 
83 Mill, The Scottish Police, 58-59. 
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1945 Morren advised the town council that 16 adults and four children had been killed 
in Edinburgh as a consequence of 16 air raids during the Second World War.85  
Murder and Culpable Homicide killed a further 17 or 18 people during the war.86  Yet 
neither air raids nor crimes and offences can explain the sharp rise in the number of 
sudden deaths during the Second World War.   
 
 Number Index 1930=100 
Suicides Sudden Deaths Suicides	 Sudden Deaths	
1930 65 312 100 100 
1931 60 290 92 93 
1932 95 319 146 102 
1933 65 276 100 88 
1934 88 291 135 93 
1935 71 370 109 119 
1936 80 403 123 129 
1937 63 495 97 159 
1938 83 373 128 120 
1939 94 397 145 127 
1940 66 480 102 154 
1941 60 598 92 192 
1942 37 723 57 232 
1943 61 647 94 207 
1944 48 674 74 216 
1945 49 616 75 197 
1947 46 681 71 218 
1948 60 471 92 151 
1949 78 476 120 153 
Table 6.7  Suicides and Sudden Deaths in Edinburgh, 1930-1949 
Note: Figures for 1946 are not given in Morren’s annual report to the town council.  
[Source: ECA ED006/1/9-12]  
 
Part of the explanation was undoubtedly related to the blackout.  Calder catalogued the 
types of accidents where people were killed as a consequence of the blackout: ‘those 
who walked into canals, fell down steps, plunged through glass roofs and toppled from 
railway platforms’.  A poll in January 1940 showed that about one person in five had 
been injured due to the blackout.87  More specifically, however, as will be seen in next 
chapter, the blackout led to an increase in the number of road accidents and those that 
proved fatal.  The Police Review reported that the number of those killed as a result of 
road accidents in Britain in the first month of the war was more than double the figure 
                                                
85 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1945, 18. 
86 The date of one incident of culpable homicide in 1945 is not given in Morren’s Annual Report to 
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for the whole of 1938, and the increase was mainly amongst pedestrians.88  The 
Edinburgh Evening News reported that 39 people had been killed in road accidents in 
Edinburgh in the first four months of war compared to 25 between January and August 
1939.89  Thus the increase in sudden deaths in Edinburgh during the Second World 
War was a consequence of war conditions rather than the character of policing. 
 
Policing in relation to the maintenance of order 
In the reports made by the chief constable to the town council the largest classification 
of crimes and offences made known to the police, and those where someone was 
arrested or cited, during the Second World War related to Class VII, ‘Miscellaneous 
Offences’.  All of the crimes and offences relating to public order were in categories in 
this classification.  Indeed, nearly half of the crimes and offences in Class VII related 
to public order.  This task was therefore a significant aspect of operational policing in 
Edinburgh.  As Table 6.8 demonstrates, the difference between the number of crimes 
and offences made known to the police in relation to public order, and cases where 
one or more persons were arrested or cited, was minimal, if any.  The high mean 
solution rate of 99.7 for all crimes and offences related to public order over the period 
under consideration, by comparison with housebreaking for example, was undoubtedly 
a reflection of the fact that they generally only became known at the point of 
detection.  In effect, there were few crimes or offences related to public order made 
known to the police as a consequence of a complaint made by a member of the public. 
 
From a Marxist perspective, one of the main aims of the development of the ‘new’ 
police was related to public order, specifically to maintain discipline amongst the 
working class.  Robert Storch, for example, has argued that the ‘new’ police arose 
from the need to create ‘a professional, bureaucratically organised lever of urban 
discipline’ in working class communities.  The police therefore became the ‘guardians 
of unfettered capitalist economic development and of free labour market as defined by 
orthodox political economy’.90  From other perspectives, historians have pointed to the 
significance of the desire to control vagrancy.   Barrie, for example, has argued that 
the concern over vagrancy ‘played an important role’ in the spread of police 
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development throughout Scotland.91  John McGowan has pointed to the lack of poor 
relief and hardening attitudes to vagrancy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries as major factors in police reform in Edinburgh.92  
 
As Table 6.8 shows, despite the burden of additional duties and a reduction in the 
strength of regular officers, the police in Edinburgh continued throughout the Second 
World War to arrest and cite individuals for crimes and offences of vagrancy and 
trespass.  Indeed, in general terms, whereas police activity in this regard decreased in 
the immediate pre- and post-war periods, it increased during the war.  As a percentage 
of all Class VII crimes and offences police activity in relation to vagrancy and trespass 
increased sharply from 0.43 per cent in 1940 to 3.92 per cent in 1945.  Part of the 
explanation relates to the dislocation of family life.  As observed, wartime conditions 
caused significant disruption to living arrangements which might have increased the 
perception of itinerancy.  At the same time, the mobilisation for total war undoubtedly 
increased the pressure on vagrancy.  Whereas large numbers of the labour force were 
diverted to wartime employment, vagrants, although they could be conscripted or 
compelled to work, were, by definition, unlikely to contribute otherwise to the war 
effort.93  Given the context, there might therefore have been something of a concerted 
effort by the police against vagrancy during the war, possibly in response to a directive 
from central government.  This being the case, it would be reasonable to expect the 
pattern of enforcement to be approximate throughout the UK.   
 
  
                                                
91 Barrie, Police in the Age of Improvement, 113. 
92 McGowan, Policing the Metropolis of Scotland, 41. 
93 Vagrants were subject to the National Registration Act.  See NRS HH52/27/1, Circular 3718, 23 
September 1939.   
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Breach of the 
Peace 
Betting, Gaming, 
and Lotteries Prostitution 
1935 81 1860 654 419 134 
1936 84 2098 850 416 236 
1937 99 2346 1009 360 239 
1938 132 2045 848 372 218 
1939 89 2371 768 256 155 
1940 69 2063 594 40 32 
1941 80 1745 539 13 124 
1942 103 1334 355 12 11 
1943 72 1115 499 28 106 
1944 125 660 510 40 104 
1945 143 634 520 41 1 
1946 84 769 646 193 17 
1947 75 918 635 207 30 
1948 82 933 657 169 26 
1949 59 954 582 153 41 
 Number of cases where one or more persons were arrested or cited 
1935 81 1860 654 419 134 
1936 84 2098 850 416 236 
1937 99 2346 1009 360 239 
1938 132 2045 848 372 218 
1939 89 2371 768 256 155 
1940 69 2063 594 40 32 
1941 80 1745 539 13 124 
1942 103 1334 355 12 11 
1943 72 1115 499 28 106 
1944 125 660 458 40 104 
1945 143 634 480 41 1 
1946 84 769 645 193 17 
1947 75 918 619 207 30 
1948 82 933 650 169 26 
1949 59 954 560 153 41 
	 Detection/Solution rate (%)	
1935	 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1936	 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1937	 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1938	 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1939	 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1940	 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1941	 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1942	 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1943	 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1944	 100.0 100.0 89.8 100.0 100.0 
1945	 100.0 100.0 92.3 100.0 100.0 
1946	 100.0 100.0 99.8 100.0 100.0 
1947	 100.0 100.0 97.5 100.0 100.0 
1948	 100.0 100.0 98.9 100.0 100.0 
1949	 100.0 100.0 96.2 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.8 Crimes and offences of and against: Vagrancy and Trespass; 
Intoxicating Liquor Laws; Breach of the Peace; Betting, Gaming, 
and Lotteries; and Prostitution in Edinburgh, 1935-1949 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/10-12]  
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However, across Scotland as a whole, as well as England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, 
the general pattern of enforcement during the war, apart from a modest increase around 
1942-1943, was declining.94  Given the additional demands on the police during the 
war and the release of regular officers it might be expected that some less serious and 
victimless crimes and offences would be subject to reduced police activity.  Indeed, as 
will be seen, this partly explains the lower number of arrests for drunkenness 
throughout the UK during the war.  It is therefore difficult to explain why the general 
trend appears to be different in Edinburgh, and the number of cases where one or more 
persons were arrested or cited doubled between 1943 and 1945.  Given, as McGowan 
has argued, reform of the police in Edinburgh was premised on controlling vagrancy, 
the pattern of enforcement might be a consequence of an ethos more particular to the 
capital than elsewhere.  On the other hand, it might be the consequence of the exercise 
of discretion by officers at a strategic or tactical level.   
 
By comparison with vagrancy, drunkenness was clearly perceived to be more of a 
threat to the maintenance of public order.  One writer has argued that the expenditure 
on intoxicating liquor in the nineteenth century was ‘regarded above all others as the 
major obstacle to improvement’.95  Throughout the 1930s the reports by the chief 
constable in Edinburgh to the town council evince an obsession with the consumption 
of alcohol and related police activity.  In addition to statistics relating to crimes and 
offences against ‘Intoxicating Liquor Laws’, the reports between 1930 and 1936, for 
example, contain detailed information on the effect of the Forbes Mackenzie Act and, 
in particular, drunkenness on Sundays.96  Likewise, from 1935-1938 they contain 
charts showing the wards in which arrests were made as well as statistics relating to 
the number of arrests for drinking methylated spirits and eau de cologne.97  The 
majority of those arrested or cited in relation to ‘Intoxicating Liquor Laws’ during the 
                                                
94 cf Cmd 7505, 14-15., Statistical Digest of the War, 48, 50.   
95 Dingle, "Drink and Working-Class Living Standards " 608. 
96 Forbes Mackenzie, a nineteenth century Scottish Conservative politician and ardent temperance 
reformer, was the originator of the Act for the Regulation of Public Houses in Scotland.  See H. C. G.  
Matthew, "Mackenzie, William Forbes (1807-1862)," in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford: 2004).  The Act provided for the closing of public houses on Sundays and at 10pm on 
Weekdays.  16 & 17 Vict, cap. 67 (1853).  
97 Efforts were made to ‘render methylated spirits unfit for use as a beverage without destroying its 
usefulness for commercial and household purposes, but with doubtful success’.  See Police Manual 
for Scotland, 217.  In 1938 methylated and surgical spirits became controlled under 1 Edw. 8 & 1 
Geo. 6, cap. 48 (1937).  As a consequence, habitual drinkers turned to eau de cologne made with 
industrial methylated spirits which could be purchased without restrictions.  See ECA ED006/1/10, 
Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1938, 17.  
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war were related to ‘drunkenness’ but it is impossible to conclude whether this was a 
consequence of proactive or reactive police activity.  
 
In contrast to vagrancy, however, as Table 6.8 shows, police activity in relation to 
alcohol declined sharply with the outbreak of war and progressively until 1945 when it 
increased.  As a percentage of all Class VII crimes and offences, police activity 
declined from 14.3 per cent in 1939 to 7.6 per cent in 1944.  In successive reports to 
the town council Morren pointed out that the number of arrests for drunkenness had 
declined and commended the public for their sobriety, given that the majority of 
arrests were repeat offenders.  In 1942, for example, he reported that apprehensions 
were the lowest since 1918.  Similarly, in 1944 it was the ‘lowest ever recorded’, and 
in 1945 the ‘lowest on record’.98  A similar pattern was evident in Scotland as a whole 
as well as in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.99   
 
Part of the explanation undoubtedly relates to the reduced visibility of the police 
caused by the decrease in manpower and the pressure of additional war-related duties.  
On the other hand, a Home Intelligence Report in February 1940 suggested that 
offenders escaped detection in the blackout. 100   Nevertheless, a reduction in 
drunkenness during the Second World War was part of a long-term trend.  Alcohol 
consumption in Britain declined from the beginning of the twentieth century.  In his 
1944 report to the town council Morren commented on the sharp fall in the number of 
apprehensions for drunkenness over the previous 40 years.  Although the population in 
Edinburgh had increased ‘very considerably’ over the period, the number of 
apprehensions for drunkenness per 1000 of the population had fallen from 20.9 in 
1908 to 1.5 in 1944.101   
 
At the same time, many of those who would otherwise have consumed alcohol locally 
had been conscripted.  By 1944, for example, nearly one-third of the male working 
population in the UK was in the armed forces and auxiliary services.102  Some had 
undoubtedly been employed in the manufacture of alcohol.  As a consequence, 
                                                
98 ECA ED006/1/10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1940, 6; ED006/1/11, 
1942, 7; 1944, 1; 1945, 13.  
99 cf Cmd 7505, 14-15., Statistical Digest of the War, 48, 50.   
100 NRS HH55/19, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 16 February 1940. 
101 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1944, 11-12. 
102 Statistical Digest of the War, 8. 
 196
supplies were scarce and erratic and that which was available was expensive and had, 
at times, been watered down.103  During the war grocers selling alcohol in Edinburgh 
either closed down or allowed their licences to lapse, whilst public houses restricted 
their opening hours in response to the lack of trade thereby restricting the supply of 
alcohol further.104  In his annual report to the town council in 1945 Morren pointed out 
that the reduction in the number of arrests for drunkenness had been ‘due in large 
measure to the scarcity of supplies of intoxicating liquor, and possibly to labour 
shortage in the “Trade”’.105  The reduction in policing in relation to drunkenness 
during the Second World War was thus a consequence of a combination of internal 
and external factors that were both specific to wartime and a legacy of the pre-war era.  
Indeed, when some of these were removed in the immediate post-war period policing 
demand in this field increased.  The demobilisation of four million servicemen 
between June 1945 and January 1947, for example, precipitated an increase in 
drunkenness and hence policing demand in Edinburgh, particularly in relation to 
associated social celebrations.106   
 
Despite the wartime decrease in drunkenness in Edinburgh, Home Intelligence Reports 
during the last third of the war suggest that there was concern within the police that 
drinking and drunkenness was becoming less a largely male and working class activity 
and was, as a consequence, undermining both the social and public order.  The report 
in September 1943, for example, recorded that notwithstanding the larger number of 
service personnel and the ‘normal’ level of drunkenness:  
 
There are many indications that the habit is spreading amongst classes 
hitherto more or less immune.  In former years … a young woman of what 
might be termed respectable class was never seen in a public house or in a 
state of intoxication in the streets.  Now that sight is all too common.107   
 
                                                
103 Edward Smithies, The Black Economy in England Since 1914 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1984), 
65. 
104 cf NRS HH55/21, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 26 April 1940; NRS 
HH55/23, 13 September 1940; NRS HH55/35, 4 December 1942; NRS HH55/39, 28 January 1944; 
NRS HH55/42, 30 June 1945.  
105 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1945, 13. 
106 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1946, 15., David 
Kynaston, Austerity Britain: 1945-51 (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), 97. 
107 NRS HH55/38, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 10 September 1943. 
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Again, in June 1944 Morren highlighted the issue of young women in licensed 
premises: ‘War conditions no doubt largely account for this, but it also indicates a 
change, and as many hold, a deterioration in the social habits of the people’.108  These 
comments must, however, be viewed in the context of wider fears of social 
disintegration.  As observed, a ‘panic of moral laxity’ developed in the UK during the 
Second World War over ‘amateur prostitutes’ and the spread of venereal disease, 
especially amongst the armed services, which led to uniformed women police 
patrolling the streets of Edinburgh for the first time in late 1943.109  
 
Notwithstanding the long-term decline in drunkenness, there was also clearly concern 
in government circles at the potential for alcohol consumption to have an adverse 
effect on the war effort on the home front.  In the first weeks of war, the Secretary of 
State for Scotland, David Colville, asked police forces to provide reports of incidences 
of excessive and sustained consumption of alcohol.110   In June 1941, the then 
Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom Johnston, asked chief constables to provide 
reports on Sunday drinking.111  In consequence, six Orders were made throughout the 
war under the Defence Regulations to restrict the supply of alcohol on Sunday.  The 
first, made in 1941, applied to the areas and burghs of, among others, the Lothians, 
except Edinburgh, and was intended to secure ‘the maintenance of public order and for 
maintaining essential services or supplies essential to the life of the community’.112  
The SHD subsequently reported that Sunday drinking had decreased in those areas 
where Orders had been applied.113 
 
An unintended consequence of the policy, however, was the displacement of those 
seeking to drink on Sunday from places throughout Scotland that were subject to an 
                                                
108 NRS HH55/40, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 16 June 1944. 
109 Sonya O. Rose, Which People's War?: National Identity and Citizenship in Britain 1939-1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 75-80., Roger Davidson, Dangerous Liaisons: A Social 
History of Venereal Disease in Twentieth-Century Scotland, Clio medica (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), 
207. 
110 NRS HH52/27/1, Circular 3715, 22 September 1939.  
111 NRS HH52/31, Circular 4489, 24 June 1941.  Under the Licensing (Scotland) Act, 1921 public 
houses in Scotland were permitted to open between 11.30am-3.00pm and 5.30-10.00pm on days 
except Sunday.  Other than to persons resident in seven- or six-day license hotels and clubs and to 
travellers in seven-day licence hotels, the sale of alcohol on Sunday was illegal.  Police Manual for 
Scotland, 189, 192. 
112 NRS HH52/30, Circular 4541, 7 August 1941.  The Orders made it illegal to supply alcohol on 
Sunday except for consumption with a meal and in a room set apart from the service of meals to 
Sunday travellers.   
113 NRS HH55/30, Summary of Home Intelligence Reports, 24 October 1941.  
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Order to contiguous areas where there were no restrictions.114  Those from East 
Lothian, for example, travelled to Edinburgh.115  In October 1941 Morren reported that 
‘a comprehensive survey’ had shown that a ‘very substantial number of people’ were 
frequenting hotels in Edinburgh on Sundays, ‘presumably with the object of obtaining 
drink’.  One hotel had over 700 visitors on a Sunday: ‘a large number of them coming 
from outside areas’.  Despite an appeal by him and the town council an Order was not 
applied to the city during the war.116  As a consequence, the police in Edinburgh 
covertly or overtly monitored hotels on Sundays.  A Home Intelligence Report in 
March 1943, for example, advised that observations had been carried out on twelve of 
the principal seven-day licensed hotels on a Sunday.  Almost 1,000 of the 1,553 
people entering the premises were found to have come from outside the city, which 
was a decrease of about 500 in the number entering ‘compared with a similar check-up 
a year ago’.  The following month’s report recorded that ‘recent observations’ on the 
hotels showed a decrease in the total Sunday visitors and in those giving addresses 
outwith the city.117  It is unknown whether police tactics involved verifying the 
address of every person entering the hotels or if visitors were obliged to sign a register 
which the police audited.  In any event, although police activity in Edinburgh in 
relation to drunkenness declined throughout the war, the introduction of Orders in 
contiguous areas increased policing demand in Edinburgh on Sundays in relation to 
the maintenance of order.118   
 
Following on from drunkenness, the category of crime or offence most directly 
associated with disorderly conduct was Breach of the Peace.119  As Table 6.8 shows, 
there was a decline in policing demand in Edinburgh in the Second World War in 
relation to Breach of the Peace by comparison with the immediate pre-war and post-
                                                
114 cf NRS HH55/34, Summary of Home Intelligence Reports, 11 September 1942; NRS HH55/35, 6 
November 1942; NRS HH55/35, 4 December 1942.  
115 NRS HH55/35, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 4 December 1942.  
116 NRS HH55/30, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 10 October 1941; 24 
October 1941.  
117 NRS HH55/36, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 26 March 1943; 23 April 
1943.  
118 Whilst the issue of policing Sunday drinkers was displaced in areas where Orders had been 
applied, they could still create a local policing demand.  The SHD summary of Home Intelligence 
Reports for March 1942, for example, recorded that the police in the Scottish Borders were required to 
give assistance to maintain order after local transport facilities were unable to cope with the number of 
returning travellers on a Sunday.  NRS HH55/33, Summary of Home Intelligence Reports, 27 March 
1942.  
119 Police Manual for Scotland, 71. 
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war periods, which largely corresponds to the pattern for drunkenness.  By a similar 
token, the increase in policing activity in relation to Breach of the Peace towards the 
end of the war can be associated with the increase in drunkenness.  As a percentage of 
all Class VII crimes and offences, police activity in respect of Breach of the Peace 
increased from 2.4 per cent in 1942 to 13.3 per cent in 1945.  Statistics show that the 
pattern for Scotland as a whole was broadly similar.120  
 
Some of those arrested or cited by the police in Edinburgh for breach of the peace in 
1940 were related to the riots that occurred in the aftermath of the declaration of war 
by Italy and the detention of Italians for internment.  The Scotsman reported that a 
crowd of over 1,000 gathered and ‘anti-Italian feeling found vent in an orgy of 
window breaking and looting in different parts of the city’.121  Dominic Crolla 
remembered: ‘the feelings of the local population, to put it mildly, was deep anger 
against us.  Where they could they smashed shops, looted the goods’.  Joseph Pia 
recalled that ‘there was rioting against Italian shops, window-smashing, looting of 
goods, and so on … I would say half the Italian shops in Edinburgh got it’.122  As a 
consequence, the police had to make a number of baton charges to disperse the 
rioters. 123   Thus, the increase in policing demand in this regard was a direct 
consequence of the war.  At the same time, a legacy of fierce anti-Catholicism existed 
in Edinburgh which might have been a contributory factor.  In the mid-1930s anti-
Catholic riots broke out in the city.  In 1935, for example, a number of people were 
arrested after, as The Scotsman reported, ‘sectarian feeling’ led to ‘exciting’ and 
‘disorderly’ street scenes on occasion of the Roman Catholic Eucharist Congress: 
‘almost the entire force of police in Edinburgh was drafted to the disturbed area, where 
the handling of the crowds was supervised by Chief Constable Ross’.124  In that sense, 
policing of the riots in 1940 represented a continuity of responding to large-scale 
sectarian disorder.   
 
                                                
120 Cmd 7505, 14-15. There is no common law equivalent in the rest of the UK and therefore a 
comparative figure cannot be extrapolated from statistics.  
121 The Scotsman, 11 June 1940, 6.  
122 Ian MacDougall, Voices from War: and Some Labour Struggles; Personal Recollections of War in 
our Century by Scottish Men and Women (Edinburgh: Mercat Press, 1995), 291, 308. 
123 Edinburgh Evening News, 11 June 1940, 6.  
124 The Scotsman, 25 June 1935, 9. 26 June 1935, 9.  
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As observed, from a Marxist perspective one of the main functions of the ‘new’ police 
was to control the working class for the needs of the capitalist mode of production.  In 
the era before the Great War, street betting was seen by some to have replaced 
drunkenness as the prevalent moral vice.  Stefan Petrow has argued that betting 
‘excited moral guardians’.125  Because of its perceived destructive effects on working 
class life, it became the target for a moral crusade through legislation and strategic 
police action.  At the same time, as the 1928 Royal Commission on Police Powers and 
Procedure in England and Wales found, offences like street betting did not command 
the ‘general or convinced support of public opinion’. 126  Indeed, at the tactical level, 
many policemen, who themselves came from working class backgrounds, did not 
regard street betting as a problem and chose to ignore it.127  Smithies has argued that 
the public became hostile to street betting during the Second World War, however, 
because of its adverse effect on family incomes and therefore the war effort on the 
home front.128   
 
As Table 6.8 shows, there was a sharp decline in police activity in relation to crimes 
and offences associated with Betting, Gaming, and Lotteries during the Second World 
War by comparison with the immediate pre-war and post-war periods.  As a 
percentage of all class VII crimes and offences, police activity in relation to Betting, 
Gaming, and Lotteries declined from 6.17 per cent in 1935 to 0.08 per cent by 1942.  
A broadly similar pattern prevailed in relation to Scotland as a whole and the rest of 
the UK.129  As with other aspects of policing during the Second World War part of the 
explanation for the decline in police activity relates to the reduction of regular officers, 
combined with the pressure of war-related duties, especially given the suggestion that 
the police were disinclined to enforce the law in relation to street betting in normal 
circumstances.  At the same time, given public opposition it might be that fewer 
offences were committed.  Certainly, many of those who would otherwise have been 
involved in street betting had been relocated as a consequence of being conscripted 
into the armed services or otherwise deployed on essential war work.  On the other 
                                                
125 Stefan Petrow, Policing Morals: The Metropolitan Police and the Home Office, 1870-1914 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 239-293. 
126 Cmd 3297, 76-80. 
127 Klein, Invisible Men, 100. 
128 Smithies, Crime in Wartime, 123. 
129 cf Cmd 7505, 14-15., Statistical Digest of the War, 48, 50. 
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hand, as with drunkenness, it might be that offenders escaped detection in the 
blackout.   
 
Meanwhile, from the outset of the creation and development of the ‘new’ police, the 
control of prostitutes was seen as an essential component in the maintenance of public 
order.  From a Marxist perspective the control of prostitutes was related to the 
imposition of ‘new standards of urban discipline’ and the control of public spaces.130  
List’s Treatise, which became the blueprint for policing the rural border counties of 
Scotland in the early nineteenth century, included, for example, the gathering of 
intelligence and surveillance of prostitutes.131  During the Great War women police 
patrols were introduced in some police forces for the first time in response to ‘khaki 
fever’ and ‘amateur’ prostitutes, together with concerns about the spread of venereal 
disease and moral decay.132  At the same time, in comparatively recent research in 
relation to Edinburgh in the interwar period, Louise Settle has argued that, 
notwithstanding public concerns regarding immorality in the city, police officers were 
‘often apathetic towards policing prostitution’.  On the one hand, police officers did 
not consider it a ‘real’ crime because it was victimless.  On the other, police officers in 
the aftermath of the Savidge case in 1928 were cautious about accusing potentially 
innocent women.  As a consequence, it was ‘complaints from the public about the 
annoyance caused by a particular prostitute woman that provided the main motivation 
for police action’.133  In that sense, police activity was largely reactive rather than 
proactive.  
 
As Table 6.8 shows, police activity in relation to prostitution in Edinburgh declined 
sharply during the war by comparison with the pre-war period.  Indeed, the mean 
                                                
130 Robert D Storch, "Police Control of Street Prostitution in Victorian London: A Study in the 
Contexts of Police Action," in Police and Society, ed. David H. Bayley (Beverly Hills: Sage 1977), 
50-51. 
131 David Martin Smale, "Alfred John List and the Development of Policing in the Counties of 
Scotland, c.1832-77," Scottish Historical Studies 33, no. 1 (2013): 3. 
132 Angela Woollacott, "'Khaki Fever' and its Control: Gender, Class, Age and Sexual Morality on the 
British Homefront in the First World War," Journal of Contemporary History 29, no. 2 (1994): 327, 
331., Lucy Bland, "In the Name of Protection: The Policing of Women in the First World War," in 
Women-in-Law: Explorations in Law, Family and Sexuality, ed. Julia Brophy and Carol Smart 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 28. 
133 Louise Settle, "The Social Geography of Prostitution in Edinburgh, 1900-1939," Journal of 
Scottish Historical Studies 33, no. 2 (2013): 252-254., "The Kosmo Club Case: Clandestine 
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the Savidge case see Report of the Tribunal appointed under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 
1921 in regard to the interrogation by the Police of Miss Savidge. Cmd 3147, 1928. 
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annual number of crimes and offences made known to the police, and cases where one 
or more persons were arrested or cited. in the period 1939-1945 was nearly two-thirds 
less than that in 1935-1938.  Part of the explanation relates to the shortage of women 
engaged in prostitution.  Part of the explanation might relate to the fact that some local 
prostitutes were called up for war service.  By 1943, for example, some 99.7 per cent 
of the total female working population was either in the armed forces and auxiliary 
services or in civil employment.134  At the same time, some street prostitution, given 
its inherent nature, undoubtedly escaped detection in the blackout, especially given the 
reduction in the visibility of the police, the pressure of war-related duties, and the 
potential to exercise discretion.  Indeed, Donaldson found in his oral history study of 
two English forces during the war that police officers had an ambivalent attitude 
towards prostitutes.135 
 
Smithies, however, has argued that there was a ‘fierce campaign’ against prostitution 
in England during the Second World War, which reached its peak in 1943-1945.136  
Indeed, Table 6.8 demonstrates that there were spikes of increased police activity in 
Edinburgh in relation to prostitution between 1940 and 1941 and again between 1942 
and 1944.  As a percentage of all class VII crimes and offences police activity in 
relation to prostitution increased from 0.2 per cent in 1940 to 0.93 per cent in 1941 
and again from 0.07 per cent in 1942 to 1.19 per cent in 1944.  A similar pattern in 
relation to the number of crimes and offences made known to the police, and cases 
where one or more persons were arrested or cited, was evident across Scotland as a 
whole.137   
 
The explanation is undoubtedly related to the periodic moral panics over ‘amateur 
prostitutes’ and promiscuity, especially during the blackout, and the increase in 
venereal disease.138  In a repeat of the Great War, there was increasing public 
comment about declining morals.  Furthermore, by 1941, the rates of syphilis in 
                                                
134 Smithies, Crime in Wartime, 143., Gardiner, Wartime, 125-126., Statistical Digest of the War, 8. 
135 Donaldson, "Policing the War," 176. 
136 Smithies, Crime in Wartime, 138. 
137 Cmd 7505, 14-15.  Figures for the rest of the UK are not given in the Statistical Digest of the War.  
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Britain had increased 13 per cent among males and 63 per cent among females.139  As 
a consequence, Defence Regulation 33B was issued in late 1942 and provided for the 
detention for treatment of sexually active females suspected of transmitting venereal 
disease.  In line with this, Roger Davidson has pointed to evidence in the Second 
World War that ‘in certain localities in Scotland, police surveillance of suspected 
female contacts and, on occasions, physical restraint for examination and treatment’ 
took place.140  Whilst it is unknown whether this occurred in Edinburgh, there was 
thus clearly pressure on the police to respond proactively to the perceived problem.  In 
that regard the visibility of the police was increased by the introduction of women 
police with police powers patrolling the streets of Edinburgh for the first time in late 
1943.  
 
Policing in relation to civic regulation 
Part of core policing functions in the early twentieth century was, as noted, civic 
regulation.  In one respect, this was a legacy of the wider concept of ‘police’ that had 
been in existence in Scotland since at least the early seventeenth century.  As 
McGowan pointed out, the City Constables that were established in Edinburgh in 1606 
were not only charged with apprehending offenders but also ‘had wider powers 
relating to public safety and well-being’.141 It was also a legacy of the importation in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from France of a concept of ‘police’ related to 
the regulation of local communities.142  Alan Williams has argued that the police in 
Paris in the eighteenth century became a model because of its reputation for 
efficiency.  The lieutenant of police, for example, had, since the creation of the office 
in 1667, wide responsibility for many areas of civic regulation, including preserving 
life from ‘disease and natural disaster, from accidents and fire, from hunger and 
unwholesome food’.143  Goldsmith has also pointed to the significance of the tradition 
of ‘medical policing’ in Imperial Germany for the police acts in Glasgow in the 
nineteenth century.144  As Laxton and Rodger concluded in relation to nineteenth-
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century Edinburgh: ‘the concept of “police” went far beyond watching property to 
watching a range of environmental health concerns, and so demonstrated that the term 
“public health” was deeply rooted in a broad Scottish vision of civic responsibility’.145  
For their part, police authorities saw the police as a cheaper alternative than employing 
inspectors for a range of functions associated with civic regulation.  
 
Much of the legislation in the nineteenth century that created many of the ‘new’ police 
forces therefore contained provisions relating to community life.  The Burgh Police 
(Scotland) Act 1892, for example, which created many of the burgh forces, also 
contained provisions relating to, among others, the regulation of buildings, carts and 
carriages, footpaths, bathing, and skating.146  In Edinburgh, the 1933 Corporation 
Order provided for the adoption of some sections of the 1892 Act in addition to, for 
example, regulating electricity markets, slaughterhouses, public health, cleansing, 
lighting, parks, bathing, washhouses, seashore, strand, and municipal buildings.147  
Both acts remained in force throughout the Second World War and came under the 
category of ‘Police Acts’ in classification VII, ‘Miscellaneous Offences’, in official 
statistics. 
 
As Figure 6.4 shows, police activity in Edinburgh in relation to ‘Police Acts’ declined 
during the Second World War, especially by comparison with the period 1936-1938.  
Indeed, as a percentage of all Class VII crimes and offences it declined from a high of 
17.5 per cent in 1936 to 5.1 per cent in 1945.  Statistics show the pattern for Scotland 
as a whole also declined during the period 1940-1945.148  As with the decline in other 
aspects of core policing during the war, part of the explanation relates to the reduction 
in the visibility of the police and pressure of other tasks associated with the war on the 
home front, especially given the crimes and offences were largely victimless and 
therefore largely a consequence of proactive police activity.  In that respect, police 
officers clearly exercised discretion.  In addition, many of those who would otherwise 
be involved in municipal maintenance had been conscripted or relocated for essential 
war service, whilst those who remained were deployed to allow the corporation to 
                                                
145 Laxton, Rodger, and Littlejohn, Insanitary City, 31. 
146 55 & 56 Vict, cap. 55 (1892). 
147 24 Geo. 5, cap. 5 (1933). 
148 See Cmd 7505, 14-15.  Figures for the rest of the UK are not given in the Statistical Digest of the 
War. 
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meet its statutory obligations with regard to air-raid precaution and civil defence 
measures.  Thus, it would be reasonable for police officers at a strategic or tactical 
level to hold the view that there was no point in taking action over minor 
infringements that entailed building or cleansing maintenance, for example, given it 
was unlikely that these tasks would be carried out for the duration of the war.  
 
 
Figure 6.4 Crimes and offences related to ‘Police Acts’ made known to the  
police in Edinburgh, 1935-1949 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/10-12]   
 
Conclusion 
Policing in the late 1930s was much as it had been since the creation of the ‘new’ 
police in the nineteenth century.  Despite increasing responsibility for a number of 
functions that had little to do with breaking the law, it remained premised on the 
policeman patrolling a beat discharging the core role of preventing crime and 
preserving the peace.  The extent to which policing altered as a consequence of the 
Second World War is the subject of competing interpretation.  This chapter has 
demonstrated that police activity with respect to core functions in Edinburgh during 
the Second World War represented both continuity and change.   
 
In general terms policing with regard to the protection of property remained 
unchanged during the war from that of the immediate pre- and post-war eras.  









1935	 1937	 1939	 1941	 1943	 1945	 1947	 1949	
 206
housebreaking.  To some extent, this was a consequence of wartime factors, in 
particular the reduction in the actual strength of regular officers through their release 
to the armed services and industry.  The Police Review was in no doubt that the 
‘serious increase in crime in many parts of the [UK]’ during the war could be 
attributed to the reduction in strength of the police forces.149  Notwithstanding the 
recruitment of auxiliaries, together with the requirement to undertake additional 
wartime tasks, this reduction in numbers lessened the amount of time that experienced 
officers with intimate local knowledge could spend on patrol preventing crime.  Thus 
property was most likely not checked to the same extent it was before and after the 
war.  The perpetrators’ discourse of ‘fair shares’, which arose as a consequence of the 
mobilisation for total war, was also possibly a contributory factor. 
 
On the other hand, the increased demand on the police in respect of housebreaking 
was a consequence of the legacy of pre-war social and economic factors, in particular 
suburbanisation.  In that regard, the lack of street lighting, which hindered 
preventative policing in the immediate pre-war era, was exacerbated by the 
introduction of the blackout.  At the same time, the introduction of police boxes in the 
1930s reduced the effectiveness of the police.  In short, the opportunities for 
housebreakers during the war were enhanced.  Finally, the strategic decision not to 
implement an informal warning system for juvenile offenders potentially increased the 
demand on the police with regard to reoffenders.  
 
Policing with regard to the protection of life also remained largely unchanged during 
the war.  Given the inherently ‘domestic’ nature of the most numerical related crimes 
and offences it is, however, difficult to infer much from this about the character of 
policing.  Had the classification included a category of street violence, for example, it 
might have been possible to infer something about preventative policing.  
Nevertheless, there was an increase in police activity in respect of the three most 
numerical related crimes and offences.  For the most part, this can be attributed to 
purely wartime factors.  The increase in demand with regard to the mistreatment of 
children, for example, was a consequence of the social dislocation caused by the war, 
whilst that in relation to assaults was most likely related to the increase in armed 
                                                
149 Police Review, 9 March 1945, 113. 
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services personnel.  Furthermore, the intensification of the requirement to investigate 
sudden deaths was partly a consequence of the blackout.  
 
Of the core policing functions the requirement to maintain order and civic regulation 
changed most noticeably in Edinburgh during the war.  Police activity in respect of 
nearly all the related crimes and offences in these categories decreased sharply by 
comparison with the immediate pre-war era.  In contrast to the other core roles, crimes 
and offences in relation to the maintenance of order and civic regulation were largely 
victimless and therefore reliant on proactive police activity.  Police officers thus had 
more latitude for discretion and were more likely to exercise this given the reduction 
in regular officers, the pressure of war-related duties, and ambivalence to some crimes 
and offences.  In this regard there was an increase in the use of summons and a 
corresponding decrease in the use of apprehension as a means of dealing with all 
crimes and offences.  At the same time, the decrease in police activity was also largely 
a consequence of wartime factors.  Some offenders undoubtedly escaped detection in 
the blackout, whilst conscription or essential civilian war work relocated many who 








Road Traffic policing  
The requirement to regulate road traffic became an increasing demand for the police 
throughout Britain in the early twentieth century as a consequence of the rapid 
increase in the number of vehicles on the road.  The number of private cars registered 
in Britain rose from around 186,000 to one million in the 1920s and two million by 
1939.1  Part of the explanation relates to the reduction in the cost of motoring.  Emsley 
has argued that the growth of regulation was also part of the expansion of the 
‘Policeman State’.2  The Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure in 
England and Wales in 1928 reported that there had been a ‘phenomenal growth of 
work’ for the police in relation to road traffic ‘which had resulted from the advent of 
the motor vehicle’.3  The 1929 Royal Commission on Transport, meanwhile, found 
that traffic regulation had become a ‘difficult and irksome duty’.  Furthermore, that 
increasing numbers of officers were being abstracted for traffic regulation thereby 
increasing the pressure for the delivery of core policing on those left patrolling beats.4   
 
By the interwar period the demand on the police in Edinburgh in relation to the 
regulation of traffic had increased in line with the general pattern across Britain.  As 
Table 7.1 shows, in the 1920s the number of vehicles registered in Edinburgh almost 
tripled, whilst the number of driving licences issued more than doubled.  The number 
of both increased further in the 1930s. By 1930 the chief constable, Roderick Ross, 
reported: ‘Vehicular traffic continues to increase at a remarkable rate; in order to cope 
efficiently with it a large volume of extra work devolves upon the Police, and traffic 
control has become one of the most important duties which fall to be performed by the 
Service.’5  Together with the growing demands related to a range of public services, 
such as lost and found property and policing the new suburbs, the regulation of traffic 
                                                
1 Brenda M. White, "Road Accident Statistics in Peace and War in Britain 1930-1951," in Road 
Accidents Great Britain 1991: The Casualty Report (London: Department of Transport, HMSO, 
1992), 33. 
2 Emsley, "'Mother, What Did Policemen Do When There Weren't Any Motors?'," 357, 373. 
3 Cmd 3297, 81. 
4 The Royal Commission also concluded that traffic regulation had not been ‘part of the original 
functions of the police’.  Cmd 3365, 21.  The regulation of traffic in Scotland had, however, been a 
requirement for constables long before the development of the ‘new’ police.  See, for example, 12 
Geo. 3, cap. 45 (1772).   
5 ECA ED006/1/9, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1930, 20. 
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created a problem of capacity.  Throughout the interwar period Inspectors of 
Constabulary in England warned that police resources were being overwhelmed.6  As 
Laybourn and Taylor concluded: 
 
the demand for free-flowing traffic in town and country and, increasingly, for 
safety on the roads involved the diversion of police resources into traffic 
regulation and control at a time when there were increasing demands being 













1921 8280 9191 100 100 
1922 10770 11005 130 120 
1923 12810 12558 155 137 
1924 14285 13829 173 150 
1925 14994 16234 181 177 
1926 17102 18502 207 201 
1927 18237 20180 220 220 
1928 20001 21560 242 235 
1929 22055 22760 266 248 
1930 22601 23893 273 260 
1931 24732 24379 299 265 
1932 25431 25377 307 276 
1933 25547 27112 309 295 
1934 27463 29495 332 321 
1935 28567 31535 345 343 
1936 28692 35640 347 388 
1937 30241 39636 365 431 
1938 32081 44220 387 481 
1939 33581 44654 406 486 
1946 27758 43621 335 475 
1947 29640 44787 358 487 
1948 28086 46524 339 506 
1949 30742 51009 371 555 
Table 7.1 Vehicles registered and driving licences issued in Edinburgh,  
1921-1939, 1946-19498 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/9-12] 
  
                                                
6 Weinberger, The Best Police in the World, 72. 
7 Laybourn and Taylor, Policing in England and Wales, 135. 
8 Figures were not given in the chief constable’s annual reports to the town council during the Second 
World War. 
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In the City of Edinburgh Police this led to the creation of a dedicated traffic 
department in 1926.9  Some other Scottish forces, however, did not adopt a system of 
motor patrols until 1930, which suggests that the problem was greater, or at least 
perceived earlier, in the capital.10  Meanwhile, the police in Edinburgh adopted a 
combination of proactive and reactive strategies and tactics to regulate road traffic.  
This chapter examines the extent to which the pattern of policing in this regard in the 
Second World War was different from that which otherwise prevailed in the period 
1930-1949. Supplemented by SHD circulars, the chapter draws principally on the 
chief constable’s annual reports to the town council which contain statistics and 
entries relating to the regulation of traffic.   
 
It is argued here that traffic policing in Edinburgh during the Second World War 
represented both continuity and change.  Put simply, throughout the period under 
consideration the police continued to enforce the law in relation to the regulation of 
traffic and responded to road traffic accidents.  Nevertheless, the introduction of the 
blackout led to an increase in the number of fatal road accidents which increased the 
requirement on the police in terms of investigation as well as necessitating changes to 
the technology and tactics associated with enforcement.  The chapter further 
demonstrates that, in a parallel to the use of summons noted in chapter six, the 
shortage of regular officers and the pressure of war-related duties led to an increase in 
the use of the caution as a means of disposal in relation to road traffic offences.  
Finally, most police activity in respect of road safety ceased during the war as a 
consequence of social and economic factors associated with the mobilisation for total 
war.   
 
Policing in relation to enforcement  
The most obvious area of policing in relation to traffic regulation was enforcement of 
the relevant legislation.  In the period under consideration this related principally to 
the Road Traffic Act 1930 and 1934.11  The number of crimes and offences relating to 
these acts was included in the reports by the chief constable to the town council under 
                                                
9 ECA ED006/1/9, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1930, 20. 
10 NRS ED43/12, Report of the Scottish Inter-Departmental Committee on Road Safety among School 
Children, 1936, 14.  
11 20 & 21 Geo. 5, cap. 43 (1930); 24 & 25 Geo. 5, cap. 50 (1934).   
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the heading ‘Road Acts’ in Class VII ‘Miscellaneous Offences’.12  As with other 
crimes and offences in this classification, they were largely victimless and only 
became ‘known’ at the point of detection, largely as a consequence of proactive police 
activity.  As a consequence, the number made known to the police, and cases where 
one or more person was arrested or cited, are almost identical.  
 
 Crimes and offences related to ‘Road Acts’  
Number made known to the 
police  
As % of all crimes and offences  
made known to the police 
1930 1674 18.5 
1931 989 13.8 
1932 1283 17.7 
1933 1773 23.5 
1934 2273 25.6 
1935 2579 21.2 
1936 8177 38.5 
1937 10467 42.3 
1938 13336 47.5 
1939 8669 38.0 
1940 4304 19.5 
1941 4456 22.7 
1942 6277 30.8 
1943 4593 25.4 
1944 3146 20.3 
1945 1020 9.9 
1946 1675 14.6 
1947 1749 15.6 
1948 1849 15.6 
1949 1998 17.6 
Table 7.2 Crimes and offences related to ‘Road Acts’ in Edinburgh,  
1930-1949 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/9-12] 
 
As Table 7.2 shows, there was an increase in police activity from 1931, which was 
dramatic in the period 1935-1938.  By 1938 the number of road traffic crimes and 
offences made known to the police was 700 per cent greater than that of 1930.  At the 
same time, dealing with road traffic increasingly became part of police work to the 
                                                
12 It is likely that officers did not perceive contraventions of the ‘Road Acts’ to have been divisible 
into categories of ‘serious’ or otherwise.  Indeed, notwithstanding the exercise of discretion by 
officers to enforce in particular or general instances, given that crimes and offences related to the 
regulation of road traffic were specified by statute they were less open to interpretation than those at 
common law.  There was therefore less likelihood that the statistics relating to the ‘Road Acts’ would 
have been subject to the same degree of editing in the annual reports by the chief constable to the 
town council as other categories of crimes and offence clearly were in the period before 1935.  This 
chapter therefore includes figures dating from 1930.   
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extent that nearly half of all crimes and offences made known to the police were 
related to ‘Road Acts’.  Part of the explanation was undoubtedly the response to the 
demand created by the increase in registered vehicles and driving licences.  Whilst the 
increase was steady in the period under consideration, it was particularly rapid in the 
period 1935-1939.  Given that there were no attested female officers in Edinburgh 
until the Second World War, those enforcing the legislation in relation to ‘Road Acts’ 
were men and, for the most part, constables.  Notwithstanding an increase between 
1930 and 1938 in the actual strength of the City of Edinburgh Police from 809 to 889, 
the percentage of actual male regular constables declined from 81 to 79 per cent.  Thus 
the growth in policing demand in Edinburgh in relation to the enforcement of ‘Road 
Acts’ in the immediate pre-war period was exponential. 
 
Given the problem of capacity, officers exercised discretion in the enforcement of the 
legislation in relation to the regulation of road traffic.  As the 1929 Royal Commission 
on Transport concluded:  
 
Probably not one motorist in a thousand observes the general speed limit … 
and in many parts of the country no attempt is made to enforce it.  Flagrant 
and universal breaches of the law tend to bring the whole law of the country 
into contempt and the enforcement of the traffic law becomes increasingly 
difficult.13   
 
Part of the explanation might, however, have been related to the availability of 
technology and thus the ability to provide incontrovertible evidence.  In many cases it 
was difficult if not impossible to determine precise speeds.14  What is clear is that 
Roderick Ross saw the role of the police in Edinburgh in relation to the regulation of 
road traffic as being principally advisory.  In 1930 and 1931, for example, he reported 
that the ‘police were more anxious to help than to prosecute’.  In particular, the 
function of the traffic department was to have a ‘moral effect on inconsiderate drivers 
… [and] … check bad driving’.  In its first four years of operation, 1926-1930, traffic 
department officers cautioned a mean of 86.1 per cent of offenders. 15  Table 7.3 
                                                
13 Cmd 3365, 3. 
14 Laybourn and Taylor, Policing in England and Wales, 159. 
15 ECA ED006/1/9, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1930, 20, 23; 1931, 
12.  
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demonstrates that the mean over the period 1931-1934, before Ross retired, was 85.8, 
which was consistent with that in the period 1926-1930.  Given that the total number 
of offences made known to the police, and cases where one or more persons was 
arrested or cited, excludes those offenders cautioned by officers other than those in the 
traffic department, the number not reported for process was clearly much greater.  
 
 Number % 
 Cautioned Reported Total Cautioned Reported Total  
1930 6092 1225 7317 83.3 16.7 100.0 
1931 7312 707 8019 91.2 8.8 100.0 
1932 7899 969 8868 89.1 10.9 100.0 
1933 8614 1220 9834 87.6 12.4 100.0 
1934 5418 1537 6955 77.9 22.1 100.0 
1935 5166 1436 6602 78.2 21.8 100.0 
1936 5528 1437 6965 79.4 20.6 100.0 
1937 7968 1372 9340 85.3 14.7 100.0 
1938 10060 2061 12121 83.0 17.0 100.0 
1939 6022 1187 7209 83.5 16.5 100.0 
1940 3204 765 3969 80.7 19.3 100.0 
1941 3977 723 4700 84.6 15.4 100.0 
1942 6593 786 7379 89.3 10.7 100.0 
1943 5151 472 5623 91.6 8.4 100.0 
1944 3495 465 3960 88.3 11.7 100.0 
1946 6321 1266 7587 83.3 16.7 100.0 
1947 4759 1244 6003 79.3 20.7 100.0 
1948 5823 1380 7203 80.8 19.2 100.0 
1949 5777 1342 7119 81.1 18.9 100.0 
Table 7.3 Disposal of offences by traffic department officers in Edinburgh,  
1930-1944, 1946-1949 
Note: Figures for 1945 were not given in Morren’s annual report to the town council. 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/9-12] 
 
At the same time, Ross clearly responded to public pressure in his determination of the 
role of the police.  In 1934, for example, he reported that the police had acted with 
‘special vigilance’ and ‘strict attention’ to the ‘many bitter complaints’ by the public 
regarding indiscriminate parking in the city and speeding vehicles in Queensferry 
Road.16  In this sense, police activity was also reactive.  Ross’s view was not held by 
all chief police officers however.  Sir Philip Game, Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
Police 1935-45, was quite clear that drivers should be prosecuted rather than warned 
or advised.17  The important point here is that in addition to the discretion exercised by 
                                                
16 ECA ED006/1/9, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1934, 20-21. 
17 Donaldson, "Policing the War," 216. 
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rank-and-file officers, the character of policing in relation to the regulation of traffic 
was determined to a great extent at a strategic level by the chief constable’s perception 
of the role of the police.   
 
In his annual reports to the town council there is nothing to suggest that William 
Morren, the chief constable throughout the Second World War, held the same view as 
Ross in relation to enforcing road traffic legislation.  Indeed, in the immediate pre-war 
period Morren vigorously exploited the opportunities afforded by new legislation.  For 
example, in 1938 he reported that a campaign had ‘been made possible’ by the 
introduction of the Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1937, which 
gave the police the power to test the brakes of vehicles.18  In consequence, officers of 
the traffic department carried out 2,808 tests that year.19  Whilst the use of a caution 
remained the predominant method of disposal in the first two years in which Morren 
was chief constable, its mean use in the period 1935-36 declined markedly to 78.8 per 
cent, which suggests that there might have been something of a change in strategy.  
Morren explained that the rise in enforcement in relation to road traffic policing in 
1938 was a consequence of the replacement of the traffic fleet with cars of greater 
horsepower, which allowed for more intensive ‘supervision’ to be given to the 
regulation of traffic.20  In that sense, the extent of enforcement was also determined by 
the availability of advances in motor-car technology.  Meanwhile, it is likely that 
public concern also continued to influence enforcement.  For example, the publication 
of the Report of the Scottish Inter-Departmental Committee on Road Safety Among 
School Children in 1936, which found that the number killed in road accidents under 
the age of 15 had increased from 436 in 1925 to 699 in 1934, would undoubtedly have 
put pressure on the police to be proactive.21 
 
Part of the ‘supervision’ Morren referred to was related to speeding.  Whilst the 
recommendations of the 1929 Royal Commission on Transport had led to the abolition 
in the 1930 Act of speed limits for passenger vehicles on the basis that it was largely 
                                                
18 S.R.&O. (No. 229), regulation 95 (1937).   
19 ECA ED006/1/10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1938, 23. 
20 ECA ED006/1/10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1938, 18. 
21 NRS ED43/12, Report of the Scottish Inter-Departmental Committee on Road Safety among School 
Children, 1936, 52. 
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held in contempt, the 1934 Act reintroduced a limit of 30mph on some roads.22  
Although the Secretary of State for Scotland pointed out that the police measures 
would vary according to local circumstances, he endorsed the principle that, like in 
London, the police in Scotland would, at times, utilise unmarked cars crewed by 
officers in plain clothes to detect contraventions of the speed limit.23  The police in 
Edinburgh, and elsewhere in Britain, therefore deployed proactive and covert tactics to 
enforce the speed limit.  
 
The outbreak of the Second World War, and in particular the introduction of the 
blackout, however, necessitated changes to the tactics employed in the enforcement of 
legislation in relation to speeding.  As will be noted later in this chapter, there was an 
increase in the number of road traffic accidents, especially those that were fatal, as a 
consequence of the blackout.  In response, at the beginning of February 1940 central 
government introduced a 20mph speed limit in built-up areas during the hours of 
darkness.24  Although the Secretary of State for Scotland, David Colville, recognised 
that enforcing this during the blackout presented ‘special problems’, chief constables 
were urged to ensure police supervision of traffic.  In particular, Colville argued that 
general compliance with the law could not be expected if it became known that those 
who flouted the legislation in relation to speeding were ‘seldom detected’ during the 
hours of darkness.  Whilst it was envisaged that methods would generally be similar to 
those employed enforcing other speed limits, tactics had to be adapted to conform to 
the lighting regulations.  In the event that officers were unable to stop a vehicle, for 
example, they were only permitted to switch on an unmasked fog lamp ‘momentarily’ 
and infrequently to identify the offender’s number plate.  In a similar manner, the 
speedometer of the police car had to be modified to ensure that it did not dazzle the 
driver, whilst at the same time ensuring that another officer could see it for 
corroboration.  Furthermore, although motor patrols were still regarded as the ‘normal 
method’ of enforcement, Colville, drawing on the experience of the Metropolitan 
Police, also authorised the ‘supplementary measure’ of ‘fixed controls’ where officers 
were deployed at each end of a measured stretch of road, presumably timing vehicles 
                                                
22 24 & 25 Geo. 5, cap. 50, section 1 (1934).   
23 NRS DD4/403, Press release by the Commissioner Metropolitan Police, March 1935; Press release 
by the Secretary of State for Scotland, 12 March, 1935.  
24 Police Review, 9 February 1940, 58.  
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over the distance.25  In this sense, in addition to the operational deployment by the 
chief constable, police enforcement of the legislation in relation to speeding was 
dictated by central government on the basis of war conditions and the available 
technology. 
 
Nevertheless, Table 7.2 demonstrates, in general terms, that there was a decline in 
police activity in relation to the ‘Road Acts’ in Edinburgh during the war.  The 
number of crimes and offences made known to the police in 1940, the first full year of 
war, was 35 per cent less than in 1938, the last full year before the emergency.  By 
1945, the last year of the war, the number of crimes and offences made known to the 
police was 92 per cent less than in 1938.  The general trend continued in the 
immediate post-war period.  The mean number of crimes and offences made known to 
the police in the first four full years of peace, 1946-1949, was nearly 80 per cent less 
than in 1935-1938.   
 
Part of the explanation relates to the reduction in the number of motor vehicles as a 
consequence of sustained periods of petrol rationing from the start of the war until 
1950.26  Between 1939 and 1942 the five million or so private cars and other vehicles 
on the roads in Britain were reduced by over a third.27  In Edinburgh, Morren advised 
in a Home Intelligence Report in mid-1942 that about two-thirds of cars normally 
licensed were off the road.28  By early 1944 the Police Review reported that the roads 
in Britain had been ‘cleared of practically all vehicular traffic except military vehicles 
and those serving essential services’.29  Although Morren further noted that there had 
been an increase in traffic on the roads in Edinburgh in the months following the end 
of the war, Table 7.1 demonstrates that the number of vehicles registered in the first 
three full post-war years still remained less than in 1937-1939.30  Thus by comparison 
with the immediate pre-war period, the reduction in the demand on the police in 
                                                
25 NRS HH52/29, Circular 3853, 2 February 1940.  
26 Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain: Rationing, Controls, and Consumption, 1939-
1955 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 193-194., Kynaston, Austerity Britain, 511. 
27 Bill Luckin, "War on the Roads: Traffic Accidents and Social Tension in Britain, 1939-45," in 
Accidents in History: Injuries, Fatalities and Social Relations, ed. Roger Cooter and Bill Luckin 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), 236., William Plowden, The Motor Car and Politics in Britain (London: 
The Bodley Head, 1973), 301-302. 
28 NRS HH55/34, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 17 July 1942. 
29 Police Review, 4 February 1944, 49.  
30 NRS HH55/42, Home Intelligence Report by City of Edinburgh Police, 31 December 1945. 
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relation to enforcement during the war, and in the post-war ‘age of austerity’, was a 
consequence of external factors.   
 
Yet notwithstanding the general pattern of a decline in police activity during the war 
in relation to the ‘Road Acts’, there was, as tables 7.2 and 7.3 demonstrate, a marked 
increase in 1942 in the number of offences made known to the police, and cases where 
one or more persons were arrested or cited, as well as the number of offenders 
cautioned by traffic department officers.  The explanation is undoubtedly related to the 
establishment in 1941 of an inter-departmental committee under the chairmanship of 
the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport to consider road safety 
in light of the increase in the number of fatal road accidents as a consequence of the 
blackout.  Whilst the Ministry of Information initiated an intensive publicity 
campaign, the Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom Johnston, pointed out to chief 
constables in December 1941 that this alone would not produce a reduction in 
accidents and that enforcement ‘must still be a major factor’.  Scottish chief constables 
were therefore asked to ‘take all practicable steps to secure that the law is observed … 
[and that] … particular attention may in all circumstances be paid to enforcement of 
the laws relating to safe driving’.31 
 
There were, however, as observed, fewer regular male constables to enforce the 
legislation in relation to the regulation of traffic.  Whilst police auxiliaries had been 
recruited to fill the void, they were not trained or experienced to the same extent in the 
highly technical aspects of some of the legislation, especially by comparison with 
regular traffic department officers.  The Edinburgh Evening News reported in 1943, 
for example, that part of the role for the eight members of the Women’s Auxiliary 
Police Corps who had been attested was to deal with motoring offences.32  Meanwhile, 
Weinberger has argued that traffic policing changed during the war as a consequence 
of petrol rationing and the requirement for officers to be on standby for war-related 
duties.33  In his annual reports to the town council, Morren pointed, for example, to the 
large number of exercises that took place throughout the war.  In 1940, for instance, 
some 1,456 exercises were held involving members of the Civil Defence Services, 
                                                
31 NRS HH52/30, Circular 4736, 11 December 1941.  
32 Edinburgh Evening News, 20 October 1943, 3.  
33 Weinberger, The Best Police in the World, 125. 
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with a further 2,860 involving staff at Reporting Centres.34  Although the extent of 
police involvement is not made explicit, officers undoubtedly participated and some, if 
not many, were diverted from operational policing for that purpose.  Probably partly 
for such reasons the percentage of offences dealt with by a caution increased during 
the war by comparison with the period immediately after Morren became chief 
constable.  In 1943, for example, some 91.6 per cent of offences dealt with by traffic 
officers were disposed of by way of a caution.  Over the period 1939-1944 a mean 
86.6 per cent of offences resulted in a caution, which is consistent with the figure that 
pertained whilst Ross was chief constable.   
 
In 1947 the Committee on Road Safety, which was appointed in 1943 as a 
consequence of the 1941 Inter-Departmental Committee, produced its final report.35  
In an echo of Ross’ view of the police role in relation to the regulation of traffic in the 
pre-war period, the report argued that: 
 
most motoring offences are the outcome of ignorance of the principles of 
road conduct and that advice and assistance rather than prosecution should 
accordingly be the keynote of Police policy, particularly for those offences 
under the Road Traffic Acts which are regarded by some as being of a 
‘technical’ character.  Any system under which fear becomes the controlling 
factor in obtaining the required reaction among so large a section of the 
public who, as individuals, are generally law abiding, is not, we think, likely 
to produce the most effective results.36 
 
The mean percentage of offences dealt with by caution by traffic department officers 
in Edinburgh in the immediate aftermath of the report, 1948-49, was 81.0, which was 
clearly less than the figure that pertained during the war.  The significant point is that 
the increased use of cautions as a means of disposal during the war was an expedient, 
either at a strategic or tactical level, to the problem of capacity.  Laybourn found in his 
study that wartime conditions had ‘fostered an attitude of liberality towards the 
motorist’.37 
                                                
34 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1940, 9. 
35 White, "Road Accident Statistics," 36. 
36 The National Archives (hereafter TNA) MT92/17, Final Report of the Committee on Road Safety, 
1947, 42-43.  
37 Laybourn, The Battle for the Roads, 90. 
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Given the brevity of Morren’s annual reports to the town council during the war, it is 
difficult to construct an accurate picture of enforcement in relation to the regulation of 
road traffic in Edinburgh other than by inference from the statistics and, by 
implication, from the SHD circulars, which applied to all Scottish forces.  In mid-
1941, for example, a circular highlighted Treasury concerns at the loss of revenue 
caused by unlicensed vehicles.  Whilst the Secretary of State, Tom Johnston, pointed 
out that he accepted chief constables had been obliged in some cases to discontinue 
the ‘full system of quarterly checks’ and could not be ‘expected to divert personnel 
from more important duties’, he hoped that they would be able to resume checks to the 
‘extent which is possible’.38  Whether the failure to carry out the checks was the 
consequence of a strategic decision by chief constables or the exercise of discretion by 
rank-and-file officers is unknown.  In either case, it would, however, be 
understandable if what was in effect a comparatively trivial responsibility was 
overlooked given the pressure of war-related duties.  Indeed, by May 1943, the SHD 
advised chief constables that whilst licensing offences ‘detected by the police in the 
course of their normal duties’ should continue to be reported, systematic checks were 
no longer required in the ‘present circumstances’.39   
 
Morren’s reports, however, identify a continuity in the enforcement of the regulations 
in relation to hackney carriages.  The relevant department, which had been a 
responsibility of the town council since before 1855, was transferred to the police in 
1933.40  Although the strength of the force was, in consequence, increased by one 
officer, the requirements in relation to examining carriages and drivers contributed to 
an increased demand on the police in relation to the regulation of traffic in the pre-war 
period.  By 1937 Morren reported that the work entailed was ‘considerable’.41  Taking 
the two main licences issued in relation to hackney carriages, Table 7.4 demonstrates 
that police activity in this regard continued to be discharged throughout the war.  
Indeed, in 1940, for example, Morren recorded that: ‘As in former years … all 
requirements were satisfactorily complied with’.42   
 
                                                
38 NRS HH52/30, Circular 4519, 18 July 1941.  
39 NRS HH52/30, Circular 5377, 29 May 1943.  
40 ECA ED006/1/9, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1933, 27. 
41 ECA ED006/1/10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1937, 25. 
42 ECA ED006/1/10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1940, 7. 
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1933 278 378 100 100 
1934 276 377 99.3 99.7 
1935 271 365 97.5 96.6 
1936 284 352 102.2 93.1 
1937 306 356 110.1 94.2 
1938 282 339 101.4 89.7 
1939 259 322 93.2 85.2 
1940 238 303 85.6 80.2 
1941 227 287 81.7 75.9 
1942 317 308 114.0 81.5 
1943 298 347 107.2 91.8 
1944 247 334 88.8 88.4 
1945 285 378 102.5 100.0 
1946 377 469 135.6 124.1 
1947 410 496 147.5 131.2 
1948 434 532 156.1 140.7 
1949 450 538 161.9 142.3 
Table 7.4 Motorised hackney carriage licences and motorised hackney 
carriage drivers’ licences issued in Edinburgh, 1933-1949 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/9-12] 
 
The reason for the continued police activity relates to the demand for taxis.  Given 
petrol rationing and the consequent shortage of private motoring, there was a demand 
for alternative modes of transport.  Public transport was, however, not always 
available due to shortages of staff, spare parts, and petrol.43  Thus, whilst the town 
council had in 1942 limited the number of taxis on the roads in Edinburgh at one time 
to 240, Morren recorded a year later that the number had been increased to 247 
‘having regard to the public demand for more’.44  In a similar manner, the increased 
number of licences issued in the immediate post-war period was a consequence of the 
demand by the public for more taxis.45  In this sense police activity can be seen as 
reactive in relation to the public demand created by the continued shortage of petrol.  
Notwithstanding the increased demand for taxis, the question arises as to why the 
police continued to issue licences given the additional demands related to policing the 
home front.  For example, the redeployment of Ministry of Transport examiners to 
                                                
43 Calder, The People's War, 319. 
44 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1942, 8; 1943, 11.   
45 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1945, 14. 
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defence duties led to the suspension of driving tests intermittently during the war.46  
The explanation probably relates to the fact that taxis were employed in conveying the 
public and there was, therefore, some obligation to ensure that both drivers and 
vehicles were fit for purpose.  
 
Policing in relation to responding to accidents  
As a consequence of the rapid increase in cars on the roads in the early twentieth 
century there was an increase in the number of road traffic accidents in Britain.  As 
Table 7.5 shows this was especially marked from the late 1920s into the early 1930s.  
One writer has pointed out that in 1934 there were an unprecedented number of road 
accidents and that the figure was not exceeded in peacetime until 1964.47  In Scotland 
the police had a duty to investigate any accident ‘which may have involved some 
violation of the law’.48  In addition to enforcement, the increase in the number of cars 
in the interwar period therefore created an increase in the requirement for the police to 
respond to road traffic accidents.   
 
Given the inconsistency in the content of the annual reports to the town council by the 
chief constable in the period 1930-1949, it is, however, difficult to construct an 
accurate picture of the extent of road traffic accidents in Edinburgh.  It is often not 
clear whether a figure relates to the number of persons killed and injured in accidents 
or the number of accidents that resulted in death or injury.  Furthermore, the number 
of accidents whereby damage or injury was caused to any vehicle, or animal, and 
reported to the police under the provisions of the 1930 Act is not recorded.49  The 
number of persons killed and injured is therefore an indicative, rather than precise, 
measure of the number of all road traffic accidents.  
  
                                                
46 cf The Scotsman, 1 September 1939, 11; 5 December 1939, 9.  
47 White, "Road Accident Statistics," 33. 
48 Mill, The Scottish Police, 56. 




Scotland England & Wales Total 
Scotland England & Wales Total  







1913 219 3240 1743 38050 43252 0.5 7.5 4.0 88.0 100.0 
1916 285 3890 2393 46090 52658 0.5 7.4 4.5 87.5 100.0 
1917 248 3433 2047 38326 44054 0.6 7.8 4.6 87.0 100.0 
1918 242 2987 1842 31604 36675 0.7 8.1 5.0 86.2 100.0 
1919 249 3957 2239 43305 49750 0.5 8.0 4.5 87.0 100.0 
1920 318 4417 2386 49317 56438 0.6 7.8 4.2 87.4 100.0 
1921 350 4790 2328 55153 62621 0.6 7.6 3.7 88.1 100.0 
1922 327 4987 2441 62504 70259 0.5 7.1 3.5 89.0 100.0 
1923 285 5832 2694 74290 83101 0.3 7.0 3.2 89.4 100.0 
1924 326 6717 3269 87867 98179 0.3 6.8 3.3 89.5 100.0 
1925 436 8798 3535 102704 115473 0.4 7.6 3.1 88.9 100.0 
1926 567 10638 4236 108846 124287 0.5 8.6 3.4 87.6 100.0 
1927 614 11509 4581 117239 133943 0.5 8.6 3.4 87.5 100.0 
1928 625 12405 5358 129199 147587 0.4 8.4 3.6 87.5 100.0 
1929 688 12767 5817 132529 151801 0.5 8.4 3.8 87.3 100.0 
1930 757 13642 6317 136077 156793 0.5 8.7 4.0 86.6 100.0 
1931 644 15321 5855 159257 181077 0.4 8.5 3.2 87.9 100.0 
1932 687 15567 5800 161952 184006 0.4 8.5 3.2 88.0 100.0 
1933 680 15364 6321 169417 191782 0.4 8.0 3.3 88.3 100.0 
1934 699 17387 6456 180168 204710 0.3 8.5 3.2 88.0 100.0 
1935 624 16714 5690 172864 195892 0.3 8.5 2.9 88.2 100.0 
Table 7.5  Road traffic accidents in Britain, 1913-1935  
[Source: Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom, 1930-1931, 1935, and 193750] 
 
As Figure 7.1 shows, the decline from 1926 in the number of those killed or injured in 
road traffic accidents in Edinburgh was reversed dramatically in 1934.  For Roderick 
Ross the explanation was related to legislation, in particular the abolition of the speed 
limit for passenger vehicles in the 1930 Act.51  Although he reported in the first two 
years after the abolition that it had not led to the envisaged increase in accidents, by 
1933 he concluded that the speed limit should be reintroduced given that ‘excessive 
speed’ was a contributory factor in the increased number of injuries sustained.  At the 
same time Ross highlighted the problem that many who held a driving licence were 
unfit to drive and argued for the introduction of a driving test.52  Although many 
countries required that drivers pass a test of proficiency, the 1929 Royal Commission 
                                                
50 In Emsley, "'Mother, What Did Policemen Do When There Weren't Any Motors?'," 359. 
51 20 & 21 Geo. 5, cap. 43, section 10 (1930).  Under the First Schedule to the Act there was, with 
exceptions, no limit to the maximum speed for vehicles constructed solely for the carriage of 
passengers and their effects.  
52 ECA ED006/1/9, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1931, 13; 1932, 16; 
1933, 16-17. 
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on Transport rejected its introduction.  Despite the requirement in the 1930 Act for 
applicants to make a declaration of any physical disability that would render them a 
danger, licences continued to be ‘nothing more than a receipt’ for the fee of five 
shillings.53   
 
 
Figure 7.1 Number of persons killed or injured in road traffic accidents in 
Edinburgh, 1926-1949 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/9-12] 
 
Figure 7.1 demonstrates that there was a reduction in the number of persons killed or 
injured in road traffic accidents in Edinburgh in 1935.  The explanation undoubtedly 
relates to the introduction in the 1934 Act of a driving test and a speed limit.  As Ross 
recorded, motorists in Edinburgh largely observed the latter.54  Thus, in addition to the 
increased number of vehicles on the road, the character of legislation relating to the 
regulation of traffic affected the propensity for accidents in the interwar period and 
hence the level of demand on the police.  However, as Figure 7.2 demonstrates, by 
comparison with 1934, there was a decline in the number of death and injury accidents 
each regular male constable responded to in the last full five years before the outbreak 
of war.  The continuing increase in the number of cars on the roads, along with the 
decrease in the percentage of male regular constables, therefore acted as 
countervailing factors.   
                                                
53 Cmd 3297, 28-30., 20 & 21 Geo. 5, cap. 43, sections 4-5 (1930).   






















































































Figure 7.2 Number of death or injury accidents responded to by each  
male regular constable in Edinburgh, 1934-1938 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/10]  
 
Historians have identified that there was a dramatic rise in the number of fatal road 
accidents in Britain with the outbreak of war.55  As Table 7.6 demonstrates, by 1941 
the number of fatalities in Britain was some 57 per cent greater than in 1938.  Joe 
Moran has argued in relation to the first four months of war that it ‘was more 
dangerous to be on the roads than in the armed services’.56  The General Secretary of 
the ‘Safety First’ Association identified Edinburgh, along with Glasgow, Dundee, and 
Aberdeen, as having the largest increase in Britain in the first six months of war by 
comparison with the corresponding period in 1938.57 Indeed, although relatively small 
in real terms, there was a sharp increase in the number killed in Edinburgh in the first 
years of war by comparison with 1938.  Yet any increase in the number of fatalities 
had the potential to affect the capacity of the police in Scotland exponentially given 
the protracted and detailed nature of the investigation required to report the 
circumstances to the procurator fiscal.  
 
  
                                                
55 See, for example, Calder, The People's War, 63., Gardiner, Wartime, 61., Hylton, Their Darkest 
Hour, 102. 
56 Joe Moran, "Crossing the Road in Britain, 1931-1976," The Historical Journal 49, no. 2 (2006): 
483. 












1934	 1935	 1936	 1937	 1938	
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 Road Fatalities 
Number Index 1938=100 
Britain  Edinburgh Britain Edinburgh 
1938 3046 51 100 100 
1939 4497 65 148 127 
1940 4714 72 155 141 
1941 4781 69 157 135 
1942 3650 61 120 120 
1943 3058 56 100 110 
1944 3314 50 109 98 
1945 2602 43 85 84 
1946 2489 52 82 102 
1947 2380 37 78 73 
1948 2368 39 78 76 
Table 7.6 Road fatalities in Britain and Edinburgh, 1938-1948 
[Source: Road Accident Statistics, 1938-54;58 ECA ED006/1/9-12]  
 
Writers attribute the increase in road accidents during the war to the introduction of 
the blackout.  William Plowden, for example, argued: ‘The black-out made the use of 
roads at night a perilous affair.’59  Likewise, Luckin identified a ‘decisive war-time 
movement towards more accidents occurring during the hours of darkness’. 60  
Motorists and pedestrians in particular struggled to adjust to using the roads in the new 
conditions of relative gloom.   The Ministry of Transport concluded that, by the end of 
1940, most of the fatal accidents during the preceding 15 months had ‘occurred during 
the hours of darkness’.61  The phenomenon was identified in the Police Review as the 
new ‘Black Death’.62  In Edinburgh, Morren clearly blamed the ‘alarming rise’ in fatal 
road accidents in 1939 on the blackout.  He recorded that in 1939, whilst there had 
been 25 fatalities up to the end of August, there had been 40 in the first four months of 
war, with 80 per cent of these occurring when ‘black-out conditions were operating’.  
Of these, 97 per cent were pedestrians, mostly middle-aged or elderly.  Morren 
concluded that ‘certain classes of pedestrians’ had been ‘slow to react’ to the 
‘revolutionary change in everyday conditions’.63 
 
Thus, whereas the demand on the police in relation to the enforcement of the 1934 Act 
was potentially offset by the likely reduction in road traffic accidents, an unintended 
                                                
58 In Luckin, "War on the Roads," 238. 
59 Plowden, The Motor Car and Politics, 303. 
60 Luckin, "War on the Roads," 238. 
61 Edinburgh Evening News, 18 December 1940, 5.  
62 Police Review, 17 November 1939, 398.  
63 ECA ED006/1/10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1939, 5, 18. 
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consequence of the enforcement of the ‘Lighting Restrictions’ was an increase in fatal 
accidents.  At the same time the driving test, which had contributed to a reduction in 
accidents in the immediate pre-war period, was suspended intermittently, whilst the 
requirement was removed for provisional license holders to be accompanied by a fully 
licensed driver and to display ‘L’ plates on the vehicle.  Central Government’s 
intention was to enable holders of provisional licences to drive to ease the position 
where there was a scarcity of available drivers.64  Joe Moran has argued, however, that 
its effect was to ‘put more incompetent drivers on the road’ thereby increasing the 
potential for accidents to occur.65   
 
The introduction by central government of a 20mph speed limit and the extension of 
daylight hours was, however, an attempt to mitigate the causes of accidents and, 
notwithstanding the drive for more enforcement in 1941-1942, thereby potentially 
reduced the requirement on the police.  As demonstrated, there was a partial reduction 
in the number of people killed and injured in road accidents in Edinburgh from 1942 
until the end of the war.   Yet part of the explanation must relate to a reduction in the 
number of vehicles on the road.  Indeed, the general downward trend, which continued 
into the immediate post-war years, was reversed in 1945 as a consequence of the 
restoration of a petrol allowance for ordinary use.  Morren reported that this had led to 
a considerable increase in the number of vehicles on the roads in the city.66  By a 
similar token the abolition of the basic petrol ration in 1946 helps explain the 
reduction in 1947 in the number of fatalities.   
 
Nontheless, Morren saw the demand on the police in relation to road accidents as 
being the consequence of the changing perceptions of all road users.  In 1942, for 
example, he argued that given the considerably reduced number of vehicles on the 
road the reduction in the number of people killed and injured was not as significant as 
might have been expected: ‘It is probable that this is due to a false sense of security 
acquired by road users generally on the principle that the reduction in vehicles means 
a greater degree of road safety.  From the Statistics this would appear to be a fallacy 
                                                
64 NRS HH52/29, Circular 3985, 31 May 1940.  
65 Moran, "Crossing the Road," 483. 
66 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1945, 13. 
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…’67  In a similar vein he argued that the increase in fatalities in 1946 was a 
consequence of the war: ‘There is little doubt that the intervening war years have had 
the general effect of nullifying, in the minds of the citizens, that “awareness” of the 
dangers of the road which had been carefully built up during the years preceding 
hostilities.’68  
 
Policing in relation to road safety  
As part of the regulation of traffic in the 1930s and 1940s the police in Edinburgh 
adopted a strategy to proactively reduce the risk of road accidents.  Indeed, the 
Committee on Road Safety, which began work in 1943, concluded in its final report 
that the main duties of the police in relation to road traffic and road accidents, which 
were of ‘importance equal to that or criminal investigation’, included: 
 
(a) The study of the traffic problem and the development and 
advancement of the technique of traffic control in all its phases. 
(b) The prevention of offences and the education of road users. 
(c) The enforcement of the law. 
(d) The prevention of road accidents and the systematic investigation 
and review of their causes.69 
 
By 1949 Morren advised the town council that responsibilities in this regard in 
Edinburgh had ‘increased enormously’ in ‘recent years’ and that whilst ‘all members 
of the Force … are continually on the alert to do everything in their power to reduce 
… factors to a minimum’, it was only part of the solution to road safety.70  Indeed, in 
contrast to enforcement and responding to accidents where responsibility lay primarily 
with the police, a number of organisations participated in policy communities to use 
Rhodes’ terms, to promote road safety.  Given this, it is impossible at times to 
ascertain the extent of police involvement.  For example, many of the chief constables’ 
reports to the town council refer to some aspect of road engineering, such as lighting 
or halt signs, but give no clue as to whether the police were involved.  What is clear is 
                                                
67 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1942, 8. 
68 ECA ED006/1/12, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1946, 29. 
69 TNA MT92/17, Final Report of the Committee on Road Safety, 1947, 40. 
70 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1949, 24. 
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that by comparison with the immediate pre- and post-war periods, police activity in 
relation to road safety was much reduced as a consequence of the war. 
 
Yet Roderick Ross had been clearly of the view that education was an effective 
strategy, especially in relation to children, to pursue in respect of road safety.  In 1934, 
for example, he advised that lectures by police officers had been given in 90 schools.71  
Throughout the early 1930s he attributed the reduction in the number of fatal accidents 
in particular to the dissemination of road safety propaganda.72  Morren, likewise, 
pursued a strategy of education.  In 1935, for instance, he reported that, in addition to 
the Women’s Guild, lectures had been given to 88 schools, where members of the 
Scottish Inter-Departmental Committee on Road Safety among School Children had 
been present.73  The approval and recommendation by the Committee a year later that 
lectures by police officers should be extended was therefore based, at least in part, on 
the practice in Edinburgh.74 
 
Indeed, dominant discourses in the 1930s and 1940s in relation to accidents viewed 
pedestrians rather than drivers as being largely responsible. 75   Damian Collins, 
Catherine Bean, and Robin Kearns have identified in relation to New Zealand that 
children especially were socially constructed as ‘risky and unpredictable ‘objects”.76  
Likewise, the Scottish Inter-Departmental Committee reported in 1936 that: ‘the main 
source of road accidents to children is to be found in the psychology of the child and 
the fact that his adaptation to traffic conditions cannot be effected without a course of 
training which involves some restraint and re-orientation of natural instincts’.77  In a 
similar manner, Brenda White found that contemporaries during the Second World 
War blamed the increase in road traffic accidents on pedestrians who were perceived 
to be ‘unable to rid themselves of peacetime psychology’, whereas ‘no such 
                                                
71 ECA ED006/1/10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1934, 18. 
72 See, for example, ECA ED006/1/9, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 
1930, 24-25. 
73 ECA ED006/1/10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1935, 18. 
74 NRS ED43/12, Report of the Scottish Inter-Departmental Committee on Road Safety among School 
Children, 1936, 42.  
75 Moran, "Crossing the Road," 478. 
76 Damian Collins, Catherine Bean, and Robin Kearns, "'Mind that Child': Childhood, Traffic and 
Walking in Automobilised Space," in Car Troubles: Critical Studies of Automobility and Auto-
mobility, ed. Jim Conley and Arlene Tigar McLaren (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 127. 
77 NRS ED43/12, Report of the Scottish Inter-Departmental Committee on Road Safety among School 
Children, 1936, 20. 
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culpability was attributed to speeding motorists’.78  In his study of road deaths 
published in the immediate aftermath of war the former chairman of the Pedestrians’ 
Association, J. S. Dean, argued that notwithstanding that there was less than three 
million drivers amongst a population of 40 million, ‘motor interests’ had ‘almost 
complete control of the road safety situation’.  The main aim of ‘motor interests’ was 
to persuade the public that the accidents were ‘always the fault of the non-drivers, 
especially pedestrians … to … secure the removal or the non-enforcement of the 
existing controls on the drivers and to prevent the introduction of new ones’.79   
 
 
Figure 7.3  Pedestrians killed as a percentage of all persons killed in road  
traffic accidents in Edinburgh, 1930-1939 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/9-10]  
 
As Figure 7.3 demonstrates, the majority of those killed in road traffic accidents in 
Edinburgh in the 1930s were in fact pedestrians.  Although this is very different from 
proving that pedestrians were responsible, Ross was in no doubt that they were to 
blame.  In 1932, for example, he argued: ‘A large proportion of the accidents under 
review must be definitely attributed to the conduct of pedestrians who, failing to take 
the precautions so vital nowadays for their own safety, stepped off the footway or 
crossed the carriageway carelessly.’  Likewise, in 1933 he reported: ‘there is no doubt 
                                                
78 White, "Road Accident Statistics," 36. 
79 J. S. Dean, Murder Most Foul: A Study of the Road Deaths Problem (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 
1947), 13, 42. 












that many pedestrians cause accidents by thoughtlessness’.  As a consequence, he 
advocated the introduction of legislation to control pedestrians.80   
 
Morren, in contrast, appeared more balanced in his attribution of responsibility in 
relation to road traffic accidents.  In 1947, for example, he argued that ‘persistent 
forms of propaganda must be directed to all members of the community’.  At the same 
time, however, he pointed out that the ‘reckless disregard so often shown by children 
does not always result in serious consequences … due in no small measure to the 
presence of mind on the part of motorists’.  This suggests that he, like Ross, was of the 
view that drivers were less blameworthy.  As a consequence, he instituted a proactive 
programme of intervention.  Following acts of carelessness by children, officers 
communicated directly with their parents and issued them with road safety advice.81  
As Mona Gleason suggested, such measures similar were intended to act in loco 
parentis based on the perception of incompetent parenting and the consequent concept 
of the ‘public child’.82  In this sense, the construction of the road safety problem was 
largely a reflection of central government policy which, as Luckin has identified, was 
premised on the ‘human model’ of blame until the 1950s.83 
 
Notwithstanding these educational initiatives, the police road safety education 
programme ceased entirely during the war.  In 1946 Morren advised the town council: 
‘Prior to the outbreak of war, lectures on road safety were given … and I am pleased 
to record that it has now been found possible to reintroduce these talks.  This year, 58 
lectures were delivered at schools in the City by members of the Traffic Section.’84  
As with other aspects of wartime policing, part of the explanation as to why the 
education programme was suspended undoubtedly relates to the shortage of regular 
officers and the pressure of war-related duties.  As Brenda White confirmed in relation 
to the regulation of road traffic across Britain: ‘matters were not helped by the 
reduction in police strength, depleted by active service volunteers and utilised for 
other vital war duties’.85  In any event, there was significant disruption to the schools 
                                                
80 ECA ED006/1/9, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1932, 16-17; 1933, 17. 
81 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1947, 31.  
82 Mona Gleason, "From Disgraceful Carlessness to Intelligent Precaution: Accidents and the Public 
Child in English Canada, 1900-1950," Journal of Family History 30, no. 2 (2005). 
83 Luckin, "War on the Roads," 245-246. 
84 ECA ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1946, 30. 
85 White, "Road Accident Statistics," 36. 
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where the lectures were delivered as a consequence of the evacuation scheme.  Within 
a few days of the declaration of war by the UK about 31,000 children had been 
evacuated from Edinburgh, with a further 3,000 a few weeks later.86   
 
As with other forms of preventative policing it is difficult to definitively ascertain 
whether road safety campaigns reduced the number of road accidents.  Table 7.7 
demonstrates that there were more fatalities and injures in non-road traffic accidents, 
such as those occurring in the workplace which might indicate some effect.  However, 
this does not necessarily prove that education and other road safety programmes were 
effective.  Although Ross was clearly of the view that the police education programme 
reduced the number of accidents, he argued that road engineering, to which the police 
also contributed as part of road safety strategy, had also made ‘the City roads safer’.87  
In contrast, whilst Morren pointed out that there were fewer people killed and injured 
in Edinburgh as a result of road accidents than other places in Britain, especially Leeds 
which had a comparable population (see Table 7.8), he was cautious about attributing 
the cause to education and road engineering.  In 1937, for example, he recorded:  
 
Naturally every endeavour is being made to reduce the risk of accident by 
means of propaganda and, among other things, improvement of conditions at 
danger points, such as road junctions … Unfortunately, however, action of 
this description, so far as it affects accident prevention, may be said to be 
somewhat neutralised by the increasing number of motor vehicles which are 
placed on the road every year.88 
 
Thus in the immediate pre-war period there was some question over the degree to 
which the police road safety strategy was considered successful in reducing the 
number of accidents. 
  
                                                
86 The Scotsman, 5 September 1939, 5; 3 October, 1939, 5. 
87 ECA ED006/1/9, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1930, 25. 
88 ECA ED006/1/10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1937, 20. 
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 Road traffic	 Other Total 
1934 49	 51 100.0 
1935 42	 58 100.0 
1936 42	 58 100.0 
1937 37	 63 100.0 
1938 36	 64 100.0 
1939 36	 64 100.0 
1940 38	 62 100.0 
1941 36	 64 100.0 
1942 29	 71 100.0 
1943 26	 74 100.0 
1944 28	 72 100.0 
1945 30	 70 100.0 
1946 29	 71 100.0 
1947 32	 68 100.0 
Table 7.7 People killed and injured in road traffic and other accidents in 
Edinburgh, 1933-1947 (%) 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/9-11] 
 
	 Number 
 Edinburgh Leeds Glasgow Scotland 
1937 2.58 4.94 3.30 3.91 
1938 2.65 5.17 4.03 4.13 
Table 7.8  People killed and injured in road accidents in Edinburgh, Leeds, 
Glasgow, and Scotland per 1000 population, in 1937 and 1938 
[Source: ECA ED006/1/10] 
 
In tandem with their other duties, part of the contribution of the police related to the 
collection of data to enable the analysis of the pattern of accidents.  As the 1936 
Scottish Inter-Departmental Committee on Road Safety among School Children 
found, chief constables submitted returns and cooperated with Ministry of Transport 
engineers and Traffic Commissioners to identify the extent to which accidents were a 
consequence of road conditions.89  Jennifer Bonham has argued from the perspective 
of ‘automobility’ that ‘through the first decades of the twentieth century street spaces 
and travel practices were simultaneously ordered and intervened upon to secure the 
safe conduct of travel’.90  Indeed, in the 1930s chief constables in Britain were 
required to submit at least eight forms to the Ministry of Transport in relation to 
accidents. 91   In 1949 chief constables were also instructed to forward detailed 
information regarding all fatal and injury road accidents.  That year Morren reported 
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that the ‘compilation and preparation of accident statistics now forms an important 
part of the duties carried out in the Traffic Department’.92  During the 1930s and 
1940s the requirement for the police in Edinburgh and elsewhere in Britain to respond 
to the requirements for data relating to road traffic accidents thus became increasingly 
onerous.   
 
During the Second World War, however, chief constables in Britain were instructed to 
discontinue the submission of all but the monthly road casualty return.  As Brenda 
White put it, the ‘seemingly permanent output of annual and occasional road accident 
statistics came to an abrupt end immediately war was declared’.93  Thus, as with 
education, police involvement in the submission of data for the purposes of road safety 
largely ceased with the outbreak of war.  Whilst this clearly had the effect of relieving 
hard-pressed police forces, the explanation undoubtedly relates to the diversion to 
other duties of officials of central government departments.  
 
As part of the road safety strategy the police in Edinburgh also assessed traffic 
schemes.  In practice, the police were ‘deeply involved in the new architecture of the 
roads’.94  In 1947, for example, Morren reported that divisional officers had ‘for some 
time’ had the junction of Willowbrae Road and London Road ‘under observation’ so 
that a scheme could be formulated to improve traffic control.  The innovation of the 
temporarily extended tramway island was also ‘closely watched’.  Similarly, a 
‘watching brief’ was kept on the effectiveness of a traffic scheme in Princes Street in 
1949.  At the same time, it is clear that some of the police activity in this regard was 
reactive.  In his annual report to the town council in 1946, for example, Morren 
recorded that many of the improvements in traffic conditions were the result of ‘acting 
on suggestions received from traffic-minded citizens'.95   
 
The extent to which the police carried out this role in the remainder of the period 
under consideration, 1930-1949, is however unclear.  In 1935, for example, Morren 
reported that ‘observation was kept for six months’ on the experimental scheme of 
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traffic lanes on Glasgow Road.  Similarly, in 1937 he recorded that ‘special 
observations’ of 39 ‘Halt at Major Road Ahead’ signs in the city had determined that 
they were a ‘definite asset in the cause of accident prevention’.96  Yet it is not clear if 
the police did the observing.  Notwithstanding that the entries were in reports by the 
chief constable to the town council, which might imply that they related to police 
activity, the existence of policy communities in relation to road safety means that this 
could equally have been carried out by surveyors.  
 
Nevertheless, as with education and the collection of data, the outbreak of war had an 
immediate effect on the engineering aspects of road safety.  After only a few months 
of the emergency, Morren reported that efforts to improve road conditions were ‘only 
completed in a minor degree owing to the general suspension of road traffic schemes 
due to the outbreak of War’.  He recorded for the majority of the remainder of the war 
that ‘only work of a very minor nature could be carried out’.  In the last months of the 
conflict and the immediate post-war period, improvements were largely confined to 
removing the blockhouses that had been installed at junctions in case of invasion.97  
Part of explanation for this inactivity undoubtedly relates to conscription and essential 
war service.  As with those involved in civic maintenance, many of those who would 
otherwise have carried out road improvements had been redeployed.  At the same 
time, those who remained, together with the materials required for road engineering, 
were diverted to the war effort.  The extent to which the police were required to 
support road engineering in the aftermath of war was likewise limited by the ‘age of 
austerity’.  In 1947, for example, Morren reported that the erection of guardrails and 
islands in Princes Street had been delayed due to the shortage of materials.  In a 
similar manner, in 1949 he advised that the erection of ‘Keep Left’ signs at a number 
of junctions in the city had been delayed due to the ‘economic situation’.98 
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The chief constable, the police authority, central government, and 
power-interdependence in practice  
As with other aspects of policing noted especially in chapter three, a web of power-
interdependence existed in relation to the regulation of traffic in the 1930 and 1940s.  
At its most obvious the chief constable was dependent on the town council and police 
authority in particular for infrastructural resources.  For example, in connection with 
the requirement to enforce the 1930 Act the police authority purchased two cars and 
six motorcycle combinations for use by the Traffic Department.  In his annual report 
to the town council Ross advised that traffic patrols were a ‘very effective means of 
preventing careless or reckless driving’ and that the additional vehicles would permit 
the ‘additional supervision necessary’.99  At the same time the police authority was 
dependent on the chief constable for the local delivery of policing in relation to the 
regulation of traffic.  
 
The extent to which the purchase of these vehicles can be seen as support by the police 
authority for policing in relation to the regulation of traffic needs to be treated with 
some caution however.  Rather than fund the purchase through local taxation and 
central government subvention, the police authority drew on the provisions of the 
1930 Act.  This provided that expenses incurred in respect of vehicles required to 
enforce the Act could be advanced from the Road Fund.  Thus, as with other aspects 
of policing, the line of police dependency for resources ran through the police 
authority to central government.  At the same time, as will be seen in relation to the 
example of the establishment of pedestrian crossings, central government was 
dependant on local authorities.  
 
The evidence suggests some parsimony by the police authority in Edinburgh in the 
1930s and 1940s in relation to the regulation of traffic.  As noted, by the early 
twentieth century chief constables, especially in urban forces, were regarded as the 
autonomous expert on operational policing matters.  Indeed, as the Committee on 
Road Safety reported in the 1940s: ‘The police are necessarily expert in all problems 
of traffic movement and traffic control’.100  However, despite repeated pleas by both 
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Ross and Morren that it hampered efficiency, the police authority in Edinburgh failed 
throughout the 1930s to provide the supporting capital infrastructure for traffic 
department vehicles.  By 1934 the motorcycle combinations had been replaced by 
motorcars necessitating additional garage accommodation.  Although Ross made 
representations to alter or purchase several sites he recorded that ‘none was approved’.  
As a consequence, temporary rental premises had to be utilised.  Morren recorded in 
1938 that the proposal to extend an existing garage for the fleet, which by then 
comprised 12 motorcars, was ‘still undecided’.  A succession of temporary rentals 
therefore had to be used which Morren recorded were ‘not satisfactory’ as they were 
‘some considerable distance from the Traffic Department Headquarters’ and could 
‘not receive proper supervision’.101  
 
Given the brevity of Morren’s annual reports to the town council during the Second 
World War it is impossible to ascertain the degree to which the police authority in 
Edinburgh supported the police in terms of the infrastructure relating to the regulation 
of traffic.  There is, however, nothing in the immediate post-war reports to indicate 
that the situation had altered with regard to the garage accommodation.  Simply put, 
the police authority disregarded the advice of the expert in this regard if it entailed 
additional local expenditure.  The extent to which the police could depend on the 
police authority for the resources to meet the increasing requirement to regulate traffic 
in the 1930s and 1940s was, therefore, conditional.   
 
The evidence points to the town council adopting a similar attitude to aspects of road 
safety such as engineering.  Whilst the town council was content in 1930 to erect and 
modify automatic traffic signals on the basis of a 60 per cent grant from central 
government, both Ross and Morren struggled throughout the 1930s and 1940s to get 
councillors to agree to their recommendations to improve road safety and the 
regulation of traffic by further modifications or installations.  By 1934, 38 of the 39 
signals in the city operated on the basis of fixed-time, whilst one was vehicle-actuated.  
Despite Ross’s advice to the council that the ‘modern vehicle actuated-type’ was more 
efficient at reducing congestion, his representations to convert the others were rejected 
on the grounds of the ‘expense involved’.  Morren reported in 1936 that the question 
                                                
101 ECA ED006/1/10, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1934, 23-24; 1935, 
21; 1936, 23; 1937, 24; 1938, 21-22.  
 238
was ‘still receiving the attention of the authorities’.  In a similar manner, in 1938 he 
recorded that the representation he made for automatic traffic signals in Princes Street, 
which had been ‘delayed indefinitely’ by the Lord Provost’s Committee in February 
1937, were still ‘under consideration’.102   
 
The town council likewise stymied the establishment of pedestrian crossings in the 
mid-1930s.  Under the 1934 Act the Minister of Transport could make Orders to 
establish crossings on the basis of proposals made by councils ‘after consultation’ with 
chief constables. 103   Morren reported later that year that his subsequent 
recommendations were ‘under consideration’ by the town council.  Whilst the scheme 
to establish 16 crossings was approved by both councillors and minister, none was 
completed due to a subsequent proposal for an additional 313 crossings that, by 1936, 
was ‘still receiving attention’.  The minister was, however, asked to delay approval of 
this due to a motion by a councillor to rescind the scheme entirely.  In consequence, 
the council ‘instructed further examination and report on the subject’.  In 1938 Morren 
recorded in relation to pedestrian crossings that the ‘question arose some years ago’ 
but is ‘still under the consideration of the Magistrates’.104 
 
Given that road engineering was largely halted during the Second World War, the 
question of the extent to which Morren was dependent on the town council to 
implement his representations is redundant.  However, in the third year after the war 
Morren recorded that a recommendation made in 1936 to install signals at a junction 
had still not been put into effect despite ‘numerous complaints regarding existing 
dangers to pedestrians and motorists’, which suggests that the council’s attitude in the 
late 1940s was much the same as it had been in the 1930s.  In the immediate post-war 
years Morren concluded that ‘many suggestions which have been submitted … 
[that]…would have been, and have been proved in other places, beneficial in accident 
prevention, have not received the necessary support’ of councillors.105 
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The police authority in Edinburgh, however, acquiesced to most of Morren’s 
representations in other aspects of policing which raises a question as to why the 
infrastructure and issues relating to the regulation of traffic were different.  The 
answer might be that, on the one hand, councillors, who were responsible to the 
electorate, were dependent on the chief constable for the local delivery of policing and 
were, therefore, usually unwilling to contradict his recommendations.  Yet, on the 
other, Christopher Hamlin found that inertia in British local government in the 
nineteenth century was a consequence of disorderliness, disagreement and ‘great fear 
of doing anything at all, lest it be the wrong thing and commit the town to an 
enormous waste of money’.106  The cost of regulating traffic was clearly an issue for 
local authorities in the context of competing demands.  The perception that 
expenditure on the regulation of traffic provided little local benefit undoubtedly 
underpinned council decisions in Edinburgh about the extent of its support for police 
efforts.  Indeed, the occasions where Morren’s representations were successful in this 
regard in the post-war period appear to have been those that involved little or no 
expense.  In 1947, for example, the town council approved a joint submission by 
Morren and the city engineer to create 117 parking places in the city.107  
 
The chief constable, road safety policy communities, and power-
interdependence in practice  
The Committee on Road Safety, which began work in 1943, concluded that one of the 
main duties of the police in relation to the regulation of traffic was the prevention of 
road accidents.  As part of its strategy in this regard, the police utilised education, 
contributed to road engineering, and provided statistics.  The prevention of road traffic 
accidents was, however, not solely the responsibility of the police.  Central and local 
government, together with a number of organisations participated in policy 
communities to promote road safety.  Much activity took place under the auspices of 
the ‘Safety First’ campaign, which had been established by the Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Accidents in Britain in the 1920s, premised on a joint agency approach 
to reduce all types of accidents.  Ross subsequently recorded that a ‘united effort’ was 
required to effect a reduction in road traffic accidents.  Likewise, in the immediate 
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pre-war years Morren reported that the force was ‘working in conjunction’ with the 
Edinburgh Safety First Council: ‘continually studying road accidents causation and 
remedial measures’.108  At the launch of the campaign in Edinburgh in 1926, Ross, 
however, pointed out: ‘the principles of safety should be first taught in the home.  
Where parents realised the importance of instructing their children in “Safety First” 
the number of road accidents in the near future would be quickly reduced to a 
minimum’.109  Thus, as with police education-based road safety programmes, the 
‘Safety First’ campaign was informed by a dominant discourse of culpability that 
largely excluded drivers and was intended to mitigate implied parental neglect.   
 
Whereas, as we have seen, police activity with regard to road safety largely ceased 
during the war, SHD circulars indicate that aspects of related activity by the other 
organisations continued, most notably in response to the increasing incidence of fatal 
accidents that was a consequence of the blackout.  On the last day of 1941, for 
example, a circular advised chief constables of a UK-wide education campaign 
conducted by central government, the Board of Education, the Ministry of 
Information, and the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents. 110   The 
contribution by the police in Edinburgh to the increase in accidents, meanwhile, was 
limited to enforcement.  By Christmas 1942, however, the SHD advised that ‘in 
present conditions’ the campaign would in the main ‘have’ to be focussed on accidents 
to children and in the blackout.111  Thus, as with the police, the war necessitated some 
contraction of activity by the other organisations involved in the road safety ‘policy 
community’. 
 
The pattern of power-interdependence between the police and others in relation to 
road safety was, however, re-established in the post-war years.  The restoration of the 
petrol allowance for ordinary motoring purposes immediately after the end of the war 
led to an increase in the number of vehicles on the road and a consequent increase in 
the number of road traffic accidents.  Whilst this placed a reactive demand on the 
police, the proposal by the Committee on Road Safety in 1944 that Local Safety 
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Organisations be created increased the requirement for the police to be proactive.  
Local authorities were invited to establish, in effect, policy communities involving ‘as 
a minimum’ local government, the police, the local education authority, and the Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Accidents to ‘prepare and conduct local road safety 
schemes’ that would be eligible for grants from the Road Fund.112  In the sense that 
central government was dependent on the participants to deliver the strategy, whilst 
the participants were dependent on central government for funding, there was an 
interdependency of power.  By early 1946 Morren reported that the ‘matter is at 
present well in hand in Edinburgh’ with a proposed campaign aimed at children in 
particular.113  As with other aspects of the regulation of traffic, the town council was 
supportive when the representation arose at a national level and the expense was 
largely defrayed by central government.  
 
The extent of power-interdependence in the immediate post-war period among road 
safety policy communities is demonstrated in the ‘Safety First’ quiz and programme of 
road safety demonstrations.  As Morren reported, whilst a police officer compiled the 
questions and presided, the event was held ‘in conjunction’ with the council’s 
Entertainment Scheme and the ‘joint efforts’ of the Parks Sub-Committee for 
Attractions and Entertainments, and the Edinburgh Accident Prevention Council.  
Similarly, in 1948, a ‘Safety First’ competition was ‘specially arranged’ by a police 
officer in conjunction with Gaumont Picture Corporation Ltd in co-operation with the 
Edinburgh Accident Prevention Council, where episodes of the ‘Dick Barton’ serial 
film were shown containing infringements of the Highway Code, which children were 
invited to identify.  By 1949 Morren reported that the efforts of the police, Ministry of 
Transport, Local Authority, and road safety organisations were ‘co-ordinated’.114   
 
Given the variables in the incidence of road traffic accidents it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to ascertain whether the road safety policy communities in Edinburgh 
were successful.  There is, however, evidence that they struggled to engage members 
of the public.  Following the participation by the police in the road safety exhibition 
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held in the Waverley Market in 1947, under the auspices of the Edinburgh Accident 
Prevention Council and sponsored by the town council, Morren recorded his extreme 
disappointment at the ‘lack of enthusiasm shown by the general public as evidence by 
the poor attendances’.  The ‘results obtained’, he argued, ‘could not be said to justify 
the tremendous amount of work entailed’.115  Part of the explanation might be related 
to the dominance until the 1950s of the ‘human model’ in discourses around 
culpability for road traffic accidents.   
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated that policing in relation to the regulation of traffic in 
the 1930s and 1940s in Edinburgh was dictated by, most especially, the number of 
vehicles on the road. The rapid increase in the number of vehicles in the interwar 
period in particular created a problem of capacity in relation to enforcement, 
responding to accidents, and the promotion of road safety.  Likewise, the reduction in 
the number of vehicles due to the shortage of petrol during the Second World War 
reduced the level of demand on the police.  Legislation further determined policing.  
Thus the police reacted to external social, economic, and political developments.  In 
this regard, notwithstanding the reduction in the number of vehicles on the road during 
the war, the introduction of the blackout led to an increase in the number of fatal road 
traffic accidents which precipitated an increase in police activity, particularly in 1942.  
 
In the meantime, policing in relation to the regulation of traffic in the period under 
consideration was also determined by the available technology, in particular the 
equipment and vehicles required to enforce the law in relation to speeding.  The 
blackout also necessitated modifications to both the technology and associated tactics 
during the war.  The character of policing was further influenced at the operational 
level by the exercise of discretion by rank and file officers and, strategically, by the 
chief constable’s perception of the role of the police.  Thus, by comparison with the 
immediate pre- and post war periods, there was an increase in the use of the caution as 
a means of disposal in dealing with road traffic offences in Edinburgh during the war 
in response to the shortage of regular officers and the pressure of duties associated 
with the home front.  Likewise, police activity with regard to education, engineering, 
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and data collection virtually ceased during the war as a consequence of the evacuation 
programme and the diversion of the men and materials that would otherwise be 
involved in facets of road safety. 
 
A web of power-interdependence existed in Edinburgh between the police, town 
council, and central government in relation to policing with regard to the regulation of 
traffic.  Whilst the extent to which the town council supported Morren in relation to 
the regulation of traffic during the war is unknown, the evidence from the pre- and 
post-war period points to the fact that councillors were reluctant to disburse public 
funds on the basis that the regulation of traffic was considered unavailing.  In any 
event, in contrast to enforcement and responding to accidents, which were primarily a 
police responsibility, activity in relation to road safety was largely proactive and 
promoted through policy communities.  The evidence suggests, however, that these 
policy communities failed to engage members of the public.  As with other aspects of 
operational policing in Edinburgh, this chapter supports the hypothesis that there was a 
paradigm shift during the Second World War in relation to the regulation of traffic, 








This thesis has demonstrated that the organisational and operational aspects of 
policing the City of Edinburgh during the Second World War were characterised by 
continuity and change.  Although most of the regular male police officers who served 
in the City of Edinburgh Police during the Second World War continued to be drawn 
from manual sectors of the economy, there was a change in the pattern of recruitment 
from 1910-1939 when the majority were recruited.  The proportion of those from 
predominantly rural areas and those employed as agricultural labourers and farm 
servants decreased, whilst there was an increase in the number drawn from Edinburgh 
and those employed as clerks.  Furthermore, by comparison with the pre-war period, 
those recruited during the emergency were generally older as a consequence of 
conscription of younger men into the armed services and essential civilian work.  In 
addition, those who would otherwise have been superannuated were prevented from 
retiring, whilst younger regular male police officers were, as in the Great War, 
released to the armed services and industry in response to demands related to the 
prosecution of the war.  The regular officers serving during the Second World War 
were therefore older than otherwise would have been the case.  Although there was no 
consequent obvious change in the pattern or incidence of sickness, there was an 
increase in those leaving the force on the grounds of ill-health.  Furthermore, although 
police auxiliaries were recruited they did not, for the most part, have the same degree 
of local knowledge or experience, particularly in relation to the more technical aspects 
of policing such as the regulation of road traffic.   
 
Notwithstanding the complex dynamics of policing, these factors, coupled with the 
requirement to undertake additional duties associated with the home front, diminished 
operational capacity and effectiveness.  As a consequence, there was a change in the 
pattern of discretion exercised by police officers at both the strategic and tactical level.  
Part of this related to dealing with offenders.  In respect of all offences there was, by 
comparison with the interwar period, a decrease in the number of persons proceeded 
against at the instance of the police, whilst there was an increase in the use of 
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summons rather than apprehension.  Part also related to the extent to which aspects of 
core roles and the regulation of traffic were discharged.   
 
In contrast to personnel matters, and despite the centralised direction of the war effort 
there was little or no change in the dynamics of the governance of the police in 
Edinburgh during the Second World War.  As in the interwar period, a complex and 
overlapping pattern of power and authority existed at all levels.  Notwithstanding the 
introduction of the Defence Regulations, which gave the Secretary of State for 
Scotland the power to directly control the police in operational matters, the power of 
the central state remained limited in effect and there is no evidence that the police 
authority was marginalised.  The interplay between central government, local 
government, and the chief constable during the Second World War was thus 
characterised by power-interdependence.  Those concerned with the governance of the 
police deferred to each other for matters within their respective purviews in much the 
same way as they had done in the pre-war period.  Power continued to be negotiated.  
Part of the explanation as to why the Defence Regulations were limited in practice 
relates to the political pluralism of the two Secretaries of State for Scotland who were 
in office for most of the war: David Colville and Tom Johnston.  It was also a 
consequence of the conflicting principles that underpinned the desire for the ‘new’ 
police and the largely piecemeal way in which the forces were created.  As a 
consequence, the system of police governance evolved gradually in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries creating a legacy of confusion over roles and responsibilities in 
practice that persists in the twenty-first century.   
 
The complex and overlapping pattern of power and authority was also present within 
the local government aspect of police governance.  Again, part of the explanation 
relates to a legacy of confusion over roles and responsibilities.  As a consequence, the 
town council, its Lord Provost’s Committee, and its Watching Sub-Committee 
variously acted as the police authority.  The interplay between the town council and its 
network of committees was likewise characterised by power-interdependence as 
councillors negotiated political deals through an established quid-pro-quo.  Although 
co-option and political partisanship, which arose during the war, created fractures, the 
Lord Provost was in a pivotal position to exercise power and influence across council 
policy communities to maintain stability and continuity in outcomes.  Neither Colville 
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nor Johnston demonstrated a willingness to force an issue in the face of opposition 
from a large urban council that was determined to resist.  The assumption that the 
Defence Regulations generally supplanted the system of police governance thus needs 
to be treated with caution.   
 
In terms of its ability to represent rank-and-file officers, there was little or no change 
to the Scottish Police Federation.  As a consequence of the legacy of its creation it 
remained ineffective.  Most of the issues it was concerned with during the war had 
been unresolved for decades.  It was created in the general context of ‘reactive 
underestimation’ and the fear of a Bolshevik uprising but the specific catalyst was the 
police strike in London in 1918.  It was conceded by central government as the least-
worst option by comparison with a union.  Yet those concerned with the governance of 
the police had no desire to cede power.  That the Federation proved ineffective was no 
coincidence: it was set up to fail.  Its structure was highly fragmented to divide the 
membership and its role severely circumscribed.  Rather than a means of collective 
bargaining it was merely a mechanism for bringing to the notice of the chief constable, 
police authorities, and the Secretary for Scotland matters affecting welfare and 
efficiency.    
 
As a consequence of the fragmented structure, the rank-specific Boards in Edinburgh 
were power-dependent on the Joint Branch Board at the local level which, in turn, was 
power-dependent on the Joint Central Committee at the national level.  The interplay 
between these two policy communities was, from the outset, characterised by factional 
struggles over the power of the Federation in Edinburgh relative to that of Glasgow.  
The potential for the Federation to fracture at a number of levels was perhaps an 
intention of its creators.  In turn, the Joint Central Committee remained power 
dependent on the Secretary of State for Scotland who, in practice, ignored, out of 
hand, representations by the Federation.  These structural fault lines, combined with 
members’ apathy at the ineffectiveness of the Federation, limited what it could 
achieve.   
 
The suspension of the rest day and payment for overtime as part of the mobilisation 
for the home front created an unprecedented level of dissatisfaction with the 
machinery of representation.  Whilst this led to a revival of the tactic of mass 
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meetings, disagreement arose between the policy communities in Edinburgh and at the 
national level, as well as between the Federation in Scotland and England, as to how 
best to overcome the limitations of the 1919 Act.  Given the context of the war and the 
additional requirements on the police there was, however, clearly even less of an 
incentive for central government to concede the creation of an effective means of 
representation for rank-and-file officers.  The Federation remained essentially 
impotent until in the cycle of ‘reactive underestimation’ the Oaksey Committee laid 
the foundation in 1949 for a form of collective bargaining.  
 
With the exception of personnel matters there was, therefore, little in the way of 
dramatic change to the organisational aspects of the police in Edinburgh during the 
war by comparison with the remainder of the period under consideration.  Likewise, 
many of the operational tasks that the police in Edinburgh were required to undertake 
as part of the home front were a continuation, and perhaps intensification, of existing 
functions.  During the interwar period the police maintained surveillance on 
communists, anarchists, and Scottish nationalists because of their revolutionary and 
secessionist strategic aims.  Surveillance during the war was, however, additionally 
premised on the more immediate concern that they were perceived to be undermining 
the war effort, in particular hindering conscription and inciting industrial unrest.  In 
contrast, both during the emergency and before, police surveillance of the Protestant 
Action Society was related to its anti-Catholic purpose, significantly its propensity to 
foment sectarian disorder.  This had the potential to undermine the perception, if not 
the reality, of social solidarity on the home front.  By a similar token, police activity 
with regard to aliens, military law, the evasion of duty, and identity fraud represented 
an intensification of pre-existing functions intended to support conscription in 
particular.   
 
Yet at the same time, the police were required to undertake completely new duties.  
The enforcement of the ‘Lighting Restrictions’ and other ‘War Legislation’ arose 
solely as a consequence of the emergency.  Likewise, the requirement to investigate 
cases of suspected sabotage was a response to the pervasive but unfounded fear of 
fifth columnists.  Much of the wartime policing was thus a consequence of objectives 
or stimuli that arose at the national level.  On the other hand, local policing remained 
subject to the discretion exercised by police officers.  Whilst it was clearly a national 
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priority to support the economic mobilisation for total war, the involvement of the 
police in determining the cause of strikes, for example, was the consequence of the 
personal preoccupation of the chief constable and embroiled them in what had in 
peacetime been a civil matter.   
 
Much of core policing in Edinburgh, however, continued in the same way as it had 
done during the interwar period.  In general terms, policing with regard to the 
protection of property remained unchanged.  There was, however, an increase in 
police work with regard to housebreaking.  This was a consequence of factors 
associated with the prosecution of the war.  The release of younger regular officers to 
the armed services, together with the pressure of war-related duties, reduced the 
availability of officers for beat patrol, whilst the auxiliaries who had been recruited did 
not, for the most part, have the same experience or local knowledge.  The evidence 
suggests that, as a consequence, as a result of discretion exercised at the strategic or 
tactical level, the police did not undertake preventative policing in relation to property 
to the same extent that they did in the pre- and post-war periods.  At the same time, the 
introduction of the blackout increased the opportunities for housebreakers, particularly 
given the legacy of suburbanisation.  
 
Meanwhile, in relation to the most serious crimes and offences associated with the 
protection of life there was no increased demand on the police during the war.  Indeed, 
there is no evidence to suggest that Edinburgh was a more dangerous place in terms of 
personal safety due to the reduction in preventative policing and as a result of war 
conditions.  Although there was an increase in police activity with regard to some 
categories of crime and offence in the classification of the protection of life in 
Edinburgh they were not a consequence of the character of policing.  The increase in 
police activity in relation to the cruel and unnatural treatment of children, for example, 
was undoubtedly a response to the social dislocation associated with the war.   
 
The reduction in police capacity was, however, most apparent in relation to crimes and 
offences associated with the maintenance of order and civic regulation.  Police activity 
declined markedly by comparison with the pre-war era.  The explanation undoubtedly 
relates to the fact that these crimes and offences were largely victimless.  In contrast to 
the crimes and offences related to the protection of life and property, those associated 
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with the maintenance of order and civic regulation generally did not arise from a 
complaint by a member of the public; rather, they only became known at the point of 
detection and as a consequence of proactive police activity.  If an officer exercised 
discretion by choosing to ignore some incidents it was unlikely to have any 
repercussions.  Furthermore, both the public and police officers were apathetic to 
some crimes and offences associated with the maintenance of order such as street 
betting.  Some offenders also undoubtedly escaped detection as a consequence of the 
blackout.  Many of those who would otherwise have committed offences against 
public order had, moreover, been relocated through conscription.  Given that related 
crimes and offences were often minor it would be understandable if officers ignored 
anything but situations that were likely to be the most dangerous to the public.  
 
In a similar manner, there was a decline in police activity in relation to road traffic 
regulation during the war due to the reduction in the number of vehicles on the road as 
a consequence of the shortage of petrol.  Nonetheless, the introduction of the blackout 
led to an increase in the number of fatal road traffic accidents which placed demands 
on the police.  At the same time, the blackout necessitated changes to the technology 
and tactics associated with enforcement. Yet discretion was a significant element here 
too.  It was determined by the chief constables’ view as to whether the police should 
focus on prosecution or providing advice.  This was influenced during the war by the 
problem of capacity.  The shortage of regular experienced officers and the pressure of 
war-related duties led to the suspension for the duration of police activity in respect of 
the data collection, road engineering, and educational aspects of road safety.  At a 
tactical level, there was an increase in the extent to which officers used cautions to 
dispose of offences.   
 
Police officers, civil servants, and historians writing largely in relation to the 
experience in England and Wales have offered different interpretations of the extent to 
which operational policing in the Second World War was, in wholly broad terms, a 
paradigm shift from that of the interwar period.  To repeat: this thesis has 
demonstrated that the organisational and operational aspects of policing in Edinburgh 
were characterised by a nuanced pattern of both continuity and change.  It has been 
shown that, as these writers have variously argued, in some respects police duties were 
‘extensions’ of existing functions; in still other cases, police duties changed 
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‘considerably’ and ‘completely’ from that of the interwar period; whilst other aspects 
‘disappeared’ for the duration.  It has further been demonstrated that these features 
were influenced by the macro-structural context of the war in addition to the local 
exercise of discretion by police officers and a particular configuration of political, 
social, economic, and religious factors.  Given the probable diversity of wartime 
experience, further studies of policing in other parts of Scotland may help to 
distinguish the wartime policing of Edinburgh.  
 
At this point it might be beneficial to relate this study to the wider history of the 
wartime home front.  In his analysis of the social effects of war Marwick employed a 
four-tier conceptual model to disaggregate the complicated interrelationship into a 
‘meaningful and manageable number of components’.  In particular, the ‘participation’ 
effects of different groups in society, especially those who were, like women, 
comparatively underprivileged; the ‘destructive’ and ‘disruptive’ effects such as those 
associated with the blackout and mobilisation; the ‘test’ effects in terms of the ‘stress’, 
‘strain’, or ‘challenge’ faced by institutions such as the police; and, the 
‘psychological’ effects. 1   The first three of these dimensions provide a rough 
framework to consider, briefly, some aspects of the contribution of this thesis to the 
historiography of the home front and the hypothesis of the ‘people’s war’.   
 
With regard to the theme of ‘participation’, this thesis has identified that auxiliary 
police officers were recruited in Edinburgh during the war to assist with operational 
demands and to replace the regular officers who had been released to the armed 
services and industry.  Whilst nothing is known of the auxiliary police officers as 
individuals, the members of the First Police Reserve, Police War Reserve, Special 
Constabulary, and Women’s Auxiliary Police Corps together comprised about one-
third of the actual strength of the police force.  Thus, despite not necessarily being as 
experienced or knowledgeable as regular officers, the auxiliaries made a significant 
contribution to policing the home front.  In this respect, they can be said to have 
contributed to the notion of a ‘people’s war’.  In this regard, having overcome two 
decades of opposition, the employment of women with police powers is especially 
noteworthy.  Indeed, whereas most auxiliary police units were disbanded at or around 
                                                
1 Marwick, War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century, 11-13. 
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the end of the emergency, the wartime expedient of women with police powers from 
1943 established the precedent for their continued employment in the post-war 
period.2  
 
Yet, in the context of debates about the ‘people’s war’, this thesis has identified more 
evidence of ‘destructive’ and ‘disruptive’ effects which challenge the notion of social 
solidarity.  With regard to organisational aspects, for instance, although the police 
authority was able to maintain continuity in outcomes notwithstanding the 
introduction of the Defence Regulations, the town council was riven by fractures over, 
for example, the disposition of political offices.  Whilst this represented a continuity 
from the immediate pre-war period it, together with the system of co-option, divided 
councillors on party political lines during the war notwithstanding the existence of a 
political truce.  In a similar vein, the continuation in office of the Joint Central 
Committee of the Scottish Police Federation at the outbreak of war led to its censure 
and the consequent exclusion of the Federation representatives in Edinburgh from the 
national structures.  At the same time, there was a continuation of pre-war factional 
rifts over the relative power of the Federation in Glasgow in the central committees.  
Meanwhile, the war intensified the feeling of dissatisfaction within the Federation 
membership throughout the UK at the ineffectiveness of the representative machinery.  
Yet the Federation in Edinburgh and the Joint Central Committee could not even 
achieve a consensus about how best to try to overcome the restrictions of the 1919 
Act.  All this hardly points to the existence of social cohesion. 
 
Indeed, ‘destructive’ and ‘disruptive’ aspects were also evident from the wartime 
operational policing demands in Edinburgh.  It is clear, for example, that 
housebreakers readily exploited the blackout and some were likely to have perceived 
their activity as a justifiable response to the mobilisation for the war.  Furthermore, the 
declaration of war by Italy in June 1940 was accompanied by a shameful outbreak of 
riotous xenophobia in Edinburgh notwithstanding that some Italians had been resident 
in the city for decades and were in fact British subjects.  In this regard, the Protestant 
Action Society might have been particularly complicit.  In any event, the Society’s 
                                                
2 Prior to the disbandment of the Women’s Auxiliary Police Corps in March 1946, the ‘authorised’ 
establishment of female regular police officers was increased from two constables to one sergeant and 
11 constables.  By 1947, the ‘actual’ establishment was one sergeant and eight constables.  ECA, 
ED006/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 1946, 5; 1947, 5.  
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explicit sectarian purpose and consequent agitation was at odds with social solidarity.  
Thus if the ‘people’s war’ was said to have ‘transcended the divisions of class, sect, 
self-interest and libertarian individualism that normally constitute the highly pluralistic 
and fragmented structure of British society’ the experience of Edinburgh points to 
some lack of solidarity.3  In this sense, this thesis supports the revisionist perspective.   
 
Finally, in examining the ‘test’ effects of the war, it has been shown that, apart from 
personnel, there was little or no change to the organisational aspects of the police in 
Edinburgh.  Yet, of itself, the release of younger regular officers to meet the necessity 
caused by the war emergency in other institutions, the retention of older regular 
officers, and the loss of a considerable number who left on ill-health, did have an 
effect on the force.  At the same time, the police were required to absorb the demands 
associated with policing the home front.  Although some of these duties were merely 
an intensification of existing functions, others were entirely new.  The effect of all of 
this was, notwithstanding the recruitment of auxiliary officers, to greatly diminish the 
operational capacity and effectiveness of the force.   
 
In response to this ‘test’ there was a change in the pattern of discretion exercised by 
police officers at both strategic and tactical levels.  Fewer people were proceeded 
against at the instigation of the police during the war than in the pre-war period, whilst 
there was an increase in the use of summons, rather than apprehension, as well as 
cautions for road traffic offences.  Meanwhile, aspects of policing in relation to public 
order, civic regulation, and road traffic regulation were either less effectively 
discharged or suspended for the duration.  The continuing ‘test’ of war led to other 
modifications to the peacetime pattern of policing.  Property was, apparently, not 
protected to the same extent that it had been in the inter-war period which undoubtedly 
contributed to the increase in housebreaking.  Given the limited capacity and the 
additional pressures it would have been understandable for the police to have reduced 
or ceased activity in relation to some victimless offences or other non-critical areas of 
operational policing.  Yet the apparent abandonment of one of their core duties and 
main principles on which the ‘new’ police were founded is hard to explain.  In this 
sense the force could be said to have proved inadequate to the ‘test’.   
                                                
3 Harris, "War and Social History," 317. 
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The ‘test’ of the emergency also led to some significant changes in the immediate 
aftermath.  In particular, there was a continued shortage of police personnel.  Whilst 
many of the officers who had been released to the armed services and industry during 
the war returned, the auxiliary units were disbanded.  At the same time, the power 
forcibly to retain officers was rescinded and those who would have been 
superannuated left the force whilst there were a considerable number of ordinary 
resignations.  In this regard, the fact that police pay, in the cycle of ‘reactive 
underestimation’, had failed to keep pace with the cost of living undoubtedly became 
even more of an issue for officers who were considering their future having endured 
the experience of the increased strictness of discipline and the additional pressures of 




Appendix 1  
The Police War Instructions: 




 General Plan of the Instructions 
Code Word for telegrams (“EMPOL”) 
Arrangements for urgent messages 
All-night telegraph facilities 
Communication with the Home Office 
Communication with naval, military and air force authorities 
Defence Regulations 
 
Section 1. Precautionary Period: Outbreak of War 
 
 Summary of main action 
Significance of Precautionary Period 
Action when Precautionary Period is instituted 
Cancellation of Precautionary Period 
Defence Proclamation and Poster 
Outbreak of War 
List of Foreign Powers 
 
Section 2. Organisation of police forces for war duties  
   
 Summary of main action 
Summary of police war duties 
Strengthening of police forces 
Mutual aid arrangements 
Military aid 
Arming of police for certain duties 
Air raid protection for police personnel and buildings 
Police vehicles 
Police wireless 
(Appendix). Regular members of police forces with  
mobilisation obligations: mobilisation arrangements 
 
Section 3. Mobilisation of the Defence Force and related measures  
 






Action when mobilisation is ordered 




Section 4. Enemy Merchant Ships  
  
 Summary of main action 
Pre-arranged schemes  
Foreign ships in harbour 
Crews and passengers of enemy ships 
Examination service 
“Droit de Prince” 
(Appendix). List of Customs Ports in England and Wales 
 
Section 5. Aircraft 
  
 Summary of main action 
 General 
Action during Precautionary Period 
 Preliminary police action 
 Restrictions on civil flying 
 Detention of potential enemy aircraft 
 Requisitioning of aerodrome and aircraft 
Action of outbreak of war 
 Seizure of enemy aircraft 
Prohibition or restriction of civil flying 
Grounded aircraft 
Grounded balloons 
(Appendix). Uniforms and badges of rank of German Air Force 
  List of Infantry Training Centres: England and Wales 
 
Section 6. Control of Aliens and Passenger Traffic 
 
 Summary of main action 
Introduction 
Embarkation 
Illicit landing and embarkation 
Movements 
Registration 






Arrest of certain aliens 
“Standing Off” certain alien employees 
Aliens taken from aircraft making forced landings or crashing 
Aliens taken from ships or aircraft in port 
Action when amending Order in Council is made 
(Appendix). Draft amending Aliens Order in Council 
  Travel permit for enemy aliens 
  Registration form for use in Hotels, etc. (Form AR-E) 
  List of Internment Camps 
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Section 7. Intelligence and Control of Communications 
 
 Summary of main action 
 Intelligence 
  Co-operation with M.I.5 
  Subversive organisations 
  Reports of important occurrences 
 Restrictions on suspected persons  
 Control of Communications, etc. 
   Censorship 
  Use of wireless 
  Illicit signalling and use of pigeons 
 (Appendix). List of General Post Office Engineers, etc.  
 
Section 8. Protection of Vulnerable Points: Control of Explosives,  
Firearms and Ammunition  
 
Summary of main action 
General 
Police lists of vulnerable points 
(a) Places of national importance 
(b) Local lists 
Protective schemes 
Internal precautions 
Action when protection is required 
Explosives, firearms and ammunition 
(Appendix).  Instructions for interviewing persons in charge of premises 
  Form for report on premises 
 
Section 9. Prohibited and Protected Places and Areas 
  
 Summary of main action 
 Introduction 
 Protected Places 
 Protected Areas  
 Controlled Areas 





Section 10. Civil Defence Measures  
 
 General 
 Regional Organisation  
 Police duties 
  Air Defence Intelligence Scheme and Air Raid Warning 
  System; Lighting Restrictions; control of traffic  
  Evacuation 
  Closing of schools 
  Closing of places of entertainment, and prohibition of meetings 
  Unemployed persons 
  Public shelters 
 Burials 
 Unexploded bombs 
 Aircraft crashing of making forced landings 
 (Appendix). Civil Defence Regions 
   LOWIN telegrams: action by local authorities and police 
 
Section 11. Air Intelligence Scheme and Air Raid Warning System  
 
 General Note 
  Air Defence Intelligence Scheme 
  Observer Corps Organisation 
  Responsibility of Police 
  Control of Observer personnel 
  Calling out of Observer Corps 
  Position of Observer Corps during War 
  Test Call-out of Observer personnel 
  Police or private reports of hostile aircraft 
 Air Raid Warning System 
  General note 
  Warning districts 
  Types of Warnings and Messages 
  Form of Warnings and Messages 
  Preparation of Air Raid Warning Lists 
  Public warning signals 
 (Appendix). Terms of Service of Observer personnel 
   Present extent of Observer Organisation 
   Categories of recipients of Warning Messages 
   Draft memorandum for issue to recipients 
   Notice to be displayed near telephones of recipients 
   Draft note for issue to factories with sirens, etc.  




Section 12. Lighting Restrictions 
  
General note 
Scheme of Restrictions in details 
 Private houses, shops etc. 
 Advertisement lighting 
 Street lighting 
 Road vehicles 
 Lights for repair, etc. 
 Livestock 
 Factories and workshops 
 Industrial flare 
 External industrial lights 
 Railways 
 Docks 
 Navigation and shipping 
 Government premises 
Exemptions 
Preparatory work 
Imposition of restrictions   
 
Section 13. Control of traffic 
 
 General 
 Evacuation of civil population; Government Evacuation Scheme;    
  Unorganised evacuation 
 Removal of supplies from docks 
 Service vehicles 
 Vehicles and persons belonging to essential services 
 Organisation of war transport 
 Air raid damage to roads 
 Road works 
 Regulation of traffic at night 
  Junctions controlled by traffic signals 
  Places not normally provided with traffic signals 
  Aids to movement 
 Reporting of road accidents 
 Traffic during air raids 
 




Appendix 2  
Content of Special Branch Reports  
 
1. Arrests, searches, prosecutions, detentions and restrictions of movements of 
special importance. 
2. Cases of special importance in which the offender has not been traced or 
arrested. 
3. Objects of special interest (including arms and explosives) discovered on the 
search of the person or premises of suspects or otherwise. 
4. Organisations of a hostile, subversive or doubtful character. 
5. Publications of a hostile or subversive or doubtful character. 
6. Attempts to tamper with or create disaffection among members of HM forces 
or police or Civil Defence Services. 
7. Illicit signalling. 
8. Unusual or suspicious markings. 
9. False messages. 
10. Thefts of explosives. 
11. Leakage of secret information which might assist the enemy. 
12. Notes on current enquiries. 
13. Sabotage. 
 





Appendix 3  




1. Public order and morale. 
2. Movements of police under Mutual Aid Scheme. 
3. Requests for military aid. 
4. Police casualties and damage to police buildings by enemy action. 
5. General. 
 




(a) The conduct of the public during air raids. 
(b) Reactions to war conditions generally, e.g. evacuation, food control, lighting 
restrictions, limitation of entertainment, drunkenness etc. 
(c) The effects of enemy propaganda, particularly of broadcasts in English. 
(d) Attitude towards censorship and publicity generally. 
(e) Reaction towards subversive or pacifist propaganda. 
(f) Industrial conditions, particularly signs of unrest.  
 




(a) Subversive propaganda. 
(b) Industrial conditions, particularly signs of unrest. 
(c) The absorption of demobilised personnel into civilian conditions, and its 
effect on standards of conduct. 
(d) Incidence of drunkenness, and Sunday drinking. 
(e) Road Traffic matters. 
(f) Food and other rationing controls. 
(g) Behaviour and employment of POWs. 
(h) Any other matter which has excited strong public interest, or any local 
development which appears to have significance from the national point of 
view.  
 




Appendix 4  
Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment:  
classification of crimes and offences 
 
Crimes and Offences 
Class I. Crimes against the Person 
Murder 
Attempt to Murder 
Culpable Homicide 
Assaults 
Cruel Treatment of Children 







Theft by Housebreaking, and 
Housebreaking with intent to Steal 








Falsehood, Fraud and Wilful Imposition 
Others 
Class IV. Malicious Injuries to Property 
Malicious Mischief 
Others 
Class V. Forgery and Crimes against Currency  
Class VI. Other Crimes not included above 







Aliens Acts, Offences against 
Betting, Gaming and Lotteries 
Breach of the Peace 
Animals Acts, Offences against 
Intoxicating Liquor Laws, Offences against 
Labour Laws (Factory, Mines, etc Acts) 
Naval, Military and Air Force Laws 
Police Acts, Bye-Laws and Regulations 
Prostitution 
Roads Acts etc. Offences against 
Vagrancy and Trespass Acts 
War Legislation* 
Wireless Telegraphy Act 
Others 
*Including the ‘Lighting Restrictions’. 
[Source: ECA ED6/1/11, Report on the State of Crime and the Police Establishment, 





Appendix 5  
Discipline Code 
 
In terms of the Police (Scotland) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under 
the Police Act, 1919, any member of a police force commits an offence against 
discipline if he is guilty of- 
 
(1) Discreditable Conduct, that is to say, if he acts in a disorderly manner or any 
manner prejudicial to discipline or likely to bring discredit on the 
reputation of the force or of the Police Service. 
 
(2) Insubordinate or oppressive conduct, that is to say, if he –  
(a) is insubordinate by word, act or demeanour, or 
(b) is guilty of oppressive or tyrannical conduct towards an inferior in 
rank, or 
(c) uses obscene, abusive or insulting language to any other member of 
the force,   or 
(d) wilfully or negligently makes any false complaint or statement against 
any member of the force, or 
(e) assaults any other member of the force, or 
(f) overholds any complaint or report against any member of the force. 
 
(3) Disobedience to Orders, that is to say, if he disobeys, or without good and 
 sufficient cause omits or neglects to carry out any lawful order, 
written or otherwise. 
 
(4) Neglect of Duty, that is to say, if he -  
(a) neglects, or without good and sufficient cause omits promptly and 
diligently to attend to or carry out anything which is his duty as a 
constable, or 
(b) idles or gossips while on duty, or 
(c) fails to work his beat in accordance with orders, or leaves his beat, 
point, or other place of duty to which he has been ordered, without 
due permission or sufficient cause, or 
(d) by carelessness or neglect permits a prisoner to escape, or 
(e) fails, when knowing where any offender is to be found, to report the 
same, or to make due exertions for making him amenable to justice, or 
(f) fails to report any matter which is his duty to report, or 
(g) fails to report anything which he knows concerning a criminal charge, 
or fails to disclose any evidence which he, or any person within his 
knowledge, can give for or against any prisoner or defendant to a 
criminal charge, or 
(h) omits to make any necessary entry in any official document or book. 
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(5) Falsehood or Prevarication, that is to say, if he – 
(a) knowingly makes or signs any false statement in any official 
document or book, or 
(b) wilfully or negligently makes any false, misleading or inaccurate 
statement, or 
(c) without good and sufficient cause destroys or mutilates any official 
document or record, or alters or erases any entry therein. 
 
(6) Breach of Confidence, that is to say, if he – 
(a) divulges any matter which is in his duty to keep secret, or 
(b) gives notice, directly or indirectly, to any person against whom any 
warrant or summons has been or is about to be issued, except in the 
lawful execution of such warrant or service of such summons, or 
(c) without proper authority communicates to the public press, or to any 
unauthorised person, any matter connected with the force, or 
(d) without proper authority shows to any person outside the force any 
book or written or printed document the property of the Police 
Authority, or 
(e) makes any anonymous communication to the Police Authority or the 
Chief Constable or any superior officer, or 
(f) canvasses any member of the Police Authority with regard to any 
matter concerning the force, or 
(g) signs or circulates any petition or statement with regard to any matter 
concerning the force, except through the proper channel of 
correspondence to the Chief Constable or the Police Authority, or in 
accordance with the constitution of the Police Federation, or 
(h) calls or attends any unauthorised meeting to discuss any matter 
concerning the force. 
 
(7) Corrupt Practice, that is to say, if he – 
(a) receives any bribe, or 
(b) fails to account for or to make a prompt and true return of any money 
or property received by him in his official capacity, or 
(c) directly or indirectly solicits or receives any gratuity, present, 
subscription or testimonial without the consent of the Chief Constable 
or the Police Authority, or 
(d) places himself under pecuniary obligation to any publican, beer-
retailer, spirit grocer, or any person who holds a licence concerning 
the granting or renewal of which the police may have to report or give 
evidence, or 
(e) improperly uses his character and position as a member of the force 
for his private advantage, or 
(f) in his capacity as a member of the force, writes, signs or gives, 
without the sanction of the Chief Constable, any testimonial of 
character or other recommendation with the object of supporting an 
application for the grant of a licence of any kind, or  
(g) without the sanction of the Chief Constable, supports an application 
for the grant of a licence of any kind. 
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(8) Unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority, that is to say, if he –  
(a) without good and sufficient cause makes any unlawful or unnecessary 
arrest, or 
(b) uses any unnecessary violence to any prisoner or other person with 
whom he may brought into contact in the execution of his duty, or 
(c) is uncivil to any member of the public. 
 
 
(9) Malingering, that is to say, if he feigns or exaggerates any sickness or injury 
with  
a view to evading duty, or, while absent from duty on account of 
sickness or injury, is guilty of any act or conduct calculated to retard 
his return to duty. 
(10) Absence without leave or being late for duty, that is to say, if he without  
reasonable excuse is absent without leave from, or is late for, parade, 
Court, or any other duty,  
 
(11) Uncleanliness, that is to say, if, while on duty or while off duty in uniform in a  
public place, he is improperly dressed or is dirty or untidy in his 
person, clothing, or accoutrements. 
 
(12) Damage to clothing or other articles supplied, that is to say, if he -  
(a) wilfully or by carelessness causes any waste, loss or damage to any 
article of clothing or accoutrement, or to any book, document or other 
property of the Police Authority, served out to him or used by him or 
entrusted to his care, or  
(b) fails to report any loss or damage as above, however caused. 
 
(13) Drunkenness, that is to say, if he, while on or off duty, is unfit for duty  
through drink. 
 
(14) Drinking on duty or soliciting drink, that is to say, if he -  
(a) without the consent of his superior officer, drinks, or receives from 
any other person, any intoxicating liquor while he is on duty, or 
(b) demands, or endeavours to persuade any other person to give him, or 
to purchase or obtain for him, any intoxicating liquor while he is on 
duty. 
 
(15) Entering licensed premises, &c., while on duty, that is to say, if he enters, while 
on duty, any premises licensed under the Liquor Licensing Laws, or 
any other premises where liquors are store or distributed, when his 
presence there is not required in the execution of his duty. 
 
(16) If he lends money to any superior or borrows from or accepts any present  
From any inferior in rank. 
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(17) Any member of a police force also commits an offence against discipline,  
and shall be liable to punishment as provided in these Regulations, if 
he guilty of an offence which is punishable on conviction, whether 
summarily or on indictment, or if he connives at or is knowingly an 
accessory to any offence against discipline under this Code.  






Appendix 6  
Proportion of Pension Paid on Retirement 
 















































 60ths. 60ths. 60ths 60ths. 60ths. 60ths. 
1 or less - - 45 30 20 10 
2 - - 45 30 20 10 
3 - - 45 30 20 10 
4 - - 45 30 20 10 
5 - - 45 30 20 10 
6 - - 45 30 20 10 
7 - - 45 30 20 10 
8 - - 45 30 20 10 
9 - - 45 30 20 10 
10 - 10 45 30 20 10 
11 - 11 48 32 21 11 
12 - 12 48 32 22 12 
13 - 13 48 32 23 13 
14 - 14 48 32 24 14 
15 - 15 48 32 25 15 
16 - 16 51 34 26 16 
17 - 17 51 34 27 17 
18 - 18 51 34 28 18 
19 - 19 51 34 29 19 
20 - 20 51 34 30 20 
21 - 22 54 36 32 22 
22 - 24 54 36 34 24 
23 - 26 54 36 36 26 
24 - 28 54 36 38 28 
25 30 30 54 36 40 30 
26 32 32 57 38 40 32 
27 34 34 57 38 40 34 
28 36 36 57 38 40 36 
29 38 38 57 38 40 38 
30 or over 40 40 60 40 40 40 
































Appendix 8  
Edinburgh Town Council Standing/Sub-Committees in the Second World War 
 

























































Appendix 9  
Scottish Police Federation Central Conferences 
Standing Orders  
 
(1) All notices of motion and amendments to be given in writing. 
(2) No motion or amendment shall be spoken upon except by the mover until it has 
been seconded and read to the meeting. 
(3) No motion or amendment after being seconded shall be withdrawn without the 
consent of the meeting. 
(4) Whenever an amendment is under consideration no second amendment shall be 
moved until after the first has been disposed of. 
(5) A member shall not move or second more than one amendment to any motion. 
(6) If an amendment be carried it displaces the original motion and becomes a 
substantive motion, whereupon a further amendment may be moved.  
(7) If an amendment be negatived, another amendment to the motion then under 
consideration may be moved.  
(8) The mover of an original motion shall not introduce any new matter. 
(9) The mover of an original motion, but not of an amendment, shall have a right to 
reply at the close of the debate upon such motion, but if the previous question of “to 
proceed to the next business” be moved and seconded it shall immediately be put to 
the meeting, and if carried, the discussion upon the particular question shall close 
without any reply being made thereon by the mover of the original motion. 
(10) After replying, the motion shall be put from the Chair without further debate. 
(11) The mover of an original motion shall not speak for more than five minutes, 
except by permission of the chairman, and the seconder and each succeeding speaker 
for three minutes.  
(12) A member shall not speak more than once on the same question unless it be to a 
point of order or in explanation. 
(13) When a member speaks he shall confine his observations to the question under 
consideration and shall address the Chair. 
(14) All members, with the exception of the one addressing the meeting shall be 
seated, and when the chairman rises no one shall remain standing, nor shall anyone 
rise until the chair be resumed. 
(15) No member shall leave the meeting without the permission of the chairman. 
(16) In the event of any member not obeying the call of the chairman, it shall be 
within the power of the chairman to order such member to retire from the meeting. 
(17) Standing Orders shall not be suspended unless three-fourths of the members 
present at the meeting when such suspension is proposed shall vote in favour of the 
motion. 
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